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feat(mxc): add Windows ETW-to-OCSF audit trail - #3015

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araza008:akberr/etw-to-ocsf-mapping
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feat(mxc): add Windows ETW-to-OCSF audit trail#3015
araza008 wants to merge 10 commits into
NVIDIA:mainfrom
araza008:akberr/etw-to-ocsf-mapping

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Summary

Adds a Windows MXC audit trail that consumes Sandboxing ETW events, attributes them to OpenShell sandboxes, and emits structured OCSF events to a durable JSONL log. This provides Windows audit coverage and output parity with the Linux OCSF path.

Changes

  • Add a real-time Windows ETW consumer for the Sandboxing provider.
  • Map all supported MXC ETW events to OCSF lifecycle, configuration, process, and finding classes.
  • Attribute events to sandbox IDs using PID and strong correlation keys.
  • Buffer and safely replay events that arrive before sandbox attribution is registered.
  • Guard attribution against deletion races, duplicate command lines, and Windows PID recycling.
  • Report ETW startup and unexpected ProcessTrace failures accurately.
  • Add OS-aware OCSF device and hostname metadata.
  • Write gateway OCSF events to a synchronous, daily-rotated JSONL audit log.
  • Add configuration controls for enabling ETW auditing and selecting the OCSF log directory.
  • Document the privacy implications of recording raw process command lines.
  • Add an example PowerShell audit workflow with coverage reporting and client-safe output handling.

Testing

  • Ran mise run --skip-tools windows:ci successfully on an x64 Windows host.
  • Passed x64 and ARM64 workspace checks.
  • Passed x64 and ARM64 release builds for openshell-gateway.exe and openshell.exe.
  • Passed native x64 workspace tests: 3,195 passed, 0 failed, 25 ignored.

Checklist

  • Follows Conventional Commits
  • Commits are signed off (DCO)
  • Architecture docs updated (if applicable)

Add a Windows MXC ETW->OCSF audit trail in openshell-driver-mxc: a real-time
Sandboxing-provider ETW consumer that decodes events (TDH), attributes each to
an OpenShell sandbox_id, and maps them to OCSF (lifecycle 6002, config 5019,
process 1007, finding 2004).

cp6 Phase 1 - durable OCSF JSONL audit-file parity with Linux:
- openshell-ocsf: add emit_ocsf_event_routed (populates the event-bridge
  thread-local AND stamps sandbox_id+message in one dispatch) plus public
  set/clear_current_event; OS-aware device (Device::windows/for_current_os) so
  device.os.name reflects the host instead of a hardcoded Linux stub.
- etw_consumer: emit via the routed emit (previously fired a bare info! that
  never populated the bridge, so the structured event was dropped).
- openshell-server: install OcsfJsonlLayer over a synchronous daily-rotated
  appender (durable under force-kill), gated by OPENSHELL_OCSF_JSON, path via
  %PROGRAMDATA%\OpenShell\logs (override OPENSHELL_OCSF_LOG_DIR).
- device.hostname now resolves to the real gateway machine name.

Box-proven on 7F203-MXC-001: JSONL lines == shorthand OCSF rows, all valid
OCSF JSON, per-sandbox attribution intact, disabled state writes nothing.

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
Close the last three ETW->OCSF gaps so the audit trail covers the full
set of events the Sandboxing provider emits (12/12):

- ProcessLaunched -> Process Activity [1007] "Launch" (confirmed start;
  carries the real processId/threadId, the twin of CreateProcessInSandbox
  which only has the request + command line).
- SandboxProxyConfigured -> Device Config State Change [5019] (the one
  network-plane setup event; surfaces proxyPort, "no proxy" when 0).
- SandboxConsoleReferencePlumbed -> Device Config State Change [5019]
  (console-handle plumbing).

map_config_state now handles the full config/hardening/setup family and
carries proxyPort/hasConsoleReference/creationFlags as unmapped fields.
Verified on 7F203-MXC-001: 11/12 event types emit OCSF without a proxy
(SandboxProxyConfigured requires proxy config to fire).

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
Address CodeRabbit review on !31:

- Prevent stale ETW attribution on a delete/launch race: register the
  wxc-exec pid while holding the registry lock, and bail if the sandbox
  entry is already gone. Previously the attribution key could be seeded
  after `delete` had removed the sandbox, leaving a stale key that could
  misroute later Sandboxing ETW events to a dead sandbox_id. Lock order
  (registry -> attribution) matches the delete path, so no deadlock.
- Add unit tests for the new Device::windows and Device::for_current_os
  constructors to harden Windows/Linux OCSF device parity.

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
Addresses two ETW->OCSF attribution review items (Shailendra NVIDIA#1, NVIDIA#2).

NVIDIA#2 early-event loss: ETW delivers the sandbox create/config burst the instant wxc-exec starts, which can beat the driver's register_launch (now under the registry lock post-Ready). process_event previously dropped anything unresolved, losing the racing burst. Add a bounded, time-bounded pending buffer (PENDING_MAX=4096, PENDING_TTL=5s): unresolved events are held and replayed once attribution lands, aged-out ones dropped. Consumer switched to a timed recv_timeout(200ms) so the buffer is re-driven after each event and on a tick. Emit path factored into shared emit_resolved().

NVIDIA#1 attribution collisions: a Windows PID is recycled after exit and a command line is commonly identical across sandboxes. register_launch now rebinds by_pid on reuse and clears the stale last_pid_sid hint (warns if the PID still pointed at a different, leaked sandbox); command line is held in by_cmd only while unique and demoted to a new ambiguous_cmds set on a second owner, so a duplicate command refuses to resolve rather than misroute.

Unit tests: buffer replay (direct + cross-link), buffer bound, PID-reuse rebind, duplicate-cmd non-resolution. Box-verified on 7F203-MXC-001 (5 sandboxes, identical cmd -> 5 isolated sandbox_ids, 50/50 OCSF/JSONL, BuffersLost=0).

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
Review item NVIDIA#3 (Shailendra): add a PRIVACY NOTE on map_process_launch stating cmd_line is copied verbatim into OCSF process.cmd_line with no redaction, so secrets/PII on a command line land unredacted in the durable audit trail (deliberate audit-fidelity trade-off; treat the log as sensitive). Redaction is owned by an upstream privacy layer, not this path; no general audit-output PII scrubber exists today (openshell_core::secrets [CREDENTIAL] redaction is scoped to the proxy HTTP-target logging, a separate egress path).

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
…s real status

Review item NVIDIA#4 (Shailendra): start_session previously returned Ok(EtwSession) as soon as the pump thread was spawned, but OpenTraceW ran later inside that thread; if it failed we still handed back a live-looking session and logged 'consumer started' (silent failure = false audit coverage).

Split the two Win32 calls instead of adding a channel handshake (avoids any lost-wakeup/hang risk): the quick, synchronous OpenTraceW now runs on the caller thread (open_trace), and only the blocking ProcessTrace runs on the pump thread (run_trace). start_session returns Err if OpenTraceW fails (reclaiming the boxed Sender so the consumer disconnects, stopping the session, joining the consumer) and returns Ok/logs 'started' only once capture is genuinely open. Opened handle + LoggerName buffer + boxed Sender are carried to the pump via a Send OpenedTrace so they outlive ProcessTrace.

Box-verified on 7F203-MXC-001: consumer started=True, failed-to-start=False, 50 OCSF rows / 50 JSONL, BuffersLost=0 (no regression to capture/emit).

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
CodeRabbit flagged that drain_resolved() re-resolved buffered events
against the live by_pid map, so if Windows recycled a wxc-exec PID within
PENDING_TTL a stale event from the dead sandbox could be emitted under the
new owner.

Stamp each by_pid registration with its Instant and add resolve_replay(),
used only on the buffered/replay path. It (a) never falls back to the
recycle-/ambiguity-prone by_cmd or last_pid_sid keys, and (b) trusts a PID
match only when the registration is not newer than the buffered event by
more than REPLAY_PID_GRACE (2s) - a recycled PID's registration lands well
outside that window, so the stale event ages out instead of misattributing.
The legitimate NVIDIA#2 seed race (registration lands ~immediately) still replays.

Adds unit tests for the recycle-refusal, in-grace acceptance, and
weak-fallback exclusion.

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
…DIA#4)

start_session already returns Err on OpenTraceW failure (runs on the
caller thread since e41a770), closing the first half of Shailendra's NVIDIA#4.
This closes the second half: ProcessTrace's result was discarded, so if
capture died mid-run the backend had no way to know.

Add a shared CaptureHealth (stopped/stopping/exit_code) between the pump
thread and EtwSession. run_trace now records ProcessTrace's WIN32_ERROR
and, when the pump returns without a deliberate stop, logs at ERROR that
MXC OCSF capture is no longer running. EtwSession::stop() sets `stopping`
before teardown so a normal shutdown isn't misreported, and
EtwSession::is_capture_alive() exposes the state for status/diagnostics.

Box-verified on 7F203-MXC-001: 5 sandboxes, 50 attributed OCSF rows,
JSONL parity 50/50, BuffersLost=0, clean start/stop (no false failure).

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
…figured message

Add a runnable OCSF audit-trail example under examples/ (run-ocsf-audit.ps1,
mxc-ocsf-audit.toml, ocsf-audit.yaml, README) that spins up sandboxes with the
in-process ETW consumer and egress proxy on, emitting a full OCSF JSONL audit
trail across all four classes (6002/5019/1007/2004).

Fix SandboxProxyConfigured mapping to log "MXC sandbox proxy configured" instead
of a misleading "(no proxy)" when the provider reports proxyPort=0; the event's
presence already indicates proxy configuration. Verified on-box: 26 events, all
mapped ETW event types present.

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
Improve the ETW to OCSF audit-trail example output and make it safe to ship.

Report:
- Add an event-type coverage count ("N of M expected event types fired");
  the denominator auto-adjusts (8 with proxy on, 7 with -NoProxy).
- Split the checklist into expected event types vs anomaly findings
  (ActivityError/FallbackError), which are reported separately and not
  counted toward coverage (a clean run may emit none).
- Verdict is now coverage-based (all expected types must fire) instead of
  the looser "at least 3 OCSF classes".
- Call out the absolute path to the durable OCSF JSONL log prominently.

Client-safety:
- Default -ShareOut to empty (no auto-copy); pass -ShareOut a UNC path to
  opt in. Removes a hardcoded internal share path from a published example.
- Drop internal-team wording ("Hand that zip back for evaluation", "BUNDLE:")
  in favor of neutral "Results bundle:".
- Update README-ocsf-audit.txt to match the opt-in -ShareOut behavior.

Verified on both MXC boxes: 7F203-MXC-001 (base-container) -> PASS, 8 of 8
event types, 26 OCSF events across 4 classes; 7F203-MXC-003 (AppContainer
fallback) -> reduced set as expected, clean output.

Signed-off-by: Akber Raza <akberr@nvidia.com>
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I have read the DCO document and I hereby sign the DCO.

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