The current release is v2.6.4 "Rubric", on v2.6.3 "Mainspring" and v2.6.2 "Witness" and v2.6.1 "Interleave" and v2.6.0 "Assay" and v2.5.9 "Overture" and v2.5.8 "Blanking" and v2.5.7 "Collimation" and v2.5.6 "Vestige" and v2.5.5 "Raster" and v2.5.4 "Escapement" and v2.5.3 "Hysteresis" and v2.5.2 "Dormant" and v2.5.1 "Retrace" and v2.5.0 "Rungwork" and v2.4.9 "Plumbline II" and v2.4.8 "Palimpsest" and v2.4.7 "Keystone" and v2.4.6 "Abacus" and v2.4.5 "Compass" and v2.4.4 "Ignition" and v2.4.3 "Touchstone" and v2.4.2 "Cairn" and v2.4.1 "Fabric", which also carries the never-tagged v2.4.0 "Concordance". RustyNES ships from main on a rolling patch cadence rather than maintaining long-lived release branches, so security fixes land in the next patch release rather than being backported. Report against the latest release or main.

Two boundaries are worth stating explicitly, because they change what a report means rather than merely how old it is:

• v2.0.0 "Timebase" is the one deliberate breaking release (ADR 0003 / ADR 0028). A .rns save state or .rnm movie written before it is refused with a clear error rather than reinterpreted, so a pre-v2.0.0 parsing report is not reproducible against a current build by design.
• v2.2.9 relicensed the project to GPL-3.0-or-later (ADR 0036). That is a licensing correction, not a SemVer break — no public API or format moved.

While emulators primarily execute untrusted code in a sandboxed environment (the emulated NES hardware), several security considerations apply to RustyNES:

ROM files (iNES, NES 2.0, NSF, etc.) are untrusted input that must be parsed safely:

• Buffer overflows: ROM parsers must validate all size fields and prevent out-of-bounds access
• Integer overflows: Calculations involving ROM sizes must be checked
• Malformed headers: Invalid or malicious headers should be rejected gracefully

Save states contain serialized emulator state that could be crafted maliciously:

• Arbitrary code execution: Never deserialize Rust code or function pointers
• Memory corruption: Validate all pointers and sizes before restoring state
• Resource exhaustion: Limit maximum save state sizes

RustyNES ships rollback netplay (UDP native + WebRTC browser), which introduces additional attack vectors:

• Denial of service: Rate limiting and connection validation required
• State manipulation: All netplay state must be validated and checksummed
• Privacy: Player information and IP addresses must be handled carefully

A Lua scripting interface is a candidate post-1.0 feature; if added it would provide powerful automation but require sandboxing:

• Filesystem access: Restrict or audit all file operations
• Network access: Block or require explicit permission for network calls
• Resource limits: Enforce CPU time and memory limits for scripts
• API surface: Minimize exposed APIs to essential functions only

RustyNES depends on external crates that may have their own vulnerabilities:

• FFI bindings: rcheevos (RetroAchievements) uses unsafe FFI
• Dependency audits: Run cargo audit regularly
• WASM security: WebAssembly builds must not expose local filesystem

Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.

Send security vulnerability reports to:

Email: parobek@gmail.com

Subject: [SECURITY] RustyNES - Brief Description

Please provide the following information:

1. Description: Detailed description of the vulnerability
2. Impact: What could an attacker accomplish by exploiting this?
3. Reproduction: Step-by-step instructions to reproduce the issue
4. Proof of Concept: If applicable, a minimal test case or exploit
5. Affected Versions: Which versions of RustyNES are affected
6. Suggested Fix: If you have ideas for how to fix it (optional)

Subject: [SECURITY] RustyNES - Buffer Overflow in iNES Header Parser

Description:
A buffer overflow exists in the iNES header parser when processing
oversized PRG ROM size fields.

Impact:
An attacker could craft a malicious .nes file that causes RustyNES
to crash or potentially execute arbitrary code.

Reproduction:
1. Create a .nes file with iNES header byte 4 set to 0xFF
2. Load the file in RustyNES
3. Observe out-of-bounds memory access

Proof of Concept:
[Attached: malicious.nes]

Affected Versions:
- main branch as of commit abc123
- All unreleased versions

Suggested Fix:
Add bounds checking in rom_loader.rs at line 42 before allocating
PRG ROM buffer.

• Initial Response: Within 48 hours (acknowledgment of report)
• Triage: Within 5 business days (severity assessment)
• Status Update: Weekly until resolved
• Fix Development: Depends on severity (see below)
• Public Disclosure: After fix is released (coordinated disclosure)

1. Acknowledgment: We'll confirm receipt of your report
2. Investigation: We'll investigate and validate the issue
3. Fix Development: We'll develop and test a fix
4. Disclosure: We'll coordinate public disclosure with you
5. Credit: We'll credit you in the security advisory (unless you prefer to remain anonymous)

We follow responsible disclosure practices:

• Embargo Period: Typically 90 days from initial report
• Early Disclosure: If actively exploited in the wild, we may release earlier
• Credit: Security researchers will be credited in SECURITY-ADVISORIES.md
• CVE Assignment: Critical/High severity issues will receive CVE identifiers

After a fix is released, we will:

1. Publish a security advisory on GitHub
2. Update SECURITY-ADVISORIES.md with details
3. Credit the reporter (with permission)
4. Notify users through GitHub Discussions/Releases

Security researchers who have responsibly disclosed vulnerabilities will be credited here:

(No vulnerabilities reported yet)

Only load ROMs from trusted sources:

• Homebrew: Download from official homebrew sites
• Test ROMs: Use official test ROM repositories (blargg, nestest, etc.)
• Commercial ROMs: Legal backups of games you own

Save states should be treated as potentially malicious input:

• Unknown Sources: Don't load save states from untrusted sources
• File Inspection: Verify file sizes are reasonable (< 10 MB typical)
• Backups: Keep backups of important save files

When using netplay features:

• Trusted Players: Only connect to players you trust
• Public Servers: Be cautious with public netplay servers
• Port Forwarding: Understand the security implications of opening ports

When using Lua scripting:

• Script Review: Review Lua scripts before running them
• Trusted Sources: Only use scripts from trusted authors
• Permissions: Pay attention to filesystem/network access requests

Keep RustyNES updated:

• Latest Version: Use the latest stable release
• Security Patches: Apply security updates promptly
• Release Notes: Read release notes for security fixes

RustyNES has not yet undergone a formal security audit. Community security reviews are welcome.

• Static Analysis: Integrate cargo-audit and cargo-deny in CI
• WASM Sandboxing: Ensure WASM builds have no local filesystem access
• Dependency Scanning: Automated dependency vulnerability scanning

• Language: Rust provides memory safety by default; the chip stack is #![no_std] + alloc.
• Unsafe Code: Minimized to FFI boundaries (rcheevos in rustynes-cheevos) and one native priority hook, each guarded by a // SAFETY: comment.
• Fuzzing: cargo-fuzz harnesses exist for cartridge / CPU / mapper-write parsing.
• Dependency Scanning: Planned for CI integration.
• Security Testing: Ad-hoc, not formalized.

• Security Issues: parobek@gmail.com
• General Issues: GitHub Issues
• Discussions: GitHub Discussions

Thank you for helping keep RustyNES and its users safe!