diff --git a/.pi/extensions/sce/index.ts b/.pi/extensions/sce/index.ts index cbd2441ac..54cb2576c 100644 --- a/.pi/extensions/sce/index.ts +++ b/.pi/extensions/sce/index.ts @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ -import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; +import type { ChildProcess, ChildProcessByStdio } from "node:child_process"; +import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { createRequire } from "node:module"; @@ -10,6 +11,8 @@ import { relative, resolve as resolvePath, } from "node:path"; +import type { Readable, Writable } from "node:stream"; +import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { type ExtensionAPI, isToolCallEventType, @@ -28,6 +31,28 @@ const SCE_INSTALL_URL = "https://sce.crocoder.dev/docs/getting-started#install-cli"; const TOOL_NAME = "pi" as const; +type SpawnFn = typeof import("node:child_process").spawn; + +function nodeSpawn( + command: string, + args: readonly string[], + options: { cwd: string; stdio: readonly ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"] }, +): ChildProcessByStdio; +function nodeSpawn( + command: string, + args: readonly string[], + options: { cwd: string; stdio: readonly ["pipe", "pipe", "ignore"] }, +): ChildProcessByStdio; +function nodeSpawn( + command: string, + args: readonly string[], + options: Record, +): ChildProcess { + const spawnImpl = createRequire(import.meta.url)("node:child_process") + .spawn as SpawnFn; + return spawnImpl(command, args as string[], options as never); +} + type ConversationTraceMessageItem = { type: "message"; session_id: string; @@ -119,7 +144,7 @@ function runConversationTraceHook( payload: ConversationTracePayload, ): Promise { return new Promise((resolve) => { - const child = spawn("sce", ["hooks", "conversation-trace"], { + const child = nodeSpawn("sce", ["hooks", "conversation-trace"], { cwd, stdio: ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"], }); @@ -211,8 +236,9 @@ function buildMessageEndConversationTracePayload( */ async function resolvePiToolVersion(): Promise { try { - const require_ = createRequire(import.meta.url); - const entryPath = require_.resolve("@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"); + const entryPath = fileURLToPath( + import.meta.resolve("@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"), + ); const packageJsonPath = join(dirname(entryPath), "..", "package.json"); const parsed: { version?: unknown } = JSON.parse( await readFile(packageJsonPath, "utf8"), @@ -234,7 +260,7 @@ function runDiffTraceHook( payload: DiffTracePayload, ): Promise { return new Promise((resolve) => { - const child = spawn("sce", ["hooks", "diff-trace"], { + const child = nodeSpawn("sce", ["hooks", "diff-trace"], { cwd, stdio: ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"], }); @@ -332,9 +358,410 @@ async function buildUnifiedDiff( } } +export type PiMutationHookEventName = + | "ToolExecutionStart" + | "ToolCall" + | "ToolResult" + | "ToolExecutionEnd" + | "ToolExecutionAbandon"; + +export type PiMutationScopePayload = { + hook_event_name: PiMutationHookEventName; + session_id: string; + tool_call_id: string; + cwd: string; + tool_name: string; + model?: string; +}; + +const MUTATION_SCOPE_FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE = + "SCE could not establish Pi mutation attribution for this tool execution."; +const MUTATION_SCOPE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000; + +const TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES = new Set(["bash", "edit", "write"]); + +type MutationScopeStartOutcome = "ok" | "denied" | "cli-missing"; + +function forwardMutationScopeStart( + payload: PiMutationScopePayload, +): MutationScopeStartOutcome { + let result: ReturnType; + try { + result = spawnSync("sce", ["hooks", "pi-mutation-scope"], { + input: JSON.stringify(payload), + encoding: "utf8", + timeout: MUTATION_SCOPE_TIMEOUT_MS, + }); + } catch { + return "denied"; + } + + if (result.error) { + if ((result.error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT") { + console.warn(`sce CLI not found. Install it from ${SCE_INSTALL_URL}`); + return "cli-missing"; + } + return "denied"; + } + + return result.status === 0 ? "ok" : "denied"; +} + +function forwardMutationScopeBestEffort( + cwd: string, + payload: PiMutationScopePayload, +): Promise { + return new Promise((resolve) => { + const child = nodeSpawn("sce", ["hooks", "pi-mutation-scope"], { + cwd, + stdio: ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"], + }); + + child.on("error", (err: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => { + if (err.code === "ENOENT") { + console.warn(`sce CLI not found. Install it from ${SCE_INSTALL_URL}`); + } + resolve(); + }); + child.on("close", () => resolve()); + + child.stdin.end(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n`); + }); +} + +function attemptMutationScopeDelivery( + cwd: string, + payload: PiMutationScopePayload, +): Promise { + return new Promise((resolve) => { + const child = nodeSpawn("sce", ["hooks", "pi-mutation-scope"], { + cwd, + stdio: ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"], + }); + + let settled = false; + const finish = (delivered: boolean) => { + if (settled) { + return; + } + settled = true; + resolve(delivered); + }; + + child.on("error", (err: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => { + if (err.code === "ENOENT") { + console.warn(`sce CLI not found. Install it from ${SCE_INSTALL_URL}`); + } + finish(false); + }); + child.on("close", (code) => finish(code === 0)); + + child.stdin.end(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n`); + }); +} + +const TERMINAL_RETRY_INITIAL_MS = 500; +const TERMINAL_RETRY_MAX_MS = 10_000; + +export type AttemptKey = { sessionId: string; toolCallId: string }; + +function attemptMapKey(key: AttemptKey): string { + return `s=${key.sessionId.length}:${key.sessionId}|c=${key.toolCallId.length}:${key.toolCallId}`; +} + +type ResultDeliveryOutcome = "delivered" | "failed"; + +export type RetryScheduleFn = (run: () => void, delayMs: number) => void; + +const defaultRetrySchedule: RetryScheduleFn = (run, delayMs) => { + const timer = setTimeout(run, delayMs); + timer.unref?.(); +}; + +export function createTerminalDeliveryTracker( + schedule: RetryScheduleFn = defaultRetrySchedule, +) { + const attempts = new Map< + string, + { resultDelivery: Promise } + >(); + const unresolved = new Set(); + + function scheduleAbandonRetry( + cwd: string, + endPayload: PiMutationScopePayload, + mapKey: string, + delayMs: number, + ): void { + const abandonPayload: PiMutationScopePayload = { + ...endPayload, + hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionAbandon", + }; + schedule(() => { + void attemptMutationScopeDelivery(cwd, abandonPayload).then( + (delivered) => { + if (delivered) { + unresolved.delete(mapKey); + return; + } + scheduleAbandonRetry( + cwd, + endPayload, + mapKey, + Math.min(delayMs * 2, TERMINAL_RETRY_MAX_MS), + ); + }, + ); + }, delayMs); + } + + async function deliverEndThenFallbackToAbandon( + cwd: string, + endPayload: PiMutationScopePayload, + mapKey: string, + ): Promise { + unresolved.add(mapKey); + const delivered = await attemptMutationScopeDelivery(cwd, endPayload); + if (delivered) { + unresolved.delete(mapKey); + return; + } + scheduleAbandonRetry(cwd, endPayload, mapKey, TERMINAL_RETRY_INITIAL_MS); + } + + async function deliverAbandonImmediately( + cwd: string, + endPayload: PiMutationScopePayload, + mapKey: string, + ): Promise { + unresolved.add(mapKey); + const abandonPayload: PiMutationScopePayload = { + ...endPayload, + hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionAbandon", + }; + const delivered = await attemptMutationScopeDelivery(cwd, abandonPayload); + if (delivered) { + unresolved.delete(mapKey); + return; + } + scheduleAbandonRetry(cwd, endPayload, mapKey, TERMINAL_RETRY_INITIAL_MS); + } + + return { + hasUnresolved(): boolean { + return unresolved.size > 0; + }, + + forwardResult( + cwd: string, + payload: PiMutationScopePayload, + key: AttemptKey, + ): void { + const mapKey = attemptMapKey(key); + const resultDelivery = attemptMutationScopeDelivery(cwd, payload).then( + (delivered): ResultDeliveryOutcome => { + if (delivered) { + return "delivered"; + } + unresolved.add(mapKey); + return "failed"; + }, + ); + attempts.set(mapKey, { resultDelivery }); + }, + + async forwardEnd( + cwd: string, + payload: PiMutationScopePayload, + key: AttemptKey, + ): Promise { + const mapKey = attemptMapKey(key); + const entry = attempts.get(mapKey); + attempts.delete(mapKey); + + if (!entry) { + await deliverEndThenFallbackToAbandon(cwd, payload, mapKey); + return; + } + + const outcome = await entry.resultDelivery; + if (outcome === "failed") { + await deliverAbandonImmediately(cwd, payload, mapKey); + return; + } + + await deliverEndThenFallbackToAbandon(cwd, payload, mapKey); + }, + }; +} + +const GUARD_ESTABLISH_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000; + +const GUARD_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE = + "SCE could not establish the worktree external-mutation guard for this command."; +const WINDOWS_UNSUPPORTED_MESSAGE = + "SCE does not support guarded user_bash execution on Windows in this release; run this command outside Pi."; + +function guardRefusal(output: string) { + return { + result: { output, exitCode: 1, cancelled: false, truncated: false }, + }; +} + +type GuardLine = + | { status: "armed" } + | { stream: "stdout" | "stderr"; data: string } + | { status: "result"; exit_code: number | null }; + +class LineReader { + private buffer = ""; + private readonly onLine: (line: string) => void; + + constructor(onLine: (line: string) => void) { + this.onLine = onLine; + } + + push(chunk: Buffer | string): void { + this.buffer += chunk.toString(); + let index = this.buffer.indexOf("\n"); + while (index !== -1) { + const line = this.buffer.slice(0, index); + this.buffer = this.buffer.slice(index + 1); + if (line.length > 0) { + this.onLine(line); + } + index = this.buffer.indexOf("\n"); + } + } +} + +class ExternalMutationGuardSession { + private readonly child: ReturnType; + private readonly pendingLines: GuardLine[] = []; + private readonly waiters: Array<(line: GuardLine | undefined) => void> = []; + private closed = false; + + constructor(cwd: string) { + this.child = nodeSpawn("sce", ["hooks", "external-mutation-guard"], { + cwd, + stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "ignore"], + }); + const reader = new LineReader((line) => { + try { + this.deliver(JSON.parse(line) as GuardLine); + } catch {} + }); + this.child.stdout?.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => reader.push(chunk)); + this.child.on("close", () => { + this.closed = true; + this.deliver(undefined); + }); + this.child.on("error", () => { + this.closed = true; + this.deliver(undefined); + }); + } + + private deliver(line: GuardLine | undefined): void { + const waiter = this.waiters.shift(); + if (waiter) { + waiter(line); + } else if (line !== undefined) { + this.pendingLines.push(line); + } + } + + private nextLine(): Promise { + const queued = this.pendingLines.shift(); + if (queued) { + return Promise.resolve(queued); + } + if (this.closed) { + return Promise.resolve(undefined); + } + return new Promise((resolve) => this.waiters.push(resolve)); + } + + private send(payload: Record): void { + this.child.stdin?.write(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n`); + } + + async waitForArmed(timeoutMs: number): Promise { + this.send({ operation: "arm" }); + const timedOut = Symbol("timeout"); + const timeout = new Promise((resolve) => { + setTimeout(() => resolve(timedOut), timeoutMs); + }); + const outcome = await Promise.race([this.nextLine(), timeout]); + return ( + outcome !== undefined && + outcome !== timedOut && + "status" in outcome && + outcome.status === "armed" + ); + } + + exec( + command: string, + cwd: string, + options: { + onData: (data: Buffer) => void; + signal?: AbortSignal; + timeout?: number; + env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; + }, + ): Promise<{ exitCode: number | null }> { + const env: Record = {}; + if (options.env) { + for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(options.env)) { + if (typeof value === "string") { + env[key] = value; + } + } + } + this.send({ operation: "exec", command, cwd, env }); + + const onAbort = () => this.send({ operation: "cancel" }); + options.signal?.addEventListener("abort", onAbort); + const timeoutHandle = options.timeout + ? setTimeout(onAbort, options.timeout) + : undefined; + + return (async () => { + try { + for (;;) { + const line = await this.nextLine(); + if (line === undefined) { + throw new Error( + "SCE lost contact with the external-mutation-guard supervisor before it reported a command result.", + ); + } + if ("stream" in line) { + options.onData(Buffer.from(line.data)); + continue; + } + if (line.status === "result") { + return { exitCode: line.exit_code }; + } + } + } finally { + options.signal?.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort); + if (timeoutHandle) { + clearTimeout(timeoutHandle); + } + } + })(); + } + + terminate(): void { + this.child.kill(); + } +} + export default function sceExtension(pi: ExtensionAPI): void { const pendingFileMutations = new Map(); const piToolVersionPromise = resolvePiToolVersion(); + const terminalDelivery = createTerminalDeliveryTracker(); pi.on("tool_call", (event) => { if (!isToolCallEventType("bash", event)) { @@ -359,6 +786,107 @@ export default function sceExtension(pi: ExtensionAPI): void { return undefined; }); + pi.on("tool_call", async (event, ctx) => { + if (!TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES.has(event.toolName)) { + return undefined; + } + + if (terminalDelivery.hasUnresolved()) { + return { block: true, reason: MUTATION_SCOPE_FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE }; + } + + const outcome = forwardMutationScopeStart({ + hook_event_name: "ToolCall", + session_id: ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId(), + tool_call_id: event.toolCallId, + cwd: ctx.cwd, + tool_name: event.toolName, + model: ctx.model ? `${ctx.model.provider}/${ctx.model.id}` : undefined, + }); + + if (outcome === "ok") { + return undefined; + } + return { block: true, reason: MUTATION_SCOPE_FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE }; + }); + + pi.on("tool_execution_start", (event, ctx) => { + if (!TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES.has(event.toolName)) { + return; + } + void forwardMutationScopeBestEffort(ctx.cwd, { + hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionStart", + session_id: ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId(), + tool_call_id: event.toolCallId, + cwd: ctx.cwd, + tool_name: event.toolName, + }); + }); + + pi.on("tool_result", (event, ctx) => { + if (!TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES.has(event.toolName)) { + return; + } + const sessionId = ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId(); + terminalDelivery.forwardResult( + ctx.cwd, + { + hook_event_name: "ToolResult", + session_id: sessionId, + tool_call_id: event.toolCallId, + cwd: ctx.cwd, + tool_name: event.toolName, + }, + { sessionId, toolCallId: event.toolCallId }, + ); + }); + + pi.on("tool_execution_end", (event, ctx) => { + if (!TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES.has(event.toolName)) { + return; + } + const sessionId = ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId(); + void terminalDelivery.forwardEnd( + ctx.cwd, + { + hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionEnd", + session_id: sessionId, + tool_call_id: event.toolCallId, + cwd: ctx.cwd, + tool_name: event.toolName, + }, + { sessionId, toolCallId: event.toolCallId }, + ); + }); + + pi.on("user_bash", async (event) => { + if (process.platform === "win32") { + return guardRefusal(WINDOWS_UNSUPPORTED_MESSAGE); + } + + const guard = new ExternalMutationGuardSession(event.cwd); + const armed = await guard.waitForArmed(GUARD_ESTABLISH_TIMEOUT_MS); + if (!armed) { + guard.terminate(); + return guardRefusal(GUARD_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE); + } + + return { + operations: { + exec: ( + command: string, + cwd: string, + options: { + onData: (data: Buffer) => void; + signal?: AbortSignal; + timeout?: number; + env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; + }, + ) => guard.exec(command, cwd, options), + }, + }; + }); + pi.on("tool_call", async (event, ctx) => { if ( !isToolCallEventType("edit", event) && diff --git a/cli/src/cli_schema.rs b/cli/src/cli_schema.rs index ed94712d8..112ee5061 100644 --- a/cli/src/cli_schema.rs +++ b/cli/src/cli_schema.rs @@ -342,6 +342,20 @@ pub enum HooksSubcommand { hide = true )] OpenCodeMutationScope, + + #[command( + name = "pi-mutation-scope", + about = "Run the Pi mutation-scope adapter (reads JSON payload from STDIN)", + hide = true + )] + PiMutationScope, + + #[command( + name = "external-mutation-guard", + about = "Run the harness-neutral external-mutation supervisor (reads a JSON run request, then cancel requests, from STDIN)", + hide = true + )] + ExternalMutationGuard, } #[derive(Subcommand, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/mod.rs b/cli/src/services/hooks/mod.rs index 1ec4988fa..52a19c673 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/hooks/mod.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/mod.rs @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ pub mod command; pub mod lifecycle; pub mod mutation_scope; pub mod opencode_mutation_scope; +pub mod pi_mutation_scope; pub const NAME: &str = "hooks"; pub const CANONICAL_SCE_COAUTHOR_TRAILER: &str = "Co-authored-by: SCE "; @@ -109,6 +110,8 @@ pub enum HookSubcommand { ClaudeMutationScope, CodexMutationScope, OpenCodeMutationScope, + PiMutationScope, + ExternalMutationGuard, } #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)] @@ -255,6 +258,12 @@ fn run_hooks_subcommand_in_repo( HookSubcommand::OpenCodeMutationScope => { opencode_mutation_scope::run_opencode_mutation_scope_subcommand(logger) } + HookSubcommand::PiMutationScope => { + pi_mutation_scope::run_pi_mutation_scope_subcommand(logger) + } + HookSubcommand::ExternalMutationGuard => { + mutation_scope::run_external_mutation_guard_subcommand(repository_root, logger) + } } } @@ -1111,6 +1120,15 @@ fn normalize_opencode_model_id(model: &str) -> Option { Some(normalized.to_string()) } +fn normalize_pi_model_id(model: &str) -> Option { + let normalized = model.trim(); + if normalized.is_empty() { + return None; + } + + Some(normalized.to_string()) +} + fn extract_claude_event_time(payload: &serde_json::Map) -> u64 { for key in &["time", "timestamp"] { if let Some(time_value) = payload.get(*key) { @@ -1988,6 +2006,8 @@ fn hook_runtime_invocation_name(subcommand: &HookSubcommand) -> &'static str { HookSubcommand::ClaudeMutationScope => "Claude mutation-scope runtime invocation", HookSubcommand::CodexMutationScope => "Codex mutation-scope runtime invocation", HookSubcommand::OpenCodeMutationScope => "OpenCode mutation-scope runtime invocation", + HookSubcommand::PiMutationScope => "Pi mutation-scope runtime invocation", + HookSubcommand::ExternalMutationGuard => "external-mutation-guard runtime invocation", } } @@ -4757,6 +4777,8 @@ mod tests { use crate::services::hooks::claude_mutation_scope; use crate::services::hooks::codex_mutation_scope; use crate::services::hooks::opencode_mutation_scope; + use crate::services::hooks::pi_mutation_scope; + use crate::services::mutation_trace::runtime::resolve_git_dir; use crate::services::mutation_trace::runtime::resolve_post_commit_mutation_ai_patch; fn git(repo: &Path, args: &[&str]) -> String { @@ -5563,6 +5585,746 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(row_count(&repo.db(), "mutation_trace_events"), 1); assert_eq!(row_count(&repo.db(), "agent_traces"), 1); } + + fn pi_tool_call( + cwd: &str, + session_id: &str, + tool_call_id: &str, + tool_name: &str, + model: Option<&str>, + ) -> String { + let mut payload = json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolCall", + "session_id": session_id, + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": cwd, + "tool_name": tool_name, + }); + if let Some(model) = model { + payload["model"] = json!(model); + } + payload.to_string() + } + + fn pi_tool_result( + cwd: &str, + session_id: &str, + tool_call_id: &str, + tool_name: &str, + ) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolResult", + "session_id": session_id, + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": cwd, + "tool_name": tool_name, + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn pi_tool_execution_end( + cwd: &str, + session_id: &str, + tool_call_id: &str, + tool_name: &str, + ) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolExecutionEnd", + "session_id": session_id, + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": cwd, + "tool_name": tool_name, + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn drive_pi(repo: &ProvenanceE2eRepo, payload: &str) -> Result { + pi_mutation_scope::run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload_at_state_root( + &repo.state_root, + payload, + None, + ) + } + + fn pi_confirmed_tool_case(tool_name: &str, label: &str) { + let repo = ProvenanceE2eRepo::new(label); + let session_id = format!("ses-{label}"); + let call_id = format!("call-{label}"); + let cwd = repo.cwd(); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call( + &cwd, + &session_id, + &call_id, + tool_name, + Some("anthropic/opus-5"), + ), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolCall should establish the tracked scope before execution"); + + repo.write_change(&format!("one\npi {tool_name} mutation\n")); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_result(&cwd, &session_id, &call_id, tool_name), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolResult should mark the attempt executed"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, &session_id, &call_id, tool_name), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolExecutionEnd paired with an observed ToolResult should Close"); + repo.commit_change(); + + let trace = repo.run_post_commit(); + assert_mutation_trace_provenance( + &trace, + "anthropic/opus-5", + &format!("pi_{session_id}"), + ); + assert_eq!(row_count(&repo.db(), "diff_traces"), 0); + assert_eq!(row_count(&repo.db(), "post_commit_patch_intersections"), 1); + assert_eq!(row_count(&repo.db(), "mutation_trace_events"), 1); + assert_eq!(row_count(&repo.db(), "agent_traces"), 1); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_bash_mutation_persists_model_and_session_in_agent_trace() { + pi_confirmed_tool_case("bash", "pi-bash"); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_write_mutation_persists_model_and_session_in_agent_trace() { + pi_confirmed_tool_case("write", "pi-write"); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_edit_mutation_persists_model_and_session_in_agent_trace() { + pi_confirmed_tool_case("edit", "pi-edit"); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_missing_model_preserves_session_with_null_model_in_agent_trace() { + let repo = ProvenanceE2eRepo::new("pi-no-model"); + let session_id = "ses-pi-no-model"; + let cwd = repo.cwd(); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call(&cwd, session_id, "call-1", "bash", None), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolCall should establish the scope without model evidence"); + + repo.write_change("one\npi mutation without model\n"); + + drive_pi(&repo, &pi_tool_result(&cwd, session_id, "call-1", "bash")) + .expect("Pi ToolResult should mark the attempt executed"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, session_id, "call-1", "bash"), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolExecutionEnd should close the scope"); + repo.commit_change(); + + let trace = repo.run_post_commit(); + assert_eq!(trace["files"][0]["path"], json!("file.txt")); + let contributor = &trace["files"][0]["conversations"][0]["contributor"]; + assert_eq!(contributor["type"], json!("ai")); + assert!( + contributor.get("model_id").is_none(), + "absent model evidence must never be guessed or fabricated" + ); + assert_eq!( + trace["files"][0]["conversations"][0]["related"], + json!([{ + "type": "session", + "url": "https://sce.crocoder.dev/sessions/pi_ses-pi-no-model", + }]) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_read_only_and_unknown_tools_create_no_scope_or_mutation_state() { + let repo = ProvenanceE2eRepo::new("pi-untracked"); + let session_id = "ses-pi-untracked"; + let cwd = repo.cwd(); + + for tool_name in [ + "read", + "grep", + "find", + "ls", + "custom_mcp_tool", + "totally_unknown_future_tool", + "user_bash", + ] { + let call_id = format!("call-{tool_name}"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call(&cwd, session_id, &call_id, tool_name, None), + ) + .unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("{tool_name} ToolCall should be neutral")); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_result(&cwd, session_id, &call_id, tool_name), + ) + .unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("{tool_name} ToolResult should be neutral")); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, session_id, &call_id, tool_name), + ) + .unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("{tool_name} ToolExecutionEnd should be neutral")); + } + + assert_eq!(row_count(&repo.db(), "mutation_trace_scopes"), 0); + assert_eq!(row_count(&repo.db(), "mutation_trace_events"), 0); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_later_extension_rejection_after_start_produces_no_mutation_ai_patch() { + let repo = ProvenanceE2eRepo::new("pi-later-rejection"); + let session_id = "ses-pi-rejected"; + let cwd = repo.cwd(); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call(&cwd, session_id, "call-1", "bash", Some("anthropic/opus-5")), + ) + .expect( + "Pi ToolCall should establish the scope before a later extension can reject it", + ); + + fs::write( + repo.root.join("rejected.txt"), + "should never be attributed AI\n", + ) + .expect("the blocked attempt's incidental write should still land on disk"); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, session_id, "call-1", "bash"), + ) + .expect("ToolExecutionEnd with no preceding ToolResult must abandon, not error"); + + let scope_status = repo + .db() + .query_map("SELECT status FROM mutation_trace_scopes", (), |row| { + row.get::(0).map_err(anyhow::Error::from) + }) + .expect("scope-status query should succeed"); + assert_eq!( + scope_status, + vec!["abandoned".to_string()], + "the D7 abandon path must leave the scope durably abandoned, never closed or active" + ); + + git(&repo.root, &["add", "-A"]); + git(&repo.root, &["commit", "-qm", "rejected mutation"]); + + let db = repo.db(); + let post_commit_data = capture_post_commit_patch_from_git(&repo.root) + .expect("capturing the post-commit patch should succeed"); + let mutation_ai_patch = resolve_post_commit_mutation_ai_patch( + &repo.root, + &db, + &ParsedPatch { files: Vec::new() }, + &post_commit_data.parsed_patch, + ); + + assert!( + mutation_ai_patch.files.is_empty(), + "a Start that never reached a confirmed Close must never produce mutation_ai_patch entries" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_mutate_then_error_still_persists_confirmed_mutation_through_close() { + let repo = ProvenanceE2eRepo::new("pi-error-executed"); + let session_id = "ses-pi-error"; + let cwd = repo.cwd(); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call(&cwd, session_id, "call-1", "bash", Some("anthropic/opus-5")), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolCall should establish the scope"); + + repo.write_change("one\npartial mutation before failure\n"); + + let mut result_payload: Value = + serde_json::from_str(&pi_tool_result(&cwd, session_id, "call-1", "bash")) + .expect("tool_result payload should parse as JSON"); + result_payload["isError"] = json!(true); + drive_pi(&repo, &result_payload.to_string()) + .expect("a failed-but-executed ToolResult is still positive execution evidence"); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, session_id, "call-1", "bash"), + ) + .expect("ToolExecutionEnd paired with an observed ToolResult must Close, not abandon"); + repo.commit_change(); + + let trace = repo.run_post_commit(); + assert_mutation_trace_provenance(&trace, "anthropic/opus-5", "pi_ses-pi-error"); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_concurrent_reject_and_confirm_keeps_only_the_confirmed_mutation_ai() { + let repo = ProvenanceE2eRepo::new("pi-concurrent-reject"); + let session_id = "ses-pi-concurrent"; + let cwd = repo.cwd(); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call( + &cwd, + session_id, + "call-a-edit", + "edit", + Some("anthropic/opus-5"), + ), + ) + .expect("A's edit ToolCall should establish a scope"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call( + &cwd, + session_id, + "call-b-write", + "write", + Some("anthropic/opus-5"), + ), + ) + .expect("B's write ToolCall should establish a distinct concurrent scope"); + + fs::write(repo.root.join("rejected.txt"), "rejected mutation\n") + .expect("A's mutation should write"); + fs::write( + repo.root.join("ambiguous.txt"), + "B's mutation before recovery\n", + ) + .expect("B's pre-recovery mutation should write"); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, session_id, "call-a-edit", "edit"), + ) + .expect( + "A's ToolExecutionEnd with no ToolResult should abandon A's scope and consume \ + the shared ambiguous interval", + ); + + fs::write( + repo.root.join("confirmed.txt"), + "B's mutation after recovery\n", + ) + .expect("B's post-recovery mutation should write"); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_result(&cwd, session_id, "call-b-write", "write"), + ) + .expect("B's ToolResult should mark it executed"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, session_id, "call-b-write", "write"), + ) + .expect("B's ToolExecutionEnd should confirm exactly B's own surviving scope"); + + git(&repo.root, &["add", "-A"]); + git(&repo.root, &["commit", "-qm", "concurrent mutation"]); + + let db = repo.db(); + let post_commit_data = capture_post_commit_patch_from_git(&repo.root) + .expect("capturing the post-commit patch should succeed"); + let mutation_ai_patch = resolve_post_commit_mutation_ai_patch( + &repo.root, + &db, + &ParsedPatch { files: Vec::new() }, + &post_commit_data.parsed_patch, + ); + + let ai_paths: Vec<&str> = mutation_ai_patch + .files + .iter() + .map(|file| file.new_path.as_str()) + .collect(); + assert!( + !ai_paths.contains(&"rejected.txt"), + "the abandoned scope's own mutation must never enter mutation_ai_patch" + ); + assert!( + !ai_paths.contains(&"ambiguous.txt"), + "B's mutation made before the ambiguity-consuming flush is genuinely \ + indistinguishable from A's and must stay non-AI, not merely non-A" + ); + assert!( + ai_paths.contains(&"confirmed.txt"), + "B's own later mutation, made after A's interval was consumed and confirmed \ + by B's own Close, must be attributed AI" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_and_claude_overlap_produces_ai_contended() { + let repo = ProvenanceE2eRepo::new("pi-claude-overlap"); + let pi_session = "ses-pi-contended"; + let claude_session = "claude-pi-overlap-session"; + let cwd = repo.cwd(); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call( + &cwd, + pi_session, + "call-pi-contended", + "write", + Some("anthropic/opus-5"), + ), + ) + .expect("Pi write should establish a scope"); + + let claude_pre = json!({ + "hook_event_name": "PreToolUse", + "session_id": claude_session, + "cwd": cwd, + "tool_name": "Bash", + "tool_use_id": "claude-pi-overlap-bash", + "tool_input": {"command": "printf mutation"}, + }); + claude_mutation_scope::run_claude_mutation_scope_from_payload_at_state_root( + &repo.state_root, + &claude_pre.to_string(), + None, + ) + .expect( + "Claude Bash PreToolUse should establish a concurrent, non-confirmation-required scope", + ); + + repo.write_change("one\npi+claude contended mutation\n"); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_result(&cwd, pi_session, "call-pi-contended", "write"), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolResult should mark the attempt executed"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, pi_session, "call-pi-contended", "write"), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolExecutionEnd should confirm its own scope"); + + let attribution = repo.mutation_events(); + assert_eq!( + attribution.last().map(|(kind, _)| kind.as_str()), + Some("ai_contended"), + "a confirmed Pi close alongside a live non-confirmation-required Claude scope is contended, not suppressed" + ); + + let claude_post = json!({ + "hook_event_name": "PostToolUse", + "session_id": claude_session, + "cwd": cwd, + "tool_name": "Bash", + "tool_use_id": "claude-pi-overlap-bash", + }); + claude_mutation_scope::run_claude_mutation_scope_from_payload_at_state_root( + &repo.state_root, + &claude_post.to_string(), + None, + ) + .expect("Claude PostToolUse should close its own scope"); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_and_codex_overlap_stays_ineligible_until_codex_confirms() { + let repo = ProvenanceE2eRepo::new("pi-codex-overlap"); + let pi_session = "ses-pi-overlap"; + let codex_session = "codex-pi-overlap-session"; + let cwd = repo.cwd(); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call( + &cwd, + pi_session, + "call-pi", + "write", + Some("anthropic/opus-5"), + ), + ) + .expect("Pi write should establish a scope"); + + let codex_pre = json!({ + "hook_event_name": "PreToolUse", + "session_id": codex_session, + "turn_id": "codex-pi-overlap-turn", + "cwd": cwd, + "tool_name": "Bash", + "tool_use_id": "codex-pi-overlap-bash", + "model": "gpt-5.6-sol", + "tool_input": {"command": "true"}, + }); + codex_mutation_scope::run_codex_mutation_scope_from_payload_at_state_root( + &repo.state_root, + &codex_pre.to_string(), + None, + ) + .expect("Codex Bash PreToolUse should establish a concurrent scope"); + + repo.write_change("one\npi codex overlap mutation\n"); + + drive_pi(&repo, &pi_tool_result(&cwd, pi_session, "call-pi", "write")) + .expect("Pi ToolResult should mark the attempt executed"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, pi_session, "call-pi", "write"), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolExecutionEnd should attempt to confirm its own scope"); + + let attribution_after_first_close = repo.mutation_events(); + assert_eq!( + attribution_after_first_close + .last() + .map(|(kind, _)| kind.as_str()), + Some("ineligible_unscoped"), + "an unconfirmed live Codex scope must suppress Pi's own confirming close" + ); + + let codex_post = json!({ + "hook_event_name": "PostToolUse", + "session_id": codex_session, + "turn_id": "codex-pi-overlap-turn", + "cwd": cwd, + "tool_name": "Bash", + "tool_use_id": "codex-pi-overlap-bash", + }); + codex_mutation_scope::run_codex_mutation_scope_from_payload_at_state_root( + &repo.state_root, + &codex_post.to_string(), + None, + ) + .expect("Codex PostToolUse should close its own scope"); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call( + &cwd, + pi_session, + "call-pi-2", + "write", + Some("anthropic/opus-5"), + ), + ) + .expect("a fresh Pi write should establish a new scope"); + repo.write_change("one\npi codex overlap mutation\nsecond change\n"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_result(&cwd, pi_session, "call-pi-2", "write"), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolResult should mark the fresh attempt executed"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, pi_session, "call-pi-2", "write"), + ) + .expect("the fresh Pi scope should close cleanly once Codex is confirmed"); + + let attribution_after_second_close = repo.mutation_events(); + assert_eq!( + attribution_after_second_close + .last() + .map(|(kind, _)| kind.as_str()), + Some("ai_exclusive"), + "once every other live scope is confirmation-safe, a solo confirming close is AiExclusive" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_and_opencode_overlap_stays_ineligible_until_opencode_confirms() { + let repo = ProvenanceE2eRepo::new("pi-opencode-overlap"); + let pi_session = "ses-pi-oc-overlap"; + let oc_session = "ses_opencode_pi_overlap"; + let cwd = repo.cwd(); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call( + &cwd, + pi_session, + "call-pi", + "write", + Some("anthropic/opus-5"), + ), + ) + .expect("Pi write should establish a scope"); + + drive_opencode( + &repo, + &opencode_before( + &cwd, + oc_session, + "call_oc", + "write", + Some("opencode/big-pickle"), + ), + ) + .expect("OpenCode write ToolExecuteBefore should establish a concurrent scope"); + + repo.write_change("one\npi opencode overlap mutation\n"); + + drive_pi(&repo, &pi_tool_result(&cwd, pi_session, "call-pi", "write")) + .expect("Pi ToolResult should mark the attempt executed"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, pi_session, "call-pi", "write"), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolExecutionEnd should attempt to confirm its own scope"); + + let attribution_after_first_close = repo.mutation_events(); + assert_eq!( + attribution_after_first_close + .last() + .map(|(kind, _)| kind.as_str()), + Some("ineligible_unscoped"), + "an unconfirmed live OpenCode scope must suppress Pi's own confirming close" + ); + + drive_opencode(&repo, &opencode_after(&cwd, oc_session, "call_oc", "write")) + .expect("OpenCode ToolExecuteAfter should close its own scope"); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call( + &cwd, + pi_session, + "call-pi-2", + "write", + Some("anthropic/opus-5"), + ), + ) + .expect("a fresh Pi write should establish a new scope"); + repo.write_change("one\npi opencode overlap mutation\nsecond change\n"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_result(&cwd, pi_session, "call-pi-2", "write"), + ) + .expect("Pi ToolResult should mark the fresh attempt executed"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, pi_session, "call-pi-2", "write"), + ) + .expect("the fresh Pi scope should close cleanly once OpenCode is confirmed"); + + let attribution_after_second_close = repo.mutation_events(); + assert_eq!( + attribution_after_second_close + .last() + .map(|(kind, _)| kind.as_str()), + Some("ai_exclusive"), + "once every other live scope is confirmation-safe, a solo confirming close is AiExclusive" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_stale_process_recovery_discards_ambiguous_interval_while_fresh_pi_work_remains_usable( + ) { + let repo = ProvenanceE2eRepo::new("pi-stale-recovery"); + let stale_session = "ses-pi-stale"; + let fresh_session = "ses-pi-fresh"; + let cwd = repo.cwd(); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call( + &cwd, + stale_session, + "call-stale", + "bash", + Some("anthropic/opus-5"), + ), + ) + .expect("the stale attempt's Pi ToolCall should establish a scope"); + + let git_dir = resolve_git_dir(&repo.root).expect("git dir should resolve"); + let scope_id = pi_mutation_scope::state::read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state should be readable") + .attempts + .iter() + .find(|attempt| attempt.session_id == stale_session) + .expect("the stale attempt should exist") + .scope_id + .clone(); + pi_mutation_scope::force_attempt_owner_dead_for_tests(&git_dir, &scope_id); + + fs::write( + repo.root.join("ambiguous.txt"), + "left behind by the dead Pi process\n", + ) + .expect("the stale attempt's own mutation should still land on disk"); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_call( + &cwd, + fresh_session, + "call-fresh", + "write", + Some("anthropic/opus-5"), + ), + ) + .expect("a fresh Pi ToolCall should trigger dead-owner recovery and then establish its own scope"); + + fs::write(repo.root.join("confirmed.txt"), "the fresh Pi work\n") + .expect("the fresh attempt's mutation should write"); + + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_result(&cwd, fresh_session, "call-fresh", "write"), + ) + .expect("the fresh attempt's ToolResult should mark it executed"); + drive_pi( + &repo, + &pi_tool_execution_end(&cwd, fresh_session, "call-fresh", "write"), + ) + .expect("the fresh attempt should close and reach AiExclusive"); + + git(&repo.root, &["add", "-A"]); + git(&repo.root, &["commit", "-qm", "stale recovery"]); + + let db = repo.db(); + let post_commit_data = capture_post_commit_patch_from_git(&repo.root) + .expect("capturing the post-commit patch should succeed"); + let mutation_ai_patch = resolve_post_commit_mutation_ai_patch( + &repo.root, + &db, + &ParsedPatch { files: Vec::new() }, + &post_commit_data.parsed_patch, + ); + + let ai_paths: Vec<&str> = mutation_ai_patch + .files + .iter() + .map(|file| file.new_path.as_str()) + .collect(); + assert!( + !ai_paths.contains(&"ambiguous.txt"), + "the dead process's ambiguous interval must never be attributed AI" + ); + assert!( + ai_paths.contains(&"confirmed.txt"), + "later fresh Pi work must remain usable and reach AiExclusive" + ); + + let attribution = repo.mutation_events(); + assert_eq!( + attribution.last().map(|(kind, _)| kind.as_str()), + Some("ai_exclusive"), + "the fresh attempt, unencumbered by the recovered stale scope, should reach AiExclusive" + ); + } } #[test] diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs b/cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs index 0579163dc..9d41b35d7 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs @@ -1,12 +1,13 @@ +use std::io::Write; use std::path::Path; use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result}; -use serde_json::{Map, Value}; +use serde_json::{json, Map, Value}; use crate::services::agent_trace_db::repository::RepositoryAgentTraceDb; use crate::services::mutation_trace::runtime::{ - abandon_scope, coordinate, AbandonScopeError, AbandonScopeOutcome, CoordinateError, - CoordinateOutcome, RuntimeBoundary, StartProvenance, + abandon_scope, arm_external_mutation_guard, coordinate, AbandonScopeError, AbandonScopeOutcome, + CoordinateError, CoordinateOutcome, GuardEvent, GuardRequest, RuntimeBoundary, StartProvenance, }; use crate::services::mutation_trace::types::{ActorKind, EventId, ScopeId}; use crate::services::observability::traits::Logger; @@ -399,6 +400,222 @@ fn log_marker_clear_after_durable_completion( } } +const GUARD_OPERATION_FIELD: &str = "operation"; +const GUARD_OPERATION_ARM: &str = "arm"; +const GUARD_OPERATION_EXEC: &str = "exec"; +const GUARD_OPERATION_CANCEL: &str = "cancel"; +const GUARD_COMMAND_FIELD: &str = "command"; +const GUARD_CWD_FIELD: &str = "cwd"; +const GUARD_ENV_FIELD: &str = "env"; + +fn parse_guard_object(line: &str) -> Result> { + if line.trim().is_empty() { + bail!(validation_error( + "expected a JSON object guard request, got an empty line" + )); + } + let parsed: Value = serde_json::from_str(line) + .with_context(|| validation_error("expected a valid JSON guard request"))?; + parsed + .as_object() + .cloned() + .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!(validation_error("expected a JSON object guard request"))) +} + +fn parse_guard_arm(line: &str) -> Result<()> { + let object = parse_guard_object(line)?; + reject_unexpected_keys(&object, &[GUARD_OPERATION_FIELD])?; + let operation = required_str(&object, GUARD_OPERATION_FIELD)?; + if operation != GUARD_OPERATION_ARM { + bail!(validation_error(&format!( + "field 'operation' must be 'arm', got '{operation}'" + ))); + } + Ok(()) +} + +fn parse_guard_exec(line: &str) -> Result { + let object = parse_guard_object(line)?; + reject_unexpected_keys( + &object, + &[ + GUARD_OPERATION_FIELD, + GUARD_COMMAND_FIELD, + GUARD_CWD_FIELD, + GUARD_ENV_FIELD, + ], + )?; + let operation = required_str(&object, GUARD_OPERATION_FIELD)?; + if operation != GUARD_OPERATION_EXEC { + bail!(validation_error(&format!( + "field 'operation' must be 'exec', got '{operation}'" + ))); + } + + let command = required_non_blank_str(&object, GUARD_COMMAND_FIELD)?; + let cwd = optional_non_blank_str(&object, GUARD_CWD_FIELD)?; + let env = match object.get(GUARD_ENV_FIELD) { + None | Some(Value::Null) => Vec::new(), + Some(Value::Object(entries)) => entries + .iter() + .map(|(key, value)| { + let value = value.as_str().ok_or_else(|| { + anyhow!(validation_error(&format!( + "field 'env.{key}' must be a string" + ))) + })?; + Ok((key.clone(), value.to_string())) + }) + .collect::>>()?, + Some(_) => bail!(validation_error("field 'env' must be a JSON object")), + }; + + Ok(GuardRequest { command, cwd, env }) +} + +fn parse_guard_cancel(line: &str) -> Result<()> { + let object = parse_guard_object(line)?; + reject_unexpected_keys(&object, &[GUARD_OPERATION_FIELD])?; + let operation = required_str(&object, GUARD_OPERATION_FIELD)?; + if operation != GUARD_OPERATION_CANCEL { + bail!(validation_error(&format!( + "field 'operation' must be 'cancel', got '{operation}'" + ))); + } + Ok(()) +} + +fn guard_operation(line: &str) -> Option { + serde_json::from_str::(line) + .ok() + .and_then(|value| value.as_object().cloned()) + .and_then(|object| { + object + .get(GUARD_OPERATION_FIELD) + .and_then(Value::as_str) + .map(str::to_owned) + }) +} + +fn guard_event_json_line(event: &GuardEvent) -> String { + match event { + GuardEvent::Armed => json!({ "status": "armed" }).to_string(), + GuardEvent::Stdout(chunk) => json!({ + "stream": "stdout", + "data": String::from_utf8_lossy(chunk), + }) + .to_string(), + GuardEvent::Stderr(chunk) => json!({ + "stream": "stderr", + "data": String::from_utf8_lossy(chunk), + }) + .to_string(), + } +} + +pub(crate) fn run_external_mutation_guard_subcommand( + repository_root: &Path, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, +) -> Result { + let reader = std::io::BufReader::new(std::io::stdin()); + let stdout = std::io::stdout(); + run_external_mutation_guard_protocol_with( + repository_root, + logger, + reader, + stdout.lock(), + |root| super::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime(root, MUTATION_SCOPE_DB_CONTEXT), + ) +} + +fn run_external_mutation_guard_protocol_with( + repository_root: &Path, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, + mut reader: R, + mut writer: W, + open_db: O, +) -> Result +where + R: std::io::BufRead + Send + 'static, + W: Write, + O: Fn(&Path) -> Result, +{ + let mut first_line = String::new(); + std::io::BufRead::read_line(&mut reader, &mut first_line) + .context("Failed to read the external-mutation guard arm request from STDIN.")?; + parse_guard_arm(&first_line)?; + + let (cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = std::sync::mpsc::channel(); + let repository_root = repository_root.to_path_buf(); + let armed_guard = arm_external_mutation_guard( + &repository_root, + || open_db(&repository_root), + || write_guard_event(&mut writer, &GuardEvent::Armed), + cancel_rx, + )?; + + let mut exec_line = String::new(); + match std::io::BufRead::read_line(&mut reader, &mut exec_line) + .context("Failed to read the external-mutation guard exec request from STDIN.")? + { + 0 => return Ok(String::new()), + _ if guard_operation(&exec_line).as_deref() == Some(GUARD_OPERATION_CANCEL) => { + parse_guard_cancel(&exec_line)?; + return Ok(String::new()); + } + _ => {} + } + let request = parse_guard_exec(&exec_line)?; + + std::thread::spawn(move || { + let mut line = String::new(); + loop { + line.clear(); + match std::io::BufRead::read_line(&mut reader, &mut line) { + Ok(0) | Err(_) => break, + Ok(_) if guard_operation(&line).as_deref() == Some(GUARD_OPERATION_CANCEL) => { + if parse_guard_cancel(&line).is_ok() { + let _ = cancel_tx.send(()); + } + } + Ok(_) => {} + } + } + }); + + let outcome = armed_guard.exec(&request, |event| { + let _ = write_guard_event(&mut writer, &event); + })?; + + if outcome.marker_clear_failed { + log_marker_clear_after_durable_completion( + logger, + "external_mutation_guard", + &anyhow!("external-taint marker clear failed after a durable guard finish"), + ); + } + + let _ = write_guard_line( + &mut writer, + &json!({ + "status": "result", + "exit_code": outcome.exit_code, + }) + .to_string(), + ); + + Ok(String::new()) +} + +fn write_guard_event(writer: &mut W, event: &GuardEvent) -> std::io::Result<()> { + write_guard_line(writer, &guard_event_json_line(event)) +} + +fn write_guard_line(writer: &mut W, line: &str) -> std::io::Result<()> { + writeln!(writer, "{line}")?; + writer.flush() +} + #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; @@ -971,6 +1188,7 @@ mod tests { mod real_git_db_ingress { use std::cell::Cell; use std::fs; + use std::io::{Cursor, Error, ErrorKind, Write}; use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; use std::process::Command; @@ -1186,6 +1404,175 @@ mod tests { .expect("mutation-events query should succeed") } + struct LostArmedWriter; + + impl Write for LostArmedWriter { + fn write(&mut self, _buffer: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result { + Err(Error::new( + ErrorKind::BrokenPipe, + "injected lost Armed delivery", + )) + } + + fn flush(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<()> { + Err(Error::new( + ErrorKind::BrokenPipe, + "injected lost Armed delivery", + )) + } + } + + #[test] + fn hidden_guard_lost_armed_ack_never_runs_the_exec_command() { + let repo = IngressRepo::new("guard-lost-armed-ack"); + let target = repo.root.join("lost-armed-side-effect"); + let command = format!("touch '{}'", target.display()); + let input = format!( + "{{\"operation\":\"arm\"}}\n{{\"operation\":\"exec\",\"command\":{command:?}}}\n" + ); + + let result = run_external_mutation_guard_protocol_with( + &repo.root, + None, + Cursor::new(input.into_bytes()), + LostArmedWriter, + |root| { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + root, + &repo.state_root, + "lost Armed guard transport test", + ) + }, + ); + + assert!(result.is_err()); + assert!(!target.exists(), "lost Armed must not run the exec command"); + assert!( + repo.marker_path().exists(), + "ambiguous establishment remains conservatively tainted" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn hidden_guard_cancel_after_armed_exits_without_running_a_shell() { + let repo = IngressRepo::new("guard-cancel-before-exec"); + let target = repo.root.join("cancel-side-effect"); + let mut output = Vec::new(); + + run_external_mutation_guard_protocol_with( + &repo.root, + None, + Cursor::new(b"{\"operation\":\"arm\"}\n{\"operation\":\"cancel\"}\n".to_vec()), + &mut output, + |root| { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + root, + &repo.state_root, + "cancel before exec transport test", + ) + }, + ) + .expect("cancel before exec should terminate cleanly"); + + assert!(!target.exists()); + assert!(repo.marker_path().exists()); + assert_eq!( + String::from_utf8(output) + .expect("guard output should be UTF-8") + .lines() + .count(), + 1, + "only Armed should be emitted" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn hidden_guard_eof_after_armed_exits_without_running_a_shell() { + let repo = IngressRepo::new("guard-arm-without-exec"); + let target = repo.root.join("eof-side-effect"); + let mut output = Vec::new(); + + run_external_mutation_guard_protocol_with( + &repo.root, + None, + Cursor::new(b"{\"operation\":\"arm\"}\n".to_vec()), + &mut output, + |root| { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + root, + &repo.state_root, + "arm without exec transport test", + ) + }, + ) + .expect("EOF before exec should terminate cleanly"); + + assert!(!target.exists()); + assert!(repo.marker_path().exists()); + assert_eq!( + String::from_utf8(output) + .expect("guard output should be UTF-8") + .lines() + .count(), + 1, + "only Armed should be emitted" + ); + repo.drive(FLUSH) + .expect("next boundary should self-heal marker"); + assert!(!repo.marker_path().exists()); + } + + #[test] + fn hidden_guard_transport_arms_then_executes_only_the_explicit_exec_command() { + let repo = IngressRepo::new("guard-two-phase-transport"); + let target = repo.root.join("exec-side-effect"); + let duplicate_target = repo.root.join("duplicate-exec-side-effect"); + let command = format!("touch '{}'", target.display()); + let duplicate_command = format!("touch '{}'", duplicate_target.display()); + let input = format!( + "{{\"operation\":\"arm\"}}\n{{\"operation\":\"exec\",\"command\":{command:?}}}\n{{\"operation\":\"exec\",\"command\":{duplicate_command:?}}}\n" + ); + let mut output = Vec::new(); + + run_external_mutation_guard_protocol_with( + &repo.root, + None, + Cursor::new(input.into_bytes()), + &mut output, + |root| { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + root, + &repo.state_root, + "two-phase guard transport test", + ) + }, + ) + .expect("the hidden guard transport should complete"); + + assert!(target.exists(), "the side effect must occur after exec"); + assert!( + !duplicate_target.exists(), + "a duplicate exec must not launch a second shell" + ); + let output = String::from_utf8(output).expect("guard output should be UTF-8"); + let lines: Vec = output + .lines() + .map(|line| serde_json::from_str(line).expect("guard output line should be JSON")) + .collect(); + assert_eq!( + lines.first().and_then(|line| line.get("status")), + Some(&json!("armed")) + ); + assert_eq!( + lines.last().and_then(|line| line.get("status")), + Some(&json!("result")) + ); + assert_eq!( + lines.last().and_then(|line| line.get("exit_code")), + Some(&json!(0)) + ); + } + const START_A_E1: &str = r#"{"operation":"start","scope_id":"A","event_id":"e1","actor_kind":"claude_code"}"#; const ADVANCE_A_E2: &str = @@ -1714,4 +2101,94 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(count(&db, "mutation_trace_scope_provenance"), 1); } } + + mod guard_protocol { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn arm_has_no_execution_fields() { + assert!(parse_guard_arm(r#"{"operation":"arm"}"#).is_ok()); + assert!(parse_guard_arm(r#"{"operation":"arm","command":"true"}"#).is_err()); + assert!(parse_guard_arm(r#"{"operation":"guard","command":"true"}"#).is_err()); + } + + #[test] + fn malformed_arm_is_rejected() { + assert!(parse_guard_arm("").is_err()); + assert!(parse_guard_arm("{").is_err()); + assert!(parse_guard_arm(r#"{"operation":"start"}"#).is_err()); + } + + #[test] + fn exec_requires_a_non_blank_command() { + assert!(parse_guard_exec(r#"{"operation":"exec","command":"pwd"}"#).is_ok()); + assert!(parse_guard_exec(r#"{"operation":"exec","command":" "}"#).is_err()); + assert!(parse_guard_exec(r#"{"operation":"exec"}"#).is_err()); + assert!(parse_guard_exec(r#"{"operation":"guard","command":"pwd"}"#).is_err()); + } + + #[test] + fn exec_parses_cwd_and_environment() { + let request = parse_guard_exec( + r#"{"operation":"exec","command":"pwd","cwd":"/repo/crates/foo","env":{"FOO":"bar","BAZ":"qux"}}"#, + ) + .unwrap(); + assert_eq!(request.command, "pwd"); + assert_eq!(request.cwd, Some("/repo/crates/foo".to_string())); + let mut env = request.env; + env.sort(); + assert_eq!( + env, + vec![("BAZ".into(), "qux".into()), ("FOO".into(), "bar".into())] + ); + } + + #[test] + fn invalid_exec_fields_are_rejected() { + assert!( + parse_guard_exec(r#"{"operation":"exec","command":"pwd","cwd":" "}"#).is_err() + ); + assert!( + parse_guard_exec(r#"{"operation":"exec","command":"pwd","env":{"FOO":1}}"#) + .is_err() + ); + assert!( + parse_guard_exec(r#"{"operation":"exec","command":"pwd","env":"nope"}"#).is_err() + ); + assert!( + parse_guard_exec(r#"{"operation":"exec","command":"pwd","extra":true}"#).is_err() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn cancel_is_a_strict_control_frame() { + assert!(parse_guard_cancel(r#"{"operation":"cancel"}"#).is_ok()); + assert!(parse_guard_cancel(r#"{"operation":"cancel","command":"pwd"}"#).is_err()); + assert_eq!( + guard_operation(r#"{"operation":"cancel"}"#).as_deref(), + Some("cancel") + ); + assert_eq!(guard_operation("not json"), None); + } + + #[test] + fn armed_event_serializes_without_a_stream_field() { + let line = guard_event_json_line(&GuardEvent::Armed); + let parsed: Value = serde_json::from_str(&line).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(parsed["status"], "armed"); + } + + #[test] + fn stdout_and_stderr_events_tag_their_stream() { + let stdout_line = guard_event_json_line(&GuardEvent::Stdout(b"hello".to_vec())); + let parsed: Value = serde_json::from_str(&stdout_line).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(parsed["stream"], "stdout"); + assert_eq!(parsed["data"], "hello"); + + let stderr_line = guard_event_json_line(&GuardEvent::Stderr(b"oops".to_vec())); + let parsed: Value = serde_json::from_str(&stderr_line).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(parsed["stream"], "stderr"); + assert_eq!(parsed["data"], "oops"); + } + } } diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/boundary_lock.rs b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/boundary_lock.rs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b8665bc6e --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/boundary_lock.rs @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; +use std::time::Duration; + +use super::os_lock::{AdvisoryLockError, OsAdvisoryLock}; +use super::state::adapter_state_dir; + +const ADAPTER_BOUNDARY_LOCK_FILE: &str = "pi-mutation-scope-boundary.lock"; +const BOUNDARY_LOCK_WHAT: &str = "adapter-boundary"; + +pub(crate) const DEFAULT_BOUNDARY_LOCK_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10); + +pub(crate) fn boundary_lock_path(git_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf { + adapter_state_dir(git_dir).join(ADAPTER_BOUNDARY_LOCK_FILE) +} + +pub(crate) struct AdapterBoundaryLock { + _inner: OsAdvisoryLock, +} + +impl AdapterBoundaryLock { + pub(crate) fn acquire( + git_dir: &Path, + timeout: Duration, + ) -> Result { + let inner = OsAdvisoryLock::acquire( + &adapter_state_dir(git_dir), + boundary_lock_path(git_dir), + timeout, + BOUNDARY_LOCK_WHAT, + )?; + Ok(AdapterBoundaryLock { _inner: inner }) + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering}; + use std::sync::mpsc; + use std::thread; + + use super::*; + + static NEXT_ID: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0); + + fn unique_git_dir(label: &str) -> PathBuf { + let id = NEXT_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed); + std::env::temp_dir().join(format!( + "sce-pi-mutation-scope-boundary-{label}-{}-{id}", + std::process::id() + )) + } + + #[test] + fn a_leftover_boundary_lock_file_alone_does_not_block_acquisition() { + let git_dir = unique_git_dir("leftover-file"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(adapter_state_dir(&git_dir)).expect("state dir should be created"); + std::fs::write(boundary_lock_path(&git_dir), b"leftover") + .expect("leftover lock file should be writable"); + + AdapterBoundaryLock::acquire(&git_dir, Duration::from_millis(200)) + .expect("a lock file with no live OS owner must not block a new acquirer"); + + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_second_in_process_acquirer_blocks_until_the_first_releases() { + let git_dir = unique_git_dir("in-process-contention"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + + let holder = AdapterBoundaryLock::acquire(&git_dir, Duration::from_secs(5)) + .expect("first acquirer should succeed immediately"); + + let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let git_dir_clone = git_dir.clone(); + let handle = thread::spawn(move || { + let result = AdapterBoundaryLock::acquire(&git_dir_clone, Duration::from_secs(5)); + let _ = tx.send(()); + result.is_ok() + }); + + assert!( + rx.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(300)).is_err(), + "the second acquirer must not proceed while the first holds the boundary lock", + ); + + drop(holder); + + rx.recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)) + .expect("the second acquirer should complete once the first releases"); + assert!(handle + .join() + .expect("second acquirer thread should not panic")); + + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn the_boundary_lock_path_is_distinct_from_the_state_lock_and_lives_under_sce() { + let git_dir = unique_git_dir("path-shape"); + let path = boundary_lock_path(&git_dir); + assert!(path.starts_with(adapter_state_dir(&git_dir))); + assert!(path.ends_with(ADAPTER_BOUNDARY_LOCK_FILE)); + assert_ne!( + path.file_name(), + Path::new("pi-mutation-scope-state.lock").file_name(), + ); + } +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/NOTES.md b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/NOTES.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..086f0ee30 --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/NOTES.md @@ -0,0 +1,729 @@ +# T01 — Pi mutation lifecycle evidence + +Frozen lifecycle evidence for the Pi mutation-scope integration +(`context/plans/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`). Every load-bearing +assumption behind design decisions **D1–D14** carries a disposition here, +backed by a captured event sequence in `captures/` and/or a citation into the +pinned package's compiled source (`dist/`) and documentation (`docs/`). A +contradictory reading of this evidence is a re-planning gate for T02+, per the +plan's Design preamble and its own version-drift clause. + +Dispositions use exactly four values: + +- `PROVEN` — observed live in `captures/`. +- `PROVEN-BY-PINNED-SOURCE` — not driven live, but fixed unambiguously by the + pinned package's compiled source or documentation. +- `DOCUMENTED — NON-LOAD-BEARING` — characterised, but no plan decision rests + on the exact detail. +- `UNSUPPORTED` — the plan's stated assumption does not hold on the pinned + version, as literally written. + +## Pinned versions (evidence is version-bound) + +| Component | Version | Provenance | +|---|---|---| +| `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent` | **0.80.6** | repo-pinned value in `config/lib/package.json`; confirmed live via `node dist/cli.js --version` | +| Upstream repository | `github.com/earendil-works/pi`, package directory `packages/coding-agent` | `package.json` `repository` field | +| Upstream tag (per plan) | `v0.80.6`, commit `2b3fda9921b5590f285165287bd442a25817f17b` | plan's **Dependency and version policy** | +| Node runtime | `nodejs-24.16.0` (nixpkgs) | invoked via `nix run nixpkgs#nodejs -- /dist/cli.js` | +| OS | Linux 6.18.37 `x86_64`, NixOS | — | + +This machine has no outbound network access to `github.com` from the sandboxed +probe shell, so the upstream Git tag could not be cloned for line-numbered +citations. All source citations below are therefore against the pinned +package's own compiled `dist/*.js` (built from that exact tag per the +package's own build pipeline — no transformation beyond `tsgo` compilation) +and its shipped `docs/*.md`, which describe the same pinned release. This is +the same "pinned build is the source of truth" posture the OpenCode T01 used +for its own citations, one level more direct here because the npm package +ships both compiled source and docs together. + +## Probe environment and method + +- **Probe repo:** a throwaway `git init` repo (`/repo` in the + captures), never this SCE checkout. +- **Isolation:** `HOME` was redirected to a scratch `/fakehome` + for every probe invocation. Only `~/.pi/agent/auth.json` (real provider + credentials) and `~/.pi/agent/models-store.json` were copied in; no other + operator state was touched. Verified before and after every batch of runs + that the operator's real `~/.pi/agent/sessions/` entry count (226) never + changed, and that the fake-home run created its own + `fakehome/.pi/agent/sessions//` tree, confirming Pi's session + storage is `HOME`-resolved and therefore fully isolable this way (see D11). +- **Invocation:** the pinned binary is `dist/cli.js`; it was always run as + `nix run nixpkgs#nodejs -- /dist/cli.js` (this repo's Bash-tool + policy requires running `node` through `nix`). One-shot driving via + `pi -p ""`; `--no-session` for throwaway runs, a real session only + for the D11 session-id/session-file probe. `--tools ` constrained + the tool surface for deterministic probes. +- **Model:** the operator's authenticated default, `openai-codex` / + `gpt-5.5`/`gpt-5.6-luna` (ChatGPT-backend Codex responses API). It reliably + drove `bash`, `write`, and `edit` tool calls from a direct natural-language + instruction, including "call the tool exactly once, do not retry" framing + needed to keep blocked/failed-tool probes deterministic (this model retries + tool calls under some failure framings if not told not to). +- **Instrumentation:** `probe-plugins/capture.ts`, loaded via `-e`, subscribes + every mutation-relevant `pi.on(...)` event and appends one JSON line per + event to `$PI_PROBE_LOG`, stamped with `mono_us` (`process.hrtime.bigint()`), + wallclock, `pid`, a per-process `seq`, and the live `ctx.model`. Extensions + are typed against `ExtensionAPI`; event names not present in this pinned + version's public event union are cast through `as any` in the probe only + (the production T03 adapter will use the real typed union). +- **Fault injection:** `capture.ts` throws or blocks in `tool_call` when + `PI_PROBE_FAULT=throw|block`. `probe-plugins/order-first.ts` / + `order-last.ts` / `order-last-fault.ts` bracket `capture.ts` in the `-e` + list to observe multi-extension `tool_call` ordering and fail-closed + barriers (Probes B/C). +- **Custom tool probe:** `probe-plugins/customtool.ts` registers a + filesystem-mutating custom tool `probe_mutate` (D2 classification), loaded + with `NODE_PATH` pointed at `config/lib/node_modules` so its `typebox` + import resolves without vendoring a copy into the probe tree. +- **Session id probe:** `probe-plugins/sessioninfo.ts` reads + `ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId()` / `getSessionFile()` on `session_start`. +- `` replaces the absolute scratch path in every committed + capture. + +## Tool vocabulary at 0.80.6 (D2 substrate) + +`dist/core/tools/index.js`: + +```js +export const allToolNames = new Set(["read", "bash", "edit", "write", "grep", "find", "ls"]); +``` + +Exactly seven built-ins, unconditionally registered (no model-id-gated +alternate tool set like OpenCode's `apply_patch`/`edit` split — `createCodingTools` +always returns `{read, bash, edit, write}`, `createReadOnlyTools` always +`{read, grep, find, ls}`). This is a strictly simpler substrate than the +OpenCode precedent: **every session sees the same maximal tracked set** +`{bash, edit, write}`, with no per-model exclusivity gate to account for. + +--- + +## D1 — One tool execution is one scope + +**Disposition: PROVEN.** + +`tool_call` / `tool_execution_start` / `tool_execution_end` / `tool_result` +inputs all carry `toolCallId` + `toolName` (`docs/extensions.md` event +signatures; live in every capture below). + +Observed identifier shape (`captures/bash-success.jsonl`): + +``` +call_nHNT6BxYPqG8Cau0y6adOtMI|fc_01db62cb980e99c0016aa453e0c87c87d2b74d28a903bb7046 +``` + +i.e. `call_<24 base62>|fc_<52 hex>` — a composite of the AI-SDK-level tool-call +id and the provider (`openai-codex-responses`) function-call id, joined by +`|`. Opaque, stable across one invocation's full +`tool_execution_start → tool_call → tool_result → tool_execution_end` bracket +(byte-identical in every capture), and distinct per concurrent call +(`captures/parallel.jsonl`: `call_lsPkqWP10EsCzDm...` and +`call_dDfkKrO7xudGotf...` overlap, see D9-equivalent below). No `sessionID` is +embedded in `toolCallId` itself, but `ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId()` +(D11) is available in the same handler invocation to pair with it. + +**Freeze:** `ScopeId` identity is `(sessionId, toolCallId)`, exactly as the +plan's canonical identity template assumes (`s=:|c=:`). +The literal `toolCallId` string may itself contain `|`, so the plan's +length-prefixed encoding (not a raw delimiter join) is necessary and already +anticipates this — confirmed necessary, not merely convenient, by this exact +observed shape. + +--- + +## D2 — Conservative tool classification + +**Disposition: PROVEN.** + +- `allToolNames` (above) is a closed, version-pinned set. `bash`/`edit`/`write` + are the only mutation-capable built-ins; `read`/`grep`/`find`/`ls` are + read-only, per `dist/core/tools/index.js`'s own + `createCodingTools` (mutation-capable) vs `createReadOnlyTools` split. +- **Every built-in, including read-only ones, fires the identical + `tool_execution_start → tool_call → tool_result → tool_execution_end` + bracket.** `captures/readonly-footprint.jsonl`: `ls`, `grep`, `find`, `read` + each get the full bracket, none mutate. +- **A custom (plugin-registered) tool fires the same bracket and can mutate.** + `captures/customtool.jsonl`: `probe_mutate` (via `pi.registerTool`) gets the + full bracket and its `execute` wrote `ct.txt` to the probe repo. + +**Therefore hook presence is not a mutation signal**, exactly as D2 assumes. +Classification must be a closed allowlist keyed on the exact `toolName` +string: + +``` +bash | edit | write -> TrackedMutation +read | grep | find | ls -> Untracked (known read-only) +everything else (custom/plugin tools, future built-ins) -> Untracked (unknown) +``` + +No intended tracked tool fails the soundness contract. Custom-tool mutation +with no scope (`ct.txt` written, zero footprint) is the intended, safe +`Untracked` outcome — covered by the conservative unscoped fallback, not by +false AI attribution. + +**Built-in-name replacement:** `pi.registerTool({ name: "bash", ... })` was +not attempted live (out of T01's time budget), but `docs/extensions.md` +"Overriding Built-in Tools" documents this as a supported, sanctioned +extension capability. **Disposition: DOCUMENTED — NON-LOAD-BEARING for T01, +carried forward as an explicit open risk for T03**: if a project extension +overrides `bash`/`edit`/`write` with different mutation semantics, the +adapter's classification-by-name allowlist would still admit it as tracked +(matching plan D2's stated tolerance: classification is by name, not by +introspecting behavior), so this does not invalidate D2, but T03+ should not +assume the built-in tool's *documented* semantics (e.g. exact `bash` timeout +handling) hold if a project has silently replaced it. + +--- + +## D3 — Start is write-ahead and fail-closed + +**Disposition: PROVEN — with a load-bearing ordering correction, see D5.** + +`tool_call` is documented as "Fired after `tool_execution_start`, before the +tool executes. **Can block.**" (`docs/extensions.md`). Live proof of the +fail-closed contract: + +- **Probe A — block:** `captures/probeA-block.jsonl`. `capture.ts` returns + `{ block: true, reason }` from `tool_call`. Result: no `tool_result` event, + `tool_execution_end` still fires but with `isError: true` and + `result.content` carrying the block reason. The target file + (`probeA.txt`) was **never created**. +- **Probe A — throw:** `captures/probeA-throw.jsonl`. `capture.ts` throws + synchronously from `tool_call`. Identical outcome: no `tool_result`, + `tool_execution_end` fires with `isError: true` and the thrown message as + content, target file (`probeA2.txt`) **never created**. +- Source: `dist/core/agent-session.js` `_installAgentToolHooks()` wires + `agent.beforeToolCall` directly to the extension runner's `tool_call` + emission; a thrown/rejected handler or a `{ block: true }` return is caught + and converted into an error that the underlying `Agent` treats as the tool + call's own failure, so `item.execute` (the tool's real body) is never + invoked in either case. This is a single, uniform code path — a plugin + `throw` and a plugin `return { block: true }` are handled identically from + the tool's perspective. + +**Freeze:** `tool_call` is a genuine, synchronous, fail-closed pre-execution +gate for every tool. An SCE extension's `tool_call` handler that throws or +returns `block: true` before mutation-scope admission succeeds prevents the +tool from ever running, with zero filesystem side effect — matches D3 +exactly. See D5 for why `tool_execution_start` is *not* usable as this gate. + +--- + +## D4 — (Not applicable as a separate design point for Pi) + +Pi has no bash-specific pre-spawn hook analogous to OpenCode's `shell.env` — +`tool_call` is the single universal pre-execution boundary for every tool +including `bash` (`docs/extensions.md`'s `tool_call` example uses `bash` as +its primary illustration, mutating `event.input.command` in place). The +plan's D3 (not a separate D4) already reflects this by putting "bash policy" +and "mutation-scope Start" as two handlers on the same `tool_call` gate, in +extension-array order, rather than needing a second Pi-specific hook the way +OpenCode's Bash tool needed `shell.env` in addition to `tool.execute.before`. +**Disposition: DOCUMENTED — NON-LOAD-BEARING** (informational: the plan +already anticipated the simpler Pi shape). + +--- + +## D5 — Execution start is lifecycle evidence, not a mutation boundary + +**Disposition: UNSUPPORTED, as literally stated. Load-bearing correction — +see below for the safe substitute.** + +The plan's assumed ordering is: + +``` +PendingStart + ↓ generic Start (tool_call) succeeds +AwaitingExecution + ↓ tool_execution_start +Active +``` + +i.e. `tool_execution_start` was assumed to fire *after* a successful `tool_call`, +proving the tool actually began running. **This is backwards on 0.80.6.** + +Documented order (`docs/extensions.md`, Lifecycle Overview, and the `tool_call` +section verbatim: "Fired **after** `tool_execution_start`, before the tool +executes"): + +``` +tool_execution_start (unconditional, fires for every registered extension) +tool_call (can block — the actual gate) +tool_execution_update +tool_result (only if the tool actually ran) +tool_execution_end +``` + +Live proof, three ways: + +1. **Single-extension bash success** (`captures/bash-success.jsonl`): + `tool_execution_start` (seq 5) precedes `tool_call` (seq 6) by ~1.3ms, for + the same `toolCallId`. +2. **Multi-extension ordering, Probe C** (`captures/probeC-order-throw.jsonl`, + extensions loaded as `order-first, capture, order-last`): **all three** + extensions' `tool_execution_start` handlers fire, in array order, *before + any* `tool_call` handler runs at all. Only then does `order-first`'s + `tool_call` handler fire and throw; `capture`'s and `order-last`'s + `tool_call` handlers are never reached, and the tool never executes. +3. **Source** — `dist/core/agent-session.js`: `tool_execution_start` / + `tool_execution_update` / `tool_execution_end` are forwarded verbatim via + `await this._extensionRunner.emit(extensionEvent)` — a fire-and-forget, + non-blocking broadcast from the underlying low-level `Agent`'s own event + stream — entirely separate from `agent.beforeToolCall`/`agent.afterToolCall`, + which are the only two hooks wired to `tool_call`/`tool_result` and the + only two whose return value can affect execution. `tool_execution_start` is + therefore emitted unconditionally as soon as the underlying agent loop + schedules a tool call, **before** the extension-gated `tool_call` check + that decides whether it will actually run. + +**Consequence:** `tool_execution_start` carries **zero evidentiary value** for +"the tool actually began executing" — it fires identically whether the call +is later allowed, blocked, or thrown on. The plan's `AwaitingExecution` state, +keyed on `tool_execution_start`, cannot do the job D5 assigns it (distinguishing +"Start admitted, tool never executed" from "tool execution actually began"). + +**Safe substitute (verified below, D6):** `tool_result` — not +`tool_execution_start` and not raw `tool_execution_end` — is the signal that +proves the tool's `execute()` body actually ran. It fires in every capture +where the tool actually executed (success, non-zero exit, custom-tool +mutation) and in **none** of the block/throw captures. This preserves the +design intent behind D5 (distinguish "never ran" from "ran") with a different, +already-available signal, and does not require weakening the soundness +contract — see the Disposition summary's action item. + +**This finding is exactly the kind of thing T01 exists to catch** (the plan's +own "T01 is a re-planning gate" clause for ordering divergence from D1–D14). +It requires a design-level correction before T03 encodes any adapter state +machine on the wrong event, but the correction is mechanical (swap +`tool_execution_start` for `tool_result`-gated logic; `tool_execution_start` +becomes pure informational telemetry, useful only for e.g. progress UI, never +for scope-state transitions) and does not touch the soundness properties D3, +D6, or D7 rely on — those remain intact once re-keyed to `tool_result`. + +--- + +## D6 — `tool_execution_end` is the candidate confirming Close + +**Disposition: UNSUPPORTED as a standalone signal; PROVEN once gated on +`tool_result`.** + +The plan assumed `tool_execution_end` fires exactly for +`{success, isError}` outcomes of an execution that actually happened. Live +evidence shows **`tool_execution_end` fires unconditionally for every +`tool_call`, including one blocked or thrown on before execution**: + +| Scenario | `tool_result`? | `tool_execution_end`? | `tool_execution_end.isError` | Capture | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| bash success | yes | yes | `false` | `bash-success.jsonl` | +| bash non-zero exit | yes | yes | `true` (exit code is data) | `bash-nonzero.jsonl` | +| write success | yes | yes | `false` | `write-success.jsonl` | +| edit success (2 ops) | yes (×2) | yes (×2) | `false` | `edit-success.jsonl` | +| custom tool mutation | yes | yes | `false` | `customtool.jsonl` | +| `tool_call` blocked | **no** | yes | `true` (block reason as content) | `probeA-block.jsonl` | +| `tool_call` throws | **no** | yes | `true` (thrown message as content) | `probeA-throw.jsonl` | +| later extension blocks after an earlier one admits (Probe B) | **no** | yes | `true` | `probeB-later-block.jsonl` | + +**`tool_result` is present if and only if the tool's `execute()` body actually +ran** (fires for success and for a genuine runtime failure alike — bash exit +7 still fires `tool_result` with `isError: true` and the partial write +persists, matching the plan's "isError must not discard the observation" +requirement) **and is absent whenever `tool_call` prevented execution.** +`tool_execution_end` alone cannot make this distinction; it must be paired +with "did a `tool_result` for this `toolCallId` precede it." + +**Freeze (revised from the plan's literal D6):** the confirming Close signal +is `tool_result` (equivalently: `tool_execution_end` *conditioned on* having +observed `tool_result` first for the same `toolCallId` — the adapter may use +either as the trigger as long as it never treats a `tool_execution_end` with +no preceding `tool_result` as a Close). Both success (`isError:false`) and +failed-but-executed (`isError:true`) map to the same Close boundary, exactly +as D6 intends — the correction is only about which raw event proves +"execution happened," not about the success/failure treatment. + +No two boundaries are produced per execution: exactly one `tool_result` + +one `tool_execution_end` pair per `toolCallId`, even for a blocked call +(where only `tool_execution_end` appears). + +--- + +## D7 — A Start followed by no execution must be abandoned, never closed + +**Disposition: PROVEN, and the correct terminal signal is now precisely +identified (not left open as the plan anticipated).** + +The plan explicitly left open "the exact signal proving that an +`AwaitingExecution` attempt can no longer execute," candidate-listing "the +actual blocked-tool result sequence" and `agent_settled`. T01 resolves this: +**the exact signal is the arrival of `tool_execution_end` with no preceding +`tool_result` for that `toolCallId`.** This is not a heuristic or a broad +lifecycle event — it is the same synchronous per-call event pair examined in +D6, deterministically distinguishing "admitted, never executed" (`probeA-*`, +`probeB-later-block`) from "executed" (every success/failure capture). No +reliance on `agent_settled` or any session-wide event is needed for this +specific determination. + +**Freeze:** on `tool_execution_end` for an attempt with no observed +`tool_result`, the adapter must abandon that scope (never close it), exactly +per D7's flush/abandon/rebaseline requirement — using the pairing established +here, not an inferred timeout or a broad session-level event. + +--- + +## D8 — Recovery follows the soundness-first flush/abandon/flush pattern + +**Disposition: DOCUMENTED — NON-LOAD-BEARING for T01.** This is a T04 adapter +design obligation, not a Pi-lifecycle fact. Nothing observed here contradicts +its feasibility: Probe B/Probe C both prove multiple extensions and multiple +overlapping scopes are independently observable per `toolCallId` (D1, D9- +equivalent below), which is what a flush/abandon/rebaseline sequence needs to +target the correct scope without disturbing siblings. + +--- + +## D9 — Transport failure after tool execution cannot be repaired by pretending the observation is current + +**Disposition: DOCUMENTED — NON-LOAD-BEARING for T01.** A T05 +(TypeScript-extension) and T04 (Rust adapter) design obligation. The relevant +Pi-side fact — that `tool_result`/`tool_execution_end` fire exactly once, +synchronously, per real execution, with no re-delivery mechanism observed — +is already established in D6 and supports the "no replay" requirement, but +inventing an actual transport failure between the TS extension and the Rust +adapter is outside what a Pi-lifecycle probe can exercise. + +--- + +## D10 — Process death is positive staleness evidence; elapsed time is not + +**Disposition: DOCUMENTED — NON-LOAD-BEARING for T01, with one supporting +live fact.** `captures/sigint.jsonl`: a SIGINT delivered to the underlying +`sh -c 'sleep 20; ...'` child's process group while a `bash` tool call was +in flight killed the **pi/node process itself** (it disappeared from `ps` +immediately), while the spawned `sh`/`sleep` descendants **kept running +and completed their mutation (`sig.txt` written) after `pi` was already +dead** — the same "orphan survives parent death" shape the OpenCode T01 +found. This directly supports D10's premise that a durable attempt can +outlive its owning Pi process with no terminal event ever arriving, and that +no timeout can distinguish "orphan still mutating" from "cleanly abandoned." +Exact cross-platform process-instance identity (PID-reuse-safe ownership +proof) was not probed — that is a T04 implementation detail, not a Pi +lifecycle fact, and the plan already treats it as an open implementation +question ("the implementation should use the strongest process-instance +evidence available"). + +--- + +## D11 — Pi session/model provenance is admission-time metadata + +**Disposition: PROVEN, and simpler than the plan's OpenCode-derived +assumption suggested.** + +- **Session id:** `ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId()` returns a UUIDv7, e.g. + `01a091f4-3d57-7132-91a9-57218a3564f1` (`captures/sessioninfo.jsonl`). + Canonical `pi_` prefixing per D11 applies cleanly; no observed + characters would need escaping. +- **Session storage is checkout-scoped, not global-user-scoped** (unlike + OpenCode): `ctx.sessionManager.getSessionFile()` resolves under + `~/.pi/agent/sessions//_.jsonl` + — one directory per project working directory, encoded from the cwd path + itself (`--tmp-...-pi-t01-probe-repo--` for + `/tmp/.../pi-t01-probe/repo`). This directly supports D12 (multiple Pi + processes on one checkout share the same session-directory namespace with + no cross-checkout leakage) and made the isolation strategy above + straightforward (`HOME` redirection alone fully isolates a probe run from + the operator's real Pi state — confirmed: the operator's real + `~/.pi/agent/sessions/` entry count was unchanged, 226, before and after + every probe batch). +- **Model provenance is simpler than OpenCode's `chat.params`-tracking + design:** every extension event handler receives `ctx.model` **directly** + (`{ provider, id }`, e.g. `{"provider":"openai-codex","id":"gpt-5.5"}` — + observed identically on `session_start`, `tool_call`, `tool_execution_end`, + etc. in every capture). There is no need for an adapter-side + session-id-to-model map built from a separate pre-turn event — `ctx.model` + at the exact moment of `tool_call` **is** the admission-time model + observation the plan wants, with no risk of it lagging behind a `chat.params` + race. A session with no resolvable model would presumably have failed + before any `tool_call` could fire at all (a `tool_call` implies a + successful LLM response was already parsed into a tool-call message), so + "missing model at `tool_call`" is expected to be unreachable in practice + rather than a real per-call `NULL` case — this was not falsified live but + follows directly from `ctx.model`'s presence in the `ExtensionContext` + contract (`docs/extensions.md` `### ctx.modelRegistry / ctx.model`). + `model_select` (fires on `/model`, cycling, or session restore) is the only + documented way the active model changes mid-session; each subsequent + `tool_call`'s own `ctx.model` reflects the change automatically, so no + explicit switch-tracking is needed. + +**Freeze:** `provenance.session_id = pi_` from +`ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId()`; `provenance.model_id = +normalized(ctx.model.provider + "/" + ctx.model.id)` read directly at the +`tool_call` handler invocation, else `NULL` if `ctx.model` is ever absent +(not observed, but the plan's "never guess" rule applies unconditionally). + +--- + +## D12 — Multi-process Pi is normal concurrency + +**Disposition: PROVEN (single-process parallelism) / PROVEN-BY-PINNED-SOURCE +(cross-process).** + +`captures/parallel.jsonl` (one assistant turn issuing two `bash` calls +explicitly in parallel): both calls' `tool_execution_start`/`tool_call` fire +with distinct `toolCallId`s while the first (3s sleep) is still in flight +when the second (1s sleep) starts and finishes first — genuine overlap, +independently identified, no forced serialization, no accidental scope +collapse. This proves the single-process half of D12 (D1's identity scheme +is sufficient for real overlap). + +Two genuinely separate Pi **processes** on one checkout were not driven live +(out of T01's time budget; would need two full agent turns run concurrently +under the same isolated `HOME`/cwd). This is supported by source instead: +D11 already establishes that Pi session storage is a per-session file inside +a per-cwd directory (`/_.jsonl>`), with the +session id itself (a UUIDv7) as the sole per-session key — nothing in the +observed session/tool-call identity scheme is process-global or requires a +single writer. Two processes in the same checkout would each get their own +session file and their own `toolCallId` namespace (each `toolCallId` is +already provider/call-specific, not checkout- or process-derived), so nothing +in D1's `(sessionId, toolCallId)` identity scheme could collide across +processes. **Disposition for the cross-process half specifically: +PROVEN-BY-PINNED-SOURCE**, not live-witnessed. + +--- + +## D13 — `!` / `!!` user Bash is not AI attribution + +**Disposition: PROVEN-BY-PINNED-SOURCE — and this triggers the plan's own +stop condition. Flagged as a required T02+ design item, not a whole-plan +re-planning gate.** + +`user_bash` (`!`/`!!`) is a TUI-only, keystroke-driven feature +(`dist/modes/interactive/interactive-mode.js`) with no reachable path from +`-p`/one-shot mode, so it could not be exercised through this probe harness's +non-interactive driving method within T01's time budget. Source inspection is +unambiguous and directly answers the plan's explicit open question ("T01 must +explicitly determine whether `user_bash` can execute concurrently with an +active agent tool"): + +```js +// interactive-mode.js, handleBashCommand() +const isDeferred = this.session.isStreaming; +this.bashComponent = new BashExecutionComponent(command, this.ui, excludeFromContext); +if (isDeferred) { + // Show in pending area when agent is streaming + this.pendingMessagesContainer.addChild(this.bashComponent); + ... +} else { + this.chatContainer.addChild(this.bashComponent); +} +... +const result = await this.session.executeBash(command, ...); +``` + +`this.session.isStreaming` (i.e., an agent turn, and therefore any in-flight +tool call, is active) affects **only where the bash output is displayed** — +`pendingMessagesContainer` (deferred visual placement) vs immediate chat +placement. **`session.executeBash(command, ...)` is called unconditionally, +regardless of `isStreaming`.** The only guard that prevents launching a user +bash command is `session.isBashRunning` (a second `!` while one user bash is +already running), which has nothing to do with agent-tool activity. **`!`/`!!` +user Bash can therefore execute concurrently with an active agent +`bash`/`edit`/`write` tool call** on 0.80.6. + +Per the plan's own text: *"If it can, the plan must stop and add a sound +explicit unscoped/taint boundary before T02."* This condition is met. This is +reported here as the required action for T02, not attempted in T01 (T01 is +evidence-only): T02+ must ensure a `user_bash` mutation occurring while a +tracked Pi scope is live is never attributable to that scope merely because +it overlapped in time — e.g. by having the TS extension's `user_bash` handler +explicitly notify the Rust adapter (a taint/fence boundary), or by relying on +the existing unscoped-interval fallback plus verifying no code path lets a +`user_bash`-caused mutation land inside an *open* AI-scope's confirmed +interval. This does not invalidate D1–D12; it adds one required new +integration point. + +--- + +## D14 — Detached descendants remain an explicit limitation + +**Disposition: PROVEN.** + +`captures/bash-detached.jsonl`: `nohup sh -c 'sleep 5; echo done > detached.txt' >/dev/null 2>&1 &` +inside one `bash` tool call. `tool_execution_end` fires immediately (the +foreground `bash` tool call returns once the backgrounding shell built-in +returns), but `detached.txt` does not exist yet at that point and only +appears ~5s later, well after `tool_execution_end`/Close and after +`session_shutdown`. Exactly the plan's documented limitation: `tool_execution_end` +(paired with `tool_result`, per D6) proves the foreground tool call finished, +never that its full process tree stopped mutating. No shell-parsing or +static background-process detection was attempted, per the plan's explicit +non-goal. + +--- + +## Fail-closed execution-barrier probes + +### Probe A — `tool_call` failure (block and throw) · PROVEN + +See D3/D6 above. Both `{ block: true }` and a synchronous `throw` in +`tool_call` produce: no `tool_result`, `tool_execution_end` with +`isError: true` and the block/throw reason as content, and **zero filesystem +side effect** (`probeA.txt` / `probeA2.txt` never created). +Captures: `probeA-block.jsonl`, `probeA-throw.jsonl`. + +### Probe B — later-extension rejection after an earlier extension's silent admission · PROVEN + +`captures/probeB-later-block.jsonl` (extensions loaded `capture, order-last-fault`, +a `bash` call): `capture`'s `tool_call` handler runs first and returns +`undefined` (silent admission — the shape an SCE mutation-scope Start success +would have), then `order-last-fault`'s `tool_call` handler runs and returns +`{ block: true }`. Result: `probeB.txt` **never created**, no `tool_result` +observed by `capture`, `tool_execution_end` fires with `isError: true`. +**Proves D4's premise directly: a successful (non-blocking) `tool_call` +handler from an earlier extension does not itself prove the tool will +execute — a later extension can still reject it after that point.** This is +exactly why D4 (Pi becomes confirmation-required) is necessary, and confirms +the mechanism is real on this pinned version, not merely theoretical. + +### Probe C — earlier-extension synchronous throw blocks every later extension and the tool · PROVEN + +`captures/probeC-order-throw.jsonl` (extensions loaded +`order-first, capture, order-last`, a `bash` call, `order-first` configured +to throw in `tool_call`): all three extensions' `tool_execution_start` +handlers fire (array order) — see D5 — then only `order-first`'s `tool_call` +handler fires and throws; `capture`'s and `order-last`'s `tool_call` handlers +are **never reached**, and the tool never executes (`probeC.txt` not +created). **Proves the plan's required handler ordering is enforceable**: +placing SCE bash-policy before the mutation-scope extension in the `-e`/ +extension-array order means a bash-policy rejection prevents the +mutation-scope extension's `tool_call` handler from running at all — creating +no scope, exactly per D3's requirement — and this is a hard array-order +guarantee, not a race. + +--- + +## Disposition summary + +| # | Decision | Disposition | Primary evidence | +|---|---|---|---| +| D1 | Scope identity = one tool execution `(sessionId, toolCallId)` | **PROVEN** | `bash-success`, `parallel`; `docs/extensions.md`, `agent-session.js` | +| D2 | Explicit tool-name allowlist; `Untracked` ≠ read-only | **PROVEN** | `customtool`, `readonly-footprint`; `core/tools/index.js` | +| D3 | `tool_call` is a synchronous fail-closed pre-execution gate | **PROVEN** | `probeA-block`, `probeA-throw`; `agent-session.js` `_installAgentToolHooks` | +| D4 | (folded into D3 for Pi — no separate pre-spawn hook) | **DOCUMENTED — NON-LOAD-BEARING** | `docs/extensions.md` `tool_call` | +| D5 | `tool_execution_start` proves execution began, after a successful Start | **UNSUPPORTED as stated** — fires unconditionally *before* `tool_call`, for every extension | `bash-success`, `probeC-order-throw`; `agent-session.js` | +| D6 | `tool_execution_end` is the confirming Close for success/isError | **UNSUPPORTED standalone; PROVEN once gated on `tool_result`** | `probeA-*`, `probeB-later-block`, `bash-nonzero` | +| D7 | Start-without-execution must be abandoned, terminal signal owned by T01 | **PROVEN — signal identified: `tool_execution_end` with no preceding `tool_result`** | `probeA-*`, `probeB-later-block` | +| D8 | Recovery flush/abandon/flush pattern | **DOCUMENTED — NON-LOAD-BEARING (T04)** | `probeB`, `probeC` (multi-scope isolation feasibility) | +| D9 | No replay of a lost terminal boundary | **DOCUMENTED — NON-LOAD-BEARING (T04/T05)** | D6 (single-fire guarantee) | +| D10 | Process death is positive staleness evidence; no TTL | **PROVEN (orphan-survives-parent fact); DOCUMENTED for PID-reuse mechanics** | `sigint.jsonl` | +| D11 | Session id = `pi_`; model observed via live `ctx.model`, else `NULL` | **PROVEN** | `sessioninfo.jsonl`; `docs/extensions.md` `ctx.model` | +| D12 | Legitimate parallelism preserved, single- and cross-process | **PROVEN (single-process); PROVEN-BY-PINNED-SOURCE (cross-process)** | `parallel.jsonl`; session-file-per-cwd scheme | +| D13 | `user_bash` never creates an `ActorKind::Pi` scope; overlap must be checked | **PROVEN-BY-PINNED-SOURCE — overlap IS possible, plan's stop condition triggered** | `interactive-mode.js` `handleBashCommand` | +| D14 | Detached descendants: explicit, documented limitation | **PROVEN** | `bash-detached.jsonl` | +| Probe A | `tool_call` block/throw is fail-closed, zero side effect | **PROVEN** | `probeA-block`, `probeA-throw` | +| Probe B | Later-extension rejection after earlier silent admission blocks execution | **PROVEN** | `probeB-later-block` | +| Probe C | Earlier-extension throw blocks later extensions + the tool | **PROVEN** | `probeC-order-throw` | + +**Re-planning-gate assessment.** Per the plan's stop conditions +("`tool_call` cannot reliably block before mutation execution," "no sound +confirming post-execution boundary exists," "later-extension rejection +invalidates the confirmation-required design," "Pi user Bash can overlap AI +execution in a way the current protocol cannot soundly distinguish," or +"process/recovery semantics cannot conservatively preserve false-positive +safety") — **none of these hold as stated**: `tool_call` blocks reliably +(Probes A/B/C), a sound confirming boundary exists (`tool_result`, once D5/D6 +are corrected as above), later-extension rejection is exactly what motivates +and validates the confirmation-required design (D4/Probe B), and +process/recovery semantics remain conservative (D7's signal is now exact, +D10's orphan-survival fact is accounted for by staying confirmation-required). + +**However, two findings are load-bearing corrections that T02+ must adopt +before implementation, not treat as already-settled by the plan text as +written:** + +1. **D5/D6 correction (mechanical, does not weaken soundness):** the adapter's + `PendingStart → AwaitingExecution → Active` bookkeeping must key + `AwaitingExecution → Active` (and D7's abandon decision) on **`tool_result`** + arriving for the `toolCallId`, never on `tool_execution_start`, which + carries no evidentiary value on this pinned version. `tool_execution_end` + is safe to treat as Close **only** when a `tool_result` for the same + `toolCallId` was already observed; a `tool_execution_end` with none is an + abandon signal, not a Close. +2. **D13 requires an explicit new T02+ design item**, not present in the + plan's current task bodies: a sound way to ensure a `user_bash` mutation + that overlaps a live, unconfirmed Pi AI scope is never later folded into + that scope's positive attribution once it confirms. This is additive (a + new required correctness property to design and test in T02–T04), not a + contradiction of anything already scoped — but it is not yet written down + as a task deliverable anywhere in T02–T06's "Done when" bullets, and + should be before those tasks are treated as complete. + +Neither finding requires broadening positive attribution, weakening the +soundness contract, or abandoning the overall design — both are refinements +discovered by doing exactly what T01 was scoped to do. Whether this rises to +a formal plan revision before T02 begins, versus folding the corrections into +T02/T04's existing scope language, is a decision for whoever reviews this +task's completion, per the plan's stop-condition text ("any such finding +requires revising this plan rather than weakening attribution"). + +## Capture index + +| File | Scenario | Key result | +|---|---|---| +| `captures/bash-success.jsonl` | `printf > file` via `bash` | `tool_execution_start → tool_call → tool_result → tool_execution_end`, ~1.3ms Start-to-gate | +| `captures/bash-nonzero.jsonl` | `sh -c '...; exit 7'` | `tool_result`/`tool_execution_end` still fire, `isError:true`; partial write persists | +| `captures/bash-detached.jsonl` | `nohup sh -c 'sleep 5; echo done' &` | Close fires before the descendant's mutation; descendant survives session shutdown | +| `captures/write-success.jsonl` | `write` new file | Same bracket shape as `bash` | +| `captures/edit-success.jsonl` | `write` then `edit` | Two independent brackets, two distinct `toolCallId`s | +| `captures/readonly-footprint.jsonl` | `ls`, `grep`, `find`, `read` | Identical bracket shape to mutating tools; zero mutation | +| `captures/customtool.jsonl` | plugin tool `probe_mutate` mutates a file | Identical bracket shape; must be `Untracked` per D2 | +| `captures/parallel.jsonl` | one turn, two `bash` calls forced parallel | Overlapping live scopes, distinct `toolCallId`s, out-of-order Close | +| `captures/probeA-block.jsonl` | `tool_call` returns `{block:true}` | No `tool_result`; `tool_execution_end` `isError:true`; no file created | +| `captures/probeA-throw.jsonl` | `tool_call` throws | Identical shape to block | +| `captures/probeB-later-block.jsonl` | earlier ext admits silently, later ext blocks | No execution despite earlier "successful" `tool_call` | +| `captures/probeC-order-throw.jsonl` | earlier ext throws in `tool_call` (3-ext array) | Later extensions' `tool_call` never reached; all 3 exts' `tool_execution_start` still fire first | +| `captures/sigint.jsonl` | SIGINT to process group mid-`sleep` `bash` | pi process dies immediately; orphaned `sh`/`sleep` survive and complete their mutation afterward | +| `captures/sessioninfo.jsonl` | real (non-`--no-session`) session start | Session id = UUIDv7; session file path reveals per-cwd-encoded storage | + +## probe-plugins/ + +- `capture.ts` — the instrumentation extension (also Probe A fault injection + via `PI_PROBE_FAULT=throw|block`). +- `order-first.ts` / `order-last.ts` — ordering brackets for Probe C. +- `order-last-fault.ts` — later-extension fault injection for Probe B + (`PI_PROBE_LAST_FAULT=block|throw`). +- `customtool.ts` — `probe_mutate` custom mutating tool for D2. +- `sessioninfo.ts` — reads `ctx.sessionManager` identity for D11. + +Comment-free per repository convention. Reference material for T02–T05, not +production code, and not on any build/workspace include path. + +## Scenarios not exercised live (time/environment limits, not credential limits) + +Unlike the OpenCode T01 (which hit a real credential wall for `apply_patch`), +every tool and lifecycle path here was reachable with the operator's existing +Pi credentials. The scenarios below were skipped for probe-harness/time +reasons and are flagged for T02–T06 to close before `/validate`, not because +the pinned version lacks the capability: + +- **Session resume/fork/reload/switch, `agent_end` vs `agent_settled` + distinctness under retry/compaction, `SIGKILL` (vs the `SIGINT` proven + above), and two genuinely separate Pi processes racing one checkout.** All + are documented mechanisms in `docs/extensions.md`'s Lifecycle Overview and + Session Events sections and are structurally consistent with everything + proven above (in particular, D11's per-session-file, per-cwd-directory + storage scheme and D1's per-call identity scheme give no reason to expect + different behavior), but were not independently captured. +- **Built-in tool-name replacement** (D2) — documented as supported by + `docs/extensions.md` but not driven live. +- **Model switch mid-session** (`model_select` event) — documented, not + captured live; D11's live-`ctx.model`-per-call design makes this low-risk + by construction (each `tool_call` reads the model current at that instant), + but the mechanism itself deserves a live regression before `/validate`'s + AC13. + +None of these are Probes A/B/C (all three of which are proven above), and +none currently contradict any D1–D14 disposition; they are recorded here so +T03–T06 do not silently assume live coverage that wasn't actually collected. diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/captures/bash-detached.jsonl b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/captures/bash-detached.jsonl new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cdccccd76 --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/captures/bash-detached.jsonl @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +{"mono_us":160131784092,"wall":"2026-09-11T19:28:06.495Z","pid":936631,"tag":"capture","seq":1,"hook":"session_start","payload":{"event":{"type":"session_start","reason":"startup"},"model":{"provider":"openai-codex","id":"gpt-5.5"}}} +{"mono_us":160131784620,"wall":"2026-09-11T19:28:06.495Z","pid":936631,"tag":"capture","seq":2,"hook":"before_agent_start","payload":{"event":{"type":"before_agent_start","prompt":"Run this exact bash command using the bash tool: nohup sh -c 'sleep 5; echo done > detached.txt' >/dev/null 2>&1 & echo launched","systemPrompt":"You are an expert coding assistant operating inside pi, a coding agent harness. 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+{"mono_us":159685217841,"wall":"2026-09-11T19:20:39.928Z","pid":934070,"tag":"capture","seq":14,"hook":"session_shutdown","payload":{"event":{"type":"session_shutdown","reason":"quit"},"model":{"provider":"openai-codex","id":"gpt-5.5"}}} diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/capture.ts b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/capture.ts new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8d8d8100c --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/capture.ts @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +import type { ExtensionAPI } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"; +import { appendFileSync } from "node:fs"; + +const LOG = process.env.PI_PROBE_LOG as string; +const TAG = process.env.PI_PROBE_TAG || "capture"; +let seq = 0; + +function write(hook: string, payload: unknown) { + seq += 1; + const line = { + mono_us: Number(process.hrtime.bigint() / 1000n), + wall: new Date().toISOString(), + pid: process.pid, + tag: TAG, + seq, + hook, + payload, + }; + appendFileSync(LOG, JSON.stringify(line) + "\n"); +} + +export default function (pi: ExtensionAPI) { + const events = [ + "session_start", + "session_shutdown", + "before_agent_start", + "agent_start", + "agent_end", + "agent_settled", + "turn_start", + "turn_end", + "tool_call", + "tool_execution_start", + "tool_execution_end", + "tool_result", + "user_bash", + "model_select", + ] as const; + + for (const name of events) { + pi.on(name as any, async (event: any, ctx: any) => { + const model = ctx?.model ? { provider: ctx.model.provider, id: ctx.model.id } : undefined; + write(name, { event, model }); + + if (name === "tool_call") { + const fault = process.env.PI_PROBE_FAULT; + if (fault === "throw" && TAG === (process.env.PI_PROBE_FAULT_TAG || TAG)) { + write("tool_call_fault_throw", { toolName: event.toolName, toolCallId: event.toolCallId }); + throw new Error(`PI_PROBE_FAULT throw (${TAG})`); + } + if (fault === "block" && TAG === (process.env.PI_PROBE_FAULT_TAG || TAG)) { + write("tool_call_fault_block", { toolName: event.toolName, toolCallId: event.toolCallId }); + return { block: true, reason: `PI_PROBE_FAULT block (${TAG})` }; + } + } + }); + } +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/customtool.ts b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/customtool.ts new file mode 100644 index 000000000..90b7f2c28 --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/customtool.ts @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +import type { ExtensionAPI } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"; +import { Type } from "typebox"; +import { writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; + +export default function (pi: ExtensionAPI) { + pi.registerTool({ + name: "probe_mutate", + label: "Probe Mutate", + description: "Writes a fixed marker file to prove custom tool mutation capability", + parameters: Type.Object({}), + async execute(_toolCallId, _params, _signal, _onUpdate, _ctx) { + writeFileSync("ct.txt", "custom-tool-mutated"); + return { content: [{ type: "text", text: "wrote ct.txt" }], details: {} }; + }, + }); +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/order-first.ts b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/order-first.ts new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d4f7b654b --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/order-first.ts @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +import type { ExtensionAPI } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"; +import { appendFileSync } from "node:fs"; + +const LOG = process.env.PI_PROBE_LOG as string; +let seq = 0; + +function write(hook: string, payload: unknown) { + seq += 1; + appendFileSync( + LOG, + JSON.stringify({ + mono_us: Number(process.hrtime.bigint() / 1000n), + pid: process.pid, + tag: "order-first", + seq, + hook, + payload, + }) + "\n", + ); +} + +export default function (pi: ExtensionAPI) { + pi.on("tool_call" as any, async (event: any) => { + write("tool_call", { toolName: event.toolName, toolCallId: event.toolCallId }); + const fault = process.env.PI_PROBE_ORDER_FAULT; + if (fault === "throw") { + write("tool_call_throw", {}); + throw new Error("order-first synchronous throw"); + } + if (fault === "block") { + write("tool_call_block", {}); + return { block: true, reason: "order-first block" }; + } + }); + pi.on("tool_execution_start" as any, async (event: any) => { + write("tool_execution_start", { toolName: event.toolName, toolCallId: event.toolCallId }); + }); +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/order-last-fault.ts b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/order-last-fault.ts new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1be8ea41c --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/order-last-fault.ts @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +import type { ExtensionAPI } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"; +import { appendFileSync } from "node:fs"; + +const LOG = process.env.PI_PROBE_LOG as string; +let seq = 0; + +function write(hook: string, payload: unknown) { + seq += 1; + appendFileSync( + LOG, + JSON.stringify({ + mono_us: Number(process.hrtime.bigint() / 1000n), + pid: process.pid, + tag: "order-last-fault", + seq, + hook, + payload, + }) + "\n", + ); +} + +export default function (pi: ExtensionAPI) { + pi.on("tool_call" as any, async (event: any) => { + write("tool_call", { toolName: event.toolName, toolCallId: event.toolCallId }); + const fault = process.env.PI_PROBE_LAST_FAULT; + if (fault === "block") { + write("tool_call_block", {}); + return { block: true, reason: "order-last-fault block" }; + } + if (fault === "throw") { + write("tool_call_throw", {}); + throw new Error("order-last-fault throw"); + } + }); +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/order-last.ts b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/order-last.ts new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0e85ea48b --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/order-last.ts @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +import type { ExtensionAPI } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"; +import { appendFileSync } from "node:fs"; + +const LOG = process.env.PI_PROBE_LOG as string; +let seq = 0; + +function write(hook: string, payload: unknown) { + seq += 1; + appendFileSync( + LOG, + JSON.stringify({ + mono_us: Number(process.hrtime.bigint() / 1000n), + pid: process.pid, + tag: "order-last", + seq, + hook, + payload, + }) + "\n", + ); +} + +export default function (pi: ExtensionAPI) { + pi.on("tool_call" as any, async (event: any) => { + write("tool_call", { toolName: event.toolName, toolCallId: event.toolCallId }); + }); + pi.on("tool_execution_start" as any, async (event: any) => { + write("tool_execution_start", { toolName: event.toolName, toolCallId: event.toolCallId }); + }); +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/sessioninfo.ts b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/sessioninfo.ts new file mode 100644 index 000000000..edd230e0c --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/sessioninfo.ts @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +import type { ExtensionAPI } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"; +import { appendFileSync } from "node:fs"; + +const LOG = process.env.PI_PROBE_LOG as string; + +export default function (pi: ExtensionAPI) { + pi.on("session_start" as any, async (event: any, ctx: any) => { + appendFileSync( + LOG, + JSON.stringify({ + hook: "session_info", + sessionId: ctx.sessionManager?.getSessionId?.(), + sessionFile: ctx.sessionManager?.getSessionFile?.(), + model: ctx.model, + }) + "\n", + ); + }); +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/mod.rs b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/mod.rs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bfa4e855b --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/mod.rs @@ -0,0 +1,3064 @@ +#![allow(dead_code)] + +mod boundary_lock; +mod os_lock; +mod process_owner; +pub(crate) mod state; + +use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; + +use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result}; +use serde_json::{json, Map, Value}; + +use crate::services::hooks::{normalize_pi_model_id, prefixed_diff_trace_session_id, PI_TOOL_NAME}; +use crate::services::mutation_trace::runtime::resolve_git_dir; +use crate::services::observability::traits::Logger; + +use boundary_lock::{AdapterBoundaryLock, DEFAULT_BOUNDARY_LOCK_TIMEOUT}; +use state::{AdmitDecision, RecoveryFlushCompletion}; + +const HOOK_EVENT_NAME_FIELD: &str = "hook_event_name"; +const SESSION_ID_FIELD: &str = "session_id"; +const TOOL_CALL_ID_FIELD: &str = "tool_call_id"; +const CWD_FIELD: &str = "cwd"; +const TOOL_NAME_FIELD: &str = "tool_name"; +const MODEL_FIELD: &str = "model"; + +const HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_EXECUTION_START: &str = "ToolExecutionStart"; +const HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_CALL: &str = "ToolCall"; +const HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_RESULT: &str = "ToolResult"; +const HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_EXECUTION_END: &str = "ToolExecutionEnd"; +const HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_EXECUTION_ABANDON: &str = "ToolExecutionAbandon"; + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub(crate) enum PiHookEvent { + ExecutionStart(PiToolIdentity), + Call(PiToolCall), + Executed(PiToolIdentity), + ExecutionEnd(PiToolIdentity), + ExecutionAbandon(PiToolIdentity), +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub(crate) struct PiToolIdentity { + pub session_id: String, + pub tool_call_id: String, + pub cwd: String, + pub tool_name: String, +} + +impl PiToolIdentity { + pub(crate) fn attempt_key(&self) -> AttemptKey { + AttemptKey { + session_id: self.session_id.clone(), + tool_call_id: self.tool_call_id.clone(), + } + } + + pub(crate) fn classification(&self) -> ToolClassification { + classify_tool(&self.tool_name) + } +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub(crate) struct PiToolCall { + pub identity: PiToolIdentity, + pub model: Option, +} + +#[allow(clippy::struct_field_names)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Hash)] +pub(crate) struct AttemptKey { + pub session_id: String, + pub tool_call_id: String, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub(crate) enum ToolClassification { + TrackedMutation, + Untracked, +} + +const TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES: &[&str] = &["bash", "edit", "write"]; + +pub(crate) fn classify_tool(tool_name: &str) -> ToolClassification { + if TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES.contains(&tool_name) { + ToolClassification::TrackedMutation + } else { + ToolClassification::Untracked + } +} + +const PI_SCOPE_ID_SCHEME: &str = "pi-tool-v1"; + +pub(crate) fn format_pi_scope_id(key: &AttemptKey, attempt_seq: u64) -> String { + format!( + "{PI_SCOPE_ID_SCHEME}|n={attempt_seq}|s={}:{}|c={}:{}", + key.session_id.len(), + key.session_id, + key.tool_call_id.len(), + key.tool_call_id, + ) +} + +pub(crate) fn pi_scope_start_event_id(scope_id: &str) -> String { + format!("{scope_id}|start") +} + +pub(crate) fn pi_scope_close_event_id(scope_id: &str) -> String { + format!("{scope_id}|close") +} + +const ACTOR_KIND_PI: &str = "pi"; + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub(crate) struct PiScopeProvenance { + pub session_id: String, + pub model_id: Option, +} + +pub(crate) fn pi_scope_provenance(session_id: &str, model: Option<&str>) -> PiScopeProvenance { + PiScopeProvenance { + session_id: prefixed_diff_trace_session_id(PI_TOOL_NAME, session_id), + model_id: model.and_then(normalize_pi_model_id), + } +} + +pub(crate) fn parse_pi_hook_event(stdin_payload: &str) -> Result { + if stdin_payload.trim().is_empty() { + bail!(validation_error( + "expected a JSON object, got an empty payload" + )); + } + + let parsed: Value = serde_json::from_str(stdin_payload) + .with_context(|| validation_error("expected valid JSON"))?; + let object = parsed + .as_object() + .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!(validation_error("expected a JSON object")))?; + + let hook_event_name = required_non_blank_str(object, HOOK_EVENT_NAME_FIELD)?; + + match hook_event_name.as_str() { + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_EXECUTION_START => { + parse_tool_identity(object).map(PiHookEvent::ExecutionStart) + } + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_CALL => parse_tool_call(object).map(PiHookEvent::Call), + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_RESULT => parse_tool_identity(object).map(PiHookEvent::Executed), + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_EXECUTION_END => parse_tool_identity(object).map(PiHookEvent::ExecutionEnd), + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_EXECUTION_ABANDON => { + parse_tool_identity(object).map(PiHookEvent::ExecutionAbandon) + } + other => bail!(validation_error(&format!( + "unsupported hook_event_name '{other}'" + ))), + } +} + +fn parse_tool_identity(object: &Map) -> Result { + Ok(PiToolIdentity { + session_id: required_non_blank_str(object, SESSION_ID_FIELD)?, + tool_call_id: required_non_blank_str(object, TOOL_CALL_ID_FIELD)?, + cwd: required_non_blank_str(object, CWD_FIELD)?, + tool_name: required_non_blank_str(object, TOOL_NAME_FIELD)?, + }) +} + +fn parse_tool_call(object: &Map) -> Result { + Ok(PiToolCall { + identity: parse_tool_identity(object)?, + model: optional_non_blank_str(object, MODEL_FIELD)?, + }) +} + +fn required_field<'a>(object: &'a Map, field: &str) -> Result<&'a Value> { + object.get(field).ok_or_else(|| { + anyhow!(validation_error(&format!( + "missing required field '{field}'" + ))) + }) +} + +fn required_str(object: &Map, field: &str) -> Result { + required_field(object, field)? + .as_str() + .map(str::to_owned) + .ok_or_else(|| { + anyhow!(validation_error(&format!( + "field '{field}' must be a string" + ))) + }) +} + +fn required_non_blank_str(object: &Map, field: &str) -> Result { + let value = required_str(object, field)?; + if value.trim().is_empty() { + bail!(validation_error(&format!( + "field '{field}' must be a non-blank string" + ))); + } + Ok(value) +} + +fn optional_non_blank_str(object: &Map, field: &str) -> Result> { + match object.get(field) { + None | Some(Value::Null) => Ok(None), + Some(Value::String(value)) => { + if value.trim().is_empty() { + bail!(validation_error(&format!( + "field '{field}' must be null, absent, or a non-blank string" + ))); + } + Ok(Some(value.clone())) + } + Some(_) => bail!(validation_error(&format!( + "field '{field}' must be null, absent, or a non-blank string" + ))), + } +} + +fn validation_error(detail: &str) -> String { + format!("Invalid Pi hook event payload from STDIN: {detail}.") +} + +pub(crate) fn run_pi_mutation_scope_subcommand(logger: Option<&dyn Logger>) -> Result { + let stdin_payload = super::read_hook_stdin()?; + run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload(&stdin_payload, logger) +} + +pub(crate) fn run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload( + stdin_payload: &str, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, +) -> Result { + let resolve_git_dir_fn = |cwd: &str| resolve_git_dir(Path::new(cwd)); + let seam_fn = |repository_root: &Path, payload: &str, logger: Option<&dyn Logger>| { + super::mutation_scope::run_mutation_scope_from_payload(repository_root, payload, logger) + }; + + run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload_with_seams( + stdin_payload, + logger, + &resolve_git_dir_fn, + &seam_fn, + ) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +pub(crate) fn run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload_at_state_root( + state_root: &Path, + stdin_payload: &str, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, +) -> Result { + let resolve_git_dir_fn = |cwd: &str| resolve_git_dir(Path::new(cwd)); + let seam_fn = |repository_root: &Path, payload: &str, logger: Option<&dyn Logger>| { + super::mutation_scope::run_mutation_scope_from_payload_at_state_root( + repository_root, + state_root, + payload, + logger, + ) + }; + + run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload_with_seams( + stdin_payload, + logger, + &resolve_git_dir_fn, + &seam_fn, + ) +} + +type GitDirResolver<'a> = &'a dyn Fn(&str) -> Result; + +type IngressSeam<'a> = &'a dyn Fn(&Path, &str, Option<&dyn Logger>) -> Result; + +const FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE: &str = + "SCE could not establish Pi mutation attribution for this tool execution."; + +const FAIL_CLOSED_EVENT: &str = "sce.hooks.pi_mutation_scope.start_fail_closed"; + +fn log_fail_closed(logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, context: &str, error: &anyhow::Error) { + if let Some(log) = logger { + log.warn( + FAIL_CLOSED_EVENT, + &error.to_string(), + &[("context", context)], + None, + ); + } +} + +fn run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload_with_seams( + stdin_payload: &str, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, + resolve_git_dir: GitDirResolver, + seam: IngressSeam, +) -> Result { + let event = parse_pi_hook_event(stdin_payload)?; + dispatch_pi_hook_event(event, logger, resolve_git_dir, seam) +} + +fn dispatch_pi_hook_event( + event: PiHookEvent, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, + resolve_git_dir: GitDirResolver, + seam: IngressSeam, +) -> Result { + match event { + PiHookEvent::ExecutionStart(_identity) => Ok(String::new()), + PiHookEvent::Call(call) => match call.identity.classification() { + ToolClassification::TrackedMutation => { + let provenance = + pi_scope_provenance(&call.identity.session_id, call.model.as_deref()); + establish_tracked_start( + &call.identity.cwd, + &call.identity.attempt_key(), + &call.identity.tool_name, + &provenance, + logger, + resolve_git_dir, + seam, + ) + } + ToolClassification::Untracked => Ok(String::new()), + }, + PiHookEvent::Executed(identity) => { + if !matches!( + identity.classification(), + ToolClassification::TrackedMutation + ) { + return Ok(String::new()); + } + let git_dir = resolve_git_dir(&identity.cwd)?; + state::mark_executed(&git_dir, &identity.attempt_key())?; + Ok(String::new()) + } + PiHookEvent::ExecutionEnd(identity) => { + if !matches!( + identity.classification(), + ToolClassification::TrackedMutation + ) { + return Ok(String::new()); + } + let git_dir = resolve_git_dir(&identity.cwd)?; + let repository_root = Path::new(&identity.cwd); + let key = identity.attempt_key(); + with_boundary_lock(&git_dir, || { + state::normalize_recovery_after_boundary_lock_acquired(&git_dir)?; + handle_tool_execution_end(&git_dir, repository_root, &key, logger, seam) + }) + } + PiHookEvent::ExecutionAbandon(identity) => { + if !matches!( + identity.classification(), + ToolClassification::TrackedMutation + ) { + return Ok(String::new()); + } + let git_dir = resolve_git_dir(&identity.cwd)?; + let repository_root = Path::new(&identity.cwd); + let key = identity.attempt_key(); + with_boundary_lock(&git_dir, || { + state::normalize_recovery_after_boundary_lock_acquired(&git_dir)?; + force_abandon_attempt(&git_dir, repository_root, &key, logger, seam) + }) + } + } +} + +fn with_boundary_lock(git_dir: &Path, operation: impl FnOnce() -> Result) -> Result { + let _boundary = AdapterBoundaryLock::acquire(git_dir, DEFAULT_BOUNDARY_LOCK_TIMEOUT) + .map_err(|error| anyhow!("Failed to acquire adapter boundary lock: {error}"))?; + operation() +} + +enum Admission { + Admitted(state::AllocatedAttempt), + Denied, +} + +enum StartOutcome { + Established, + Denied, +} + +fn establish_tracked_start( + cwd: &str, + key: &AttemptKey, + tool_name: &str, + provenance: &PiScopeProvenance, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, + resolve_git_dir: GitDirResolver, + seam: IngressSeam, +) -> Result { + let git_dir = match resolve_git_dir(cwd) { + Ok(git_dir) => git_dir, + Err(error) => { + log_fail_closed(logger, "resolve_git_dir", &error); + return Err(error.context(FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE)); + } + }; + let repository_root = Path::new(cwd); + + let outcome = with_boundary_lock(&git_dir, || { + state::normalize_recovery_after_boundary_lock_acquired(&git_dir)?; + + match admit_or_recover(&git_dir, repository_root, key, tool_name, logger, seam)? { + Admission::Admitted(allocated) => { + establish_start( + &git_dir, + repository_root, + &allocated, + provenance, + logger, + seam, + )?; + Ok(StartOutcome::Established) + } + Admission::Denied => Ok(StartOutcome::Denied), + } + }); + + match outcome { + Ok(StartOutcome::Established) => Ok(String::new()), + Ok(StartOutcome::Denied) => bail!(FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE), + Err(error) => { + log_fail_closed(logger, "establish_tracked_start", &error); + Err(error.context(FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE)) + } + } +} + +fn admit_or_recover( + git_dir: &Path, + repository_root: &Path, + key: &AttemptKey, + tool_name: &str, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, + seam: IngressSeam, +) -> Result { + match reconcile_stale_owners(git_dir, repository_root, logger, seam)? { + RecoveryResolution::Cleared => {} + RecoveryResolution::Unresolved => return Ok(Admission::Denied), + } + + match state::admit_tracked_attempt(git_dir, key, tool_name)? { + AdmitDecision::Admitted(allocated) => Ok(Admission::Admitted(allocated)), + AdmitDecision::RecoveryBlocked + | AdmitDecision::UncertainAttemptBlocked + | AdmitDecision::TerminalAttemptBlocked => Ok(Admission::Denied), + AdmitDecision::FlushClaimed { generation } => { + match resolve_recovery(git_dir, repository_root, generation, logger, seam)? { + RecoveryResolution::Cleared => readmit_after_flush(git_dir, key, tool_name), + RecoveryResolution::Unresolved => Ok(Admission::Denied), + } + } + } +} + +/// D10: every tracked Start admission is a reconciliation opportunity, independent of the +/// incoming key. Repeatedly collects `PendingStart`/`Executed` attempts with a positively dead +/// owner (any session, any prior process) and retires them through the existing D8 +/// flush/abandon/flush sequence, grouping every independently-proven-dead scope into one +/// generation per pass. Live and uncertain-owner attempts are left untouched. +fn reconcile_stale_owners( + git_dir: &Path, + repository_root: &Path, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, + seam: IngressSeam, +) -> Result { + loop { + let dead_scope_ids = state::find_definitely_dead_attempts(git_dir)?; + if dead_scope_ids.is_empty() { + return Ok(RecoveryResolution::Cleared); + } + + let generation = state::begin_terminal_cleanup(git_dir, &dead_scope_ids)?; + if matches!( + resolve_recovery(git_dir, repository_root, generation, logger, seam)?, + RecoveryResolution::Unresolved + ) { + return Ok(RecoveryResolution::Unresolved); + } + } +} + +fn readmit_after_flush(git_dir: &Path, key: &AttemptKey, tool_name: &str) -> Result { + match state::admit_tracked_attempt(git_dir, key, tool_name)? { + AdmitDecision::Admitted(allocated) => Ok(Admission::Admitted(allocated)), + AdmitDecision::FlushClaimed { generation } => { + state::relinquish_recovery_flush(git_dir, generation)?; + Ok(Admission::Denied) + } + AdmitDecision::RecoveryBlocked + | AdmitDecision::UncertainAttemptBlocked + | AdmitDecision::TerminalAttemptBlocked => Ok(Admission::Denied), + } +} + +fn establish_start( + _git_dir: &Path, + repository_root: &Path, + allocated: &state::AllocatedAttempt, + provenance: &PiScopeProvenance, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, + seam: IngressSeam, +) -> Result<()> { + let scope_id = &allocated.attempt.scope_id; + + let start_payload = + scope_start_payload(scope_id, &pi_scope_start_event_id(scope_id), provenance); + + seam(repository_root, &start_payload, logger)?; + Ok(()) +} + +fn handle_tool_execution_end( + git_dir: &Path, + repository_root: &Path, + key: &AttemptKey, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, + seam: IngressSeam, +) -> Result { + let current = state::read_state(git_dir)?; + let Some(attempt) = current + .attempts + .iter() + .find(|attempt| { + attempt.session_id == key.session_id && attempt.tool_call_id == key.tool_call_id + }) + .cloned() + else { + return Ok(String::new()); + }; + + let doomed_scope_id = attempt.scope_id.clone(); + + if !matches!(attempt.phase, state::AttemptPhase::Executed) { + return abandon_and_consume(git_dir, repository_root, logger, seam, move |candidate| { + candidate.scope_id == doomed_scope_id + }); + } + + let close_payload = scope_boundary_payload( + "close", + &attempt.scope_id, + &pi_scope_close_event_id(&attempt.scope_id), + ); + + if seam(repository_root, &close_payload, logger).is_ok() { + state::remove_attempt(git_dir, &attempt.scope_id)?; + Ok(String::new()) + } else { + abandon_and_consume(git_dir, repository_root, logger, seam, move |candidate| { + candidate.scope_id == doomed_scope_id + }) + } +} + +fn force_abandon_attempt( + git_dir: &Path, + repository_root: &Path, + key: &AttemptKey, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, + seam: IngressSeam, +) -> Result { + let current = state::read_state(git_dir)?; + let Some(attempt) = current + .attempts + .iter() + .find(|attempt| { + attempt.session_id == key.session_id && attempt.tool_call_id == key.tool_call_id + }) + .cloned() + else { + return Ok(String::new()); + }; + + let doomed_scope_id = attempt.scope_id.clone(); + abandon_and_consume(git_dir, repository_root, logger, seam, move |candidate| { + candidate.scope_id == doomed_scope_id + }) +} + +enum RecoveryResolution { + Cleared, + Unresolved, +} + +fn abandon_and_consume( + git_dir: &Path, + repository_root: &Path, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, + seam: IngressSeam, + doomed: impl Fn(&state::AdapterAttempt) -> bool, +) -> Result { + let doomed_scope_ids: Vec = state::read_state(git_dir)? + .attempts + .into_iter() + .filter(|attempt| doomed(attempt)) + .map(|attempt| attempt.scope_id) + .collect(); + if doomed_scope_ids.is_empty() { + return Ok(String::new()); + } + + let generation = state::begin_terminal_cleanup(git_dir, &doomed_scope_ids)?; + resolve_recovery(git_dir, repository_root, generation, logger, seam)?; + Ok(String::new()) +} + +fn resolve_recovery( + git_dir: &Path, + repository_root: &Path, + generation: u64, + logger: Option<&dyn Logger>, + seam: IngressSeam, +) -> Result { + let pending_abandon: Vec = state::read_state(git_dir)? + .attempts + .into_iter() + .filter(|attempt| attempt.phase == state::AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon) + .collect(); + + if let Err(error) = seam(repository_root, &flush_payload(), logger) { + log_fail_closed(logger, "recovery_ambiguity_flush", &error); + state::relinquish_recovery_flush(git_dir, generation)?; + return Ok(RecoveryResolution::Unresolved); + } + + for attempt in &pending_abandon { + if let Err(error) = seam(repository_root, &abandon_payload(&attempt.scope_id), logger) { + log_fail_closed(logger, "recovery_abandon", &error); + state::relinquish_recovery_flush(git_dir, generation)?; + return Ok(RecoveryResolution::Unresolved); + } + state::remove_attempt(git_dir, &attempt.scope_id)?; + } + + if let Err(error) = seam(repository_root, &flush_payload(), logger) { + log_fail_closed(logger, "recovery_rebaseline_flush", &error); + state::relinquish_recovery_flush(git_dir, generation)?; + return Ok(RecoveryResolution::Unresolved); + } + + match state::complete_recovery_flush(git_dir, generation)? { + RecoveryFlushCompletion::Cleared => Ok(RecoveryResolution::Cleared), + RecoveryFlushCompletion::Superseded => Ok(RecoveryResolution::Unresolved), + } +} + +fn scope_boundary_payload(operation: &str, scope_id: &str, event_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "operation": operation, + "scope_id": scope_id, + "event_id": event_id, + "actor_kind": ACTOR_KIND_PI, + }) + .to_string() +} + +fn scope_start_payload(scope_id: &str, event_id: &str, provenance: &PiScopeProvenance) -> String { + json!({ + "operation": "start", + "scope_id": scope_id, + "event_id": event_id, + "actor_kind": ACTOR_KIND_PI, + "provenance": { + "session_id": provenance.session_id, + "model_id": provenance.model_id, + }, + }) + .to_string() +} + +fn abandon_payload(scope_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "operation": "abandon", + "scope_id": scope_id, + }) + .to_string() +} + +fn flush_payload() -> String { + json!({ "operation": "flush" }).to_string() +} + +#[cfg(test)] +pub(crate) fn force_attempt_owner_dead_for_tests(git_dir: &Path, scope_id: &str) { + let mut dead_child = std::process::Command::new("true") + .spawn() + .expect("spawning 'true' should succeed"); + let dead_pid = i32::try_from(dead_child.id()).expect("pid fits in i32"); + dead_child.wait().expect("child should exit and be reaped"); + state::set_attempt_owner_for_tests( + git_dir, + scope_id, + process_owner::ProcessOwner { + pid: dead_pid, + instance_token: None, + }, + ); +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + fn tool_event_json(hook_event_name: &str, overrides: &[(&str, Value)]) -> String { + let mut object = Map::new(); + object.insert( + HOOK_EVENT_NAME_FIELD.to_string(), + Value::String(hook_event_name.to_string()), + ); + object.insert( + SESSION_ID_FIELD.to_string(), + Value::String("01a091f4-session".to_string()), + ); + object.insert( + TOOL_CALL_ID_FIELD.to_string(), + Value::String("call_1|fc_1".to_string()), + ); + object.insert( + CWD_FIELD.to_string(), + Value::String("/repo/checkout".to_string()), + ); + object.insert( + TOOL_NAME_FIELD.to_string(), + Value::String("write".to_string()), + ); + for (field, value) in overrides { + object.insert((*field).to_string(), value.clone()); + } + Value::Object(object).to_string() + } + + fn key(session_id: &str, tool_call_id: &str) -> AttemptKey { + AttemptKey { + session_id: session_id.to_string(), + tool_call_id: tool_call_id.to_string(), + } + } + + fn tool_call(payload: &str) -> PiToolCall { + match parse_pi_hook_event(payload).expect("valid ToolCall parses") { + PiHookEvent::Call(call) => call, + other => panic!("expected ToolCall, got {other:?}"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn empty_payload_is_rejected() { + let error = parse_pi_hook_event(" ").unwrap_err().to_string(); + assert_eq!( + error, + "Invalid Pi hook event payload from STDIN: expected a JSON object, got an empty payload." + ); + } + + #[test] + fn non_object_json_is_rejected() { + for payload in ["[]", "\"ToolCall\"", "42", "null"] { + let error = parse_pi_hook_event(payload).unwrap_err().to_string(); + assert!( + error.contains("expected a JSON object"), + "payload {payload:?} produced {error:?}" + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn invalid_json_is_rejected() { + let error = parse_pi_hook_event("{not json").unwrap_err().to_string(); + assert!( + error.contains("Invalid Pi hook event payload from STDIN: expected valid JSON"), + "{error:?}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn unsupported_hook_event_name_is_rejected() { + for name in ["PreToolUse", "tool_call", "chat.params", ""] { + let payload = tool_event_json(name, &[]); + let error = parse_pi_hook_event(&payload).unwrap_err().to_string(); + assert!( + error.contains("hook_event_name"), + "name {name:?} produced {error:?}" + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn missing_required_fields_are_rejected_without_fabricating_identity() { + for field in [ + SESSION_ID_FIELD, + TOOL_CALL_ID_FIELD, + CWD_FIELD, + TOOL_NAME_FIELD, + ] { + let mut object: Map = + serde_json::from_str(&tool_event_json(HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_CALL, &[])).unwrap(); + object.remove(field); + let payload = Value::Object(object).to_string(); + + let error = parse_pi_hook_event(&payload).unwrap_err().to_string(); + assert!( + error.contains(&format!("'{field}'")), + "missing {field} produced {error:?}" + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn blank_required_fields_are_rejected() { + for field in [ + SESSION_ID_FIELD, + TOOL_CALL_ID_FIELD, + CWD_FIELD, + TOOL_NAME_FIELD, + ] { + let payload = tool_event_json( + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_CALL, + &[(field, Value::String(" ".to_string()))], + ); + let error = parse_pi_hook_event(&payload).unwrap_err().to_string(); + assert!( + error.contains(&format!("field '{field}' must be a non-blank string")), + "blank {field} produced {error:?}" + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn wrong_typed_fields_are_rejected() { + let payload = tool_event_json( + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_CALL, + &[(TOOL_CALL_ID_FIELD, Value::Bool(true))], + ); + let error = parse_pi_hook_event(&payload).unwrap_err().to_string(); + assert!( + error.contains("field 'tool_call_id' must be a string"), + "{error:?}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn wrong_typed_optional_model_is_rejected() { + let payload = tool_event_json(HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_CALL, &[(MODEL_FIELD, Value::Bool(false))]); + let error = parse_pi_hook_event(&payload).unwrap_err().to_string(); + assert!( + error.contains("field 'model' must be null, absent, or a non-blank string"), + "{error:?}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn tool_call_parses_identity_and_model() { + let call = tool_call(&tool_event_json( + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_CALL, + &[ + (TOOL_NAME_FIELD, Value::String("edit".to_string())), + ( + MODEL_FIELD, + Value::String("openai-codex/gpt-5.5".to_string()), + ), + ], + )); + assert_eq!(call.identity.session_id, "01a091f4-session"); + assert_eq!(call.identity.tool_call_id, "call_1|fc_1"); + assert_eq!(call.identity.tool_name, "edit"); + assert_eq!(call.model.as_deref(), Some("openai-codex/gpt-5.5")); + assert_eq!( + call.identity.classification(), + ToolClassification::TrackedMutation + ); + } + + #[test] + fn tool_call_model_is_optional() { + let call = tool_call(&tool_event_json(HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_CALL, &[])); + assert_eq!(call.model, None); + } + + #[test] + fn tool_result_and_tool_execution_end_parse_minimal_identity() { + for name in [ + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_RESULT, + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_EXECUTION_END, + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_EXECUTION_ABANDON, + ] { + let event = parse_pi_hook_event(&tool_event_json(name, &[])).unwrap(); + let identity = match event { + PiHookEvent::Executed(identity) + | PiHookEvent::ExecutionEnd(identity) + | PiHookEvent::ExecutionAbandon(identity) => identity, + other => panic!("expected a minimal-identity event, got {other:?}"), + }; + assert_eq!( + identity.attempt_key(), + key("01a091f4-session", "call_1|fc_1") + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn tool_execution_start_parses_and_is_never_evidence() { + let event = + parse_pi_hook_event(&tool_event_json(HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_EXECUTION_START, &[])).unwrap(); + let PiHookEvent::ExecutionStart(identity) = event else { + panic!("expected ToolExecutionStart"); + }; + assert_eq!(identity.tool_call_id, "call_1|fc_1"); + } + + #[test] + fn classification_table() { + let cases: &[(&str, ToolClassification)] = &[ + ("bash", ToolClassification::TrackedMutation), + ("edit", ToolClassification::TrackedMutation), + ("write", ToolClassification::TrackedMutation), + ("read", ToolClassification::Untracked), + ("grep", ToolClassification::Untracked), + ("find", ToolClassification::Untracked), + ("ls", ToolClassification::Untracked), + ("probe_mutate", ToolClassification::Untracked), + ("Bash", ToolClassification::Untracked), + ("some_future_pi_builtin", ToolClassification::Untracked), + ("", ToolClassification::Untracked), + ]; + for (tool_name, expected) in cases { + assert_eq!( + classify_tool(tool_name), + *expected, + "classify_tool({tool_name:?})" + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn scope_id_embeds_attempt_seq_and_is_length_prefixed() { + let k = key("01a091f4-session", "call_1|fc_1"); + let scope_id = format_pi_scope_id(&k, 1); + assert_eq!( + scope_id, + "pi-tool-v1|n=1|s=16:01a091f4-session|c=11:call_1|fc_1" + ); + assert_ne!(format_pi_scope_id(&k, 1), format_pi_scope_id(&k, 2)); + assert_eq!( + pi_scope_start_event_id(&scope_id), + format!("{scope_id}|start") + ); + assert_eq!( + pi_scope_close_event_id(&scope_id), + format!("{scope_id}|close") + ); + assert_ne!( + pi_scope_start_event_id(&scope_id), + pi_scope_close_event_id(&scope_id) + ); + } + + #[test] + fn length_prefix_disambiguates_delimiter_collisions() { + let a = key("s|c=1:x", "y"); + let b = key("s", "1:x|y"); + assert_ne!(format_pi_scope_id(&a, 1), format_pi_scope_id(&b, 1)); + } + + #[test] + fn provenance_canonicalizes_the_session_and_normalizes_the_model() { + let provenance = pi_scope_provenance("01a091f4-session", Some("openai-codex/gpt-5.5")); + assert_eq!(provenance.session_id, "pi_01a091f4-session"); + assert_eq!(provenance.model_id.as_deref(), Some("openai-codex/gpt-5.5")); + } + + #[test] + fn provenance_keeps_an_already_prefixed_session_id() { + let provenance = pi_scope_provenance("pi_01a091f4-session", None); + assert_eq!(provenance.session_id, "pi_01a091f4-session"); + } + + #[test] + fn provenance_without_model_evidence_is_null() { + for model in [None, Some(""), Some(" ")] { + let provenance = pi_scope_provenance("01a091f4-session", model); + assert_eq!(provenance.model_id, None, "model {model:?}"); + } + } + + #[test] + fn run_from_payload_fails_closed_when_a_tracked_start_cannot_resolve_its_checkout() { + let payload = tool_event_json( + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_CALL, + &[( + CWD_FIELD, + Value::String("/nonexistent/sce/pi/checkout".to_string()), + )], + ); + let error = run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload(&payload, None) + .expect_err("a tracked Start that cannot resolve its checkout must fail closed"); + assert!(error.to_string().contains(FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE), "{error:?}"); + } + + #[test] + fn run_from_payload_is_neutral_for_untracked_events() { + for tool_name in ["read", "grep", "find", "ls", "probe_mutate"] { + let payload = tool_event_json( + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_CALL, + &[(TOOL_NAME_FIELD, Value::String(tool_name.to_string()))], + ); + assert_eq!( + run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload(&payload, None).unwrap(), + String::new() + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn run_from_payload_surfaces_malformed_input() { + let error = run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload("{bad", None) + .unwrap_err() + .to_string(); + assert!(error.contains("expected valid JSON"), "{error:?}"); + } + + #[test] + fn tool_execution_start_is_always_a_no_op_regardless_of_classification() { + for tool_name in ["bash", "read"] { + let payload = tool_event_json( + HOOK_EVENT_TOOL_EXECUTION_START, + &[(TOOL_NAME_FIELD, Value::String(tool_name.to_string()))], + ); + assert_eq!( + run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload(&payload, None).unwrap(), + String::new() + ); + } + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod lifecycle_tests { + use std::path::PathBuf; + use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering}; + use std::sync::Mutex; + + use serde_json::Value; + + use super::state::{read_state, AdapterAttempt, AdapterState, AttemptPhase, RecoveryState}; + use super::*; + + static NEXT_ID: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0); + + fn temp_git_dir(label: &str) -> PathBuf { + let id = NEXT_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed); + std::env::temp_dir().join(format!( + "sce-pi-mutation-scope-lifecycle-{label}-{}-{id}", + std::process::id() + )) + } + + const CWD: &str = "/repo/pi-checkout"; + + struct RecordingSeam { + calls: Mutex>, + fail_operations: Vec, + fail_once_operations: Mutex>, + } + + impl RecordingSeam { + fn new() -> Self { + Self { + calls: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + fail_operations: Vec::new(), + fail_once_operations: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), + } + } + + fn failing_on(operations: &[&str]) -> Self { + Self { + fail_operations: operations.iter().map(|op| (*op).to_string()).collect(), + ..Self::new() + } + } + + fn failing_once_on(operations: &[&str]) -> Self { + Self { + fail_once_operations: Mutex::new( + operations.iter().map(|op| (*op).to_string()).collect(), + ), + ..Self::new() + } + } + + fn handle(&self, payload: &str) -> Result { + let operation = operation_of(payload); + { + let mut calls = self.calls.lock().expect("seam mutex"); + calls.push(operation.clone()); + } + if self.fail_operations.contains(&operation) { + bail!("seam failure injected by test for '{operation}'"); + } + { + let mut once = self.fail_once_operations.lock().expect("seam mutex"); + if let Some(position) = once.iter().position(|candidate| candidate == &operation) { + once.remove(position); + bail!("transient seam failure injected once by test for '{operation}'"); + } + } + Ok(String::new()) + } + + fn operations(&self) -> Vec { + self.calls.lock().expect("seam mutex").clone() + } + } + + fn operation_of(payload: &str) -> String { + let value: Value = serde_json::from_str(payload).expect("seam payload is JSON"); + value + .get("operation") + .and_then(Value::as_str) + .expect("seam payload has an operation") + .to_string() + } + + fn drive(git_dir: &Path, seam: &RecordingSeam, payload: &str) -> Result { + let resolver = |_cwd: &str| Ok(git_dir.to_path_buf()); + let seam_fn = + |_root: &Path, payload: &str, _logger: Option<&dyn Logger>| seam.handle(payload); + run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload_with_seams(payload, None, &resolver, &seam_fn) + } + + fn tool_call_event(tool_name: &str, tool_call_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolCall", + "session_id": "ses-main", + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": CWD, + "tool_name": tool_name, + "model": "openai-codex/gpt-5.5", + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn tool_result_event(tool_name: &str, tool_call_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolResult", + "session_id": "ses-main", + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": CWD, + "tool_name": tool_name, + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn tool_execution_end_event(tool_name: &str, tool_call_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolExecutionEnd", + "session_id": "ses-main", + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": CWD, + "tool_name": tool_name, + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn tool_execution_abandon_event(tool_name: &str, tool_call_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolExecutionAbandon", + "session_id": "ses-main", + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": CWD, + "tool_name": tool_name, + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn tool_execution_abandon_event_for_session( + tool_name: &str, + session_id: &str, + tool_call_id: &str, + ) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolExecutionAbandon", + "session_id": session_id, + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": CWD, + "tool_name": tool_name, + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn cleanup(git_dir: &Path) { + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(git_dir); + } + + fn tool_call_event_for_session( + tool_name: &str, + session_id: &str, + tool_call_id: &str, + ) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolCall", + "session_id": session_id, + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": CWD, + "tool_name": tool_name, + "model": "openai-codex/gpt-5.5", + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn tool_result_event_for_session( + tool_name: &str, + session_id: &str, + tool_call_id: &str, + ) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolResult", + "session_id": session_id, + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": CWD, + "tool_name": tool_name, + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn dead_process_owner() -> super::process_owner::ProcessOwner { + let mut dead_child = std::process::Command::new("true") + .spawn() + .expect("spawning 'true' should succeed"); + let dead_pid = i32::try_from(dead_child.id()).expect("pid fits in i32"); + dead_child.wait().expect("child should exit and be reaped"); + super::process_owner::ProcessOwner { + pid: dead_pid, + instance_token: None, + } + } + + fn attempt_owned_by(state: &AdapterState, session_id: &str) -> AdapterAttempt { + state + .attempts + .iter() + .find(|attempt| attempt.session_id == session_id) + .expect("attempt for session must exist") + .clone() + } + + #[test] + fn tool_call_establishes_a_write_ahead_start_and_replays_idempotently() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("write-ahead-start"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("write", "call_1")).expect("first Start"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("write", "call_1")) + .expect("duplicate Start is idempotent"); + + assert_eq!(seam.operations(), vec!["start", "start"]); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].phase, AttemptPhase::PendingStart); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].tool_name, "write"); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn concurrent_bash_calls_in_one_session_stay_separate_live_scopes() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("concurrent-bash"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_a")).expect("A Start"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_b")) + .expect("B Start must not retire A"); + + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 2); + assert!(state + .attempts + .iter() + .all(|attempt| attempt.phase == AttemptPhase::PendingStart)); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn full_success_lifecycle_start_result_close() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("success-lifecycle"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("Start"); + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").attempts[0].phase, + AttemptPhase::PendingStart + ); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_result_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("tool_result"); + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").attempts[0].phase, + AttemptPhase::Executed, + "D5/D6: tool_result is the sole Executed-transition evidence" + ); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_1")) + .expect("tool_execution_end closes an Executed attempt"); + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty()); + assert_eq!(seam.operations(), vec!["start", "close"]); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn tool_execution_end_without_a_preceding_tool_result_abandons_never_closes() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d7-abandon"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("Start"); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_1")) + .expect("D7: a terminal event with no preceding tool_result must abandon"); + + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty()); + assert!( + !seam.operations().contains(&"close".to_string()), + "D7: an unexecuted attempt must never be closed" + ); + assert!(seam.operations().contains(&"abandon".to_string())); + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .recovery + .is_clear()); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_failed_close_falls_back_to_abandon_recovery() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("close-failure-falls-back"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::failing_on(&["close"]); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("Start"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_result_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("tool_result"); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_1")) + .expect("a Close failure must recover via abandon, not surface an error"); + + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty()); + assert!(seam.operations().contains(&"abandon".to_string())); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn execution_abandon_forces_abandon_even_when_the_attempt_is_already_executed() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d9-execution-abandon-executed"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("Start"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_result_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("tool_result"); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_execution_abandon_event("bash", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("ExecutionAbandon must recover via abandon, not surface an error"); + + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty()); + assert!( + !seam.operations().contains(&"close".to_string()), + "D9: an explicit abandon request must never be treated as a Close, \ + even for an attempt already marked Executed" + ); + assert!(seam.operations().contains(&"abandon".to_string())); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn execution_abandon_on_a_pending_start_attempt_abandons() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d9-execution-abandon-pending-start"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("Start"); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_execution_abandon_event("bash", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("ExecutionAbandon must recover a PendingStart attempt via abandon"); + + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty()); + assert!(seam.operations().contains(&"abandon".to_string())); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn execution_abandon_for_an_unknown_attempt_is_a_safe_no_op() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d9-execution-abandon-unknown"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + let result = drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_execution_abandon_event("bash", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("an unknown attempt must be a safe no-op, never an error"); + + assert_eq!(result, ""); + assert!(seam.operations().is_empty()); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn execution_abandon_for_an_untracked_tool_is_a_no_op() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d9-execution-abandon-untracked"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + let result = drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_execution_abandon_event("read", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("untracked tools are never adapter-relevant"); + + assert_eq!(result, ""); + assert!(seam.operations().is_empty()); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn duplicate_execution_abandon_on_an_already_abandoned_attempt_is_a_safe_no_op() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d9-execution-abandon-duplicate"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("Start"); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_execution_abandon_event("bash", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("first ExecutionAbandon retires the attempt"); + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty()); + + let result = drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_execution_abandon_event("bash", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("a duplicate ExecutionAbandon for an already-retired attempt must be a safe no-op"); + + assert_eq!(result, ""); + assert_eq!( + seam.operations(), + vec!["start", "flush", "abandon", "flush"], + "a duplicate ExecutionAbandon must never issue a second abandon or a close" + ); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn execution_abandon_for_one_session_never_touches_another_sessions_attempt_with_the_same_tool_call_id( + ) { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d9-execution-abandon-cross-session"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "ses-a", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("session A Start"); + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "ses-b", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("session B Start with the same tool_call_id"); + + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").attempts.len(), + 2 + ); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_execution_abandon_event_for_session("bash", "ses-a", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("ExecutionAbandon for session A must not error"); + + let remaining = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").attempts; + assert_eq!( + remaining.len(), + 1, + "abandoning session A's attempt must leave session B's untouched" + ); + assert_eq!(remaining[0].session_id, "ses-b"); + assert_eq!(remaining[0].tool_call_id, "call_1"); + assert_eq!(remaining[0].phase, AttemptPhase::PendingStart); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_result_event_for_session("bash", "ses-b", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("session B must still be able to progress normally after A's abandon"); + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").attempts[0].phase, + AttemptPhase::Executed + ); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_terminal_recovery_flush_failure_leaves_a_pending_recovery_and_denies_new_admission() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("recovery-flush-failure"); + let persistently_failing = RecordingSeam::failing_on(&["flush"]); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &persistently_failing, + &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("Start"); + drive( + &git_dir, + &persistently_failing, + &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_1"), + ) + .expect("abandon path swallows the flush failure rather than surfacing an error"); + + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").recovery, + RecoveryState::Pending { generation: 1 }, + "a failed ambiguity flush must leave recovery Pending, not Clear" + ); + + let error = drive( + &git_dir, + &persistently_failing, + &tool_call_event("bash", "call_2"), + ) + .expect_err("a new admission must fail closed while recovery remains unresolved"); + assert!(error.to_string().contains(FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE)); + + let recovered = RecordingSeam::new(); + drive(&git_dir, &recovered, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_3")) + .expect("a new admission must self-heal once recovery can complete"); + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .recovery + .is_clear()); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].tool_call_id, "call_3"); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn start_provenance_carries_the_prefixed_session_and_normalized_model_to_the_seam() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("provenance-present"); + let captured: Mutex> = Mutex::new(Vec::new()); + let resolver = |_cwd: &str| Ok(git_dir.clone()); + let seam_fn = |_root: &Path, payload: &str, _logger: Option<&dyn Logger>| { + captured + .lock() + .expect("capture mutex") + .push(payload.to_string()); + Ok(String::new()) + }; + + run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload_with_seams( + &tool_call_event("bash", "call_model"), + None, + &resolver, + &seam_fn, + ) + .expect("Start should succeed"); + + let payloads = captured.into_inner().expect("capture mutex"); + assert_eq!(payloads.len(), 1); + let sent: Value = serde_json::from_str(&payloads[0]).expect("seam payload is JSON"); + assert_eq!( + sent["provenance"]["session_id"].as_str(), + Some("pi_ses-main") + ); + assert_eq!( + sent["provenance"]["model_id"].as_str(), + Some("openai-codex/gpt-5.5") + ); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn start_provenance_is_null_model_when_the_event_carries_no_model() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("provenance-absent"); + let captured: Mutex> = Mutex::new(Vec::new()); + let resolver = |_cwd: &str| Ok(git_dir.clone()); + let seam_fn = |_root: &Path, payload: &str, _logger: Option<&dyn Logger>| { + captured + .lock() + .expect("capture mutex") + .push(payload.to_string()); + Ok(String::new()) + }; + + let payload = json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolCall", + "session_id": "ses-main", + "tool_call_id": "call_no_model", + "cwd": CWD, + "tool_name": "bash", + }) + .to_string(); + + run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload_with_seams(&payload, None, &resolver, &seam_fn) + .expect("Start should succeed"); + + let payloads = captured.into_inner().expect("capture mutex"); + let sent: Value = serde_json::from_str(&payloads[0]).expect("seam payload is JSON"); + assert!(sent["provenance"]["model_id"].is_null()); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn untracked_tool_call_never_admits_an_attempt() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("untracked-no-admit"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("read", "call_ro")).expect("untracked is inert"); + assert!(seam.operations().is_empty()); + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty()); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_result_event("read", "call_ro")) + .expect("untracked result inert"); + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_execution_end_event("read", "call_ro"), + ) + .expect("untracked terminal inert"); + assert!(seam.operations().is_empty()); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_pending_start_attempt_owned_by_a_dead_process_is_abandoned_not_replayed() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d10-dead-owner-abandon"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("first Start"); + let scope_id = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").attempts[0] + .scope_id + .clone(); + + let mut dead_child = std::process::Command::new("true") + .spawn() + .expect("spawning 'true' should succeed"); + let dead_pid = i32::try_from(dead_child.id()).expect("pid fits in i32"); + dead_child.wait().expect("child should exit and be reaped"); + state::set_attempt_owner_for_tests( + &git_dir, + &scope_id, + super::process_owner::ProcessOwner { + pid: dead_pid, + instance_token: None, + }, + ); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")) + .expect("a replay whose recorded owner is positively dead must abandon, not reuse"); + + assert_eq!( + seam.operations(), + vec!["start", "flush", "abandon", "flush", "start"], + "D10: a dead-owner PendingStart must be abandoned via the existing D8 flush/abandon/\ + flush pattern, then the triggering event admitted as a fresh attempt" + ); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 1); + assert_ne!( + state.attempts[0].scope_id, scope_id, + "the fresh attempt must never reuse the abandoned attempt's ScopeId" + ); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].attempt_seq, 2); + assert!(state.recovery.is_clear()); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_pending_start_attempt_owned_by_a_live_process_is_never_abandoned_by_a_replay() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d10-live-owner-no-abandon"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("first Start"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")) + .expect("a replay owned by a still-live process must be treated as a normal replay"); + + assert_eq!( + seam.operations(), + vec!["start", "start"], + "no TTL and no elapsed time may ever cause an abandon here: the owner is this test \ + process's own live parent for the whole test" + ); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].phase, AttemptPhase::PendingStart); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_dead_pending_start_attempt_is_recovered_by_an_unrelated_fresh_session_start() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d10-fresh-session-dead-pending-start"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-a", "call-a"), + ) + .expect("A's Start"); + let scope_a = + attempt_owned_by(&read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"), "sess-a").scope_id; + state::set_attempt_owner_for_tests(&git_dir, &scope_a, dead_process_owner()); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-b", "call-b"), + ) + .expect( + "B's Start must recover A's stale owner without ever replaying A's \ + (session_id, tool_call_id) key", + ); + + assert_eq!( + seam.operations(), + vec!["start", "flush", "abandon", "flush", "start"], + "D10: a dead PendingStart owner discovered by an unrelated fresh-session Start must \ + be retired through the existing D8 flush/abandon/flush sequence before the \ + triggering Start is admitted" + ); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].session_id, "sess-b"); + assert_ne!(state.attempts[0].scope_id, scope_a); + assert!(state.recovery.is_clear()); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_dead_executed_attempt_is_recovered_by_a_fresh_session_start_without_a_synthetic_close() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d10-fresh-session-dead-executed"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-a", "call-a"), + ) + .expect("A's Start"); + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_result_event_for_session("bash", "sess-a", "call-a"), + ) + .expect("A's tool_result marks Executed"); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + let scope_a = attempt_owned_by(&state, "sess-a").scope_id; + assert_eq!( + attempt_owned_by(&state, "sess-a").phase, + AttemptPhase::Executed + ); + state::set_attempt_owner_for_tests(&git_dir, &scope_a, dead_process_owner()); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-b", "call-b"), + ) + .expect("B's Start must recover A's dead Executed attempt"); + + assert_eq!( + seam.operations(), + vec!["start", "flush", "abandon", "flush", "start"], + "a dead Executed attempt must be abandoned/rebaselined via D8, never given a \ + synthetic delayed Close" + ); + assert!( + !seam.operations().contains(&"close".to_string()), + "D9: the current Git tree no longer represents the original terminal observation \ + time, so a dead Executed attempt must never be closed" + ); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].session_id, "sess-b"); + assert!(state.recovery.is_clear()); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_dead_owner_scope_is_recovered_while_a_live_owner_sibling_survives_untouched() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d10-dead-live-sibling-isolation"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-a", "call-a"), + ) + .expect("A's Start (owner will die)"); + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-b", "call-b"), + ) + .expect("B's Start (owner stays live)"); + + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + let scope_a = attempt_owned_by(&state, "sess-a").scope_id; + let scope_b = attempt_owned_by(&state, "sess-b").scope_id; + state::set_attempt_owner_for_tests(&git_dir, &scope_a, dead_process_owner()); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-c", "call-c"), + ) + .expect("C's Start must recover only A"); + + assert_eq!( + seam.operations(), + vec!["start", "start", "flush", "abandon", "flush", "start"], + "exactly one abandon must occur, and only for A's own positively dead owner" + ); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 2); + assert!(!state.attempts.iter().any(|a| a.scope_id == scope_a)); + let b = attempt_owned_by(&state, "sess-b"); + assert_eq!(b.scope_id, scope_b); + assert_eq!( + b.phase, + AttemptPhase::PendingStart, + "B must survive reconciliation exactly as it was, untouched" + ); + assert_eq!( + attempt_owned_by(&state, "sess-c").phase, + AttemptPhase::PendingStart + ); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn multiple_dead_owner_scopes_are_retired_in_one_recovery_generation_while_a_live_sibling_survives( + ) { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d10-multiple-dead-owner-scopes"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-a", "call-a"), + ) + .expect("A's Start"); + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_result_event_for_session("bash", "sess-a", "call-a"), + ) + .expect("A's tool_result marks Executed"); + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-b", "call-b"), + ) + .expect("B's Start"); + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-q", "call-q"), + ) + .expect("Q's Start (owner stays live)"); + + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + let scope_a = attempt_owned_by(&state, "sess-a").scope_id; + let scope_b = attempt_owned_by(&state, "sess-b").scope_id; + let scope_q = attempt_owned_by(&state, "sess-q").scope_id; + let dead_owner = dead_process_owner(); + state::set_attempt_owner_for_tests(&git_dir, &scope_a, dead_owner); + state::set_attempt_owner_for_tests(&git_dir, &scope_b, dead_owner); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-c", "call-c"), + ) + .expect("C's Start must recover both A and B, grouped into one recovery generation"); + + assert_eq!( + seam.operations(), + vec!["start", "start", "start", "flush", "abandon", "abandon", "flush", "start"], + "a single flush/abandon.../flush recovery generation must retire every \ + independently-proven-dead scope owned by the same dead process together" + ); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 2); + assert!(!state.attempts.iter().any(|a| a.scope_id == scope_a)); + assert!(!state.attempts.iter().any(|a| a.scope_id == scope_b)); + assert_eq!(attempt_owned_by(&state, "sess-q").scope_id, scope_q); + assert!(state.recovery.is_clear()); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn an_owner_that_cannot_be_positively_proven_dead_is_never_abandoned_by_an_unrelated_start() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d10-uncertain-owner-preserved"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-a", "call-a"), + ) + .expect("A's Start"); + let scope_a = + attempt_owned_by(&read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"), "sess-a").scope_id; + state::set_attempt_owner_for_tests( + &git_dir, + &scope_a, + super::process_owner::ProcessOwner { + pid: std::process::id().cast_signed(), + instance_token: None, + }, + ); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-c", "call-c"), + ) + .expect( + "C's Start must proceed without touching A, whose owner cannot be positively \ + proven dead", + ); + + assert_eq!( + seam.operations(), + vec!["start", "start"], + "a live pid with no instance-token evidence must never be converted into proof of \ + death: uncertain identity is conservatively treated as alive" + ); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 2); + assert!(state + .attempts + .iter() + .all(|attempt| attempt.phase == AttemptPhase::PendingStart)); + assert!(state.attempts.iter().any(|a| a.scope_id == scope_a)); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn an_interrupted_stale_owner_recovery_remains_pending_and_denies_the_triggering_start_until_resumed( + ) { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("d10-interrupted-stale-recovery"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &seam, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-a", "call-a"), + ) + .expect("A's Start"); + let scope_a = + attempt_owned_by(&read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"), "sess-a").scope_id; + state::set_attempt_owner_for_tests(&git_dir, &scope_a, dead_process_owner()); + + let crashing = RecordingSeam::failing_once_on(&["abandon"]); + let error = drive( + &git_dir, + &crashing, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-b", "call-b"), + ) + .expect_err( + "a Start that triggers a stale-owner recovery which fails mid-way must not commit", + ); + assert!(error.to_string().contains(FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE)); + + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.recovery, RecoveryState::Pending { generation: 1 }); + assert!( + !state.attempts.iter().any(|a| a.session_id == "sess-b"), + "B must never be admitted while A's stale-owner recovery is still pending" + ); + assert_eq!( + attempt_owned_by(&state, "sess-a").phase, + AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon + ); + + drive( + &git_dir, + &crashing, + &tool_call_event_for_session("bash", "sess-b", "call-b"), + ) + .expect( + "the next boundary-lock acquisition must resume and complete the pending recovery, \ + and only then admit B", + ); + + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert!(state.recovery.is_clear()); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].session_id, "sess-b"); + assert!(!state.attempts.iter().any(|a| a.scope_id == scope_a)); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn duplicate_tool_result_after_close_is_a_safe_no_op() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("duplicate-tool-result-after-close"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("Start"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_result_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("tool_result"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("Close"); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_result_event("bash", "call_1")) + .expect("a late duplicate tool_result after Close must be a safe no-op"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_1")) + .expect("a late duplicate tool_execution_end after Close must be a safe no-op"); + + assert_eq!( + seam.operations(), + vec!["start", "close"], + "a resurrected attempt must never re-enter the runtime seam after its own Close" + ); + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty()); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn duplicate_tool_execution_end_after_abandon_is_a_safe_no_op() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("duplicate-terminal-after-abandon"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("Start"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("D7 abandon"); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_1")) + .expect("a late duplicate terminal event after abandon must be a safe no-op"); + + assert_eq!( + seam.operations(), + vec!["start", "flush", "abandon", "flush"], + "a duplicate terminal delivery for an already-abandoned attempt must never issue a \ + second abandon" + ); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn abandoning_one_sibling_never_touches_a_concurrent_sibling_in_the_same_session() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("sibling-abandon-isolation"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_a")).expect("A Start"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_b")).expect("B Start"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_result_event("bash", "call_b")).expect("B tool_result"); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_a")) + .expect("A's terminal event with no tool_result must abandon only A"); + + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!( + state.attempts.len(), + 1, + "abandoning A must never remove or block sibling B" + ); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].tool_call_id, "call_b"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].phase, AttemptPhase::Executed); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_b")) + .expect("B must still close normally after A's abandonment and recovery"); + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty()); + assert_eq!( + seam.operations(), + vec!["start", "start", "flush", "abandon", "flush", "close"] + ); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_crash_mid_abandon_loop_is_resumed_and_completed_on_the_next_boundary_lock_acquisition() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("crash-mid-abandon-loop"); + let crashing = RecordingSeam::failing_once_on(&["abandon"]); + + drive(&git_dir, &crashing, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("Start"); + drive( + &git_dir, + &crashing, + &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_1"), + ) + .expect( + "a transient abandon failure mid-recovery must leave recovery Pending, not surface \ + an error, simulating a crash between marking PendingAbandon and completing the \ + flush/abandon/flush sequence", + ); + + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").recovery, + RecoveryState::Pending { generation: 1 }, + "the interrupted abandon loop must leave recovery durably Pending for the next \ + boundary-lock acquisition to resume, never Clear and never lost" + ); + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .first() + .expect("the doomed attempt must still be recorded") + .phase, + AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon + ); + + drive(&git_dir, &crashing, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_2")) + .expect("recovery must self-heal and complete on the very next invocation"); + + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .recovery + .is_clear()); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].tool_call_id, "call_2"); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_reused_tool_call_id_after_terminal_cleanup_gets_a_distinct_scope_id() { + let git_dir = temp_git_dir("terminal-scope-id-non-reuse"); + let seam = RecordingSeam::new(); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("first Start"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_result_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("first tool_result"); + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_execution_end_event("bash", "call_1")).expect("first Close"); + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty()); + + drive(&git_dir, &seam, &tool_call_event("bash", "call_1")) + .expect("reused toolCallId Start"); + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].attempt_seq, 2); + + cleanup(&git_dir); + } +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod runtime_seam_tests { + use std::fs; + use std::path::PathBuf; + use std::process::Command; + + use crate::services::agent_trace_db::repository::RepositoryAgentTraceDb; + use crate::services::agent_trace_storage::{ + resolve_agent_trace_storage_at_state_root, AgentTraceStorageContext, + }; + + use super::*; + + fn git(dir: &Path, args: &[&str]) { + let output = Command::new("git") + .args(args) + .current_dir(dir) + .output() + .expect("git should spawn"); + assert!( + output.status.success(), + "git {args:?} failed: {}", + String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr) + ); + } + + struct PiRepo { + _temp: tempfile::TempDir, + root: PathBuf, + state_root: PathBuf, + } + + impl PiRepo { + fn new(label: &str) -> Self { + let temp = tempfile::Builder::new() + .prefix(&format!("sce-pi-mutation-scope-seam-{label}-")) + .tempdir() + .expect("temp dir should be created"); + let root = temp.path().join("repo"); + fs::create_dir_all(&root).expect("repo dir should be created"); + git(&root, &["init", "-q"]); + git(&root, &["config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid"]); + git(&root, &["config", "user.name", "SCE Test"]); + git( + &root, + &["remote", "add", "origin", "git@github.com:acme/widgets.git"], + ); + fs::write(root.join("file.txt"), "one\n").expect("seed file should write"); + git(&root, &["add", "-A"]); + git(&root, &["commit", "-qm", "base"]); + + let state_root = temp.path().join("state"); + fs::create_dir_all(&state_root).expect("state root should be created"); + resolve_agent_trace_storage_at_state_root( + &AgentTraceStorageContext { + repository_root: &root, + explicit_repository_id: None, + repository_remote: "origin", + }, + &state_root, + ) + .expect("state-root storage should initialize the repository DB"); + + Self { + _temp: temp, + root, + state_root, + } + } + + fn cwd(&self) -> String { + self.root.to_string_lossy().into_owned() + } + + fn drive(&self, payload: &str) -> Result { + run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload_at_state_root(&self.state_root, payload, None) + } + + fn write(&self, name: &str, contents: &str) { + fs::write(self.root.join(name), contents).expect("write should succeed"); + } + + fn db(&self) -> RepositoryAgentTraceDb { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + &self.root, + &self.state_root, + "Pi mutation-scope seam test assertions", + ) + .expect("assertion DB should open") + } + + fn scope_status(&self, scope_id: &str) -> Option<(String, String)> { + self.db() + .query_map( + "SELECT actor_kind, status FROM mutation_trace_scopes WHERE scope_id = ?1", + (scope_id,), + |row| { + let actor_kind = row.get::(0).map_err(anyhow::Error::from)?; + let status = row.get::(1).map_err(anyhow::Error::from)?; + Ok((actor_kind, status)) + }, + ) + .expect("scope query should succeed") + .into_iter() + .next() + } + + fn scope_provenance(&self, scope_id: &str) -> Option<(String, Option)> { + self.db() + .query_map( + "SELECT session_id, model_id FROM mutation_trace_scope_provenance \ + WHERE scope_id = ?1", + (scope_id,), + |row| { + let session_id = row.get::(0).map_err(anyhow::Error::from)?; + let model_id = row.get::>(1).map_err(anyhow::Error::from)?; + Ok((session_id, model_id)) + }, + ) + .expect("scope-provenance query should succeed") + .into_iter() + .next() + } + + fn mutation_events(&self) -> Vec<(String, Option)> { + self.db() + .query_map( + "SELECT attribution_kind, attribution_scope_id \ + FROM mutation_trace_events ORDER BY revision", + (), + |row| { + let attribution_kind = row.get::(0).map_err(anyhow::Error::from)?; + let attribution_scope_id = + row.get::>(1).map_err(anyhow::Error::from)?; + Ok((attribution_kind, attribution_scope_id)) + }, + ) + .expect("mutation-events query should succeed") + } + } + + fn tool_call(repo: &PiRepo, tool_name: &str, tool_call_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolCall", + "session_id": "01a091f4-seam-session", + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": repo.cwd(), + "tool_name": tool_name, + "model": "openai-codex/gpt-5.5", + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn tool_result(repo: &PiRepo, tool_name: &str, tool_call_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolResult", + "session_id": "01a091f4-seam-session", + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": repo.cwd(), + "tool_name": tool_name, + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn tool_execution_end(repo: &PiRepo, tool_name: &str, tool_call_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolExecutionEnd", + "session_id": "01a091f4-seam-session", + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": repo.cwd(), + "tool_name": tool_name, + }) + .to_string() + } + + #[test] + fn a_write_start_result_close_lands_a_real_ai_exclusive_event_with_pi_provenance() { + let repo = PiRepo::new("real-lifecycle"); + let key = AttemptKey { + session_id: "01a091f4-seam-session".to_string(), + tool_call_id: "call_write".to_string(), + }; + let scope_id = format_pi_scope_id(&key, 1); + + repo.drive(&tool_call(&repo, "write", "call_write")) + .expect("Start should reach the real runtime"); + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_id), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "active".to_string())) + ); + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_provenance(&scope_id), + Some(( + "pi_01a091f4-seam-session".to_string(), + Some("openai-codex/gpt-5.5".to_string()) + )) + ); + + repo.write("file.txt", "one\ntwo\n"); + repo.drive(&tool_result(&repo, "write", "call_write")) + .expect("tool_result should mark Executed"); + + repo.drive(&tool_execution_end(&repo, "write", "call_write")) + .expect("Close should reach the real runtime"); + + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_id), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "closed".to_string())) + ); + assert_eq!( + repo.mutation_events(), + vec![("ai_exclusive".to_string(), Some(scope_id))] + ); + assert!( + state::read_state(&resolve_git_dir(&repo.root).expect("git dir resolves")) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_start_followed_by_no_execution_abandons_through_the_real_runtime() { + let repo = PiRepo::new("real-abandon"); + let key = AttemptKey { + session_id: "01a091f4-seam-session".to_string(), + tool_call_id: "call_blocked".to_string(), + }; + let scope_id = format_pi_scope_id(&key, 1); + + repo.drive(&tool_call(&repo, "bash", "call_blocked")) + .expect("Start should reach the real runtime"); + + repo.drive(&tool_execution_end(&repo, "bash", "call_blocked")) + .expect("the terminal event must resolve via abandon, not surface an error"); + + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_id), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "abandoned".to_string())) + ); + assert!(repo.mutation_events().is_empty()); + } +} + +#[cfg(all(unix, test))] +mod guard_reconciliation_tests { + use std::fs; + use std::path::PathBuf; + use std::process::Command; + use std::sync::mpsc; + use std::time::Duration; + + use crate::services::agent_trace_db::repository::RepositoryAgentTraceDb; + use crate::services::agent_trace_storage::{ + resolve_agent_trace_storage_at_state_root, AgentTraceStorageContext, + }; + use crate::services::mutation_trace::runtime::{ + coordinate, run_external_mutation_guard, GuardRequest, RuntimeBoundary, + }; + use crate::services::mutation_trace::types::{ActorKind, EventId, ScopeId}; + + use super::*; + + fn git(dir: &Path, args: &[&str]) { + let output = Command::new("git") + .args(args) + .current_dir(dir) + .output() + .expect("git should spawn"); + assert!( + output.status.success(), + "git {args:?} failed: {}", + String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr) + ); + } + + struct GuardRepo { + _temp: tempfile::TempDir, + root: PathBuf, + state_root: PathBuf, + } + + impl GuardRepo { + fn new(label: &str) -> Self { + let temp = tempfile::Builder::new() + .prefix(&format!("sce-pi-guard-reconciliation-{label}-")) + .tempdir() + .expect("temp dir should be created"); + let root = temp.path().join("repo"); + fs::create_dir_all(&root).expect("repo dir should be created"); + git(&root, &["init", "-q"]); + git(&root, &["config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid"]); + git(&root, &["config", "user.name", "SCE Test"]); + git( + &root, + &["remote", "add", "origin", "git@github.com:acme/widgets.git"], + ); + fs::write(root.join("file.txt"), "one\n").expect("seed file should write"); + git(&root, &["add", "-A"]); + git(&root, &["commit", "-qm", "base"]); + + let state_root = temp.path().join("state"); + fs::create_dir_all(&state_root).expect("state root should be created"); + resolve_agent_trace_storage_at_state_root( + &AgentTraceStorageContext { + repository_root: &root, + explicit_repository_id: None, + repository_remote: "origin", + }, + &state_root, + ) + .expect("state-root storage should initialize the repository DB"); + + Self { + _temp: temp, + root, + state_root, + } + } + + fn drive(&self, payload: &str) -> Result { + run_pi_mutation_scope_from_payload_at_state_root(&self.state_root, payload, None) + } + + fn open_db(&self) -> anyhow::Result { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + &self.root, + &self.state_root, + "Pi guard-reconciliation test assertions", + ) + } + + fn db(&self) -> RepositoryAgentTraceDb { + self.open_db().expect("assertion DB should open") + } + + fn scope_status(&self, scope_id: &str) -> Option<(String, String)> { + self.db() + .query_map( + "SELECT actor_kind, status FROM mutation_trace_scopes WHERE scope_id = ?1", + (scope_id,), + |row| { + let actor_kind = row.get::(0).map_err(anyhow::Error::from)?; + let status = row.get::(1).map_err(anyhow::Error::from)?; + Ok((actor_kind, status)) + }, + ) + .expect("scope query should succeed") + .into_iter() + .next() + } + + fn write(&self, name: &str, contents: &str) { + fs::write(self.root.join(name), contents).expect("write should succeed"); + } + + fn mutation_events(&self) -> Vec<(String, Option)> { + self.db() + .query_map( + "SELECT attribution_kind, attribution_scope_id \ + FROM mutation_trace_events ORDER BY revision", + (), + |row| { + let attribution_kind = row.get::(0).map_err(anyhow::Error::from)?; + let attribution_scope_id = + row.get::>(1).map_err(anyhow::Error::from)?; + Ok((attribution_kind, attribution_scope_id)) + }, + ) + .expect("mutation-events query should succeed") + } + } + + fn tool_call(repo: &GuardRepo, tool_call_id: &str, session_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolCall", + "session_id": session_id, + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": repo.root.to_string_lossy(), + "tool_name": "bash", + "model": "openai-codex/gpt-5.5", + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn tool_execution_end(repo: &GuardRepo, tool_call_id: &str, session_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolExecutionEnd", + "session_id": session_id, + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": repo.root.to_string_lossy(), + "tool_name": "bash", + }) + .to_string() + } + + fn tool_result(repo: &GuardRepo, tool_call_id: &str, session_id: &str) -> String { + json!({ + "hook_event_name": "ToolResult", + "session_id": session_id, + "tool_call_id": tool_call_id, + "cwd": repo.root.to_string_lossy(), + "tool_name": "bash", + }) + .to_string() + } + + #[test] + fn a_guard_triggered_worktree_abandonment_reconciles_with_the_pi_adapters_own_state() { + let repo = GuardRepo::new("reconcile"); + let session = "01a091f4-guard-session"; + let key_a = AttemptKey { + session_id: session.to_string(), + tool_call_id: "call_a".to_string(), + }; + let key_b = AttemptKey { + session_id: session.to_string(), + tool_call_id: "call_b".to_string(), + }; + let scope_a = format_pi_scope_id(&key_a, 1); + let scope_b = format_pi_scope_id(&key_b, 2); + + repo.drive(&tool_call(&repo, "call_a", session)) + .expect("A's Start should reach the real runtime"); + repo.drive(&tool_call(&repo, "call_b", session)) + .expect("B's Start should reach the real runtime"); + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_a), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "active".to_string())) + ); + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_b), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "active".to_string())) + ); + + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let root = repo.root.clone(); + let outcome = run_external_mutation_guard( + &root, + &GuardRequest { + command: "printf changed >> file.txt".to_string(), + cwd: None, + env: Vec::new(), + }, + || repo.open_db(), + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ) + .expect("the guard should finish successfully"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + assert!(!outcome.marker_clear_failed); + + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_a), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "abandoned".to_string())), + "the guard's finish-time forced recovery must abandon every scope live during the \ + guarded interval, regardless of which harness's boundary happened to observe \ + user_bash" + ); + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_b), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "abandoned".to_string())) + ); + + repo.drive(&tool_execution_end(&repo, "call_a", session)) + .expect( + "the adapter's next interaction for an already-abandoned scope must reconcile \ + safely (falling back through the existing Close-failure-to-abandon path) rather \ + than erroring or resurrecting the scope", + ); + repo.drive(&tool_execution_end(&repo, "call_b", session)) + .expect("the same reconciliation must hold for every sibling abandoned by the guard"); + + assert!( + state::read_state(&resolve_git_dir(&repo.root).expect("git dir resolves")) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty(), + "the Pi adapter's own durable local attempt state must converge to empty once it \ + observes the terminal event for a scope the generic runtime already abandoned out \ + from under it" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_guard_abandons_a_live_pi_scope_alongside_a_live_scope_from_another_harness() { + let repo = GuardRepo::new("cross-harness"); + let key = AttemptKey { + session_id: "01a091f4-guard-cross-session".to_string(), + tool_call_id: "call_pi".to_string(), + }; + let pi_scope_id = format_pi_scope_id(&key, 1); + let claude_scope = ScopeId("claude-scope-under-guard".to_string()); + + repo.drive(&tool_call(&repo, "call_pi", "01a091f4-guard-cross-session")) + .expect("Pi's Start should reach the real runtime"); + coordinate( + &repo.root, + &RuntimeBoundary::Start { + scope: claude_scope.clone(), + event: EventId("claude-evt-start".to_string()), + actor_kind: ActorKind::ClaudeCode, + provenance: None, + }, + || repo.open_db(), + ) + .expect("Claude's Start should reach the real runtime"); + + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&pi_scope_id), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "active".to_string())) + ); + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&claude_scope.0), + Some(("claude_code".to_string(), "active".to_string())) + ); + + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let root = repo.root.clone(); + run_external_mutation_guard( + &root, + &GuardRequest { + command: "printf changed >> file.txt".to_string(), + cwd: None, + env: Vec::new(), + }, + || repo.open_db(), + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ) + .expect("the guard should finish successfully"); + + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&pi_scope_id), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "abandoned".to_string())), + "the guard's forced recovery must abandon the Pi scope even though a different \ + harness's boundary is the one that happened to observe user_bash" + ); + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&claude_scope.0), + Some(("claude_code".to_string(), "abandoned".to_string())), + "the guard's forced recovery must abandon every live scope on the worktree \ + regardless of which harness owns it" + ); + + repo.drive(&tool_execution_end( + &repo, + "call_pi", + "01a091f4-guard-cross-session", + )) + .expect( + "the Pi adapter must still reconcile cleanly with its own scope even when a \ + sibling scope belonging to a different harness was abandoned by the same guard", + ); + assert!( + state::read_state(&resolve_git_dir(&repo.root).expect("git dir resolves")) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty() + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_foreign_pi_start_racing_an_active_guard_fails_closed_touching_no_state_then_succeeds_on_retry( + ) { + let repo = GuardRepo::new("race"); + let ready = repo.root.join("ready"); + let release = repo.root.join("release"); + let command = format!( + "touch '{}'; while [ ! -f '{}' ]; do sleep 0.02; done", + ready.display(), + release.display(), + ); + + let root = repo.root.clone(); + let state_root = repo.state_root.clone(); + let guard_thread = std::thread::spawn(move || { + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + run_external_mutation_guard( + &root, + &GuardRequest { + command, + cwd: None, + env: Vec::new(), + }, + || { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + &root, + &state_root, + "guard race test", + ) + }, + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ) + }); + + let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); + while !ready.exists() { + assert!( + std::time::Instant::now() < deadline, + "the guarded shell never reported ready" + ); + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + + let key = AttemptKey { + session_id: "01a091f4-guard-race-session".to_string(), + tool_call_id: "call_race".to_string(), + }; + let scope_id = format_pi_scope_id(&key, 1); + + let error = repo + .drive(&tool_call( + &repo, + "call_race", + "01a091f4-guard-race-session", + )) + .expect_err( + "a Pi Start racing an active external-mutation guard must block then fail \ + closed with CoordinateError::LockAcquisition, never proceed", + ); + assert!(error.to_string().contains(FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE)); + assert!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_id).is_none(), + "a boundary that fails closed on lock acquisition must touch no protocol state" + ); + + fs::write(&release, "go").expect("release file should write"); + let outcome = guard_thread + .join() + .expect("guard thread should not panic") + .expect("the guard should finish successfully once released"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + + repo.drive(&tool_call( + &repo, + "call_race", + "01a091f4-guard-race-session", + )) + .expect("retrying the same Start after the guard finishes must succeed normally"); + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_id), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "active".to_string())) + ); + } + + #[test] + #[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] + fn a_foreign_harnesss_boundary_racing_the_guard_fails_closed_then_succeeds_normally_on_retry() { + let repo = GuardRepo::new("cross-harness-race"); + let claude_scope = ScopeId("claude-scope-racing-guard".to_string()); + let key = AttemptKey { + session_id: "01a091f4-guard-cross-race-session".to_string(), + tool_call_id: "call_pi_race".to_string(), + }; + let pi_scope_id = format_pi_scope_id(&key, 1); + + repo.drive(&tool_call( + &repo, + "call_pi_race", + "01a091f4-guard-cross-race-session", + )) + .expect("Pi's Start should reach the real runtime"); + coordinate( + &repo.root, + &RuntimeBoundary::Start { + scope: claude_scope.clone(), + event: EventId("claude-evt-race-start".to_string()), + actor_kind: ActorKind::ClaudeCode, + provenance: None, + }, + || repo.open_db(), + ) + .expect("Claude's Start should reach the real runtime"); + + let ready = repo.root.join("ready"); + let release = repo.root.join("release"); + let command = format!( + "touch '{}'; printf w1 >> file.txt; while [ ! -f '{}' ]; do sleep 0.02; done; printf w2 >> file.txt", + ready.display(), + release.display(), + ); + + let root = repo.root.clone(); + let state_root = repo.state_root.clone(); + let guard_thread = std::thread::spawn(move || { + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + run_external_mutation_guard( + &root, + &GuardRequest { + command, + cwd: None, + env: Vec::new(), + }, + || { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + &root, + &state_root, + "guard cross-harness race test", + ) + }, + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ) + }); + + let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); + while !ready.exists() { + assert!( + std::time::Instant::now() < deadline, + "the guarded shell never reported ready" + ); + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)); + } + + let close_while_active = coordinate( + &repo.root, + &RuntimeBoundary::Close { + scope: claude_scope.clone(), + event: EventId("claude-evt-race-close".to_string()), + actor_kind: ActorKind::ClaudeCode, + }, + || repo.open_db(), + ); + assert!( + matches!( + close_while_active, + Err(crate::services::mutation_trace::runtime::CoordinateError::LockAcquisition(_)) + ), + "a foreign harness's boundary racing an active external-mutation guard must fail \ + closed with LockAcquisition, never proceed while the guard still holds the \ + worktree: {close_while_active:?}" + ); + assert!( + repo.mutation_events().is_empty(), + "a boundary that fails closed on lock acquisition must touch no protocol state" + ); + + fs::write(&release, "go").expect("release file should write"); + let outcome = guard_thread + .join() + .expect("guard thread should not panic") + .expect("the guard should finish successfully once released"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&pi_scope_id), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "abandoned".to_string())) + ); + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&claude_scope.0), + Some(("claude_code".to_string(), "abandoned".to_string())) + ); + + coordinate( + &repo.root, + &RuntimeBoundary::Close { + scope: claude_scope.clone(), + event: EventId("claude-evt-race-close-retry".to_string()), + actor_kind: ActorKind::ClaudeCode, + }, + || repo.open_db(), + ) + .expect( + "Claude's deferred boundary must succeed normally once retried against the \ + recovered worktree, rather than continuing to fail closed", + ); + repo.drive(&tool_execution_end( + &repo, + "call_pi_race", + "01a091f4-guard-cross-race-session", + )) + .expect("the Pi adapter must reconcile its own already-abandoned scope cleanly too"); + + assert!( + repo.mutation_events().is_empty(), + "both human writes made under the guard must remain excluded from positive AI \ + attribution for the Pi scope and for the racing foreign-harness scope alike" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_guard_triggered_abandonment_does_not_poison_the_checkout_for_a_fresh_pi_scope() { + let repo = GuardRepo::new("post-recovery-fresh-start"); + let session = "01a091f4-guard-fresh-session"; + let key_a = AttemptKey { + session_id: session.to_string(), + tool_call_id: "call_doomed".to_string(), + }; + let scope_a = format_pi_scope_id(&key_a, 1); + + repo.drive(&tool_call(&repo, "call_doomed", session)) + .expect("A's Start should reach the real runtime"); + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_a), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "active".to_string())) + ); + + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let root = repo.root.clone(); + let outcome = run_external_mutation_guard( + &root, + &GuardRequest { + command: "printf changed >> file.txt".to_string(), + cwd: None, + env: Vec::new(), + }, + || repo.open_db(), + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ) + .expect("the guard should finish successfully"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_a), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "abandoned".to_string())) + ); + repo.drive(&tool_execution_end(&repo, "call_doomed", session)) + .expect("the adapter must reconcile the guard-abandoned scope cleanly"); + + let key_c = AttemptKey { + session_id: session.to_string(), + tool_call_id: "call_clean".to_string(), + }; + let scope_c = format_pi_scope_id(&key_c, 2); + + repo.drive(&tool_call(&repo, "call_clean", session)) + .expect("a fresh Start on the same worktree after recovery must succeed normally"); + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_c), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "active".to_string())) + ); + + repo.write("file.txt", "one\nchanged\nclean\n"); + repo.drive(&tool_result(&repo, "call_clean", session)) + .expect("tool_result should mark Executed"); + repo.drive(&tool_execution_end(&repo, "call_clean", session)) + .expect("Close should reach the real runtime"); + + assert_eq!( + repo.scope_status(&scope_c), + Some(("pi".to_string(), "closed".to_string())) + ); + assert_eq!( + repo.mutation_events(), + vec![("ai_exclusive".to_string(), Some(scope_c))], + "a clean Pi mutation after guard-triggered recovery must still reach AiExclusive; \ + recovery must not permanently poison the checkout for later, uninterfered-with work" + ); + } +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/os_lock.rs b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/os_lock.rs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dc567c1b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/os_lock.rs @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +use std::fs::{File, OpenOptions, TryLockError}; +use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; +use std::time::{Duration, Instant}; + +use anyhow::Context; + +const LOCK_POLL_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_millis(20); + +#[derive(Debug)] +pub(crate) enum AdvisoryLockError { + TimedOut { + path: PathBuf, + timeout: Duration, + what: &'static str, + }, + Io(anyhow::Error), +} + +impl std::fmt::Display for AdvisoryLockError { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { + match self { + AdvisoryLockError::TimedOut { + path, + timeout, + what, + } => write!( + f, + "Timed out after {timeout:?} waiting for the {what} lock '{}'", + path.display() + ), + AdvisoryLockError::Io(source) => write!(f, "{source}"), + } + } +} + +impl std::error::Error for AdvisoryLockError {} + +pub(crate) struct OsAdvisoryLock { + file: File, +} + +impl OsAdvisoryLock { + pub(crate) fn acquire( + parent_dir: &Path, + lock_path: PathBuf, + timeout: Duration, + what: &'static str, + ) -> Result { + std::fs::create_dir_all(parent_dir) + .with_context(|| { + format!( + "Failed to create {what} lock directory '{}'", + parent_dir.display() + ) + }) + .map_err(AdvisoryLockError::Io)?; + + let file = OpenOptions::new() + .write(true) + .create(true) + .truncate(false) + .open(&lock_path) + .with_context(|| format!("Failed to open {what} lock file '{}'", lock_path.display())) + .map_err(AdvisoryLockError::Io)?; + + let deadline = Instant::now() + timeout; + loop { + match file.try_lock() { + Ok(()) => return Ok(OsAdvisoryLock { file }), + Err(TryLockError::WouldBlock) => { + let now = Instant::now(); + if now >= deadline { + return Err(AdvisoryLockError::TimedOut { + path: lock_path, + timeout, + what, + }); + } + std::thread::sleep(LOCK_POLL_INTERVAL.min(deadline - now)); + } + Err(TryLockError::Error(source)) => { + return Err(AdvisoryLockError::Io(anyhow::Error::new(source).context( + format!("Failed to acquire {what} lock '{}'", lock_path.display()), + ))); + } + } + } + } +} + +impl Drop for OsAdvisoryLock { + fn drop(&mut self) { + let _ = self.file.unlock(); + } +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/process_owner.rs b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/process_owner.rs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bb252b01f --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/process_owner.rs @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)] +pub(crate) struct ProcessOwner { + pub pid: i32, + pub instance_token: Option, +} + +#[cfg(unix)] +mod raw { + unsafe extern "C" { + pub(super) fn getppid() -> i32; + pub(super) fn kill(pid: i32, sig: i32) -> i32; + } +} + +#[cfg(unix)] +const ESRCH: i32 = 3; + +pub(crate) fn process_owner_for(pid: i32) -> ProcessOwner { + ProcessOwner { + pid, + instance_token: process_start_ticks(pid), + } +} + +pub(crate) fn current_process_owner() -> ProcessOwner { + #[cfg(unix)] + { + process_owner_for(unsafe { raw::getppid() }) + } + #[cfg(not(unix))] + { + ProcessOwner { + pid: 0, + instance_token: None, + } + } +} + +pub(crate) fn is_definitely_dead(owner: &ProcessOwner) -> bool { + #[cfg(unix)] + { + if unsafe { raw::kill(owner.pid, 0) } == 0 { + match owner.instance_token { + Some(recorded) => match process_start_ticks(owner.pid) { + Some(current) => current != recorded, + None => false, + }, + None => false, + } + } else { + std::io::Error::last_os_error().raw_os_error() == Some(ESRCH) + } + } + #[cfg(not(unix))] + { + let _ = owner; + false + } +} + +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +fn process_start_ticks(pid: i32) -> Option { + let stat = std::fs::read_to_string(format!("/proc/{pid}/stat")).ok()?; + parse_start_ticks(&stat) +} + +#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))] +fn process_start_ticks(_pid: i32) -> Option { + None +} + +#[cfg(target_os = "linux")] +fn parse_start_ticks(stat: &str) -> Option { + let after_comm = stat.rsplit_once(')')?.1; + after_comm.split_whitespace().nth(19)?.parse().ok() +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + #[test] + fn no_ttl_or_elapsed_time_primitive_is_used_by_this_module() { + let source = include_str!("process_owner.rs"); + let production_source = source + .split_once("#[cfg(test)]") + .expect("this module has a #[cfg(test)] boundary") + .0; + let forbidden_tokens = ["Instant", "SystemTime", "time::Duration"]; + for forbidden in forbidden_tokens { + assert!( + !production_source.contains(forbidden), + "D10 forbids TTL/elapsed-time staleness evidence, found {forbidden:?}" + ); + } + } + + #[test] + fn the_current_process_owner_is_never_reported_dead() { + let owner = process_owner_for(std::process::id().cast_signed()); + assert!(!is_definitely_dead(&owner)); + } + + #[test] + fn a_reaped_child_process_is_positively_dead() { + let mut child = std::process::Command::new("true") + .spawn() + .expect("spawning 'true' should succeed"); + let pid = i32::try_from(child.id()).expect("pid fits in i32"); + child.wait().expect("child should exit and be reaped"); + + let owner = ProcessOwner { + pid, + instance_token: None, + }; + assert!( + is_definitely_dead(&owner), + "a reaped child's pid must be positively proven dead, not merely assumed" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_live_process_is_never_abandoned_merely_because_no_instance_token_is_recorded() { + let owner = ProcessOwner { + pid: std::process::id().cast_signed(), + instance_token: None, + }; + assert!(!is_definitely_dead(&owner)); + } + + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] + #[test] + fn a_mismatched_instance_token_proves_death_even_though_the_pid_is_alive() { + let real_owner = process_owner_for(std::process::id().cast_signed()); + let recorded_ticks = real_owner + .instance_token + .expect("this process's own /proc/self/stat starttime must be readable on Linux"); + + let stale_owner = ProcessOwner { + pid: real_owner.pid, + instance_token: Some(recorded_ticks.wrapping_add(1)), + }; + assert!( + is_definitely_dead(&stale_owner), + "a live pid whose recorded start time no longer matches must be treated as a \ + different, dead process (PID reuse), never as the still-live original owner" + ); + } + + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] + #[test] + fn a_matching_instance_token_is_never_reported_dead() { + let real_owner = process_owner_for(std::process::id().cast_signed()); + assert!(real_owner.instance_token.is_some()); + assert!(!is_definitely_dead(&real_owner)); + } + + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] + #[test] + fn parse_start_ticks_reads_field_twenty_two_after_the_parenthesized_comm() { + let stat = "1234 (my comm) S 1 1234 1234 0 -1 4194304 100 0 0 0 5 3 0 0 20 0 4 0 987654 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0"; + assert_eq!(parse_start_ticks(stat), Some(987_654)); + } + + #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] + #[test] + fn parse_start_ticks_handles_a_comm_containing_spaces_and_parens() { + let stat = "1234 (weird ) comm)) S 1 1234 1234 0 -1 4194304 100 0 0 0 5 3 0 0 20 0 4 0 42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0"; + assert_eq!(parse_start_ticks(stat), Some(42)); + } +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/state.rs b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/state.rs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c7d4bc2eb --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/state.rs @@ -0,0 +1,972 @@ +use std::fs::OpenOptions; +use std::io::Write as _; +use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; +use std::time::Duration; + +use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result}; +use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; + +use super::os_lock::{AdvisoryLockError, OsAdvisoryLock}; +use super::process_owner::{current_process_owner, is_definitely_dead, ProcessOwner}; +use super::{format_pi_scope_id, AttemptKey}; + +const SCE_STATE_DIR: &str = "sce"; +const ADAPTER_STATE_FILE: &str = "pi-mutation-scope-state.json"; +const ADAPTER_STATE_LOCK_FILE: &str = "pi-mutation-scope-state.lock"; +const STATE_LOCK_WHAT: &str = "adapter-state"; + +const DEFAULT_LOCK_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10); + +const ADAPTER_STATE_VERSION: u32 = 2; + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)] +#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")] +pub(crate) enum AttemptPhase { + PendingStart, + Executed, + PendingAbandon, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)] +#[serde(tag = "phase", rename_all = "snake_case")] +pub(crate) enum RecoveryState { + #[default] + Clear, + Pending { + generation: u64, + }, + Flushing { + generation: u64, + }, +} + +impl RecoveryState { + pub(crate) fn is_clear(&self) -> bool { + matches!(self, RecoveryState::Clear) + } +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)] +pub(crate) struct AdapterAttempt { + pub attempt_seq: u64, + pub scope_id: String, + pub session_id: String, + pub tool_call_id: String, + pub tool_name: String, + pub phase: AttemptPhase, + pub owner: ProcessOwner, +} + +impl AdapterAttempt { + fn matches_key(&self, key: &AttemptKey) -> bool { + self.session_id == key.session_id && self.tool_call_id == key.tool_call_id + } +} + +fn default_recovery_generation() -> u64 { + 1 +} + +fn default_next_attempt_seq() -> u64 { + 1 +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)] +pub(crate) struct AdapterState { + pub version: u32, + #[serde(default = "default_next_attempt_seq")] + pub next_attempt_seq: u64, + #[serde(default = "default_recovery_generation")] + pub next_recovery_generation: u64, + #[serde(default)] + pub recovery: RecoveryState, + pub attempts: Vec, +} + +impl Default for AdapterState { + fn default() -> Self { + AdapterState { + version: ADAPTER_STATE_VERSION, + next_attempt_seq: default_next_attempt_seq(), + next_recovery_generation: default_recovery_generation(), + recovery: RecoveryState::Clear, + attempts: Vec::new(), + } + } +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub(crate) struct AllocatedAttempt { + pub attempt: AdapterAttempt, + pub reused: bool, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub(crate) enum AdmitDecision { + Admitted(AllocatedAttempt), + RecoveryBlocked, + UncertainAttemptBlocked, + TerminalAttemptBlocked, + FlushClaimed { generation: u64 }, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub(crate) enum RecoveryFlushCompletion { + Cleared, + Superseded, +} + +pub(crate) fn adapter_state_dir(git_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf { + git_dir.join(SCE_STATE_DIR) +} + +fn state_path(git_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf { + adapter_state_dir(git_dir).join(ADAPTER_STATE_FILE) +} + +fn lock_path(git_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf { + adapter_state_dir(git_dir).join(ADAPTER_STATE_LOCK_FILE) +} + +struct AdapterStateLock { + _inner: OsAdvisoryLock, +} + +impl AdapterStateLock { + fn acquire(git_dir: &Path, timeout: Duration) -> Result { + let inner = OsAdvisoryLock::acquire( + &adapter_state_dir(git_dir), + lock_path(git_dir), + timeout, + STATE_LOCK_WHAT, + )?; + Ok(AdapterStateLock { _inner: inner }) + } +} + +pub(crate) fn read_state(git_dir: &Path) -> Result { + let path = state_path(git_dir); + if !path.exists() { + return Ok(AdapterState::default()); + } + + let content = std::fs::read_to_string(&path) + .with_context(|| format!("Failed to read adapter state '{}'", path.display()))?; + parse_adapter_state(&content, &path) +} + +fn parse_adapter_state(content: &str, path: &Path) -> Result { + let state: AdapterState = serde_json::from_str(content) + .with_context(|| format!("Adapter state file '{}' is malformed", path.display()))?; + if state.version != ADAPTER_STATE_VERSION { + return Err(anyhow!( + "Adapter state file '{}' has unsupported version {} (expected {})", + path.display(), + state.version, + ADAPTER_STATE_VERSION + )); + } + Ok(state) +} + +fn write_state_durably(git_dir: &Path, state: &AdapterState) -> Result<()> { + write_state_durably_inner(git_dir, state, |_, _| Ok(())) +} + +fn write_state_durably_inner( + git_dir: &Path, + state: &AdapterState, + before_rename: F, +) -> Result<()> +where + F: FnOnce(&Path, &Path) -> Result<()>, +{ + let dir = adapter_state_dir(git_dir); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).with_context(|| { + format!( + "Failed to create adapter state directory '{}'", + dir.display() + ) + })?; + + let path = dir.join(ADAPTER_STATE_FILE); + let tmp_path = dir.join(format!("{ADAPTER_STATE_FILE}.tmp")); + + let serialized = + serde_json::to_vec_pretty(state).context("Failed to serialize adapter state")?; + + let mut tmp_file = OpenOptions::new() + .write(true) + .create(true) + .truncate(true) + .open(&tmp_path) + .with_context(|| { + format!( + "Failed to open temporary adapter state file '{}'", + tmp_path.display() + ) + })?; + tmp_file.write_all(&serialized).with_context(|| { + format!( + "Failed to write temporary adapter state file '{}'", + tmp_path.display() + ) + })?; + tmp_file.sync_data().with_context(|| { + format!( + "Failed to sync temporary adapter state file '{}'", + tmp_path.display() + ) + })?; + drop(tmp_file); + + before_rename(&tmp_path, &path)?; + + std::fs::rename(&tmp_path, &path).with_context(|| { + format!( + "Failed to rename '{}' to '{}'", + tmp_path.display(), + path.display() + ) + })?; + + #[cfg(unix)] + { + if let Ok(dir_handle) = std::fs::File::open(&dir) { + let _ = dir_handle.sync_all(); + } + } + + Ok(()) +} + +fn acquire_lock(git_dir: &Path) -> Result { + AdapterStateLock::acquire(git_dir, DEFAULT_LOCK_TIMEOUT) + .map_err(|err| anyhow!("Failed to acquire adapter-state lock: {err}")) +} + +fn allocate_pending_start( + state: &mut AdapterState, + key: &AttemptKey, + tool_name: &str, +) -> AdapterAttempt { + let attempt_seq = state.next_attempt_seq; + state.next_attempt_seq += 1; + + let attempt = AdapterAttempt { + attempt_seq, + scope_id: format_pi_scope_id(key, attempt_seq), + session_id: key.session_id.clone(), + tool_call_id: key.tool_call_id.clone(), + tool_name: tool_name.to_string(), + phase: AttemptPhase::PendingStart, + owner: current_process_owner(), + }; + state.attempts.push(attempt.clone()); + attempt +} + +pub(crate) fn admit_tracked_attempt( + git_dir: &Path, + key: &AttemptKey, + tool_name: &str, +) -> Result { + let _lock = acquire_lock(git_dir)?; + let mut state = read_state(git_dir)?; + + if let Some(existing) = state + .attempts + .iter() + .find(|attempt| attempt.matches_key(key)) + { + if existing.phase == AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon { + return Ok(AdmitDecision::TerminalAttemptBlocked); + } + return Ok(AdmitDecision::Admitted(AllocatedAttempt { + attempt: existing.clone(), + reused: true, + })); + } + + match state.recovery { + RecoveryState::Flushing { .. } => return Ok(AdmitDecision::RecoveryBlocked), + RecoveryState::Pending { generation } => { + state.recovery = RecoveryState::Flushing { generation }; + write_state_durably(git_dir, &state)?; + return Ok(AdmitDecision::FlushClaimed { generation }); + } + RecoveryState::Clear => {} + } + + if state + .attempts + .iter() + .any(|attempt| attempt.phase == AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon) + { + return Ok(AdmitDecision::UncertainAttemptBlocked); + } + + let attempt = allocate_pending_start(&mut state, key, tool_name); + write_state_durably(git_dir, &state)?; + Ok(AdmitDecision::Admitted(AllocatedAttempt { + attempt, + reused: false, + })) +} + +/// Read-only D10 scan: `scope_id`s of live (`PendingStart`/`Executed`) attempts whose own +/// recorded owner is positively dead. Never includes `PendingAbandon`. +pub(crate) fn find_definitely_dead_attempts(git_dir: &Path) -> Result> { + let _lock = acquire_lock(git_dir)?; + let state = read_state(git_dir)?; + Ok(state + .attempts + .iter() + .filter(|attempt| { + matches!( + attempt.phase, + AttemptPhase::PendingStart | AttemptPhase::Executed + ) && is_definitely_dead(&attempt.owner) + }) + .map(|attempt| attempt.scope_id.clone()) + .collect()) +} + +pub(crate) fn mark_executed(git_dir: &Path, key: &AttemptKey) -> Result<()> { + let _lock = acquire_lock(git_dir)?; + + let mut state = read_state(git_dir)?; + let Some(attempt) = state + .attempts + .iter_mut() + .find(|attempt| attempt.matches_key(key)) + else { + return Ok(()); + }; + + if attempt.phase == AttemptPhase::PendingStart { + attempt.phase = AttemptPhase::Executed; + write_state_durably(git_dir, &state)?; + } + Ok(()) +} + +pub(crate) fn remove_attempt(git_dir: &Path, scope_id: &str) -> Result<()> { + let _lock = acquire_lock(git_dir)?; + + let mut state = read_state(git_dir)?; + let before = state.attempts.len(); + state + .attempts + .retain(|attempt| attempt.scope_id != scope_id); + if state.attempts.len() == before { + return Ok(()); + } + write_state_durably(git_dir, &state) +} + +pub(crate) fn normalize_recovery_after_boundary_lock_acquired(git_dir: &Path) -> Result<()> { + let _lock = acquire_lock(git_dir)?; + let mut state = read_state(git_dir)?; + + if let RecoveryState::Flushing { generation } = state.recovery { + state.recovery = RecoveryState::Pending { generation }; + write_state_durably(git_dir, &state)?; + } + Ok(()) +} + +pub(crate) fn begin_terminal_cleanup(git_dir: &Path, scope_ids: &[String]) -> Result { + let _lock = acquire_lock(git_dir)?; + let mut state = read_state(git_dir)?; + + for attempt in &mut state.attempts { + if scope_ids + .iter() + .any(|scope_id| scope_id == &attempt.scope_id) + { + attempt.phase = AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon; + } + } + + let generation = match state.recovery { + RecoveryState::Pending { generation } | RecoveryState::Flushing { generation } => { + generation + } + RecoveryState::Clear => { + let generation = state.next_recovery_generation; + state.next_recovery_generation += 1; + generation + } + }; + state.recovery = RecoveryState::Flushing { generation }; + write_state_durably(git_dir, &state)?; + Ok(generation) +} + +pub(crate) fn complete_recovery_flush( + git_dir: &Path, + generation: u64, +) -> Result { + let _lock = acquire_lock(git_dir)?; + let mut state = read_state(git_dir)?; + + match state.recovery { + RecoveryState::Flushing { generation: owned } if owned == generation => { + state.recovery = RecoveryState::Clear; + write_state_durably(git_dir, &state)?; + Ok(RecoveryFlushCompletion::Cleared) + } + _ => Ok(RecoveryFlushCompletion::Superseded), + } +} + +pub(crate) fn relinquish_recovery_flush(git_dir: &Path, generation: u64) -> Result<()> { + let _lock = acquire_lock(git_dir)?; + let mut state = read_state(git_dir)?; + + if let RecoveryState::Flushing { generation: owned } = state.recovery { + if owned == generation { + state.recovery = RecoveryState::Pending { generation: owned }; + write_state_durably(git_dir, &state)?; + } + } + Ok(()) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +pub(crate) fn seed_attempt_for_tests( + git_dir: &Path, + key: &AttemptKey, + tool_name: &str, + phase: AttemptPhase, +) -> AdapterAttempt { + let _lock = acquire_lock(git_dir).expect("test seed lock"); + let mut state = read_state(git_dir).expect("test seed read"); + allocate_pending_start(&mut state, key, tool_name); + let seeded = state.attempts.last_mut().expect("attempt was just pushed"); + seeded.phase = phase; + let attempt = seeded.clone(); + write_state_durably(git_dir, &state).expect("test seed write"); + attempt +} + +#[cfg(test)] +pub(crate) fn set_attempt_owner_for_tests( + git_dir: &Path, + scope_id: &str, + owner: ProcessOwner, +) -> AdapterAttempt { + let _lock = acquire_lock(git_dir).expect("test owner-override lock"); + let mut state = read_state(git_dir).expect("test owner-override read"); + let attempt = state + .attempts + .iter_mut() + .find(|attempt| attempt.scope_id == scope_id) + .expect("attempt to override must already exist"); + attempt.owner = owner; + let updated = attempt.clone(); + write_state_durably(git_dir, &state).expect("test owner-override write"); + updated +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering}; + use std::thread; + + use super::*; + + static NEXT_TEST_GIT_DIR_ID: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0); + + fn unique_test_git_dir(label: &str) -> PathBuf { + let id = NEXT_TEST_GIT_DIR_ID.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed); + std::env::temp_dir().join(format!( + "sce-pi-mutation-scope-state-{label}-{}-{id}", + std::process::id() + )) + } + + fn remove_test_git_dir(git_dir: &Path) { + let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(git_dir); + } + + fn key(session_id: &str, tool_call_id: &str) -> AttemptKey { + AttemptKey { + session_id: session_id.to_string(), + tool_call_id: tool_call_id.to_string(), + } + } + + fn admit(git_dir: &Path, key: &AttemptKey, tool_name: &str) -> AdmitDecision { + admit_tracked_attempt(git_dir, key, tool_name).expect("admit should not error") + } + + #[test] + fn read_state_returns_default_when_file_is_absent() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("read-default"); + + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("missing state file should read as default"); + assert_eq!(state, AdapterState::default()); + assert_eq!(state.version, ADAPTER_STATE_VERSION); + assert!(state.recovery.is_clear()); + assert_eq!(state.next_recovery_generation, 1); + assert_eq!(state.next_attempt_seq, 1); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn admit_persists_the_pending_start_attempt_with_attempt_seq_one() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("admit-persists-pending-start"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + + let AdmitDecision::Admitted(allocated) = admit(&git_dir, &key("ses-1", "call-1"), "write") + else { + panic!("expected Admitted"); + }; + assert_eq!(allocated.attempt.attempt_seq, 1); + + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state should be readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].scope_id, allocated.attempt.scope_id); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].phase, AttemptPhase::PendingStart); + assert_eq!(state.attempts[0].tool_call_id, "call-1"); + assert_eq!(state.next_attempt_seq, 2); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn duplicate_live_delivery_reuses_the_same_attempt_and_scope_id() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("duplicate-reuse"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + let attempt_key = key("ses-1", "call-1"); + + let AdmitDecision::Admitted(first) = admit(&git_dir, &attempt_key, "bash") else { + panic!("first admission should be Admitted"); + }; + assert!(!first.reused); + + let AdmitDecision::Admitted(second) = admit(&git_dir, &attempt_key, "bash") else { + panic!("duplicate delivery should still be Admitted"); + }; + assert!(second.reused); + assert_eq!(first.attempt.scope_id, second.attempt.scope_id); + + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state should be readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), 1); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_pending_start_attempt_never_blocks_a_concurrent_new_admission() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("pending-start-does-not-block"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + + seed_attempt_for_tests( + &git_dir, + &key("ses-1", "call-a"), + "bash", + AttemptPhase::PendingStart, + ); + + let AdmitDecision::Admitted(second) = admit(&git_dir, &key("ses-1", "call-b"), "bash") + else { + panic!( + "D12: a lingering PendingStart from a still-executing tool call must not block \ + a genuinely concurrent tool call" + ); + }; + assert!(!second.reused); + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").attempts.len(), + 2 + ); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn admit_blocks_a_new_admission_while_a_pending_abandon_exists() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("admit-blocks-on-pending-abandon"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + + seed_attempt_for_tests( + &git_dir, + &key("ses-1", "call-a"), + "bash", + AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon, + ); + + assert_eq!( + admit(&git_dir, &key("ses-1", "call-b"), "bash"), + AdmitDecision::UncertainAttemptBlocked, + "an unresolved PendingAbandon must fail closed for a new admission" + ); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn admit_rejects_duplicate_delivery_of_a_pending_abandon_key() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("admit-duplicate-pending-abandon"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + let attempt_key = key("ses-1", "call-1"); + + seed_attempt_for_tests(&git_dir, &attempt_key, "bash", AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon); + + assert_eq!( + admit(&git_dir, &attempt_key, "bash"), + AdmitDecision::TerminalAttemptBlocked, + ); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn admit_claims_the_flush_when_recovery_is_pending() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("admit-claims-flush"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + + seed_attempt_for_tests( + &git_dir, + &key("ses-1", "call-doomed"), + "bash", + AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon, + ); + let generation = begin_terminal_cleanup(&git_dir, &[]).expect("arming recovery succeeds"); + relinquish_recovery_flush(&git_dir, generation).expect("relinquish to Pending"); + + assert_eq!( + admit(&git_dir, &key("ses-1", "call-new"), "bash"), + AdmitDecision::FlushClaimed { generation }, + ); + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").recovery, + RecoveryState::Flushing { generation }, + ); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn only_one_concurrent_caller_claims_the_flush_for_a_generation() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("one-flush-owner"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + seed_attempt_for_tests( + &git_dir, + &key("ses-1", "call-doomed"), + "bash", + AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon, + ); + let generation = begin_terminal_cleanup(&git_dir, &[]).expect("arm recovery"); + relinquish_recovery_flush(&git_dir, generation).expect("relinquish to Pending"); + + let handles: Vec<_> = ["a", "b"] + .into_iter() + .map(|suffix| { + let git_dir = git_dir.clone(); + thread::spawn(move || { + admit_tracked_attempt( + &git_dir, + &key("ses-1", &format!("call-{suffix}")), + "bash", + ) + .expect("admit should not error") + }) + }) + .collect(); + + let decisions: Vec = handles + .into_iter() + .map(|handle| handle.join().expect("thread should not panic")) + .collect(); + + let flush_claims = decisions + .iter() + .filter(|decision| matches!(decision, AdmitDecision::FlushClaimed { .. })) + .count(); + let blocked = decisions + .iter() + .filter(|decision| matches!(decision, AdmitDecision::RecoveryBlocked)) + .count(); + assert_eq!(flush_claims, 1, "exactly one process may claim Flushing(g)"); + assert_eq!( + blocked, 1, + "the other concurrent caller must stay fail-closed" + ); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn complete_recovery_flush_clears_only_with_the_matching_generation() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("complete-matching-generation"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + + let generation = begin_terminal_cleanup(&git_dir, &[]).expect("arm"); + + assert_eq!( + complete_recovery_flush(&git_dir, generation + 1).expect("wrong-generation completion"), + RecoveryFlushCompletion::Superseded, + ); + assert_eq!( + complete_recovery_flush(&git_dir, generation).expect("matching completion"), + RecoveryFlushCompletion::Cleared, + ); + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .recovery + .is_clear()); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn normalize_after_boundary_lock_reclaims_orphaned_flushing_to_pending_same_generation() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("normalize-orphaned-flushing"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + + let generation = begin_terminal_cleanup(&git_dir, &[]).expect("arm g1"); + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").recovery, + RecoveryState::Flushing { generation }, + ); + + normalize_recovery_after_boundary_lock_acquired(&git_dir) + .expect("normalize should succeed"); + + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").recovery, + RecoveryState::Pending { generation }, + ); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn mark_executed_transitions_pending_start_only() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("mark-executed"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + admit(&git_dir, &key("ses-1", "call-1"), "bash"); + + mark_executed(&git_dir, &key("ses-1", "call-1")).expect("mark_executed succeeds"); + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").attempts[0].phase, + AttemptPhase::Executed, + ); + + mark_executed(&git_dir, &key("ses-unknown", "call-unknown")) + .expect("marking an unknown key executed is a safe no-op"); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn mark_executed_does_not_resurrect_a_pending_abandon_attempt() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("mark-executed-pending-abandon"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + seed_attempt_for_tests( + &git_dir, + &key("ses-1", "call-1"), + "bash", + AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon, + ); + + mark_executed(&git_dir, &key("ses-1", "call-1")).expect("mark_executed should not error"); + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("state readable").attempts[0].phase, + AttemptPhase::PendingAbandon, + "a late tool_result must never move a PendingAbandon attempt back to Executed" + ); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn removing_an_already_removed_attempt_is_a_safe_no_op() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("remove-idempotent"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + let AdmitDecision::Admitted(allocated) = admit(&git_dir, &key("ses-1", "call-1"), "bash") + else { + panic!("expected Admitted"); + }; + + remove_attempt(&git_dir, &allocated.attempt.scope_id).expect("first removal succeeds"); + remove_attempt(&git_dir, &allocated.attempt.scope_id) + .expect("duplicate terminal delivery after cleanup must be a safe no-op"); + + assert!(read_state(&git_dir) + .expect("state readable") + .attempts + .is_empty()); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn a_new_attempt_after_terminal_cleanup_gets_a_fresh_attempt_seq_and_scope_id() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("terminal-scope-id-non-reuse"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + let attempt_key = key("ses-1", "call-1"); + + let AdmitDecision::Admitted(first) = admit(&git_dir, &attempt_key, "bash") else { + panic!("expected Admitted"); + }; + assert_eq!(first.attempt.attempt_seq, 1); + remove_attempt(&git_dir, &first.attempt.scope_id).expect("terminal cleanup"); + + let AdmitDecision::Admitted(second) = admit(&git_dir, &attempt_key, "bash") else { + panic!("expected Admitted for the reused toolCallId"); + }; + assert!(!second.reused); + assert_eq!(second.attempt.attempt_seq, 2); + assert_ne!( + first.attempt.scope_id, second.attempt.scope_id, + "a reused toolCallId after terminal cleanup must never reactivate the old ScopeId" + ); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn state_round_trips_durably_through_the_canonical_path() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("round-trip"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + + let AdmitDecision::Admitted(allocated) = admit(&git_dir, &key("ses-7", "call-9"), "write") + else { + panic!("expected Admitted"); + }; + mark_executed(&git_dir, &key("ses-7", "call-9")).expect("mark_executed succeeds"); + + let reloaded = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state should reload"); + assert_eq!(reloaded.version, ADAPTER_STATE_VERSION); + assert_eq!(reloaded.attempts.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(reloaded.attempts[0].phase, AttemptPhase::Executed); + assert_eq!(reloaded.attempts[0].tool_name, "write"); + assert_eq!(reloaded.attempts[0].scope_id, allocated.attempt.scope_id); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn malformed_state_file_is_rejected_without_fabricating_bookkeeping() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("malformed-json"); + let dir = adapter_state_dir(&git_dir); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("state dir should be created"); + std::fs::write(state_path(&git_dir), b"not json") + .expect("malformed file should be written"); + + let error = read_state(&git_dir).expect_err("malformed state file must be rejected"); + assert!(error.to_string().contains("malformed")); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn an_unsupported_version_state_file_is_rejected() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("unsupported-version"); + let dir = adapter_state_dir(&git_dir); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("state dir should be created"); + std::fs::write( + state_path(&git_dir), + serde_json::json!({ + "version": 99, + "next_attempt_seq": 1, + "next_recovery_generation": 1, + "recovery": { "phase": "clear" }, + "attempts": [] + }) + .to_string(), + ) + .expect("state file should be written"); + + let error = read_state(&git_dir).expect_err("unsupported version must be rejected"); + assert!(error.to_string().contains("unsupported version")); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn interruption_before_rename_leaves_the_canonical_path_unaffected() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("interrupted-before-rename"); + let dir = adapter_state_dir(&git_dir); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("state dir should be created"); + + let state = AdapterState::default(); + let result = write_state_durably_inner(&git_dir, &state, |tmp_path, canonical_path| { + assert!(tmp_path.exists()); + assert!(!canonical_path.exists()); + Err(anyhow!("injected interruption before rename")) + }); + + assert!(result.is_err()); + assert!(!state_path(&git_dir).exists()); + assert_eq!( + read_state(&git_dir).expect("read should not error on an absent canonical file"), + AdapterState::default(), + ); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + const PARALLEL_ADMISSION_COUNT: usize = 6; + + #[test] + fn parallel_admissions_serialize_and_converge_without_lost_updates() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("parallel-admissions"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + + let handles: Vec<_> = (0..PARALLEL_ADMISSION_COUNT) + .map(|index| { + let git_dir = git_dir.clone(); + thread::spawn(move || { + let attempt_key = key("ses-1", &format!("call-{index}")); + admit_tracked_attempt(&git_dir, &attempt_key, "bash") + .expect("admit should not error") + }) + }) + .collect(); + + let mut scope_ids: Vec = handles + .into_iter() + .map(|handle| { + let AdmitDecision::Admitted(allocated) = + handle.join().expect("thread should not panic") + else { + panic!("D12: every genuinely distinct concurrent call must be admitted"); + }; + allocated.attempt.scope_id + }) + .collect(); + scope_ids.sort_unstable(); + scope_ids.dedup(); + assert_eq!(scope_ids.len(), PARALLEL_ADMISSION_COUNT); + + let state = read_state(&git_dir).expect("state should be readable"); + assert_eq!(state.attempts.len(), PARALLEL_ADMISSION_COUNT); + assert!(state + .attempts + .iter() + .all(|a| a.phase == AttemptPhase::PendingStart)); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } + + #[test] + fn adapter_state_files_live_only_below_git_dir_sce() { + let git_dir = unique_test_git_dir("path-boundary"); + std::fs::create_dir_all(&git_dir).expect("git dir should be created"); + + admit(&git_dir, &key("ses-1", "call-1"), "bash"); + + let sce_dir = git_dir.join(SCE_STATE_DIR); + assert!(state_path(&git_dir).starts_with(&sce_dir)); + assert!(lock_path(&git_dir).starts_with(&sce_dir)); + + remove_test_git_dir(&git_dir); + } +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/driver.rs b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/driver.rs index 5780fa65c..8cc6669dd 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/driver.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/driver.rs @@ -77,13 +77,14 @@ impl MutationCursorDriver { worktree_trees.insert(id.clone(), tree("tree0")); } - let scope_partition: [(&str, &WorktreeId, ActorKind); 6] = [ + let scope_partition: [(&str, &WorktreeId, ActorKind); 7] = [ ("scope0", &wt0, ActorKind::ClaudeCode), ("scope1", &wt0, ActorKind::ClaudeCode), ("scope2", &wt0, ActorKind::Codex), ("scope3", &wt1, ActorKind::OpenCode), ("scope4", &wt0, ActorKind::Codex), ("scope5", &wt0, ActorKind::OpenCode), + ("scope6", &wt0, ActorKind::Pi), ]; let mut scopes = BTreeMap::new(); for (id, owning_worktree, actor_kind) in scope_partition { diff --git a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/model.rs b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/model.rs index cefce9b4b..dcb26c553 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/model.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/model.rs @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ pub(super) enum WireScopeId { Scope3, Scope4, Scope5, + Scope6, } impl From for ScopeId { @@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ impl From for ScopeId { WireScopeId::Scope3 => "scope3", WireScopeId::Scope4 => "scope4", WireScopeId::Scope5 => "scope5", + WireScopeId::Scope6 => "scope6", } .to_string(), ) diff --git a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/tests.rs b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/tests.rs index 8c4bb0cda..3638f0910 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/tests.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/tests.rs @@ -169,7 +169,8 @@ fn mutation_cursor_guarded_recover_invokes_real_recover() -> impl Driver { #[quint_run( spec = "../spec/mutation_cursor.qnt", max_samples = 500, - max_steps = 30 + max_steps = 30, + seed = "0xbd646ab9" )] fn mutation_cursor_generated_traces_refine_rust_protocol() -> impl Driver { MutationCursorDriver::default() diff --git a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/protocol.rs b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/protocol.rs index b6425ffd3..f09ff21cc 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/protocol.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/protocol.rs @@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ pub fn attribution_for(state: &ProtocolState, worktree: &WorktreeId) -> Attribut pub fn requires_boundary_confirmation(actor_kind: ActorKind) -> bool { match actor_kind { - ActorKind::Codex | ActorKind::OpenCode => true, - ActorKind::ClaudeCode | ActorKind::Pi => false, + ActorKind::Codex | ActorKind::OpenCode | ActorKind::Pi => true, + ActorKind::ClaudeCode => false, } } diff --git a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/coordinator.rs b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/coordinator.rs index 766ee05bd..56ff5b395 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/coordinator.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/coordinator.rs @@ -241,6 +241,27 @@ where ) } +pub(super) fn coordinate_on_held_worktree

( + repository_root: &Path, + worktree_id: &WorktreeId, + boundary: &RuntimeBoundary, + open_db: P, + force_recovery: bool, +) -> Result +where + P: FnOnce() -> anyhow::Result, +{ + coordinate_protected( + repository_root, + worktree_id, + boundary, + open_db, + force_recovery, + |_attempt| {}, + |_attempt| Ok(()), + ) +} + fn protected_worktree_failure(error: ProtectedWorktreeError) -> CoordinateError { match error { ProtectedWorktreeError::GitDirResolution(source) @@ -1000,14 +1021,14 @@ mod tests { &db, &capture, &worktree, - &RuntimeBoundary::Advance { - scope: ScopeId("scope-a".to_string()), - event: EventId("evt-advance-a".to_string()), - actor_kind: actor_a, + &RuntimeBoundary::Close { + scope: ScopeId("scope-b".to_string()), + event: EventId("evt-close-b".to_string()), + actor_kind: actor_b, }, false, ) - .expect("advance should succeed"); + .expect("close should succeed"); let event = outcome .mutation_event diff --git a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..83f14a93a --- /dev/null +++ b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs @@ -0,0 +1,1759 @@ +#[cfg(not(unix))] +use std::path::Path; +#[cfg(not(unix))] +use std::sync::mpsc; + +#[cfg(not(unix))] +use crate::services::agent_trace_db::repository::RepositoryAgentTraceDb; + +use super::coordinator::CoordinateError; +use super::protected_worktree::ProtectedWorktreeError; + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub(crate) struct GuardRequest { + pub command: String, + pub cwd: Option, + pub env: Vec<(String, String)>, +} + +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub(crate) enum GuardEvent { + Armed, + Stdout(Vec), + Stderr(Vec), +} + +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] +pub(crate) struct GuardOutcome { + pub exit_code: Option, + pub marker_clear_failed: bool, +} + +#[derive(Debug)] +pub(crate) enum GuardError { + Acquire(ProtectedWorktreeError), + Cwd(anyhow::Error), + Exec(anyhow::Error), + CancelledBeforeExec, + Spawn(std::io::Error), + ArmedDelivery(std::io::Error), + Wait(std::io::Error), + Finish(CoordinateError), + UnsupportedPlatform, +} + +impl std::fmt::Display for GuardError { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { + match self { + GuardError::Acquire(source) => write!(f, "{source}"), + GuardError::Cwd(source) | GuardError::Exec(source) => write!(f, "{source}"), + GuardError::CancelledBeforeExec => { + write!(f, "external-mutation guard was cancelled before exec") + } + GuardError::Spawn(source) => write!(f, "failed to spawn the guarded shell: {source}"), + GuardError::ArmedDelivery(source) => write!( + f, + "failed to deliver the external-mutation guard admission acknowledgement: {source}" + ), + GuardError::Wait(source) => { + write!(f, "failed to wait for the guarded shell: {source}") + } + GuardError::Finish(source) => write!(f, "{source}"), + GuardError::UnsupportedPlatform => { + write!(f, "the external-mutation guard is Unix-only") + } + } + } +} + +impl std::error::Error for GuardError {} + +#[cfg(not(unix))] +pub(crate) struct ArmedExternalMutationGuard

(std::marker::PhantomData

); + +#[cfg(not(unix))] +impl

ArmedExternalMutationGuard

{ + pub(crate) fn exec( + self, + _request: &GuardRequest, + _on_event: E, + ) -> Result + where + E: FnMut(GuardEvent), + { + Err(GuardError::UnsupportedPlatform) + } +} + +#[cfg(not(unix))] +pub(crate) fn arm_external_mutation_guard( + _repository_root: &Path, + _open_db: P, + _on_armed: A, + _cancel_rx: mpsc::Receiver<()>, +) -> Result, GuardError> +where + P: FnOnce() -> anyhow::Result, + A: FnOnce() -> std::io::Result<()>, +{ + Err(GuardError::UnsupportedPlatform) +} + +#[cfg(not(unix))] +pub(crate) fn run_external_mutation_guard( + _repository_root: &Path, + _request: &GuardRequest, + _open_db: P, + _on_event: E, + _cancel_rx: mpsc::Receiver<()>, +) -> Result +where + P: FnOnce() -> anyhow::Result, + E: FnMut(GuardEvent), +{ + Err(GuardError::UnsupportedPlatform) +} + +#[cfg(unix)] +mod unix_impl { + use std::fs::File; + use std::io::{self, Read}; + use std::os::fd::{AsRawFd, FromRawFd, RawFd}; + use std::os::unix::process::CommandExt; + use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; + use std::process::{Child, ChildStderr, ChildStdout, Command, ExitStatus, Stdio}; + use std::sync::mpsc; + use std::time::{Duration, Instant}; + + use anyhow::anyhow; + + use crate::services::agent_trace_db::repository::RepositoryAgentTraceDb; + + use super::super::coordinator::coordinate_on_held_worktree; + use super::super::git_snapshot::resolve_worktree_root; + use super::super::protected_worktree::ProtectedWorktree; + use super::super::RuntimeBoundary; + use super::{GuardError, GuardEvent, GuardOutcome, GuardRequest}; + + const POLL_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_millis(20); + const STDIO_IDLE_GRACE: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100); + const STDIO_FINALIZATION_LIMIT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(1); + const SIGTERM: i32 = 15; + + const F_GETFD: i32 = 1; + const F_SETFD: i32 = 2; + const FD_CLOEXEC: i32 = 1; + const POLLIN: i16 = 0x001; + const POLLERR: i16 = 0x008; + const POLLHUP: i16 = 0x010; + const POLLNVAL: i16 = 0x020; + + #[repr(C)] + #[derive(Clone, Copy)] + struct PollFd { + fd: i32, + events: i16, + revents: i16, + } + + fn resolve_shell_executable() -> PathBuf { + const PREFERRED_BASH_PATH: &str = "/bin/bash"; + if Path::new(PREFERRED_BASH_PATH).exists() { + return PathBuf::from(PREFERRED_BASH_PATH); + } + if let Some(bash_on_path) = locate_bash_on_path() { + return bash_on_path; + } + PathBuf::from("sh") + } + + fn locate_bash_on_path() -> Option { + let output = Command::new("which").arg("bash").output().ok()?; + if !output.status.success() { + return None; + } + let stdout = String::from_utf8(output.stdout).ok()?; + let first_line = stdout.lines().next()?.trim(); + if first_line.is_empty() { + return None; + } + Some(PathBuf::from(first_line)) + } + + fn resolve_execution_cwd( + repository_root: &Path, + requested_cwd: Option<&str>, + ) -> Result { + let worktree_root = resolve_worktree_root(repository_root).map_err(GuardError::Cwd)?; + + let Some(raw_cwd) = requested_cwd else { + return Ok(worktree_root); + }; + + if raw_cwd.trim().is_empty() { + return Err(GuardError::Cwd(anyhow!( + "external-mutation guard request field 'cwd' must not be blank" + ))); + } + + let candidate = Path::new(raw_cwd); + if !candidate.is_absolute() { + return Err(GuardError::Cwd(anyhow!( + "external-mutation guard request field 'cwd' must be an absolute path, got '{raw_cwd}'" + ))); + } + + let canonical_cwd = std::fs::canonicalize(candidate).map_err(|source| { + GuardError::Cwd(anyhow!( + "external-mutation guard request field 'cwd' '{raw_cwd}' could not be resolved: {source}" + )) + })?; + + if !canonical_cwd.is_dir() { + return Err(GuardError::Cwd(anyhow!( + "external-mutation guard request field 'cwd' '{raw_cwd}' is not a directory" + ))); + } + + if !canonical_cwd.starts_with(&worktree_root) { + return Err(GuardError::Cwd(anyhow!( + "external-mutation guard request field 'cwd' '{raw_cwd}' resolves outside the guarded checkout '{}'", + worktree_root.display() + ))); + } + + Ok(canonical_cwd) + } + + mod raw { + unsafe extern "C" { + pub(super) fn dup(fd: i32) -> i32; + pub(super) fn fcntl(fd: i32, command: i32, ...) -> i32; + pub(super) fn kill(pid: i32, sig: i32) -> i32; + pub(super) fn pipe(fds: *mut i32) -> i32; + pub(super) fn poll(fds: *mut super::PollFd, count: usize, timeout: i32) -> i32; + } + } + + fn set_cloexec(fd: RawFd, enabled: bool) -> io::Result<()> { + let flags = unsafe { raw::fcntl(fd, F_GETFD, 0) }; + if flags < 0 { + return Err(io::Error::last_os_error()); + } + let updated = if enabled { + flags | FD_CLOEXEC + } else { + flags & !FD_CLOEXEC + }; + if unsafe { raw::fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, updated) } < 0 { + return Err(io::Error::last_os_error()); + } + Ok(()) + } + + #[derive(Debug)] + pub(super) struct LifetimeToken { + reader: File, + writer: Option, + } + + impl LifetimeToken { + pub(super) fn new() -> io::Result { + let mut fds = [-1_i32; 2]; + if unsafe { raw::pipe(fds.as_mut_ptr()) } < 0 { + return Err(io::Error::last_os_error()); + } + + let reader = unsafe { File::from_raw_fd(fds[0]) }; + let writer = unsafe { File::from_raw_fd(fds[1]) }; + set_cloexec(reader.as_raw_fd(), true)?; + set_cloexec(writer.as_raw_fd(), false)?; + + Ok(Self { + reader, + writer: Some(writer), + }) + } + + pub(super) fn writer_fd(&self) -> RawFd { + self.writer + .as_ref() + .expect("the supervisor writer must exist before spawn") + .as_raw_fd() + } + + fn close_writer(&mut self) { + self.writer.take(); + } + + fn observe_eof(&mut self) -> io::Result { + let mut byte = [0_u8; 1]; + match self.reader.read(&mut byte)? { + 0 => Ok(true), + _ => Ok(false), + } + } + } + + pub(super) fn spawn_guarded_shell( + execution_cwd: &Path, + request: &GuardRequest, + lock_fd: RawFd, + lifetime_fd: RawFd, + ) -> std::io::Result { + let duplicated_lock_fd = unsafe { raw::dup(lock_fd) }; + if duplicated_lock_fd < 0 { + return Err(std::io::Error::last_os_error()); + } + let duplicated_lock_fd_guard = unsafe { File::from_raw_fd(duplicated_lock_fd) }; + set_cloexec(duplicated_lock_fd_guard.as_raw_fd(), false)?; + set_cloexec(lifetime_fd, false)?; + + let mut command = Command::new(resolve_shell_executable()); + command + .arg("-c") + .arg(&request.command) + .current_dir(execution_cwd) + .envs(request.env.iter().cloned()) + .process_group(0) + .stdin(Stdio::null()) + .stdout(Stdio::piped()) + .stderr(Stdio::piped()); + + let result = command.spawn(); + drop(duplicated_lock_fd_guard); + result + } + + fn poll_fds(fds: &mut [PollFd], timeout: Duration) -> io::Result<()> { + let milliseconds = i32::try_from(timeout.as_millis().clamp(1, i32::MAX as u128)) + .expect("poll timeout was clamped to i32::MAX"); + loop { + if unsafe { raw::poll(fds.as_mut_ptr(), fds.len(), milliseconds) } >= 0 { + return Ok(()); + } + let source = io::Error::last_os_error(); + if source.kind() != io::ErrorKind::Interrupted { + return Err(source); + } + } + } + + enum StreamRead { + Data, + Closed, + NoData, + } + + fn consume_stream( + pipe: &mut R, + wrap: fn(Vec) -> GuardEvent, + on_event: &mut impl FnMut(GuardEvent), + ) -> io::Result { + let mut buffer = [0_u8; 8192]; + match pipe.read(&mut buffer) { + Ok(0) => Ok(StreamRead::Closed), + Ok(count) => { + on_event(wrap(buffer[..count].to_vec())); + Ok(StreamRead::Data) + } + Err(source) if source.kind() == io::ErrorKind::Interrupted => Ok(StreamRead::NoData), + Err(source) => Err(source), + } + } + + fn stream_is_open(stdout: Option<&ChildStdout>, stderr: Option<&ChildStderr>) -> bool { + stdout.is_some() || stderr.is_some() + } + + fn poll_and_consume_streams( + lifetime: &mut LifetimeToken, + stdout: &mut Option, + stderr: &mut Option, + on_event: &mut impl FnMut(GuardEvent), + timeout: Duration, + lifetime_complete: &mut bool, + last_stream_activity: &mut Instant, + ) -> io::Result<()> { + let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(3); + let lifetime_index = if *lifetime_complete { + None + } else { + let index = descriptors.len(); + descriptors.push(PollFd { + fd: lifetime.reader.as_raw_fd(), + events: POLLIN, + revents: 0, + }); + Some(index) + }; + let stdout_index = stdout.as_ref().map(|pipe| { + let index = descriptors.len(); + descriptors.push(PollFd { + fd: pipe.as_raw_fd(), + events: POLLIN, + revents: 0, + }); + index + }); + let stderr_index = stderr.as_ref().map(|pipe| { + let index = descriptors.len(); + descriptors.push(PollFd { + fd: pipe.as_raw_fd(), + events: POLLIN, + revents: 0, + }); + index + }); + + poll_fds(&mut descriptors, timeout)?; + if let Some(index) = lifetime_index { + if descriptors[index].revents & (POLLIN | POLLERR | POLLHUP | POLLNVAL) != 0 { + *lifetime_complete = lifetime.observe_eof()?; + } + } + if let Some(index) = stdout_index { + if descriptors[index].revents & (POLLIN | POLLERR | POLLHUP | POLLNVAL) != 0 { + if let Some(pipe) = stdout.as_mut() { + match consume_stream(pipe, GuardEvent::Stdout, on_event)? { + StreamRead::Data => *last_stream_activity = Instant::now(), + StreamRead::Closed => *stdout = None, + StreamRead::NoData => {} + } + } + } + } + if let Some(index) = stderr_index { + if descriptors[index].revents & (POLLIN | POLLERR | POLLHUP | POLLNVAL) != 0 { + if let Some(pipe) = stderr.as_mut() { + match consume_stream(pipe, GuardEvent::Stderr, on_event)? { + StreamRead::Data => *last_stream_activity = Instant::now(), + StreamRead::Closed => *stderr = None, + StreamRead::NoData => {} + } + } + } + } + Ok(()) + } + + struct GuardOwnership { + protected: Option, + spawned: bool, + lifetime_complete: bool, + } + + impl GuardOwnership { + fn new(protected: ProtectedWorktree) -> Self { + Self { + protected: Some(protected), + spawned: false, + lifetime_complete: false, + } + } + + fn mark_spawned(&mut self) { + self.spawned = true; + } + + fn mark_lifetime_complete(&mut self) { + self.lifetime_complete = true; + } + + fn protected(&self) -> &ProtectedWorktree { + self.protected + .as_ref() + .expect("guard ownership must contain the protected worktree") + } + + fn abandon_after_spawn_without_unlock(&mut self) { + if let Some(protected) = self.protected.take() { + protected.abandon_after_spawn_without_unlock(); + } + } + + fn take_protected(&mut self) -> ProtectedWorktree { + self.protected + .take() + .expect("guard ownership must contain the protected worktree") + } + } + + impl Drop for GuardOwnership { + fn drop(&mut self) { + if self.spawned && !self.lifetime_complete { + self.abandon_after_spawn_without_unlock(); + } + } + } + + fn supervision_poll_timeout( + finalization_started: Option, + last_stream_activity: Instant, + ) -> Duration { + finalization_started.map_or(POLL_INTERVAL, |started| { + let idle_remaining = STDIO_IDLE_GRACE.saturating_sub(last_stream_activity.elapsed()); + let hard_remaining = STDIO_FINALIZATION_LIMIT.saturating_sub(started.elapsed()); + idle_remaining.min(hard_remaining) + }) + } + + fn should_finish_finalization( + status: Option<&ExitStatus>, + lifetime_complete: bool, + stdout: Option<&ChildStdout>, + stderr: Option<&ChildStderr>, + finalization_started: &mut Option, + last_stream_activity: &mut Instant, + ) -> bool { + if status.is_none() || !lifetime_complete { + return false; + } + if finalization_started.is_none() { + let now = Instant::now(); + *finalization_started = Some(now); + *last_stream_activity = now; + } + let started = finalization_started.expect("finalization start must be set"); + let idle_expired = last_stream_activity.elapsed() >= STDIO_IDLE_GRACE; + let hard_limit_expired = started.elapsed() >= STDIO_FINALIZATION_LIMIT; + (!stream_is_open(stdout, stderr)) || idle_expired || hard_limit_expired + } + + #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Default)] + pub(super) struct GuardTestHooks { + pub(super) fail_lifetime_token: bool, + pub(super) fail_after_first_poll: bool, + } + + pub(crate) struct ArmedExternalMutationGuard

{ + repository_root: PathBuf, + ownership: GuardOwnership, + lifetime: LifetimeToken, + open_db: Option

, + cancel_rx: mpsc::Receiver<()>, + hooks: GuardTestHooks, + } + + impl

ArmedExternalMutationGuard

+ where + P: FnOnce() -> anyhow::Result, + { + #[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)] + pub(crate) fn exec( + mut self, + request: &GuardRequest, + mut on_event: E, + ) -> Result + where + E: FnMut(GuardEvent), + { + if self.cancel_rx.try_recv().is_ok() { + return Err(GuardError::CancelledBeforeExec); + } + if request.command.trim().is_empty() { + return Err(GuardError::Exec(anyhow!( + "external-mutation guard exec command must not be blank" + ))); + } + let execution_cwd = + resolve_execution_cwd(&self.repository_root, request.cwd.as_deref())?; + let lock_fd = self.ownership.protected().lock_raw_fd(); + let mut child = match spawn_guarded_shell( + &execution_cwd, + request, + lock_fd, + self.lifetime.writer_fd(), + ) { + Ok(child) => child, + Err(source) => return Err(GuardError::Spawn(source)), + }; + self.ownership.mark_spawned(); + self.lifetime.close_writer(); + + let mut stdout = child.stdout.take(); + let mut stderr = child.stderr.take(); + let pid = child.id(); + let mut status: Option = None; + let mut lifetime_complete = false; + let mut cancel_signaled = false; + let mut finalization_started = None; + let mut last_stream_activity = Instant::now(); + loop { + if status.is_none() { + status = match child.try_wait() { + Ok(status) => status, + Err(source) => { + self.ownership.abandon_after_spawn_without_unlock(); + return Err(GuardError::Wait(source)); + } + }; + } + + if should_finish_finalization( + status.as_ref(), + lifetime_complete, + stdout.as_ref(), + stderr.as_ref(), + &mut finalization_started, + &mut last_stream_activity, + ) { + break; + } + + if !cancel_signaled && self.cancel_rx.try_recv().is_ok() { + cancel_signaled = true; + #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_wrap)] + let group = -(pid as i32); + unsafe { + raw::kill(group, SIGTERM); + } + } + + let poll_timeout = + supervision_poll_timeout(finalization_started, last_stream_activity); + if let Err(source) = poll_and_consume_streams( + &mut self.lifetime, + &mut stdout, + &mut stderr, + &mut on_event, + poll_timeout, + &mut lifetime_complete, + &mut last_stream_activity, + ) { + self.ownership.abandon_after_spawn_without_unlock(); + return Err(GuardError::Wait(source)); + } + if lifetime_complete { + self.ownership.mark_lifetime_complete(); + } + if self.hooks.fail_after_first_poll { + self.ownership.abandon_after_spawn_without_unlock(); + return Err(GuardError::Wait(io::Error::other( + "injected post-spawn supervision failure", + ))); + } + } + + self.ownership.mark_lifetime_complete(); + let status = status.expect("the guard loop only finishes after shell exit"); + let worktree_id = self.ownership.protected().worktree_id().clone(); + if let Err(source) = coordinate_on_held_worktree( + &self.repository_root, + &worktree_id, + &RuntimeBoundary::Flush, + self.open_db + .take() + .expect("the guard database opener must be available before exec"), + true, + ) { + return Err(GuardError::Finish(source)); + } + + let protected = self.ownership.take_protected(); + let marker_clear_failed = protected.complete().is_err(); + + Ok(GuardOutcome { + exit_code: status.code(), + marker_clear_failed, + }) + } + } + + fn arm_external_mutation_guard_inner( + repository_root: &Path, + open_db: P, + on_armed: A, + cancel_rx: mpsc::Receiver<()>, + hooks: GuardTestHooks, + ) -> Result, GuardError> + where + P: FnOnce() -> anyhow::Result, + A: FnOnce() -> io::Result<()>, + { + let protected = ProtectedWorktree::acquire(repository_root).map_err(GuardError::Acquire)?; + let ownership = GuardOwnership::new(protected); + let lifetime = if hooks.fail_lifetime_token { + Err(io::Error::other( + "injected lifetime-token establishment failure", + )) + } else { + LifetimeToken::new() + } + .map_err(GuardError::Spawn)?; + on_armed().map_err(GuardError::ArmedDelivery)?; + + Ok(ArmedExternalMutationGuard { + repository_root: repository_root.to_path_buf(), + ownership, + lifetime, + open_db: Some(open_db), + cancel_rx, + hooks, + }) + } + + pub(crate) fn arm_external_mutation_guard( + repository_root: &Path, + open_db: P, + on_armed: A, + cancel_rx: mpsc::Receiver<()>, + ) -> Result, GuardError> + where + P: FnOnce() -> anyhow::Result, + A: FnOnce() -> io::Result<()>, + { + arm_external_mutation_guard_inner( + repository_root, + open_db, + on_armed, + cancel_rx, + GuardTestHooks::default(), + ) + } + + pub(crate) fn run_external_mutation_guard( + repository_root: &Path, + request: &GuardRequest, + open_db: P, + mut on_event: E, + cancel_rx: mpsc::Receiver<()>, + ) -> Result + where + P: FnOnce() -> anyhow::Result, + E: FnMut(GuardEvent), + { + let guard = arm_external_mutation_guard( + repository_root, + open_db, + || { + on_event(GuardEvent::Armed); + Ok(()) + }, + cancel_rx, + )?; + guard.exec(request, on_event) + } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub(super) fn run_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks( + repository_root: &Path, + request: &GuardRequest, + open_db: P, + mut on_event: E, + cancel_rx: mpsc::Receiver<()>, + hooks: GuardTestHooks, + ) -> Result + where + P: FnOnce() -> anyhow::Result, + E: FnMut(GuardEvent), + { + let guard = arm_external_mutation_guard_inner( + repository_root, + open_db, + || { + on_event(GuardEvent::Armed); + Ok(()) + }, + cancel_rx, + hooks, + )?; + guard.exec(request, on_event) + } + + #[cfg(test)] + pub(super) fn arm_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks( + repository_root: &Path, + open_db: P, + on_armed: A, + cancel_rx: mpsc::Receiver<()>, + hooks: GuardTestHooks, + ) -> Result, GuardError> + where + P: FnOnce() -> anyhow::Result, + A: FnOnce() -> io::Result<()>, + { + arm_external_mutation_guard_inner(repository_root, open_db, on_armed, cancel_rx, hooks) + } +} + +#[cfg(unix)] +pub(crate) use unix_impl::{ + arm_external_mutation_guard, run_external_mutation_guard, ArmedExternalMutationGuard, +}; + +#[cfg(all(unix, test))] +mod tests { + use std::fs; + use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; + use std::process::Command; + use std::sync::mpsc; + use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; + use std::time::{Duration, Instant}; + + use crate::services::agent_trace_db::repository::RepositoryAgentTraceDb; + use crate::services::agent_trace_storage::{ + resolve_agent_trace_storage_at_state_root, AgentTraceStorageContext, + }; + use crate::services::mutation_trace::store::MutationTraceStore; + + use super::super::coordinator::{coordinate, RuntimeBoundary}; + use super::super::git_snapshot::GitSnapshotService; + use super::super::protected_worktree::ProtectedWorktree; + use super::super::worktree_lock::WorktreeLock; + use super::super::{resolve_git_dir, resolve_worktree_id}; + use super::unix_impl::{ + arm_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks, run_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks, + spawn_guarded_shell, GuardTestHooks, LifetimeToken, + }; + use super::*; + + fn git(dir: &Path, args: &[&str]) { + let output = Command::new("git") + .args(args) + .current_dir(dir) + .output() + .expect("git should spawn"); + assert!( + output.status.success(), + "git {args:?} failed: {}", + String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr) + ); + } + + struct TestRepo { + _temp: tempfile::TempDir, + root: PathBuf, + state_root: PathBuf, + } + + impl TestRepo { + fn new(label: &str) -> Self { + let temp = tempfile::Builder::new() + .prefix(&format!("sce-external-mutation-guard-{label}-")) + .tempdir() + .expect("temp dir should be created"); + let root = temp.path().join("repo"); + fs::create_dir_all(&root).expect("repo dir should be created"); + git(&root, &["init", "-q"]); + git(&root, &["config", "user.email", "test@example.invalid"]); + git(&root, &["config", "user.name", "SCE Test"]); + git( + &root, + &["remote", "add", "origin", "git@github.com:acme/widgets.git"], + ); + fs::write(root.join("file.txt"), "one\n").expect("seed file should write"); + git(&root, &["add", "-A"]); + git(&root, &["commit", "-qm", "base"]); + + let state_root = temp.path().join("state"); + fs::create_dir_all(&state_root).expect("state root should be created"); + resolve_agent_trace_storage_at_state_root( + &AgentTraceStorageContext { + repository_root: &root, + explicit_repository_id: None, + repository_remote: "origin", + }, + &state_root, + ) + .expect("state-root storage should initialize the repository DB"); + + Self { + _temp: temp, + root, + state_root, + } + } + + fn git_dir(&self) -> PathBuf { + resolve_git_dir(&self.root).expect("git dir should resolve") + } + + fn nested_dir(&self, relative: &str) -> PathBuf { + let dir = self.root.join(relative); + fs::create_dir_all(&dir).expect("nested test directory should be created"); + dir.canonicalize() + .expect("nested test directory should canonicalize") + } + + fn open_db(&self) -> anyhow::Result { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + &self.root, + &self.state_root, + "external-mutation-guard test assertions", + ) + } + } + + #[test] + fn lifetime_token_establishment_failure_cannot_emit_armed() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("lifetime-token-establishment-failure"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let events = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())); + let captured_events = Arc::clone(&events); + + let result = run_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks( + &repo.root, + &request("true"), + || repo.open_db(), + move |event| captured_events.lock().expect("events mutex").push(event), + cancel_rx, + GuardTestHooks { + fail_lifetime_token: true, + fail_after_first_poll: false, + }, + ); + + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::Spawn(_)))); + assert!( + events.lock().expect("events mutex").is_empty(), + "Armed must not be emitted before lifetime-token establishment" + ); + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_millis(200)) + .expect("pre-spawn lifetime failure must release the ordinary lock"); + assert!( + repo.git_dir() + .join("sce") + .join("mutation-cursor-tainted") + .exists(), + "the existing write-ahead marker remains armed after establishment failure" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn post_spawn_supervision_failure_abandons_without_unlocking_inherited_lock() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("post-spawn-supervision-failure"); + let release = repo.root.join("release"); + let descendant_done = repo.root.join("descendant-done"); + let command = format!( + "(while [ ! -f '{}' ]; do sleep 0.01; done; printf descendant > '{}'; touch '{}') & printf ready", + release.display(), + repo.root.join("file.txt").display(), + descendant_done.display(), + ); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let (ready_tx, ready_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + + let result = run_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks( + &repo.root, + &request(&command), + || repo.open_db(), + move |event| { + if let GuardEvent::Stdout(chunk) = event { + if String::from_utf8_lossy(&chunk).contains("ready") { + ready_tx.send(()).expect("ready channel should be open"); + } + } + }, + cancel_rx, + GuardTestHooks { + fail_lifetime_token: false, + fail_after_first_poll: true, + }, + ); + + ready_rx + .recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)) + .expect("the shell must have spawned before the injected failure"); + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::Wait(_)))); + + assert!( + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_millis(200)).is_err(), + "post-spawn abandonment must not execute flock(LOCK_UN) while the descendant lives" + ); + let marker = repo.git_dir().join("sce").join("mutation-cursor-tainted"); + assert!( + marker.exists(), + "the marker must remain armed on abandonment" + ); + + fs::write(&release, "release\n").expect("descendant release handshake should write"); + wait_for_path(&descendant_done); + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_secs(1)) + .expect("the inherited descriptor should release the flock naturally"); + + coordinate(&repo.root, &RuntimeBoundary::Flush, || repo.open_db()) + .expect("the next boundary should recover inherited external taint"); + assert!( + !marker.exists(), + "inherited-taint recovery should clear the marker" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn post_spawn_supervision_failure_without_descendants_uses_the_same_abandonment_path() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("post-spawn-no-descendant-failure"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let (ready_tx, ready_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + + let result = run_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks( + &repo.root, + &request("printf ready"), + || repo.open_db(), + move |event| { + if let GuardEvent::Stdout(chunk) = event { + if String::from_utf8_lossy(&chunk).contains("ready") { + ready_tx.send(()).expect("ready channel should be open"); + } + } + }, + cancel_rx, + GuardTestHooks { + fail_lifetime_token: false, + fail_after_first_poll: true, + }, + ); + + ready_rx + .recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)) + .expect("the shell must have spawned before the injected failure"); + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::Wait(_)))); + let marker = repo.git_dir().join("sce").join("mutation-cursor-tainted"); + assert!( + marker.exists(), + "the marker must remain armed on abandonment" + ); + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_secs(1)) + .expect("without descendants the shell's inherited fd closes naturally"); + + coordinate(&repo.root, &RuntimeBoundary::Flush, || repo.open_db()) + .expect("the next boundary should recover the still-armed marker"); + assert!( + !marker.exists(), + "inherited-taint recovery should clear the marker" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn lost_armed_acknowledgement_cannot_spawn_or_mutate() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("lost-armed-ack"); + let marker = repo.git_dir().join("sce").join("mutation-cursor-tainted"); + let target = repo.root.join("lost-armed-command-ran"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + + let result = arm_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks( + &repo.root, + || repo.open_db(), + || { + Err(std::io::Error::new( + std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe, + "injected lost Armed acknowledgement", + )) + }, + cancel_rx, + GuardTestHooks::default(), + ); + + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::ArmedDelivery(_)))); + assert!( + !target.exists(), + "the command must not run without Armed delivery" + ); + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_secs(1)) + .expect("pre-spawn acknowledgement failure must release the ordinary lock"); + assert!( + marker.exists(), + "ambiguous establishment remains conservatively tainted" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn armed_guard_waits_for_exec_and_drops_without_spawning_on_eof() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("armed-without-exec"); + let marker = repo.git_dir().join("sce").join("mutation-cursor-tainted"); + let target = repo.root.join("never-ran"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let armed = arm_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks( + &repo.root, + || repo.open_db(), + || Ok(()), + cancel_rx, + GuardTestHooks::default(), + ) + .expect("arm should succeed"); + + drop(armed); + assert!(!target.exists(), "EOF before exec must not create a shell"); + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_secs(1)) + .expect("ordinary pre-spawn cleanup must release the lock"); + assert!( + marker.exists(), + "pre-spawn EOF remains conservatively tainted" + ); + + coordinate(&repo.root, &RuntimeBoundary::Flush, || repo.open_db()) + .expect("the next boundary must self-heal the conservative marker"); + assert!(!marker.exists()); + } + + #[test] + fn cancellation_before_exec_cannot_spawn() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("cancel-before-exec"); + let target = repo.root.join("cancelled-command-ran"); + let (cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let armed = arm_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks( + &repo.root, + || repo.open_db(), + || Ok(()), + cancel_rx, + GuardTestHooks::default(), + ) + .expect("arm should succeed"); + cancel_tx.send(()).expect("cancel should be received"); + + let result = armed.exec( + &request(&format!("touch '{}'", target.display())), + |_event| {}, + ); + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::CancelledBeforeExec))); + assert!(!target.exists()); + } + + #[test] + fn armed_guard_has_no_side_effect_before_exec_and_exec_runs_once() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("two-phase-happy-path"); + let target = repo.root.join("exec-ran"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let armed = arm_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks( + &repo.root, + || repo.open_db(), + || Ok(()), + cancel_rx, + GuardTestHooks::default(), + ) + .expect("arm should succeed"); + assert!(!target.exists(), "Armed must not execute the later command"); + + let request = request(&format!("touch '{}'", target.display())); + let outcome = armed + .exec(&request, |_event| {}) + .expect("the explicit exec request should run"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + assert!(target.exists(), "the command must run after explicit exec"); + } + + fn request(command: &str) -> GuardRequest { + GuardRequest { + command: command.to_string(), + cwd: None, + env: Vec::new(), + } + } + + fn request_with_cwd(command: &str, cwd: &Path) -> GuardRequest { + GuardRequest { + command: command.to_string(), + cwd: Some(cwd.to_string_lossy().into_owned()), + env: Vec::new(), + } + } + + fn wait_for_path(path: &Path) { + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); + while !path.exists() { + assert!( + Instant::now() < deadline, + "timed out waiting for '{}'", + path.display() + ); + std::thread::yield_now(); + } + } + + fn wait_for_output(output: &Mutex>, expected: &str) { + let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5); + while !String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.lock().expect("output mutex")).contains(expected) { + assert!( + Instant::now() < deadline, + "timed out waiting for output '{expected}'" + ); + std::thread::yield_now(); + } + } + + #[test] + fn a_concurrent_foreign_lock_attempt_times_out_while_the_guard_is_active() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("foreign-contention"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + + let root = repo.root.clone(); + let state_root = repo.state_root.clone(); + let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || { + run_external_mutation_guard( + &root, + &request("sleep 1"), + || { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + &root, + &state_root, + "external-mutation-guard test assertions", + ) + }, + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ) + }); + + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(200)); + + let foreign = WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_millis(200)); + assert!( + foreign.is_err(), + "a foreign lock attempt must fail closed while the guard holds the lock" + ); + + let outcome = handle + .join() + .expect("guard thread should not panic") + .expect("the guard should reach its finish step"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_millis(500)) + .expect("the lock must free once the guard's own finish step completes"); + } + + #[test] + fn graceful_completion_waits_for_an_inherited_background_descendant() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("graceful-background-descendant"); + let release = repo.root.join("release"); + let foreground_exited = repo.root.join("foreground-exited"); + let descendant_done = repo.root.join("descendant-done"); + let command = format!( + "(while [ ! -f '{}' ]; do sleep 0.01; done; printf descendant > '{}'; touch '{}') >/dev/null 2>&1 & touch '{}'", + release.display(), + repo.root.join("file.txt").display(), + descendant_done.display(), + foreground_exited.display(), + ); + let (cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + drop(cancel_tx); + let (armed_tx, armed_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let (result_tx, result_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let root = repo.root.clone(); + let state_root = repo.state_root.clone(); + let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || { + let result = run_external_mutation_guard( + &root, + &request(&command), + || { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + &root, + &state_root, + "external-mutation-guard graceful-descendant test", + ) + }, + |event| { + if matches!(event, GuardEvent::Armed) { + armed_tx.send(()).expect("armed channel should be open"); + } + }, + cancel_rx, + ); + result_tx + .send(result) + .expect("result channel should be open"); + }); + + armed_rx + .recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)) + .expect("guard should arm before spawning the shell"); + wait_for_path(&foreground_exited); + assert!( + result_rx.try_recv().is_err(), + "foreground shell exit must not complete the guard while its descendant is alive" + ); + let marker = repo.git_dir().join("sce").join("mutation-cursor-tainted"); + assert!( + marker.exists(), + "the external-taint marker must remain armed" + ); + assert!( + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_millis(200)).is_err(), + "the real worktree lock must exclude foreign acquirers until descendant completion" + ); + + fs::write(&release, "release\n").expect("descendant release handshake should write"); + wait_for_path(&descendant_done); + let outcome = result_rx + .recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)) + .expect("guard should finish after the descendant releases the token") + .expect("guard should recover successfully"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + handle.join().expect("guard thread should not panic"); + + assert_eq!( + fs::read_to_string(repo.root.join("file.txt")).expect("mutated file should read"), + "descendant" + ); + let final_tree = GitSnapshotService::new(&repo.root) + .expect("snapshot service should construct") + .capture_tree() + .expect("final tree should capture"); + let worktree_id = resolve_worktree_id(&repo.root).expect("worktree id should resolve"); + let db = repo + .open_db() + .expect("database should reopen for assertions"); + let projection = MutationTraceStore::new(&db) + .load_worktree(&worktree_id, None, None) + .expect("worktree state should load") + .expect("guard recovery should initialize worktree state"); + assert_eq!( + projection.worktree_state.cursor_tree, final_tree, + "final recovery must rebaseline to the descendant mutation" + ); + assert!(!marker.exists(), "marker clears only after final recovery"); + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_secs(1)) + .expect("worktree lock should be released after final recovery"); + } + + #[test] + fn output_is_consumed_while_a_background_descendant_holds_the_lifetime_token() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("background-output"); + let release = repo.root.join("release"); + let foreground_exited = repo.root.join("foreground-exited"); + let start_output = repo.root.join("start-output"); + let output_ready = repo.root.join("output-ready"); + let descendant_done = repo.root.join("descendant-done"); + let command = format!( + "(while [ ! -f '{}' ]; do sleep 0.01; done; i=0; while [ $i -lt 20 ]; do printf 'stdout-%s\\n' $i; printf 'stderr-%s\\n' $i >&2; i=$((i+1)); done; touch '{}'; while [ ! -f '{}' ]; do sleep 0.01; done; i=20; while [ $i -lt 40 ]; do printf 'stdout-%s\\n' $i; printf 'stderr-%s\\n' $i >&2; i=$((i+1)); done; touch '{}') & touch '{}'", + start_output.display(), + output_ready.display(), + release.display(), + descendant_done.display(), + foreground_exited.display(), + ); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let (armed_tx, armed_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let (result_tx, result_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let stdout = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())); + let stderr = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())); + let captured_stdout = Arc::clone(&stdout); + let captured_stderr = Arc::clone(&stderr); + let root = repo.root.clone(); + let state_root = repo.state_root.clone(); + let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || { + let result = run_external_mutation_guard( + &root, + &request(&command), + || { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + &root, + &state_root, + "external-mutation-guard background-output test", + ) + }, + move |event| match event { + GuardEvent::Armed => armed_tx.send(()).expect("armed channel should be open"), + GuardEvent::Stdout(chunk) => { + captured_stdout.lock().expect("stdout mutex").extend(chunk); + } + GuardEvent::Stderr(chunk) => { + captured_stderr.lock().expect("stderr mutex").extend(chunk); + } + }, + cancel_rx, + ); + result_tx + .send(result) + .expect("result channel should be open"); + }); + + armed_rx + .recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)) + .expect("guard should arm before spawning the shell"); + wait_for_path(&foreground_exited); + assert!( + result_rx.try_recv().is_err(), + "guard completion must wait for the lifetime token, not stream timing" + ); + fs::write(&start_output, "start\n").expect("output handshake should write"); + wait_for_path(&output_ready); + wait_for_output(&stdout, "stdout-19"); + wait_for_output(&stderr, "stderr-19"); + assert!( + result_rx.try_recv().is_err(), + "guard completion must wait for the lifetime token, not stream timing" + ); + + fs::write(&release, "release\n").expect("descendant release handshake should write"); + wait_for_path(&descendant_done); + result_rx + .recv_timeout(Duration::from_secs(5)) + .expect("guard should finish after descendant output and exit") + .expect("guard should recover successfully"); + handle.join().expect("guard thread should not panic"); + + let stdout_text = String::from_utf8(stdout.lock().expect("stdout mutex").clone()) + .expect("stdout should be valid UTF-8"); + let stderr_text = String::from_utf8(stderr.lock().expect("stderr mutex").clone()) + .expect("stderr should be valid UTF-8"); + assert!(stdout_text.contains("stdout-39")); + assert!(stderr_text.contains("stderr-39")); + } + + #[test] + fn the_spawned_shells_parent_is_the_calling_process() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("parent-pid"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let captured_stdout: Mutex> = Mutex::new(Vec::new()); + + let outcome = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + &request("echo $PPID"), + || repo.open_db(), + |event| { + if let GuardEvent::Stdout(chunk) = event { + captured_stdout.lock().expect("stdout mutex").extend(chunk); + } + }, + cancel_rx, + ) + .expect("guard should succeed"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + + let reported = String::from_utf8(captured_stdout.into_inner().expect("stdout mutex")) + .expect("$PPID output should be valid UTF-8"); + let ppid: u32 = reported + .trim() + .parse() + .expect("$PPID should parse as an integer"); + assert_eq!(ppid, std::process::id()); + } + + unsafe extern "C" { + fn close(fd: i32) -> i32; + } + + #[test] + fn a_supervisor_killed_without_unlocking_leaves_the_flock_held_by_the_spawned_shell() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("kill-9-simulated"); + + let protected = ProtectedWorktree::acquire(&repo.root).expect("acquire should succeed"); + let lock_fd = protected.lock_raw_fd(); + let lifetime = LifetimeToken::new().expect("lifetime token should be created"); + let mut child = spawn_guarded_shell( + &repo.root, + &request("sleep 1"), + lock_fd, + lifetime.writer_fd(), + ) + .expect("the guarded shell should spawn"); + drop(lifetime); + + unsafe { + close(lock_fd); + } + std::mem::forget(protected); + + let foreign_while_shell_alive = + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_millis(200)); + assert!( + foreign_while_shell_alive.is_err(), + "an implicit close (as a killed process's fd table teardown performs, never an \ + explicit flock unlock) must not release the flock while the spawned shell still \ + holds its own inherited descriptor" + ); + + child.wait().expect("the shell should terminate"); + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)); + + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_millis(500)) + .expect("the lock must free once the spawned shell itself exits"); + } + + #[test] + fn closing_the_control_channel_does_not_trigger_finish_or_signal_the_shell() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("control-channel-death"); + let (cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + drop(cancel_tx); + + let outcome = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + &request("exit 7"), + || repo.open_db(), + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ) + .expect("a disconnected cancel channel must not itself trigger anything abnormal"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(7)); + } + + #[test] + fn a_failed_finish_commit_leaves_the_marker_armed_and_reports_failure() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("finish-failure"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + + let result = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + &request("true"), + || Err(anyhow::anyhow!("injected DB-unavailable failure")), + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ); + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::Finish(_)))); + + let marker = repo.git_dir().join("sce").join("mutation-cursor-tainted"); + assert!( + marker.exists(), + "a failed finish commit must leave the external-taint marker armed" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn a_cancel_request_signals_the_shells_process_group_and_finish_still_waits_for_real_exit() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("cancel-request"); + let (cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + + let root = repo.root.clone(); + let state_root = repo.state_root.clone(); + let handle = std::thread::spawn(move || { + run_external_mutation_guard( + &root, + &request("trap 'exit 9' TERM; sleep 30"), + || { + crate::services::hooks::open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime_at_state_root( + &root, + &state_root, + "external-mutation-guard test assertions", + ) + }, + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ) + }); + + std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(200)); + cancel_tx + .send(()) + .expect("cancel channel should still be open"); + + let outcome = handle + .join() + .expect("guard thread should not panic") + .expect("the guard should reach its finish step after the signaled shell exits"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(9)); + } + + fn run_and_capture_stdout(repo: &TestRepo, req: &GuardRequest) -> (GuardOutcome, String) { + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let captured_stdout: Mutex> = Mutex::new(Vec::new()); + let outcome = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + req, + || repo.open_db(), + |event| { + if let GuardEvent::Stdout(chunk) = event { + captured_stdout.lock().expect("stdout mutex").extend(chunk); + } + }, + cancel_rx, + ) + .expect("guard should succeed"); + let output = String::from_utf8(captured_stdout.into_inner().expect("stdout mutex")) + .expect("stdout should be valid UTF-8"); + (outcome, output) + } + + #[test] + fn a_root_cwd_request_is_preserved_exactly() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("cwd-root"); + let canonical_root = repo + .root + .canonicalize() + .expect("repo root should canonicalize"); + let (outcome, output) = + run_and_capture_stdout(&repo, &request_with_cwd("pwd", &canonical_root)); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + assert_eq!(output.trim(), canonical_root.to_string_lossy()); + } + + #[test] + fn an_absent_cwd_defaults_to_the_worktree_root() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("cwd-default"); + let canonical_root = repo + .root + .canonicalize() + .expect("repo root should canonicalize"); + let (outcome, output) = run_and_capture_stdout(&repo, &request("pwd")); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + assert_eq!(output.trim(), canonical_root.to_string_lossy()); + } + + #[test] + fn a_nested_cwd_request_is_preserved_exactly() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("cwd-nested"); + let nested = repo.nested_dir("crates/foo"); + let (outcome, output) = run_and_capture_stdout(&repo, &request_with_cwd("pwd", &nested)); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + assert_eq!(output.trim(), nested.to_string_lossy()); + } + + #[test] + fn a_relative_exec_cwd_is_rejected_fail_closed() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("cwd-relative"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + + let result = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + &request_with_cwd("true", Path::new("relative")), + || repo.open_db(), + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ); + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::Cwd(_)))); + } + + #[test] + fn a_parent_traversal_cwd_cannot_escape_the_checkout() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("cwd-traversal"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let escaping_cwd = repo.root.join("..").to_string_lossy().into_owned(); + + let result = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + &GuardRequest { + command: "true".to_string(), + cwd: Some(escaping_cwd), + env: Vec::new(), + }, + || repo.open_db(), + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ); + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::Cwd(_)))); + } + + #[test] + fn an_absolute_cwd_outside_the_checkout_is_rejected() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("cwd-outside"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + + let result = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + &request_with_cwd("true", &repo.state_root), + || repo.open_db(), + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ); + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::Cwd(_)))); + } + + #[test] + fn a_nonexistent_cwd_is_rejected_fail_closed() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("cwd-missing"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let missing = repo.root.join("does-not-exist"); + + let result = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + &request_with_cwd("true", &missing), + || repo.open_db(), + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ); + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::Cwd(_)))); + } + + #[test] + fn a_non_directory_cwd_is_rejected_fail_closed() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("cwd-file"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let file_path = repo.root.join("file.txt"); + + let result = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + &request_with_cwd("true", &file_path), + || repo.open_db(), + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ); + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::Cwd(_)))); + } + + #[test] + fn a_rejected_exec_cwd_never_spawns_and_keeps_the_marker_conservative() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("cwd-rejected-no-lock"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + + let result = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + &request_with_cwd("true", &repo.state_root), + || repo.open_db(), + |_event| {}, + cancel_rx, + ); + assert!(matches!(result, Err(GuardError::Cwd(_)))); + + WorktreeLock::acquire(&repo.git_dir(), Duration::from_millis(200)) + .expect("a rejected pre-spawn exec must release the ordinary worktree lock"); + + let marker = repo.git_dir().join("sce").join("mutation-cursor-tainted"); + assert!( + marker.exists(), + "an armed guard that rejects its exec request must keep the marker conservative" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn multiple_stdout_chunks_immediately_before_exit_are_not_truncated() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("stdout-chunks"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let captured_stdout: Mutex> = Mutex::new(Vec::new()); + + let outcome = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + &request( + "i=0; while [ $i -lt 4000 ]; do echo \"line-$i-0123456789ABCDEF\"; i=$((i+1)); done", + ), + || repo.open_db(), + |event| { + if let GuardEvent::Stdout(chunk) = event { + captured_stdout.lock().expect("stdout mutex").extend(chunk); + } + }, + cancel_rx, + ) + .expect("guard should succeed"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + + let output = String::from_utf8(captured_stdout.into_inner().expect("stdout mutex")) + .expect("stdout should be valid UTF-8"); + let lines: Vec<&str> = output.lines().collect(); + assert_eq!( + lines.len(), + 4000, + "every line must be delivered, none dropped at process exit" + ); + assert_eq!(lines[0], "line-0-0123456789ABCDEF"); + assert_eq!(lines[3999], "line-3999-0123456789ABCDEF"); + } + + #[test] + fn stderr_output_immediately_before_exit_is_not_truncated() { + let repo = TestRepo::new("stderr-chunks"); + let (_cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = mpsc::channel(); + let captured_stderr: Mutex> = Mutex::new(Vec::new()); + + let outcome = run_external_mutation_guard( + &repo.root, + &request( + "i=0; while [ $i -lt 4000 ]; do echo \"err-$i-0123456789ABCDEF\" >&2; i=$((i+1)); done", + ), + || repo.open_db(), + |event| { + if let GuardEvent::Stderr(chunk) = event { + captured_stderr.lock().expect("stderr mutex").extend(chunk); + } + }, + cancel_rx, + ) + .expect("guard should succeed"); + assert_eq!(outcome.exit_code, Some(0)); + + let output = String::from_utf8(captured_stderr.into_inner().expect("stderr mutex")) + .expect("stderr should be valid UTF-8"); + let lines: Vec<&str> = output.lines().collect(); + assert_eq!(lines.len(), 4000); + assert_eq!(lines[3999], "err-3999-0123456789ABCDEF"); + } +} diff --git a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/git_snapshot.rs b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/git_snapshot.rs index 11c913c9b..2e1614209 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/git_snapshot.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/git_snapshot.rs @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ use std::io::Write; use std::path::{Path, PathBuf}; use std::process::{Command, Stdio}; -use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result}; +use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Context, Result}; use uuid::Uuid; use crate::services::mutation_trace::types::{TreeId, WorktreeId}; @@ -475,6 +475,35 @@ fn resolve_git_common_dir(repository_root: &Path) -> Result { Ok(git_common_dir) } +pub(crate) fn resolve_worktree_root(repository_root: &Path) -> Result { + let reported_root = run_rev_parse( + repository_root, + &["rev-parse", "--path-format=absolute", "--show-toplevel"], + )?; + + let root_path = PathBuf::from(reported_root); + debug_assert!( + root_path.is_absolute(), + "git rev-parse --path-format=absolute --show-toplevel should always return an absolute path, got '{}'", + root_path.display() + ); + + let canonical_root = std::fs::canonicalize(&root_path).with_context(|| { + format!( + "failed to canonicalize the worktree root '{}'", + root_path.display() + ) + })?; + if !canonical_root.is_dir() { + bail!( + "resolved worktree root '{}' is not a directory", + canonical_root.display() + ); + } + + Ok(canonical_root) +} + pub(crate) fn resolve_worktree_id(repository_root: &Path) -> Result { let git_dir = resolve_git_dir(repository_root)?; let git_common_dir = resolve_git_common_dir(repository_root)?; diff --git a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/mod.rs b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/mod.rs index 0f3d3d555..d7961232d 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/mod.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/mod.rs @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ mod coordinator; +mod external_mutation_guard; mod external_taint; mod git_snapshot; mod mutation_attribution; @@ -16,6 +17,11 @@ pub(crate) use coordinator::{ StartProvenance, }; #[allow(unused_imports)] +pub(crate) use external_mutation_guard::{ + arm_external_mutation_guard, run_external_mutation_guard, ArmedExternalMutationGuard, + GuardError, GuardEvent, GuardOutcome, GuardRequest, +}; +#[allow(unused_imports)] pub(crate) use git_snapshot::{resolve_git_dir, resolve_worktree_id}; #[allow(unused_imports)] pub(crate) use mutation_attribution::{ diff --git a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/protected_worktree.rs b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/protected_worktree.rs index 7bc2d4908..114f397ba 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/protected_worktree.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/protected_worktree.rs @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ pub struct ProtectedWorktree { marker: ExternalTaintMarker, inherited_external_taint: bool, worktree_id: WorktreeId, - _lock: WorktreeLock, + lock: WorktreeLock, } impl ProtectedWorktree { @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ impl ProtectedWorktree { marker, inherited_external_taint, worktree_id, - _lock: lock, + lock, }) } @@ -116,9 +116,20 @@ impl ProtectedWorktree { self.inherited_external_taint } + #[cfg(unix)] + #[must_use] + pub(super) fn lock_raw_fd(&self) -> std::os::unix::io::RawFd { + self.lock.as_raw_fd() + } + pub fn complete(self) -> anyhow::Result<()> { self.marker.clear() } + + #[cfg(unix)] + pub(super) fn abandon_after_spawn_without_unlock(self) { + self.lock.close_without_unlock(); + } } #[cfg(test)] diff --git a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/worktree_lock.rs b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/worktree_lock.rs index 214224410..0b509772f 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/worktree_lock.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/worktree_lock.rs @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ const LOCK_POLL_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100); pub struct WorktreeLock { file: File, path: PathBuf, + unlock_on_drop: bool, } #[derive(Debug)] @@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ where return Ok(WorktreeLock { file, path: lock_path, + unlock_on_drop: true, }); } Err(TryLockError::WouldBlock) => { @@ -107,9 +109,26 @@ where } } +impl WorktreeLock { + pub(super) fn close_without_unlock(mut self) { + self.unlock_on_drop = false; + } +} + impl Drop for WorktreeLock { fn drop(&mut self) { - let _ = self.file.unlock(); + if self.unlock_on_drop { + let _ = self.file.unlock(); + } + } +} + +#[cfg(unix)] +impl WorktreeLock { + #[must_use] + pub(crate) fn as_raw_fd(&self) -> std::os::unix::io::RawFd { + use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd; + self.file.as_raw_fd() } } diff --git a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/tests.rs b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/tests.rs index 16395e146..efacde309 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/tests.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/mutation_trace/tests.rs @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet}; use super::protocol::{ - abandon, attribution_for, commit, database_failure, live_scopes_on, prepare, recover, taint, - CommitOutcome, + abandon, attribution_for, attribution_for_boundary, commit, database_failure, live_scopes_on, + prepare, recover, taint, CommitOutcome, }; use super::types::*; @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ fn opencode_scope(status: ScopeStatus, worktree_id: WorktreeId) -> ScopeState { scope_with_actor(status, ActorKind::OpenCode, worktree_id) } +fn pi_scope(status: ScopeStatus, worktree_id: WorktreeId) -> ScopeState { + scope_with_actor(status, ActorKind::Pi, worktree_id) +} + fn scope_with_actor( status: ScopeStatus, actor_kind: ActorKind, @@ -1149,8 +1153,8 @@ fn two_live_non_codex_scopes_still_attribute_contention() { let event = commit_boundary( &state, - Boundary::Advance { - scope: scope("claude-a"), + Boundary::Close { + scope: scope("pi-b"), event: event("event0"), }, tree("tree1"), @@ -1775,6 +1779,81 @@ fn recover_from_external_taint_abandons_live_scopes_and_clears_external_taint() ); } +#[test] +fn a_tainted_live_pi_scope_is_abandoned_by_recover_and_a_fresh_pi_scope_can_still_confirm() { + let mut state = ProtocolState::default(); + state + .worktrees + .insert(worktree("wt0"), healthy_worktree(tree("tree0"), 2)); + state.external_taint.insert(worktree("wt0")); + state.scopes.insert( + scope("pi-a"), + pi_scope(ScopeStatus::Active, worktree("wt0")), + ); + state.scopes.insert( + scope("pi-b"), + pi_scope(ScopeStatus::NeverSeen, worktree("wt0")), + ); + + let recovered = recover(&state, &worktree("wt0"), tree("tree1")); + + assert_eq!( + recovered.scopes.get(&scope("pi-a")).unwrap().status, + ScopeStatus::Abandoned + ); + assert!(live_scopes_on(&recovered, &worktree("wt0")).is_empty()); + + let recovered_worktree = recovered.worktrees.get(&worktree("wt0")).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(recovered_worktree.cursor_tree, tree("tree1")); + assert!(!recovered_worktree.tainted); + assert_eq!(recovered_worktree.failure_kind, FailureKind::Healthy); + assert!(!recovered_worktree.needs_rebaseline); + assert!(!recovered.external_taint.contains(&worktree("wt0"))); + + let started = prepare_and_commit( + &recovered, + &attempt_id("attempt_pi_b_start"), + Boundary::Start { + scope: scope("pi-b"), + event: event("event_pi_b_start"), + }, + tree("tree1"), + ); + assert!( + started.evaluation.observes, + "Start must be accepted and observed from the recovered state" + ); + assert_eq!( + started.state.scopes.get(&scope("pi-b")).unwrap().status, + ScopeStatus::Active + ); + + assert_eq!( + attribution_for_boundary( + &started.state, + &worktree("wt0"), + &Boundary::Advance { + scope: scope("pi-b"), + event: event("event_probe"), + }, + ), + Attribution::IneligibleUnscoped, + "an unconfirmed live Pi scope must not be exclusive at another boundary" + ); + + let closed = commit_boundary( + &started.state, + Boundary::Close { + scope: scope("pi-b"), + event: event("event_pi_b_close"), + }, + tree("tree2"), + ); + + assert_eq!(closed.active_scopes, BTreeSet::from([scope("pi-b")])); + assert_eq!(closed.attribution, Attribution::AiExclusive(scope("pi-b"))); +} + #[test] fn recover_with_only_needs_rebaseline_preserves_live_scopes() { let mut state = ProtocolState::default(); diff --git a/cli/src/services/parse/command_runtime.rs b/cli/src/services/parse/command_runtime.rs index 75383896a..a1b6d9a47 100644 --- a/cli/src/services/parse/command_runtime.rs +++ b/cli/src/services/parse/command_runtime.rs @@ -516,6 +516,12 @@ fn convert_hooks_subcommand_request( cli_schema::HooksSubcommand::OpenCodeMutationScope => { Ok(services::hooks::HookSubcommand::OpenCodeMutationScope) } + cli_schema::HooksSubcommand::PiMutationScope => { + Ok(services::hooks::HookSubcommand::PiMutationScope) + } + cli_schema::HooksSubcommand::ExternalMutationGuard => { + Ok(services::hooks::HookSubcommand::ExternalMutationGuard) + } } } @@ -689,6 +695,56 @@ mod tests { ); } + #[test] + fn pi_mutation_scope_hook_parses_to_hook_subcommand() { + let command = parse(&["sce", "hooks", "pi-mutation-scope"]); + + let RuntimeCommand::Hooks(command) = command else { + panic!("expected hooks command"); + }; + + assert_eq!( + command.subcommand, + services::hooks::HookSubcommand::PiMutationScope + ); + } + + #[test] + fn pi_mutation_scope_hook_is_hidden_from_hooks_help() { + let help = + cli_schema::render_help_for_path(&["hooks"]).expect("hooks help should be renderable"); + + assert!( + !help.contains("pi-mutation-scope"), + "pi-mutation-scope must not be listed in `sce hooks --help`, got: {help}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn external_mutation_guard_hook_parses_to_hook_subcommand() { + let command = parse(&["sce", "hooks", "external-mutation-guard"]); + + let RuntimeCommand::Hooks(command) = command else { + panic!("expected hooks command"); + }; + + assert_eq!( + command.subcommand, + services::hooks::HookSubcommand::ExternalMutationGuard + ); + } + + #[test] + fn external_mutation_guard_hook_is_hidden_from_hooks_help() { + let help = + cli_schema::render_help_for_path(&["hooks"]).expect("hooks help should be renderable"); + + assert!( + !help.contains("external-mutation-guard"), + "external-mutation-guard must not be listed in `sce hooks --help`, got: {help}" + ); + } + #[test] fn sync_json_format_parses_to_sync_request() { let command = parse(&["sce", "sync", "--format", "json"]); diff --git a/config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/driver.mjs b/config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/driver.mjs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fca0df6ac --- /dev/null +++ b/config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/driver.mjs @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +import { + AuthStorage, + createAgentSession, + DefaultResourceLoader, + ModelRegistry, + SessionManager, + SettingsManager, +} from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"; + +const cwd = process.argv[2]; +const agentDir = process.argv[3]; +if (!cwd || !agentDir) { + console.error("usage: driver.mjs "); + process.exit(1); +} + +async function main() { + const authStorage = AuthStorage.create(); + const modelRegistry = ModelRegistry.create(authStorage); + const settingsManager = SettingsManager.create(cwd, agentDir); + const sessionManager = SessionManager.create(cwd, undefined); + + const resourceLoader = new DefaultResourceLoader({ + cwd, + agentDir, + settingsManager, + }); + await resourceLoader.reload(); + + const { session } = await createAgentSession({ + cwd, + agentDir, + thinkingLevel: "off", + authStorage, + modelRegistry, + settingsManager, + sessionManager, + resourceLoader, + noTools: false, + }); + + const model = modelRegistry.find("sce-test-provider", "sce-test-model"); + if (!model) { + console.error( + "FAIL: sce-test-provider/sce-test-model was not registered by extension load", + ); + session.dispose(); + process.exit(2); + } + console.log( + "Resolved custom model after session construction:", + model.provider, + model.id, + ); + await session.setModel(model); + + const events = []; + session.subscribe((event) => { + events.push(event.type); + }); + + try { + await session.prompt("please run the scripted bash tool call"); + await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 300)); + await session.prompt("continue"); + await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 300)); + console.log("DONE. event types seen:", JSON.stringify(events)); + } catch (err) { + console.error("ERROR during session.prompt:", err); + process.exitCode = 3; + } finally { + session.dispose(); + } +} + +main(); diff --git a/config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/provider-extension.ts b/config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/provider-extension.ts new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8bd871025 --- /dev/null +++ b/config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/provider-extension.ts @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +import { + createFauxCore, + fauxAssistantMessage, + fauxToolCall, +} from "@earendil-works/pi-ai"; +import type { ExtensionAPI } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"; + +export default function (pi: ExtensionAPI) { + const core = createFauxCore({ + api: "sce-test-provider-api", + provider: "sce-test-provider", + }); + core.setResponses([ + fauxAssistantMessage( + fauxToolCall( + "bash", + { command: 'printf "sce-real-pi-smoke\\n" >> smoke-output.txt' }, + { id: "sce-smoke-bash-1" }, + ), + { stopReason: "toolUse" }, + ), + fauxAssistantMessage("done", { stopReason: "stop" }), + ]); + + pi.registerProvider("sce-test-provider", { + name: "SCE Test Provider", + baseUrl: "http://localhost:0/unused", + apiKey: "unused-dummy-key", + api: "sce-test-provider-api", + models: [ + { + id: "sce-test-model", + name: "SCE Test Model", + reasoning: false, + input: ["text"], + cost: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 }, + contextWindow: 128000, + maxTokens: 4096, + }, + ], + streamSimple: core.streamSimple, + }); +} diff --git a/config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/run.sh b/config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/run.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000..d828bddbe --- /dev/null +++ b/config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/run.sh @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +set -euo pipefail + +script_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" +repo_root="$(cd "${script_dir}/../../../.." && pwd)" + +fail() { + printf 'FAIL: %s\n' "$1" >&2 + exit 1 +} + +(cd "${repo_root}" && nix develop --command bash -c "./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh build --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml") + +sce_bin="${repo_root}/cli/target/debug/sce" +if [ ! -x "${sce_bin}" ]; then + fail "expected built sce binary at ${sce_bin}" +fi +cli_bin_dir="${repo_root}/cli/target/debug" + +scratch="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/sce-real-pi-runtime-smoke.XXXXXX")" +agent_dir="${scratch}/agentdir" +mkdir -p "${agent_dir}" +cat > "${agent_dir}/settings.json" <<'EOF' +{ + "defaultProvider": "sce-test-provider", + "defaultModel": "sce-test-model" +} +EOF + +export XDG_STATE_HOME="${scratch}/state" + +( + cd "${scratch}" + git init --quiet + git config user.email smoke@example.com + git config user.name "Smoke Test" + echo seed > seed.txt + git add seed.txt + git commit --quiet -m seed + git remote add origin https://example.com/sce-real-pi-runtime-smoke.git +) + +mkdir -p "${scratch}/.sce" +cat > "${scratch}/.sce/config.json" <<'EOF' +{ + "agent_trace": { + "auto_sync": false + } +} +EOF + +(cd "${scratch}" && "${sce_bin}" setup --pi --non-interactive) + +mkdir -p "${scratch}/.pi/extensions/test-provider" +cp "${script_dir}/provider-extension.ts" "${scratch}/.pi/extensions/test-provider/index.ts" + +export SCE_CLI_BIN_DIR="${cli_bin_dir}" +( + cd "${repo_root}" + nix develop --command bash -c ' + set -euo pipefail + export PATH="${SCE_CLI_BIN_DIR}:${PATH}" + resolved="$(command -v sce)" || { + printf "FAIL: no sce resolved on PATH inside the Pi driver environment\n" >&2 + exit 1 + } + resolved_real="$(realpath "${resolved}")" + expected_real="$(realpath "${SCE_CLI_BIN_DIR}/sce")" + if [ "${resolved_real}" != "${expected_real}" ]; then + printf "FAIL: sce on PATH resolved to %s (real path %s), expected the branch-built binary at %s\n" \ + "${resolved}" "${resolved_real}" "${expected_real}" >&2 + exit 1 + fi + printf "sce on PATH resolved correctly to %s\n" "${resolved_real}" + node "$1" "$2" "$3" + ' bash "${script_dir}/driver.mjs" "${scratch}" "${agent_dir}" +) + +printf '\nscratch repo: %s\n' "${scratch}" + +doctor_json="$(cd "${scratch}" && "${sce_bin}" doctor --format json)" || fail "sce doctor did not succeed" + +db_path="$(printf '%s' "${doctor_json}" | nix shell nixpkgs#jq --command jq -r '.agent_trace_db.path // empty')" +if [ -z "${db_path}" ] || [ "${db_path}" = "null" ]; then + fail "sce doctor did not report a usable agent_trace_db.path (got: '${db_path}')" +fi +if [ ! -f "${db_path}" ]; then + fail "agent_trace_db.path reported by doctor does not exist on disk: ${db_path}" +fi +printf 'agent trace db: %s\n' "${db_path}" + +turso_query() { + local sql="$1" + (cd "${repo_root}" && nix run .#turso -- --experimental-multiprocess-wal --readonly -m list -q "${db_path}" "${sql}") +} + +assert_eq() { + local description="$1" expected="$2" actual="$3" + if [ "${actual}" != "${expected}" ]; then + fail "${description}: expected '${expected}', got '${actual}'" + fi + printf 'OK: %s = %s\n' "${description}" "${actual}" +} + +assert_count() { + local description="$1" sql="$2" expected="$3" + local actual + actual="$(turso_query "${sql}")" + assert_eq "${description}" "${expected}" "${actual}" +} + +smoke_output="${scratch}/smoke-output.txt" +if [ ! -f "${smoke_output}" ]; then + fail "smoke-output.txt was not created at ${smoke_output} — the scripted Bash mutation never executed" +fi +if ! grep -q 'sce-real-pi-smoke' "${smoke_output}"; then + fail "smoke-output.txt exists but does not contain the expected marker 'sce-real-pi-smoke'" +fi +printf 'OK: smoke-output.txt exists and contains expected marker\n' + +printf '\n=== mutation_trace_scopes (debug) ===\n' +turso_query "SELECT scope_id, actor_kind, status FROM mutation_trace_scopes;" +printf '\n=== mutation_trace_events (debug) ===\n' +turso_query "SELECT boundary_kind, attribution_kind, tainted, failure_kind FROM mutation_trace_events;" +printf '\n=== mutation_trace_scope_provenance (debug) ===\n' +turso_query "SELECT scope_id, session_id, model_id FROM mutation_trace_scope_provenance;" +printf '\n' + +assert_count "total Pi mutation scopes" \ + "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM mutation_trace_scopes WHERE actor_kind = 'pi';" "1" + +assert_count "closed Pi mutation scopes" \ + "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM mutation_trace_scopes WHERE actor_kind = 'pi' AND status = 'closed';" "1" + +assert_count "final ai_exclusive close events" \ + "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM mutation_trace_events WHERE boundary_kind = 'close' AND attribution_kind = 'ai_exclusive' AND tainted = 0 AND failure_kind = 'healthy';" \ + "1" + +assert_count "Pi session provenance rows" \ + "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM mutation_trace_scope_provenance WHERE session_id LIKE 'pi_%' AND model_id = 'sce-test-provider/sce-test-model';" \ + "1" + +assert_count "worktrees left tainted or unresolved" \ + "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM mutation_trace_worktrees WHERE tainted = 1 OR needs_rebaseline = 1 OR failure_kind != 'healthy';" \ + "0" + +printf '\nPASS: real Pi runtime mutation-attribution smoke\n' diff --git a/config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.test.ts b/config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 000000000..067359911 --- /dev/null +++ b/config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,1317 @@ +import { + afterAll, + afterEach, + beforeEach, + describe, + expect, + mock, + test, +} from "bun:test"; +import { EventEmitter } from "node:events"; +import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { createRequire } from "node:module"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { join } from "node:path"; +import type { + AttemptKey, + PiMutationScopePayload, + RetryScheduleFn, +} from "./sce-pi-extension.ts"; + +type SpawnSyncCall = { + command: string; + args: string[]; + payload: Record | undefined; +}; + +type SpawnCall = { + command: string; + args: string[]; + child: FakeChild; +}; + +class FakeChild extends EventEmitter { + stdin = { + writes: [] as string[], + write: (data: string) => { + this.stdin.writes.push(data); + return true; + }, + end: (data?: string) => { + if (data) { + this.stdin.writes.push(data); + } + }, + }; + stdout = new EventEmitter(); + + emitLine(payload: Record): void { + this.stdout.emit("data", Buffer.from(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n`)); + } + + killed = false; + kill(): void { + this.killed = true; + } +} + +let spawnSyncCalls: SpawnSyncCall[] = []; +let spawnSyncResult: { + status: number | null; + error?: NodeJS.ErrnoException; +} = { status: 0 }; + +let spawnCalls: SpawnCall[] = []; + +const realChildProcessModule = createRequire(import.meta.url)( + "node:child_process", +); +const realSpawnSync: typeof import("node:child_process").spawnSync = + realChildProcessModule.spawnSync; + +mock.module("node:child_process", () => ({ + ...realChildProcessModule, + spawnSync: ( + command: string, + args: string[], + options: { input?: string; cwd?: string }, + ) => { + if (command !== "sce") { + return realSpawnSync(command, args, options as never); + } + spawnSyncCalls.push({ + command, + args, + payload: options.input ? JSON.parse(options.input) : undefined, + }); + if (spawnSyncResult.error) { + return { + status: null, + stdout: "", + stderr: "", + error: spawnSyncResult.error, + }; + } + return { + status: spawnSyncResult.status, + stdout: "", + stderr: "", + error: undefined, + }; + }, +})); + +const realChildProcess = createRequire(import.meta.url)("node:child_process"); +const originalSpawn = realChildProcess.spawn; +realChildProcess.spawn = (command: string, args: string[]) => { + const child = new FakeChild(); + spawnCalls.push({ command, args, child }); + return child; +}; +afterAll(() => { + realChildProcess.spawn = originalSpawn; +}); + +const realFsPromisesModule = createRequire(import.meta.url)("node:fs/promises"); + +mock.module("node:fs/promises", () => ({ + ...realFsPromisesModule, + readdir: async (dir: string) => { + if (dir.endsWith("/.pi/extensions")) { + return ["sce"]; + } + return []; + }, +})); + +mock.module("@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent", () => ({ + isToolCallEventType: (toolName: string, event: { toolName: string }) => + event.toolName === toolName, +})); + +const { default: sceExtension, createTerminalDeliveryTracker } = await import( + "./sce-pi-extension.ts" +); + +type Handler = (event: unknown, ctx?: unknown) => unknown; + +function makeApi() { + const handlers = new Map(); + const api = { + on: (event: string, handler: Handler) => { + const list = handlers.get(event) ?? []; + list.push(handler); + handlers.set(event, list); + }, + }; + return { api, handlers }; +} + +function flush(): Promise { + return new Promise((resolve) => setImmediate(resolve)); +} + +function ctxFor(cwd: string, sessionId = "ses_1") { + return { + cwd, + sessionManager: { getSessionId: () => sessionId }, + model: undefined, + }; +} + +let smokeTempDirs: string[] = []; + +beforeEach(() => { + spawnSyncCalls = []; + spawnSyncResult = { status: 0 }; + spawnCalls = []; + smokeTempDirs = []; +}); + +afterEach(() => { + for (const dir of smokeTempDirs) { + rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); + } +}); + +describe("mutation-scope tool_call Start", () => { + test("does not call the adapter for a read-only tool", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [, startHandler] = handlers.get("tool_call") ?? []; + await startHandler?.( + { toolName: "read", toolCallId: "c1" }, + ctxFor("/repo"), + ); + expect(spawnSyncCalls).toHaveLength(0); + }); + + test("forwards a tracked bash tool_call as ToolCall and allows on success", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [, startHandler] = handlers.get("tool_call") ?? []; + const result = await startHandler?.( + { toolName: "bash", toolCallId: "c1" }, + ctxFor("/repo", "ses_a"), + ); + expect(result).toBeUndefined(); + expect(spawnSyncCalls).toHaveLength(1); + expect(spawnSyncCalls[0].args).toEqual(["hooks", "pi-mutation-scope"]); + expect(spawnSyncCalls[0].payload).toEqual({ + hook_event_name: "ToolCall", + session_id: "ses_a", + tool_call_id: "c1", + cwd: "/repo", + tool_name: "bash", + model: undefined, + }); + }); + + test("blocks the tool call when the adapter denies Start", async () => { + spawnSyncResult = { status: 1 }; + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [, startHandler] = handlers.get("tool_call") ?? []; + const result = await startHandler?.( + { toolName: "edit", toolCallId: "c2" }, + ctxFor("/repo"), + ); + expect(result).toEqual({ + block: true, + reason: + "SCE could not establish Pi mutation attribution for this tool execution.", + }); + }); + + test("blocks the tool call when the sce CLI is missing", async () => { + spawnSyncResult = { + status: null, + error: Object.assign(new Error("not found"), { code: "ENOENT" }), + }; + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [, startHandler] = handlers.get("tool_call") ?? []; + const result = await startHandler?.( + { toolName: "write", toolCallId: "c3" }, + ctxFor("/repo"), + ); + expect(result).toEqual({ + block: true, + reason: + "SCE could not establish Pi mutation attribution for this tool execution.", + }); + }); +}); + +describe("mutation-scope execution-evidence and Close forwarding", () => { + test("forwards tool_execution_start for a tracked tool as telemetry", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [handler] = handlers.get("tool_execution_start") ?? []; + handler?.({ toolName: "bash", toolCallId: "c1" }, ctxFor("/repo", "ses_x")); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(1); + expect(spawnCalls[0].args).toEqual(["hooks", "pi-mutation-scope"]); + expect(spawnCalls[0].child.stdin.writes[0]).toContain( + '"hook_event_name":"ToolExecutionStart"', + ); + }); + + test("does not forward tool_execution_start for an untracked tool", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [handler] = handlers.get("tool_execution_start") ?? []; + handler?.({ toolName: "grep", toolCallId: "c1" }, ctxFor("/repo")); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(0); + }); + + test("forwards a tracked tool_result as ToolResult", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const mutationScopeHandler = (handlers.get("tool_result") ?? [])[0]; + mutationScopeHandler?.( + { toolName: "write", toolCallId: "c5", isError: false }, + ctxFor("/repo", "ses_y"), + ); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(1); + const payload = JSON.parse(spawnCalls[0].child.stdin.writes[0]); + expect(payload).toEqual({ + hook_event_name: "ToolResult", + session_id: "ses_y", + tool_call_id: "c5", + cwd: "/repo", + tool_name: "write", + }); + }); + + test("forwards a tracked tool_execution_end as ToolExecutionEnd", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [handler] = handlers.get("tool_execution_end") ?? []; + handler?.( + { toolName: "edit", toolCallId: "c6", isError: false }, + ctxFor("/repo", "ses_z"), + ); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(1); + const payload = JSON.parse(spawnCalls[0].child.stdin.writes[0]); + expect(payload).toEqual({ + hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionEnd", + session_id: "ses_z", + tool_call_id: "c6", + cwd: "/repo", + tool_name: "edit", + }); + }); + + test("does not forward tool_execution_end for an untracked tool", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [handler] = handlers.get("tool_execution_end") ?? []; + handler?.({ toolName: "ls", toolCallId: "c7" }, ctxFor("/repo")); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(0); + }); +}); + +const FAIL_CLOSED_REASON = + "SCE could not establish Pi mutation attribution for this tool execution."; + +describe("terminal transport ordering (Problem 1)", () => { + test("ToolExecutionEnd is withheld until its own ToolResult delivery settles, then sent in order", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [resultHandler] = handlers.get("tool_result") ?? []; + const [endHandler] = handlers.get("tool_execution_end") ?? []; + + resultHandler?.( + { toolName: "bash", toolCallId: "c1", isError: false }, + ctxFor("/repo", "ses_order"), + ); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(1); + + endHandler?.( + { toolName: "bash", toolCallId: "c1", isError: false }, + ctxFor("/repo", "ses_order"), + ); + await flush(); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(1); + + spawnCalls[0].child.emit("close", 0); + await flush(); + await flush(); + + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(2); + expect( + JSON.parse(spawnCalls[0].child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ).toBe("ToolResult"); + expect( + JSON.parse(spawnCalls[1].child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ).toBe("ToolExecutionEnd"); + }); +}); + +describe("D9 terminal transport failure", () => { + test("a failed ToolResult delivery denies Starts immediately and converts a later ToolExecutionEnd into ToolExecutionAbandon", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [resultHandler] = handlers.get("tool_result") ?? []; + const [endHandler] = handlers.get("tool_execution_end") ?? []; + const [, startHandler] = handlers.get("tool_call") ?? []; + + resultHandler?.( + { toolName: "bash", toolCallId: "c2", isError: false }, + ctxFor("/repo", "ses_fail"), + ); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(1); + spawnCalls[0].child.emit("close", 1); + await flush(); + + const denied = await startHandler?.( + { toolName: "bash", toolCallId: "c2-sibling" }, + ctxFor("/repo"), + ); + expect(denied).toEqual({ block: true, reason: FAIL_CLOSED_REASON }); + + endHandler?.( + { toolName: "bash", toolCallId: "c2", isError: false }, + ctxFor("/repo", "ses_fail"), + ); + await flush(); + + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(2); + expect( + JSON.parse(spawnCalls[1].child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ).toBe("ToolExecutionAbandon"); + + spawnCalls[1].child.emit("close", 0); + await flush(); + + const allowed = await startHandler?.( + { toolName: "bash", toolCallId: "c2-again" }, + ctxFor("/repo"), + ); + expect(allowed).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("denies a tracked Start while a tool_execution_end delivery is unresolved", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [endHandler] = handlers.get("tool_execution_end") ?? []; + endHandler?.( + { toolName: "write", toolCallId: "c8", isError: false }, + ctxFor("/repo"), + ); + const [, startHandler] = handlers.get("tool_call") ?? []; + const result = await startHandler?.( + { toolName: "bash", toolCallId: "c8b" }, + ctxFor("/repo"), + ); + expect(result).toEqual({ block: true, reason: FAIL_CLOSED_REASON }); + expect(spawnSyncCalls).toHaveLength(0); + }); + + test("clears the unresolved marker once tool_execution_end delivery succeeds", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [endHandler] = handlers.get("tool_execution_end") ?? []; + endHandler?.( + { toolName: "write", toolCallId: "c9", isError: false }, + ctxFor("/repo"), + ); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(1); + spawnCalls[0].child.emit("close", 0); + await flush(); + + const [, startHandler] = handlers.get("tool_call") ?? []; + const result = await startHandler?.( + { toolName: "bash", toolCallId: "c9b" }, + ctxFor("/repo"), + ); + expect(result).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + test("retries a failed tool_execution_end delivery as ToolExecutionAbandon using a synchronous retry seam", async () => { + spawnCalls = []; + const scheduled: Array<() => void> = []; + const syncSchedule: RetryScheduleFn = (run) => { + scheduled.push(run); + }; + const tracker = createTerminalDeliveryTracker(syncSchedule); + const key = { sessionId: "ses_d10", toolCallId: "c10" }; + const endPayload: PiMutationScopePayload = { + hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionEnd", + session_id: "ses_d10", + tool_call_id: "c10", + cwd: "/repo", + tool_name: "bash", + }; + + const endPromise = tracker.forwardEnd("/repo", endPayload, key); + await flush(); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(1); + expect( + JSON.parse(spawnCalls[0].child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ).toBe("ToolExecutionEnd"); + + spawnCalls[0].child.emit("close", 1); + await endPromise; + expect(tracker.hasUnresolved()).toBe(true); + expect(scheduled).toHaveLength(1); + + const retry = scheduled.shift(); + retry?.(); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(2); + expect( + JSON.parse(spawnCalls[1].child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ).toBe("ToolExecutionAbandon"); + + spawnCalls[1].child.emit("close", 0); + await flush(); + expect(tracker.hasUnresolved()).toBe(false); + }); + + test("a ToolExecutionEnd transport failure after a successful ToolResult retries as ToolExecutionAbandon, never a delayed End", async () => { + spawnCalls = []; + const scheduled: Array<() => void> = []; + const syncSchedule: RetryScheduleFn = (run) => { + scheduled.push(run); + }; + const tracker = createTerminalDeliveryTracker(syncSchedule); + const key = { sessionId: "ses_d3", toolCallId: "c3" }; + const resultPayload: PiMutationScopePayload = { + hook_event_name: "ToolResult", + session_id: "ses_d3", + tool_call_id: "c3", + cwd: "/repo", + tool_name: "bash", + }; + const endPayload: PiMutationScopePayload = { + ...resultPayload, + hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionEnd", + }; + + tracker.forwardResult("/repo", resultPayload, key); + spawnCalls[0].child.emit("close", 0); + await flush(); + + const endPromise = tracker.forwardEnd("/repo", endPayload, key); + await flush(); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(2); + expect( + JSON.parse(spawnCalls[1].child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ).toBe("ToolExecutionEnd"); + + spawnCalls[1].child.emit("close", 1); + await endPromise; + expect(tracker.hasUnresolved()).toBe(true); + + const retry = scheduled.shift(); + retry?.(); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(3); + expect( + JSON.parse(spawnCalls[2].child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ).toBe("ToolExecutionAbandon"); + expect(tracker.hasUnresolved()).toBe(true); + + spawnCalls[2].child.emit("close", 0); + await flush(); + expect(tracker.hasUnresolved()).toBe(false); + }); + + test("same toolCallId in two different sessions maintain independent unresolved state", async () => { + spawnCalls = []; + const tracker = createTerminalDeliveryTracker(); + const keyA: AttemptKey = { sessionId: "ses_A", toolCallId: "c1" }; + const keyB: AttemptKey = { sessionId: "ses_B", toolCallId: "c1" }; + const resultPayloadA: PiMutationScopePayload = { + hook_event_name: "ToolResult", + session_id: "ses_A", + tool_call_id: "c1", + cwd: "/repo", + tool_name: "bash", + }; + const resultPayloadB: PiMutationScopePayload = { + ...resultPayloadA, + session_id: "ses_B", + }; + + tracker.forwardResult("/repo", resultPayloadA, keyA); + tracker.forwardResult("/repo", resultPayloadB, keyB); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(2); + + spawnCalls[0].child.emit("close", 1); + await flush(); + expect(tracker.hasUnresolved()).toBe(true); + + spawnCalls[1].child.emit("close", 1); + await flush(); + expect(tracker.hasUnresolved()).toBe(true); + + const endA = tracker.forwardEnd( + "/repo", + { ...resultPayloadA, hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionEnd" }, + keyA, + ); + await flush(); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(3); + expect( + JSON.parse(spawnCalls[2].child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ).toBe("ToolExecutionAbandon"); + spawnCalls[2].child.emit("close", 0); + await endA; + + expect(tracker.hasUnresolved()).toBe(true); + + const endB = tracker.forwardEnd( + "/repo", + { ...resultPayloadB, hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionEnd" }, + keyB, + ); + await flush(); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(4); + expect( + JSON.parse(spawnCalls[3].child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ).toBe("ToolExecutionAbandon"); + spawnCalls[3].child.emit("close", 0); + await endB; + + expect(tracker.hasUnresolved()).toBe(false); + }); +}); + +describe("user_bash guard", () => { + const originalPlatform = process.platform; + + afterEach(() => { + Object.defineProperty(process, "platform", { + value: originalPlatform, + }); + }); + + test("refuses unconditionally on win32", async () => { + Object.defineProperty(process, "platform", { value: "win32" }); + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [handler] = handlers.get("user_bash") ?? []; + const result = await handler?.({ + type: "user_bash", + command: "echo hi", + excludeFromContext: false, + cwd: "/repo", + }); + expect(result).toEqual({ + result: { + output: + "SCE does not support guarded user_bash execution on Windows in this release; run this command outside Pi.", + exitCode: 1, + cancelled: false, + truncated: false, + }, + }); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(0); + }); + + test("returns wrapped operations once the supervisor acknowledges armed", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [handler] = handlers.get("user_bash") ?? []; + const pending = handler?.({ + type: "user_bash", + command: "echo hi", + excludeFromContext: false, + cwd: "/repo", + }) as Promise<{ operations?: { exec: unknown } }>; + await flush(); + + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(1); + expect(spawnCalls[0].args).toEqual(["hooks", "external-mutation-guard"]); + expect(spawnCalls[0].child.stdin.writes[0]).toBe( + `${JSON.stringify({ operation: "arm" })}\n`, + ); + spawnCalls[0].child.emitLine({ status: "armed" }); + + const result = await pending; + expect(result.operations).toBeDefined(); + expect(typeof result.operations?.exec).toBe("function"); + }); + + test("refuses and terminates the supervisor when it closes before armed", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [handler] = handlers.get("user_bash") ?? []; + const pending = handler?.({ + type: "user_bash", + command: "echo hi", + excludeFromContext: false, + cwd: "/repo", + }) as Promise<{ result?: { output: string } }>; + await flush(); + + spawnCalls[0].child.emit("close"); + + const result = await pending; + expect(result.result?.output).toBe( + "SCE could not establish the worktree external-mutation guard for this command.", + ); + expect(spawnCalls[0].child.killed).toBe(true); + }); + + test("wrapped exec relays stdout/stderr to onData and resolves on the result line", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [handler] = handlers.get("user_bash") ?? []; + const pending = handler?.({ + type: "user_bash", + command: "echo hi", + excludeFromContext: false, + cwd: "/repo", + }) as Promise<{ + operations: { + exec: ( + command: string, + cwd: string, + options: { onData: (data: Buffer) => void }, + ) => Promise<{ exitCode: number | null }>; + }; + }>; + await flush(); + spawnCalls[0].child.emitLine({ status: "armed" }); + const { operations } = await pending; + + const chunks: string[] = []; + const execPromise = operations.exec("echo hi", "/repo", { + onData: (data) => chunks.push(data.toString()), + }); + + expect(spawnCalls[0].child.stdin.writes.at(-1)).toBe( + `${JSON.stringify({ operation: "exec", command: "echo hi", cwd: "/repo", env: {} })}\n`, + ); + spawnCalls[0].child.emitLine({ stream: "stdout", data: "hi\n" }); + spawnCalls[0].child.emitLine({ status: "result", exit_code: 0 }); + + const execResult = await execPromise; + expect(execResult).toEqual({ exitCode: 0 }); + expect(chunks).toEqual(["hi\n"]); + }); + + test("wrapped exec sends a cancel operation on abort", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [handler] = handlers.get("user_bash") ?? []; + const pending = handler?.({ + type: "user_bash", + command: "sleep 10", + excludeFromContext: false, + cwd: "/repo", + }) as Promise<{ + operations: { + exec: ( + command: string, + cwd: string, + options: { onData: (data: Buffer) => void; signal?: AbortSignal }, + ) => Promise<{ exitCode: number | null }>; + }; + }>; + await flush(); + spawnCalls[0].child.emitLine({ status: "armed" }); + const { operations } = await pending; + + const controller = new AbortController(); + const execPromise = operations.exec("sleep 10", "/repo", { + onData: () => {}, + signal: controller.signal, + }); + controller.abort(); + expect(spawnCalls[0].child.stdin.writes.at(-1)).toBe( + `${JSON.stringify({ operation: "cancel" })}\n`, + ); + + spawnCalls[0].child.emitLine({ status: "result", exit_code: null }); + await execPromise; + }); + + test("wrapped exec rejects when the control channel closes before any result frame, never resolving exitCode: null", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [handler] = handlers.get("user_bash") ?? []; + const pending = handler?.({ + type: "user_bash", + command: "echo hi", + excludeFromContext: false, + cwd: "/repo", + }) as Promise<{ + operations: { + exec: ( + command: string, + cwd: string, + options: { onData: (data: Buffer) => void }, + ) => Promise<{ exitCode: number | null }>; + }; + }>; + await flush(); + spawnCalls[0].child.emitLine({ status: "armed" }); + const { operations } = await pending; + + const execPromise = operations.exec("echo hi", "/repo", { + onData: () => {}, + }); + spawnCalls[0].child.emit("close"); + + await expect(execPromise).rejects.toThrow( + "SCE lost contact with the external-mutation-guard supervisor before it reported a command result.", + ); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(1); + }); + + test("an explicit supervisor result with exit_code null is a valid authoritative completion, not a channel-loss fabrication", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [handler] = handlers.get("user_bash") ?? []; + const pending = handler?.({ + type: "user_bash", + command: "echo hi", + excludeFromContext: false, + cwd: "/repo", + }) as Promise<{ + operations: { + exec: ( + command: string, + cwd: string, + options: { onData: (data: Buffer) => void }, + ) => Promise<{ exitCode: number | null }>; + }; + }>; + await flush(); + spawnCalls[0].child.emitLine({ status: "armed" }); + const { operations } = await pending; + + const execPromise = operations.exec("echo hi", "/repo", { + onData: () => {}, + }); + spawnCalls[0].child.emitLine({ status: "result", exit_code: null }); + + await expect(execPromise).resolves.toEqual({ exitCode: null }); + }); + + test("a competing extension consuming user_bash ahead of SCE prevents SCE's handler from ever running, while tracked-tool attribution in the same session is unaffected", async () => { + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const [sceHandler] = handlers.get("user_bash") ?? []; + expect(sceHandler).toBeDefined(); + + let sceHandlerInvoked = false; + const spiedSceHandler: Handler = (event, ctx) => { + sceHandlerInvoked = true; + return sceHandler?.(event, ctx); + }; + + const competingHandler: Handler = () => ({ + result: { + output: "handled by another extension", + exitCode: 0, + cancelled: false, + truncated: false, + }, + }); + const orderedHandlers: Handler[] = [competingHandler, spiedSceHandler]; + + let dispatched: unknown; + for (const handler of orderedHandlers) { + const result = await handler( + { + type: "user_bash", + command: "echo hi", + excludeFromContext: false, + cwd: "/repo", + }, + undefined, + ); + if (result) { + dispatched = result; + break; + } + } + + expect(dispatched).toEqual({ + result: { + output: "handled by another extension", + exitCode: 0, + cancelled: false, + truncated: false, + }, + }); + expect(sceHandlerInvoked).toBe(false); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(0); + + const [, startHandler] = handlers.get("tool_call") ?? []; + const callResult = await startHandler?.( + { toolName: "bash", toolCallId: "c_after_competing_user_bash" }, + ctxFor("/repo", "ses_after_competing_user_bash"), + ); + expect(callResult).toBeUndefined(); + expect(spawnSyncCalls).toHaveLength(1); + }); +}); + +type CaptureLine = { + tag: string; + hook: string; + payload: { + event?: Record; + model?: { provider: string; id: string }; + }; +}; + +const FIXTURES_DIR = join( + import.meta.dir, + "..", + "..", + "..", + "cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/captures", +); + +function loadCaptureLines(fixtureFile: string): CaptureLine[] { + const raw = readFileSync(join(FIXTURES_DIR, fixtureFile), "utf8"); + return raw + .trim() + .split("\n") + .map((line) => JSON.parse(line) as CaptureLine) + .filter( + (line) => line.tag === "capture" && line.payload.event !== undefined, + ); +} + +function findEvent( + lines: CaptureLine[], + hook: string, + occurrence = 0, +): Record { + const matches = lines.filter((line) => line.hook === hook); + const match = matches[occurrence]; + if (!match?.payload.event) { + throw new Error(`fixture missing hook "${hook}" occurrence ${occurrence}`); + } + return match.payload.event; +} + +function findRawPayload( + lines: CaptureLine[], + hook: string, + occurrence = 0, +): Record { + const matches = lines.filter((line) => line.hook === hook); + const match = matches[occurrence]; + if (!match) { + throw new Error(`fixture missing hook "${hook}" occurrence ${occurrence}`); + } + return match.payload as unknown as Record; +} + +async function emitToolCall( + handlers: Handler[], + event: unknown, + ctx: unknown, +): Promise<{ block?: boolean; reason?: string } | undefined> { + let result: { block?: boolean; reason?: string } | undefined; + for (const handler of handlers) { + const handlerResult = (await handler(event, ctx)) as + | { block?: boolean; reason?: string } + | undefined; + if (handlerResult) { + result = handlerResult; + if (result.block) { + return result; + } + } + } + return result; +} + +async function emitAll( + handlers: Handler[], + event: unknown, + ctx: unknown, +): Promise { + for (const handler of handlers) { + await handler(event, ctx); + } +} + +function ctxFromCapture( + cwd: string, + sessionId: string, + model: { provider: string; id: string } | undefined, +) { + return { + cwd, + sessionManager: { getSessionId: () => sessionId }, + model, + }; +} + +function makeTempGitRepo(): string { + const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "sce-pi-smoke-")); + const init = realSpawnSync("git", ["init", "--quiet"], { cwd: dir } as never); + if (init.status !== 0) { + throw new Error(`git init failed: ${init.stderr?.toString() ?? ""}`); + } + realSpawnSync("git", ["config", "user.email", "smoke@example.com"], { + cwd: dir, + } as never); + realSpawnSync("git", ["config", "user.name", "Smoke Test"], { + cwd: dir, + } as never); + return dir; +} + +async function settleAllSpawns(rounds = 5): Promise { + for (let i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { + for (const call of spawnCalls) { + if (!call.child.killed) { + call.child.emit("close", 0); + } + } + await flush(); + } +} + +describe("pinned Pi capture-replay smoke (T01 lifecycle fixtures, Linux)", () => { + test("bash: tool_execution_start -> tool_call -> tool_result -> tool_execution_end reaches confirmed Close wiring, with model provenance", async () => { + const lines = loadCaptureLines("bash-success.jsonl"); + const startEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_execution_start"); + const callEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_call"); + const resultEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_result"); + const endEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_execution_end"); + const model = findRawPayload(lines, "tool_call").model as { + provider: string; + id: string; + }; + + const cwd = makeTempGitRepo(); + smokeTempDirs.push(cwd); + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const ctx = ctxFromCapture(cwd, "ses_bash_smoke", model); + + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_execution_start") ?? [], startEvent, ctx); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(1); + expect( + JSON.parse(spawnCalls[0].child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ).toBe("ToolExecutionStart"); + + const callResult = await emitToolCall( + handlers.get("tool_call") ?? [], + callEvent, + ctx, + ); + expect(callResult).toBeUndefined(); + expect(spawnSyncCalls.at(-1)?.payload).toEqual({ + hook_event_name: "ToolCall", + session_id: "ses_bash_smoke", + tool_call_id: (callEvent as { toolCallId: string }).toolCallId, + cwd, + tool_name: "bash", + model: `${model.provider}/${model.id}`, + }); + + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_result") ?? [], resultEvent, ctx); + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_execution_end") ?? [], endEvent, ctx); + await settleAllSpawns(); + + const forwarded = spawnCalls.map( + (call) => JSON.parse(call.child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ); + expect(forwarded).toEqual([ + "ToolExecutionStart", + "ToolResult", + "ToolExecutionEnd", + ]); + }); + + test("write: missing model yields NULL provenance (ctx.model absent for this attempt)", async () => { + const lines = loadCaptureLines("write-success.jsonl"); + const callEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_call"); + + const cwd = makeTempGitRepo(); + smokeTempDirs.push(cwd); + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const ctx = ctxFromCapture(cwd, "ses_write_nomodel", undefined); + + await emitToolCall(handlers.get("tool_call") ?? [], callEvent, ctx); + expect(spawnSyncCalls.at(-1)?.payload).toEqual({ + hook_event_name: "ToolCall", + session_id: "ses_write_nomodel", + tool_call_id: (callEvent as { toolCallId: string }).toolCallId, + cwd, + tool_name: "write", + model: undefined, + }); + }); + + test("read-only and custom/unknown tools create zero mutation-scope footprint", async () => { + const readonlyLines = loadCaptureLines("readonly-footprint.jsonl"); + const customLines = loadCaptureLines("customtool.jsonl"); + const cwd = makeTempGitRepo(); + smokeTempDirs.push(cwd); + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const ctx = ctxFromCapture(cwd, "ses_readonly", undefined); + + for (const hook of [ + "tool_execution_start", + "tool_call", + "tool_result", + "tool_execution_end", + ]) { + for (const lines of [readonlyLines, customLines]) { + const matches = lines.filter((line) => line.hook === hook); + for (const match of matches) { + if (hook === "tool_call") { + await emitToolCall( + handlers.get("tool_call") ?? [], + match.payload.event, + ctx, + ); + } else { + await emitAll(handlers.get(hook) ?? [], match.payload.event, ctx); + } + } + } + } + + expect(spawnSyncCalls).toHaveLength(0); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(0); + }); + + test("edit: real before/after file mutation in a real Git repo drives Start/Close and the diff-trace pipeline", async () => { + const lines = loadCaptureLines("edit-success.jsonl"); + const startEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_execution_start", 1); + const callEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_call", 1) as { + toolCallId: string; + toolName: string; + input: { path: string }; + }; + const resultEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_result", 1); + const endEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_execution_end", 1); + const model = findRawPayload(lines, "tool_call", 1).model as { + provider: string; + id: string; + }; + + const cwd = makeTempGitRepo(); + smokeTempDirs.push(cwd); + const filePath = join(cwd, callEvent.input.path); + writeFileSync(filePath, "line1"); + + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const ctx = ctxFromCapture(cwd, "ses_edit_smoke", model); + + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_execution_start") ?? [], startEvent, ctx); + const callResult = await emitToolCall( + handlers.get("tool_call") ?? [], + callEvent, + ctx, + ); + expect(callResult).toBeUndefined(); + + writeFileSync(filePath, "line2"); + + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_result") ?? [], resultEvent, ctx); + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_execution_end") ?? [], endEvent, ctx); + await settleAllSpawns(); + + const mutationScopeCalls = spawnSyncCalls.filter( + (call) => call.args[1] === "pi-mutation-scope", + ); + expect(mutationScopeCalls).toHaveLength(1); + expect(mutationScopeCalls[0].payload).toEqual({ + hook_event_name: "ToolCall", + session_id: "ses_edit_smoke", + tool_call_id: callEvent.toolCallId, + cwd, + tool_name: "edit", + model: `${model.provider}/${model.id}`, + }); + + const mutationScopeSpawns = spawnCalls.filter( + (call) => call.args[1] === "pi-mutation-scope", + ); + const forwarded = mutationScopeSpawns.map( + (call) => JSON.parse(call.child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ); + expect(forwarded).toEqual([ + "ToolExecutionStart", + "ToolResult", + "ToolExecutionEnd", + ]); + + const traceSpawns = spawnCalls.filter( + (call) => + call.args[1] === "diff-trace" || call.args[1] === "conversation-trace", + ); + expect(traceSpawns.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); + const diffTraceSpawn = spawnCalls.find( + (call) => call.args[1] === "diff-trace", + ); + const diffPayload = diffTraceSpawn + ? JSON.parse(diffTraceSpawn.child.stdin.writes[0]) + : undefined; + expect(diffPayload?.diff).toContain("-line1"); + expect(diffPayload?.diff).toContain("+line2"); + }); + + test("SCE Start failure blocks a real tool_call event before execution", async () => { + spawnSyncResult = { status: 1 }; + const lines = loadCaptureLines("bash-success.jsonl"); + const callEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_call"); + const cwd = makeTempGitRepo(); + smokeTempDirs.push(cwd); + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const ctx = ctxFromCapture(cwd, "ses_denied", undefined); + + const result = await emitToolCall( + handlers.get("tool_call") ?? [], + callEvent, + ctx, + ); + expect(result).toEqual({ + block: true, + reason: + "SCE could not establish Pi mutation attribution for this tool execution.", + }); + }); + + test("later-extension rejection after a successful SCE Start produces tool_execution_end with no preceding tool_result (D7 abandon shape)", async () => { + const lines = loadCaptureLines("probeB-later-block.jsonl"); + const startEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_execution_start"); + const callEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_call"); + const endEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_execution_end"); + expect(lines.filter((line) => line.hook === "tool_result")).toHaveLength(0); + + const cwd = makeTempGitRepo(); + smokeTempDirs.push(cwd); + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const ctx = ctxFromCapture(cwd, "ses_later_block", undefined); + + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_execution_start") ?? [], startEvent, ctx); + + const combinedHandlers: Handler[] = [ + ...(handlers.get("tool_call") ?? []), + () => ({ block: true, reason: "competing extension blocked" }), + ]; + const overall = await emitToolCall(combinedHandlers, callEvent, ctx); + expect(overall).toEqual({ + block: true, + reason: "competing extension blocked", + }); + expect(spawnSyncCalls.at(-1)?.payload).toMatchObject({ + hook_event_name: "ToolCall", + }); + + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_execution_end") ?? [], endEvent, ctx); + await flush(); + + const forwarded = spawnCalls.map( + (call) => JSON.parse(call.child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ); + expect(forwarded).toEqual(["ToolExecutionStart", "ToolExecutionEnd"]); + }); + + test("mutate-then-error (isError: true) still forwards ToolResult/ToolExecutionEnd", async () => { + const lines = loadCaptureLines("bash-nonzero.jsonl"); + const startEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_execution_start"); + const callEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_call"); + const resultEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_result") as { isError: boolean }; + const endEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_execution_end"); + expect(resultEvent.isError).toBe(true); + + const cwd = makeTempGitRepo(); + smokeTempDirs.push(cwd); + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + const ctx = ctxFromCapture(cwd, "ses_error", undefined); + + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_execution_start") ?? [], startEvent, ctx); + await emitToolCall(handlers.get("tool_call") ?? [], callEvent, ctx); + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_result") ?? [], resultEvent, ctx); + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_execution_end") ?? [], endEvent, ctx); + await settleAllSpawns(); + + const forwarded = spawnCalls.map( + (call) => JSON.parse(call.child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ); + expect(forwarded).toEqual([ + "ToolExecutionStart", + "ToolResult", + "ToolExecutionEnd", + ]); + }); +}); + +describe("Windows-specific pinned Pi capture-replay smoke (D13 disposition)", () => { + const originalPlatform = process.platform; + + afterEach(() => { + Object.defineProperty(process, "platform", { value: originalPlatform }); + }); + + test("user_bash is unconditionally refused, and a tracked bash tool_call in the same session still reaches confirmed Close wiring", async () => { + Object.defineProperty(process, "platform", { value: "win32" }); + + const cwd = makeTempGitRepo(); + smokeTempDirs.push(cwd); + const { api, handlers } = makeApi(); + sceExtension(api as never); + + const [userBashHandler] = handlers.get("user_bash") ?? []; + const refusal = await userBashHandler?.({ + type: "user_bash", + command: "echo hi", + excludeFromContext: false, + cwd, + }); + expect(refusal).toEqual({ + result: { + output: + "SCE does not support guarded user_bash execution on Windows in this release; run this command outside Pi.", + exitCode: 1, + cancelled: false, + truncated: false, + }, + }); + expect(spawnCalls).toHaveLength(0); + + const lines = loadCaptureLines("bash-success.jsonl"); + const startEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_execution_start"); + const callEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_call"); + const resultEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_result"); + const endEvent = findEvent(lines, "tool_execution_end"); + const model = findRawPayload(lines, "tool_call").model as { + provider: string; + id: string; + }; + const ctx = ctxFromCapture(cwd, "ses_win32_bash", model); + + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_execution_start") ?? [], startEvent, ctx); + const callResult = await emitToolCall( + handlers.get("tool_call") ?? [], + callEvent, + ctx, + ); + expect(callResult).toBeUndefined(); + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_result") ?? [], resultEvent, ctx); + await emitAll(handlers.get("tool_execution_end") ?? [], endEvent, ctx); + await settleAllSpawns(); + + const forwarded = spawnCalls.map( + (call) => JSON.parse(call.child.stdin.writes[0]).hook_event_name, + ); + expect(forwarded).toEqual([ + "ToolExecutionStart", + "ToolResult", + "ToolExecutionEnd", + ]); + }); +}); diff --git a/config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.ts b/config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.ts index cbd2441ac..54cb2576c 100644 --- a/config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.ts +++ b/config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.ts @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ -import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; +import type { ChildProcess, ChildProcessByStdio } from "node:child_process"; +import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { createRequire } from "node:module"; @@ -10,6 +11,8 @@ import { relative, resolve as resolvePath, } from "node:path"; +import type { Readable, Writable } from "node:stream"; +import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import { type ExtensionAPI, isToolCallEventType, @@ -28,6 +31,28 @@ const SCE_INSTALL_URL = "https://sce.crocoder.dev/docs/getting-started#install-cli"; const TOOL_NAME = "pi" as const; +type SpawnFn = typeof import("node:child_process").spawn; + +function nodeSpawn( + command: string, + args: readonly string[], + options: { cwd: string; stdio: readonly ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"] }, +): ChildProcessByStdio; +function nodeSpawn( + command: string, + args: readonly string[], + options: { cwd: string; stdio: readonly ["pipe", "pipe", "ignore"] }, +): ChildProcessByStdio; +function nodeSpawn( + command: string, + args: readonly string[], + options: Record, +): ChildProcess { + const spawnImpl = createRequire(import.meta.url)("node:child_process") + .spawn as SpawnFn; + return spawnImpl(command, args as string[], options as never); +} + type ConversationTraceMessageItem = { type: "message"; session_id: string; @@ -119,7 +144,7 @@ function runConversationTraceHook( payload: ConversationTracePayload, ): Promise { return new Promise((resolve) => { - const child = spawn("sce", ["hooks", "conversation-trace"], { + const child = nodeSpawn("sce", ["hooks", "conversation-trace"], { cwd, stdio: ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"], }); @@ -211,8 +236,9 @@ function buildMessageEndConversationTracePayload( */ async function resolvePiToolVersion(): Promise { try { - const require_ = createRequire(import.meta.url); - const entryPath = require_.resolve("@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"); + const entryPath = fileURLToPath( + import.meta.resolve("@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent"), + ); const packageJsonPath = join(dirname(entryPath), "..", "package.json"); const parsed: { version?: unknown } = JSON.parse( await readFile(packageJsonPath, "utf8"), @@ -234,7 +260,7 @@ function runDiffTraceHook( payload: DiffTracePayload, ): Promise { return new Promise((resolve) => { - const child = spawn("sce", ["hooks", "diff-trace"], { + const child = nodeSpawn("sce", ["hooks", "diff-trace"], { cwd, stdio: ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"], }); @@ -332,9 +358,410 @@ async function buildUnifiedDiff( } } +export type PiMutationHookEventName = + | "ToolExecutionStart" + | "ToolCall" + | "ToolResult" + | "ToolExecutionEnd" + | "ToolExecutionAbandon"; + +export type PiMutationScopePayload = { + hook_event_name: PiMutationHookEventName; + session_id: string; + tool_call_id: string; + cwd: string; + tool_name: string; + model?: string; +}; + +const MUTATION_SCOPE_FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE = + "SCE could not establish Pi mutation attribution for this tool execution."; +const MUTATION_SCOPE_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000; + +const TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES = new Set(["bash", "edit", "write"]); + +type MutationScopeStartOutcome = "ok" | "denied" | "cli-missing"; + +function forwardMutationScopeStart( + payload: PiMutationScopePayload, +): MutationScopeStartOutcome { + let result: ReturnType; + try { + result = spawnSync("sce", ["hooks", "pi-mutation-scope"], { + input: JSON.stringify(payload), + encoding: "utf8", + timeout: MUTATION_SCOPE_TIMEOUT_MS, + }); + } catch { + return "denied"; + } + + if (result.error) { + if ((result.error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT") { + console.warn(`sce CLI not found. Install it from ${SCE_INSTALL_URL}`); + return "cli-missing"; + } + return "denied"; + } + + return result.status === 0 ? "ok" : "denied"; +} + +function forwardMutationScopeBestEffort( + cwd: string, + payload: PiMutationScopePayload, +): Promise { + return new Promise((resolve) => { + const child = nodeSpawn("sce", ["hooks", "pi-mutation-scope"], { + cwd, + stdio: ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"], + }); + + child.on("error", (err: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => { + if (err.code === "ENOENT") { + console.warn(`sce CLI not found. Install it from ${SCE_INSTALL_URL}`); + } + resolve(); + }); + child.on("close", () => resolve()); + + child.stdin.end(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n`); + }); +} + +function attemptMutationScopeDelivery( + cwd: string, + payload: PiMutationScopePayload, +): Promise { + return new Promise((resolve) => { + const child = nodeSpawn("sce", ["hooks", "pi-mutation-scope"], { + cwd, + stdio: ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"], + }); + + let settled = false; + const finish = (delivered: boolean) => { + if (settled) { + return; + } + settled = true; + resolve(delivered); + }; + + child.on("error", (err: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => { + if (err.code === "ENOENT") { + console.warn(`sce CLI not found. Install it from ${SCE_INSTALL_URL}`); + } + finish(false); + }); + child.on("close", (code) => finish(code === 0)); + + child.stdin.end(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n`); + }); +} + +const TERMINAL_RETRY_INITIAL_MS = 500; +const TERMINAL_RETRY_MAX_MS = 10_000; + +export type AttemptKey = { sessionId: string; toolCallId: string }; + +function attemptMapKey(key: AttemptKey): string { + return `s=${key.sessionId.length}:${key.sessionId}|c=${key.toolCallId.length}:${key.toolCallId}`; +} + +type ResultDeliveryOutcome = "delivered" | "failed"; + +export type RetryScheduleFn = (run: () => void, delayMs: number) => void; + +const defaultRetrySchedule: RetryScheduleFn = (run, delayMs) => { + const timer = setTimeout(run, delayMs); + timer.unref?.(); +}; + +export function createTerminalDeliveryTracker( + schedule: RetryScheduleFn = defaultRetrySchedule, +) { + const attempts = new Map< + string, + { resultDelivery: Promise } + >(); + const unresolved = new Set(); + + function scheduleAbandonRetry( + cwd: string, + endPayload: PiMutationScopePayload, + mapKey: string, + delayMs: number, + ): void { + const abandonPayload: PiMutationScopePayload = { + ...endPayload, + hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionAbandon", + }; + schedule(() => { + void attemptMutationScopeDelivery(cwd, abandonPayload).then( + (delivered) => { + if (delivered) { + unresolved.delete(mapKey); + return; + } + scheduleAbandonRetry( + cwd, + endPayload, + mapKey, + Math.min(delayMs * 2, TERMINAL_RETRY_MAX_MS), + ); + }, + ); + }, delayMs); + } + + async function deliverEndThenFallbackToAbandon( + cwd: string, + endPayload: PiMutationScopePayload, + mapKey: string, + ): Promise { + unresolved.add(mapKey); + const delivered = await attemptMutationScopeDelivery(cwd, endPayload); + if (delivered) { + unresolved.delete(mapKey); + return; + } + scheduleAbandonRetry(cwd, endPayload, mapKey, TERMINAL_RETRY_INITIAL_MS); + } + + async function deliverAbandonImmediately( + cwd: string, + endPayload: PiMutationScopePayload, + mapKey: string, + ): Promise { + unresolved.add(mapKey); + const abandonPayload: PiMutationScopePayload = { + ...endPayload, + hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionAbandon", + }; + const delivered = await attemptMutationScopeDelivery(cwd, abandonPayload); + if (delivered) { + unresolved.delete(mapKey); + return; + } + scheduleAbandonRetry(cwd, endPayload, mapKey, TERMINAL_RETRY_INITIAL_MS); + } + + return { + hasUnresolved(): boolean { + return unresolved.size > 0; + }, + + forwardResult( + cwd: string, + payload: PiMutationScopePayload, + key: AttemptKey, + ): void { + const mapKey = attemptMapKey(key); + const resultDelivery = attemptMutationScopeDelivery(cwd, payload).then( + (delivered): ResultDeliveryOutcome => { + if (delivered) { + return "delivered"; + } + unresolved.add(mapKey); + return "failed"; + }, + ); + attempts.set(mapKey, { resultDelivery }); + }, + + async forwardEnd( + cwd: string, + payload: PiMutationScopePayload, + key: AttemptKey, + ): Promise { + const mapKey = attemptMapKey(key); + const entry = attempts.get(mapKey); + attempts.delete(mapKey); + + if (!entry) { + await deliverEndThenFallbackToAbandon(cwd, payload, mapKey); + return; + } + + const outcome = await entry.resultDelivery; + if (outcome === "failed") { + await deliverAbandonImmediately(cwd, payload, mapKey); + return; + } + + await deliverEndThenFallbackToAbandon(cwd, payload, mapKey); + }, + }; +} + +const GUARD_ESTABLISH_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000; + +const GUARD_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE = + "SCE could not establish the worktree external-mutation guard for this command."; +const WINDOWS_UNSUPPORTED_MESSAGE = + "SCE does not support guarded user_bash execution on Windows in this release; run this command outside Pi."; + +function guardRefusal(output: string) { + return { + result: { output, exitCode: 1, cancelled: false, truncated: false }, + }; +} + +type GuardLine = + | { status: "armed" } + | { stream: "stdout" | "stderr"; data: string } + | { status: "result"; exit_code: number | null }; + +class LineReader { + private buffer = ""; + private readonly onLine: (line: string) => void; + + constructor(onLine: (line: string) => void) { + this.onLine = onLine; + } + + push(chunk: Buffer | string): void { + this.buffer += chunk.toString(); + let index = this.buffer.indexOf("\n"); + while (index !== -1) { + const line = this.buffer.slice(0, index); + this.buffer = this.buffer.slice(index + 1); + if (line.length > 0) { + this.onLine(line); + } + index = this.buffer.indexOf("\n"); + } + } +} + +class ExternalMutationGuardSession { + private readonly child: ReturnType; + private readonly pendingLines: GuardLine[] = []; + private readonly waiters: Array<(line: GuardLine | undefined) => void> = []; + private closed = false; + + constructor(cwd: string) { + this.child = nodeSpawn("sce", ["hooks", "external-mutation-guard"], { + cwd, + stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "ignore"], + }); + const reader = new LineReader((line) => { + try { + this.deliver(JSON.parse(line) as GuardLine); + } catch {} + }); + this.child.stdout?.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => reader.push(chunk)); + this.child.on("close", () => { + this.closed = true; + this.deliver(undefined); + }); + this.child.on("error", () => { + this.closed = true; + this.deliver(undefined); + }); + } + + private deliver(line: GuardLine | undefined): void { + const waiter = this.waiters.shift(); + if (waiter) { + waiter(line); + } else if (line !== undefined) { + this.pendingLines.push(line); + } + } + + private nextLine(): Promise { + const queued = this.pendingLines.shift(); + if (queued) { + return Promise.resolve(queued); + } + if (this.closed) { + return Promise.resolve(undefined); + } + return new Promise((resolve) => this.waiters.push(resolve)); + } + + private send(payload: Record): void { + this.child.stdin?.write(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n`); + } + + async waitForArmed(timeoutMs: number): Promise { + this.send({ operation: "arm" }); + const timedOut = Symbol("timeout"); + const timeout = new Promise((resolve) => { + setTimeout(() => resolve(timedOut), timeoutMs); + }); + const outcome = await Promise.race([this.nextLine(), timeout]); + return ( + outcome !== undefined && + outcome !== timedOut && + "status" in outcome && + outcome.status === "armed" + ); + } + + exec( + command: string, + cwd: string, + options: { + onData: (data: Buffer) => void; + signal?: AbortSignal; + timeout?: number; + env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; + }, + ): Promise<{ exitCode: number | null }> { + const env: Record = {}; + if (options.env) { + for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(options.env)) { + if (typeof value === "string") { + env[key] = value; + } + } + } + this.send({ operation: "exec", command, cwd, env }); + + const onAbort = () => this.send({ operation: "cancel" }); + options.signal?.addEventListener("abort", onAbort); + const timeoutHandle = options.timeout + ? setTimeout(onAbort, options.timeout) + : undefined; + + return (async () => { + try { + for (;;) { + const line = await this.nextLine(); + if (line === undefined) { + throw new Error( + "SCE lost contact with the external-mutation-guard supervisor before it reported a command result.", + ); + } + if ("stream" in line) { + options.onData(Buffer.from(line.data)); + continue; + } + if (line.status === "result") { + return { exitCode: line.exit_code }; + } + } + } finally { + options.signal?.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort); + if (timeoutHandle) { + clearTimeout(timeoutHandle); + } + } + })(); + } + + terminate(): void { + this.child.kill(); + } +} + export default function sceExtension(pi: ExtensionAPI): void { const pendingFileMutations = new Map(); const piToolVersionPromise = resolvePiToolVersion(); + const terminalDelivery = createTerminalDeliveryTracker(); pi.on("tool_call", (event) => { if (!isToolCallEventType("bash", event)) { @@ -359,6 +786,107 @@ export default function sceExtension(pi: ExtensionAPI): void { return undefined; }); + pi.on("tool_call", async (event, ctx) => { + if (!TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES.has(event.toolName)) { + return undefined; + } + + if (terminalDelivery.hasUnresolved()) { + return { block: true, reason: MUTATION_SCOPE_FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE }; + } + + const outcome = forwardMutationScopeStart({ + hook_event_name: "ToolCall", + session_id: ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId(), + tool_call_id: event.toolCallId, + cwd: ctx.cwd, + tool_name: event.toolName, + model: ctx.model ? `${ctx.model.provider}/${ctx.model.id}` : undefined, + }); + + if (outcome === "ok") { + return undefined; + } + return { block: true, reason: MUTATION_SCOPE_FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE }; + }); + + pi.on("tool_execution_start", (event, ctx) => { + if (!TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES.has(event.toolName)) { + return; + } + void forwardMutationScopeBestEffort(ctx.cwd, { + hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionStart", + session_id: ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId(), + tool_call_id: event.toolCallId, + cwd: ctx.cwd, + tool_name: event.toolName, + }); + }); + + pi.on("tool_result", (event, ctx) => { + if (!TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES.has(event.toolName)) { + return; + } + const sessionId = ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId(); + terminalDelivery.forwardResult( + ctx.cwd, + { + hook_event_name: "ToolResult", + session_id: sessionId, + tool_call_id: event.toolCallId, + cwd: ctx.cwd, + tool_name: event.toolName, + }, + { sessionId, toolCallId: event.toolCallId }, + ); + }); + + pi.on("tool_execution_end", (event, ctx) => { + if (!TRACKED_MUTATION_TOOL_NAMES.has(event.toolName)) { + return; + } + const sessionId = ctx.sessionManager.getSessionId(); + void terminalDelivery.forwardEnd( + ctx.cwd, + { + hook_event_name: "ToolExecutionEnd", + session_id: sessionId, + tool_call_id: event.toolCallId, + cwd: ctx.cwd, + tool_name: event.toolName, + }, + { sessionId, toolCallId: event.toolCallId }, + ); + }); + + pi.on("user_bash", async (event) => { + if (process.platform === "win32") { + return guardRefusal(WINDOWS_UNSUPPORTED_MESSAGE); + } + + const guard = new ExternalMutationGuardSession(event.cwd); + const armed = await guard.waitForArmed(GUARD_ESTABLISH_TIMEOUT_MS); + if (!armed) { + guard.terminate(); + return guardRefusal(GUARD_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE); + } + + return { + operations: { + exec: ( + command: string, + cwd: string, + options: { + onData: (data: Buffer) => void; + signal?: AbortSignal; + timeout?: number; + env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; + }, + ) => guard.exec(command, cwd, options), + }, + }; + }); + pi.on("tool_call", async (event, ctx) => { if ( !isToolCallEventType("edit", event) && diff --git a/context/architecture.md b/context/architecture.md index aa6214689..5c84a1d80 100644 --- a/context/architecture.md +++ b/context/architecture.md @@ -2,32 +2,11 @@ ## Mutation-scope harness adapters -The mutation-scope runtime now has three concrete lifecycle adapters: Claude -Code, Codex, and OpenCode. Codex is implemented in -`cli/src/services/hooks/codex_mutation_scope/` and reaches the generic ingress -through its in-process seam; its hidden command is registered by the shared -Codex setup/merge/doctor path. The Codex adapter's tracked-tool coverage and MCP -boundary are documented in -[`context/cli/codex-mutation-scope-integration.md`](cli/codex-mutation-scope-integration.md). -OpenCode's tool lifecycle has been frozen against `@opencode-ai/plugin@1.15.4` -and OpenCode CLI 1.15.4, and its adapter in -`cli/src/services/hooks/opencode_mutation_scope/` (hidden `sce hooks -opencode-mutation-scope`) now drives the same in-process seam with a full -`Start`/`Close`/`Abandon` lifecycle, checkout-local durable state under -`/sce/` (attempt phases `PendingStart` → `Active` → `PendingAbandon`), -and a generation-tracked recovery barrier. Exact `ToolError` evidence persists -the doomed attempt as `PendingAbandon` before any cleanup seam call and the -attempt is removed only after the generic `abandon` succeeds, so a transient -cleanup failure is retried rather than losing the scope. A generated -`sce-mutation-scope.ts` transport plugin (`config/lib/mutation-scope-plugin/`, -registered last in the OpenCode `plugin` array) is installed as the final -OpenCode plugin by `sce setup` — the config merge appends it after arbitrary -user plugins and `sce doctor` flags any non-last position — so real OpenCode -sessions now reach the adapter; Pi has no adapter. See -[`context/cli/opencode-mutation-scope-integration.md`](cli/opencode-mutation-scope-integration.md) -and [`context/cli/opencode-mutation-scope-adapter-lifecycle.md`](cli/opencode-mutation-scope-adapter-lifecycle.md). - -All three adapters attach optional `ScopeProvenance` at admission (OpenCode +The mutation-scope runtime now has four concrete lifecycle adapters: Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi. Codex is implemented in `cli/src/services/hooks/codex_mutation_scope/` and reaches the generic ingress through its in-process seam; its hidden command is registered by the shared Codex setup/merge/doctor path. The Codex adapter's tracked-tool coverage and MCP boundary are documented in [`context/cli/codex-mutation-scope-integration.md`](cli/codex-mutation-scope-integration.md). +OpenCode's tool lifecycle has been frozen against `@opencode-ai/plugin@1.15.4` and OpenCode CLI 1.15.4, and its adapter in `cli/src/services/hooks/opencode_mutation_scope/` (hidden `sce hooks opencode-mutation-scope`) now drives the same in-process seam with a full `Start`/`Close`/`Abandon` lifecycle, checkout-local durable state under `/sce/` (attempt phases `PendingStart` → `Active` → `PendingAbandon`), and a generation-tracked recovery barrier. Exact `ToolError` evidence persists the doomed attempt as `PendingAbandon` before any cleanup seam call and the attempt is removed only after the generic `abandon` succeeds, so a transient cleanup failure is retried rather than losing the scope. A generated `sce-mutation-scope.ts` transport plugin (`config/lib/mutation-scope-plugin/`, registered last in the OpenCode `plugin` array) is installed as the final OpenCode plugin by `sce setup` — the config merge appends it after arbitrary user plugins and `sce doctor` flags any non-last position — so real OpenCode sessions now reach the adapter. +Pi's adapter, in `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/` (hidden `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope`), tracks `bash`/`edit`/`write` with a `PendingStart`/`Executed`/`Closed`/`PendingAbandon` lifecycle keyed on Pi's `tool_result` event; the canonical generated Pi extension now drives it from ordinary Pi sessions with fail-closed delivery. That extension also invokes the related, harness-neutral `sce hooks external-mutation-guard` process (Unix-only) for human `!`/`!!` shell commands, keeping them outside AI scopes while the durable guard is active. See [`context/cli/opencode-mutation-scope-integration.md`](cli/opencode-mutation-scope-integration.md), [`context/cli/opencode-mutation-scope-adapter-lifecycle.md`](cli/opencode-mutation-scope-adapter-lifecycle.md), [`context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`](cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md), and [`context/cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md`](cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md). + +All four adapters attach optional `ScopeProvenance` at admission (OpenCode stamps `oc_` and the observed model, else `NULL`). The verified mutation protocol still decides scope ownership and `AiExclusive(scope)`; provenance is observational metadata resolved later into mutation-derived diff --git a/context/cli/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md b/context/cli/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md index 915f914f0..561fc6718 100644 --- a/context/cli/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md +++ b/context/cli/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ call, and invokes the existing runtime with a lazy DB provider. Built by the `mutation-scope-hook-ingress` plan (`context/plans/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md`). It lives in `cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs` and is the transport/normalization -seam used by shipped Claude Code/Codex adapters and intended for future -OpenCode/Pi adapters. It contains **no** concrete mapping or lifecycle +seam used by the shipped Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode adapters, plus a Pi +adapter driven by the canonical generated extension in ordinary Pi sessions. It contains **no** concrete mapping or lifecycle translation — see [Generic ingress vs harness adapter](#generic-ingress-vs-harness-adapter). ## Command routing diff --git a/context/cli/mutation-scope-runtime.md b/context/cli/mutation-scope-runtime.md index 3d505dde7..d07fbfdc8 100644 --- a/context/cli/mutation-scope-runtime.md +++ b/context/cli/mutation-scope-runtime.md @@ -5,10 +5,12 @@ The crate-visible surface of `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/` and the Built by the `mutation-scope-runtime-integration` plan (`context/plans/mutation-scope-runtime-integration.md`). The generic [`sce hooks mutation-scope` ingress](mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md), the shipped Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode adapters (OpenCode reachable in production via a -generated plugin installed last by `sce setup`; Pi: none) drive this seam. This file +generated plugin installed last by `sce setup`) drive this seam, plus a Pi adapter +driven by the canonical generated extension in ordinary Pi sessions. This file records the adapter contract; the harness-specific mappings are in -[`codex-mutation-scope-integration.md`](codex-mutation-scope-integration.md) and -[`opencode-mutation-scope-integration.md`](opencode-mutation-scope-integration.md). +[`codex-mutation-scope-integration.md`](codex-mutation-scope-integration.md), +[`opencode-mutation-scope-integration.md`](opencode-mutation-scope-integration.md), +and [`pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`](pi-mutation-scope-integration.md). The mechanics live in [`mutation-trace-runtime-coordinator.md`](mutation-trace-runtime-coordinator.md) (`coordinate()`), [`mutation-trace-scope-abandonment.md`](mutation-trace-scope-abandonment.md) (`abandon_scope()`), [`mutation-trace-protected-worktree.md`](mutation-trace-protected-worktree.md) (safety prefix), and [`mutation-trace-protocol.md`](mutation-trace-protocol.md) (pure protocol). This file records what adapters must do and why. @@ -256,9 +258,10 @@ those seam steps leaves the attempt `PendingAbandon` and recovery unresolved, so the operation is retried on the next recovery-capable boundary instead of the scope being silently forgotten. Broad asynchronous OpenCode lifecycle events abandon nothing. -Pi has no adapter and still owns its own `ScopeId` / `EventId` derivation and -stale-process detection; repository-scoped unowned-checkout cleanup is still -open. +Pi's adapter owns its own `(session-id, tool-call-id)` → `ScopeId` derivation +(see [`pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`](pi-mutation-scope-integration.md)); +its stale-process detection and repository-scoped unowned-checkout cleanup +are still open. Real Claude and Codex `Bash` regressions exercise the complete runtime path through commit and persisted Agent Trace JSON. They confirm that diff --git a/context/cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md b/context/cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aa7570a7e --- /dev/null +++ b/context/cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md @@ -0,0 +1,279 @@ +# External-mutation guard + +`run_external_mutation_guard`, in +`cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs`, is a +harness-neutral runtime primitive — **not** Pi-specific, despite being built +alongside the Pi adapter to back Pi's `!`/`!!` `user_bash` — that lets a +human-initiated shell command mutate a worktree for a bounded, durably-guarded +interval without ever creating a mutation scope. It is reachable today through +the hidden, Unix-only `sce hooks external-mutation-guard` command and is called +by the canonical Pi extension for `user_bash`. + +## Why a scope is the wrong model for `user_bash` + +A human typing `!some-command` in an AI coding session is not an AI mutation, +so it must never become a `Start`/`Close` pair the way a tracked tool call +does. But it can genuinely overlap a live, unconfirmed AI scope — for a +confirmation-required harness, an AI scope's attribution is not settled until +its own `Close`, so a human edit landing mid-interval must never be silently +folded into that scope once it confirms. The guard exists to make that +overlap safe: for as long as it is armed, the worktree is durably marked +external-taint, so any mutation boundary that runs while the marker is set +(inherited or fresh) forces the existing `database_failure` + `recover` +composition rather than attributing the ambiguous interval to AI. + +## Lifecycle + +```text +caller starts the hidden supervisor with {"operation":"arm"} + -> acquire ProtectedWorktree (WorktreeLock + ExternalTaintMarker, write-ahead) + -> create a Unix pipe: supervisor owns the read end; the writer is + CLOEXEC-clear and remains supervisor-owned while waiting + -> durably establish the lifetime-token infrastructure + -> write and flush {"status":"armed"} + -> WAIT in ArmedWaitingForExec; no shell exists yet +caller positively accepts Armed by sending exactly one {"operation":"exec", ...} + -> validate command, cwd, and env; cwd is checked against the armed worktree + -> spawn the human shell as the guard's OWN child, own process group, + at the validated execution cwd + -> close the supervisor's writer reference + -> continuously poll shell stdout/stderr, shell wait status, and the + lifetime pipe while the lock and marker remain active + -> [optional: caller sends an explicit cancel request + -> SIGTERM to the shell's process group] + -> wait for BOTH the shell's own termination and lifetime-pipe EOF + -> bounded stdout/stderr finalization: consume available chunks until + both streams close, 100 ms idle, or a 1 s hard cap + -> force database_failure + recover on the already-held worktree + -> on durable commit only: ProtectedWorktree::complete() (clears the marker) +``` + +Foreground-shell lifetime is not external-mutation lifetime. Finish cannot +start on shell `wait()` alone: EOF on the lifetime pipe is the kernel-owned +positive evidence that the last ordinary inheritor of the writer has closed +it. The supervisor holds the real `WorktreeLock` and marker throughout that +wait. Closing the caller's control channel neither signals the shell nor +triggers finish — only an explicit cancel request does. A failed recovery +commit leaves the marker armed and reports failure without calling +`complete()`, so the next boundary self-heals through the ordinary +inherited-taint path. + +A successful shell spawn changes cleanup semantics. Before spawn, ordinary +RAII cleanup is safe because no external mutation producer exists. After spawn +and before lifetime-token EOF, every supervision error or panic-adjacent +unwind uses the consuming `ProtectedWorktree::abandon_after_spawn_without_unlock` +path: the marker remains armed and the supervisor closes only its own lock +reference without explicit `LOCK_UN`. The shell and descendants retain their +inherited lock reference, so the next boundary cannot acquire the worktree +until that inherited ownership naturally ends. Once lifetime EOF has been +observed, ordinary unlock is safe even if final recovery fails; the marker +still remains armed until a later boundary recovers it. + +`Armed` is an admission acknowledgement, not a progress event for a command +already committed to execution. It proves that `ProtectedWorktree` is held, the +external-taint marker is durably armed, lifetime-token infrastructure has been +created/configured, and the supervisor is waiting for an explicit exec request. +It never authorizes execution by itself. The later `exec` frame is positive +evidence that the caller received and accepted establishment and still wants the +command run. A command is never carried by the arm frame. + +The supervisor writes and flushes `Armed` before it can accept `exec`. If that +write or flush fails, it exits the pre-spawn path without waiting for an exec and +without spawning a shell; conservative marker retention is allowed. EOF or an +explicit `cancel` while `ArmedWaitingForExec` likewise exits without spawning. +Thus a lost or timed-out acknowledgement cannot race into execution: a caller +that never sends `exec` can never cause its command to run. + +`GuardEvent::Armed` is emitted only after the lifetime-token infrastructure has +been successfully created and configured. Lifetime-token establishment failure +therefore emits no `Armed` event and spawns no shell. + +The lifetime pipe is separate from the flock. The lock serializes runtime +access for the whole protected interval; the pipe tells the still-live +supervisor when ordinary shell descendants are gone. The pipe read end is +CLOEXEC, the writer is explicitly CLOEXEC-clear before spawn, the supervisor +closes its writer immediately after successful spawn, and only the shell's +inherited writer references remain. Normal Unix `fork`/`exec` fd inheritance +passes that writer to ordinary descendants, so EOF means no ordinary +inheritor still owns it. A descendant that deliberately closes the writer +while continuing to run remains the documented D14 escape boundary. + +## Execution cwd contract + +`GuardRequest.cwd` carries Pi's real `user_bash` execution cwd (the tool +call's own cwd, not necessarily the guard process's own launch directory). +It is never trusted verbatim. `resolve_execution_cwd` +(`external_mutation_guard.rs`) validates it after the worktree is armed and +before the explicit exec can spawn anything: + +- Worktree identity for the containment check is always derived from + `repository_root` (the guard runtime's own invoking checkout) via a new + `resolve_worktree_root` (`git_snapshot.rs`, `git rev-parse + --path-format=absolute --show-toplevel`, canonicalized) — never from the + untrusted `cwd` field itself. The repository/worktree being protected is + determined by the supervisor invocation, not by an exec request. +- Absent `cwd`: the guarded worktree's own top-level directory (the guard's + original, pre-cwd-carrying default). +- Present `cwd`: must be non-blank and absolute (Pi's own + `sessionManager.getCwd()`/tool-call cwd is always resolved-absolute by + construction, matching `resolvePath` in pinned Pi `0.80.6`'s + `dist/utils/paths.js:60-64`), is canonicalized (resolving `..` and + symlinks against the real filesystem — this is also where a nonexistent + path is rejected, matching `createLocalBashOperations`'s own + `fsAccess(cwd, F_OK)` check in `dist/core/tools/bash.js:47-52`), must + resolve to an existing directory, and must lie inside the canonicalized + worktree root. Any failure — blank, relative, nonexistent, not a + directory, or outside the checkout — is rejected outright before shell + spawn. Because the arm phase has already established the guard, the + pre-spawn supervisor releases its ordinary lock reference but retains the + marker conservatively; there is no silent fallback to the repository root on + a validation failure (only a genuinely absent `cwd` gets that default). + +## Guard wire protocol + +The hidden `sce hooks external-mutation-guard` route has an explicit +pre-spawn state machine: + +```text +Starting -> ArmedWaitingForExec -> Running -> Finished +``` + +The first frame is exactly `{"operation":"arm"}`. After and only after a +successfully delivered `{"status":"armed"}` acknowledgement, the caller sends +exactly one `{"operation":"exec","command":...,"cwd":...,"env":...}` frame. +`cancel` is accepted while waiting and means pre-spawn termination; after spawn +it signals the shell process group. Malformed JSON, unknown operations, blank +commands, invalid cwd values, and duplicate exec attempts are rejected without +creating a second shell. Control EOF before exec is not implicit authorization; +it exits the pre-spawn supervisor path. Control EOF after spawn remains +non-authoritative and does not cancel or finish the shell. + +While waiting for exec, the supervisor owns the lifetime-token writer. A +successful spawn transfers an inherited writer to the shell, then closes the +supervisor's writer; if exec never arrives, both token ends close during +pre-spawn cleanup. Successful `Command::spawn()` remains the exact boundary +for post-spawn abandonment: before it, ordinary RAII unlock is safe; after it +and before lifetime EOF, failure uses the no-`LOCK_UN` abandonment path. + +## Exact pinned Pi `0.80.6` local-shell contract + +T03 originally assumed `/bin/sh -c ` without checking pinned Pi +source, and recorded that gap explicitly for later confirmation. The actual +contract, read from `createLocalBashOperations()` in pinned +`@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent@0.80.6`'s `dist/core/tools/bash.js:39-113` +and its helpers: + +- **Shell resolution** (`dist/utils/shell.js#getShellConfig`, no + `shellPath` override plumbed by T03/T05): prefer `/bin/bash` if it + exists; else the first `bash` found via `which bash` on `PATH` + (`findBashOnPath`); else fall back to plain `sh` resolved via `PATH` at + spawn time. This is **not** always `/bin/sh` — on a typical Linux/macOS + host with `/bin/bash` present, Pi runs real bash, not POSIX `sh`, so + bash-only syntax in a command behaves differently under a plain-`sh` + guard. The guard's `resolve_shell_executable` now reproduces this exact + order instead of hardcoding `/bin/sh`. +- **Command transport**: the command string is passed as `-c ` + (an argv element), not via stdin — the stdin-transport branch in the same + function is a legacy-WSL-`bash.exe`-only special case that never applies + on Unix. The guard matches this (`Command::new(shell).arg("-c").arg(&request.command)`). +- **cwd**: `spawn(..., { cwd, ... })` — Node's `child_process.spawn` cwd + option, set from the resolved-absolute `cwd` argument. The guard matches + this via the validated execution cwd above. +- **stdin/stdout/stderr**: `stdio: [ignore, pipe, pipe]` for the non-stdin + transport (the only branch reached on Unix). The guard matches this + (`Stdio::null()`, `Stdio::piped()`, `Stdio::piped()`). +- **Process group / detach**: `detached: process.platform !== "win32"` — + true on Unix, making the child its own process-group leader. The guard's + `process_group(0)` is the same primitive. +- **Exit-code shape**: Node resolves `exitCode` as a number only on a + normal exit; a signal-terminated, aborted, or timed-out process reports + `undefined` (`dist/core/bash-executor.js:75`). Rust's `ExitStatus::code()` + is `None` exactly when signal-terminated, `Some(n)` otherwise — the same + shape. +- **Final-output draining**: pinned Pi has its own known bug class here — + `dist/utils/child-process.js#waitForChildProcess` documents + (`earendil-works/pi#5303`) that a fixed post-`exit` deadline can drop + output still arriving from a stream; Pi's fix is an idle-grace timer + re-armed on every chunk after `exit`, finalizing only once both stdout + and stderr report `end` (or the timer elapses). The guard continuously + consumes both streams while the lifetime token is held, so no unattended + queue grows during descendant execution. After shell exit and lifetime + EOF it uses the same re-armed 100 ms idle policy, with an explicit 1 s + hard cap so a deliberately token-closing process cannot hold completion + forever. Chunks observed before that bounded finalization ends are + delivered; output after the deliberate-close escape boundary is not a + lifetime-safety signal. +- **Environment** (deliberate, documented, safety-compatible difference — + not changed to match exactly): Pi always passes a *full* env snapshot + (`getShellEnv()`, `dist/utils/shell.js:97-107` — `process.env` plus a + `PATH` adjustment) as a **replacement**, since Node's `spawn` `env` option + replaces rather than merges when given explicitly. The guard's + `.envs(request.env.iter().cloned())` **merges** the wire `env` entries + onto the guard process's own inherited environment rather than fully + replacing it. The current Pi client forwards only optional `env` entries supplied through + the operations contract; it does not construct Pi's full `getShellEnv()` + snapshot. This remains a deliberate compatibility difference: flipping to a + hard `.env_clear()` would strip `PATH` (and everything else) from empty-`env` + calls, breaking ordinary command resolution. Reconcile this only if a future + caller requires exact full-snapshot environment parity. +- **Cancellation/timeout** (deliberate, documented, safety-compatible + difference — not changed to match exactly): Pi's own abort path + (`AbortSignal`/timeout) kills with `SIGKILL` to the process group + (`killProcessTree`, `dist/utils/shell.js:170-189`). The guard's D13 + design (recorded in the ADR below, predating this repair) deliberately + signals `SIGTERM` instead, on an explicit caller-driven cancel request + only — there is no guard-level `timeout` parameter at all yet. This was + an intentional D13 choice (a graceful-shutdown opportunity for the + guarded command), re-confirmed rather than silently carried forward by + this repair, and remains T05's responsibility to reconcile against Pi's + real timeout/abort wiring when `user_bash` is actually connected. + +## The two correctness properties this depends on + +**The lifetime pipe proves ordinary descendant completion.** The supervisor +creates a pipe before spawning. Its read end stays in the supervisor and its +write end is explicitly made CLOEXEC-clear before `Command::spawn()`. The +supervisor closes its own writer after spawn. Because the shell inherits the +writer across `exec`, and ordinary descendants inherit it under normal Unix +fd inheritance, a readable EOF is equivalent to the kernel having closed the +final ordinary writer reference. No process enumeration, shell parsing, PID, +TTL, or stream EOF is involved in this proof. + +**The real lock remains held until that proof and recovery finish.** The +supervisor retains `ProtectedWorktree` throughout shell wait, lifetime-pipe +wait, output finalization, and forced `database_failure + recover`. Only a +durable recovery permits `ProtectedWorktree::complete()`, whose normal +`WorktreeLock::drop()` then explicitly calls `flock(LOCK_UN)`. Thus no +explicit `LOCK_UN` can release the shared flock while an ordinary descendant +still holds the lifetime token. If post-spawn supervision becomes unreliable, +the consuming abandonment path closes only the supervisor's own fd without +calling `flock(LOCK_UN)`; the inherited shell/descendant fd remains tied to the +same open file description and keeps the flock kernel-held. The marker stays +armed, so the next boundary waits until that inherited lock is free and then +runs the existing inherited-taint `database_failure + recover` path before +clearing it. If the supervisor itself is `SIGKILL`ed, Rust destructors do not +run: the shell's inherited lock fd keeps the flock held, as covered by the +existing supervisor-death regression. A descendant that intentionally closes +the lifetime token is outside this guarantee, as D14 documents; retaining a +lock fd after that deliberate close can also be released by the supervisor's +eventual explicit unlock. + +## Non-goals of this task's implementation + +- No additional harness wiring beyond the canonical Pi extension's `user_bash` + client described in [`pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`](pi-mutation-scope-integration.md). +- No `protocol.rs`/Quint change: the mechanism is pure composition of + already-existing `ProtectedWorktree`/`WorktreeLock`/`ExternalTaintMarker`/ + `database_failure`/`recover` primitives via a new `coordinate_on_held_worktree` + wrapper around the existing (still-private) `coordinate_protected`, plus + ordinary OS process/fd mechanics. +- No Windows support: the guard is Unix-only; a non-Unix build's + `run_external_mutation_guard` unconditionally returns + `GuardError::UnsupportedPlatform`. +- No recovery beyond the guard's own crash semantics above — a stale, + never-armed marker left by some other failure mode is out of scope here. + +See [`pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`](pi-mutation-scope-integration.md) for +the adapter this mechanism was built alongside, and +[`mutation-trace-protected-worktree.md`](mutation-trace-protected-worktree.md) +for the `ProtectedWorktree` prefix it reuses unchanged. diff --git a/context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md b/context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..522d779e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ +# Pi mutation-scope integration + +The Pi mutation-scope adapter is SCE's fourth concrete harness producer. It +lives in `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/` behind the hidden +`sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` command. Its only production dependency inside +the mutation stack is the in-process +`hooks::mutation_scope::run_mutation_scope_from_payload` seam; it does not call +runtime, protocol, or database modules directly. + +The adapter is reachable through its own CLI command and is wired into the +canonical generated Pi extension (`config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.ts`) +that `sce setup --pi` installs and an ordinary `pi` invocation auto-discovers. +No launcher, wrapper, or `sce pi` entry point exists or is required: + +```text +ordinary `pi` + ↓ (normal extension auto-discovery) +generated SCE extension (`.pi/extensions/sce/index.ts`) + ↓ tool_call (bash/edit/write) -- fail-closed +fail-closed tracked Start (`sce hooks pi-mutation-scope`) + ↓ tool_result, tool_execution_end +per-attempt-ordered ToolResult / ToolExecutionEnd delivery + ↓ (terminal transport ambiguity) +D9 abandon/rebaseline recovery via ToolExecutionAbandon +``` + +The TypeScript extension's own terminal-delivery tracker keys every in-flight +attempt by `(session_id, tool_call_id)` — the same identity the Rust adapter +uses — so it never races a `tool_execution_end` subprocess against its own +`tool_result` subprocess: `tool_execution_end` delivery always awaits the +exact same attempt's `tool_result` delivery outcome first. Once a `tool_result` +delivery is known to have failed, or an executed attempt's `tool_execution_end` +delivery itself fails, the extension marks that exact attempt unresolved, +denies further tracked Starts while it stays unresolved, and recovers by +sending `ToolExecutionAbandon` (retried with backoff) rather than replaying a +stale `ToolExecutionEnd` — see D9 above and the Rust `PiHookEvent::ExecutionAbandon` +route, which the adapter treats identically to any other exact-attempt abandon +regardless of whether the attempt was still `PendingStart` or already +`Executed`. + +`user_bash` (`!`/`!!`) is delivered to SCE's own `user_bash` handler whenever +Pi actually dispatches it there (T03's documented, accepted limitation: a +competing extension registered ahead of SCE may consume the event first, in +which case SCE has nothing to guard and tracked-tool attribution in the same +session is unaffected). When SCE does receive it, the handler arms the T03 +external-mutation supervisor (`sce hooks external-mutation-guard`), awaits its +durable `Armed` acknowledgement, and only then returns `operations` that relay +`exec`/cancellation to the supervisor's own control channel — the supervisor, +not Pi/Node, spawns and owns the real shell. `wrappedOperations.exec()` +resolves only on an explicit supervisor `{"status":"result",...}` frame +(`exit_code: null` included, when the supervisor itself reports that as its +authoritative result); losing the control channel before any result frame +rejects the exec Promise rather than fabricating a completed command. + +Lifecycle evidence was frozen against pinned Pi `0.80.6`; raw captures are in +[`pi_mutation_scope/fixtures`](../../cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/). + +## Real interactive smoke evidence + +On 2026-09-17, a freshly installed current-branch extension was exercised by +ordinary interactive Pi in a real TUI. Running `!sh -c 'printf "guarded\\n" >> +human.txt; sleep 60'` showed the durable +`/sce/mutation-cursor-tainted` marker while the command was running; +cancelling the command through Pi removed the marker afterward. This proves the +normal Pi → SCE `user_bash` → arm → `Armed` → supervisor execution path and its +cancellation/finalization cleanup. Production-path regressions (real Git/Agent +Trace-DB coverage, D13 guard end-to-end cases, and a pinned Pi capture-replay +smoke — real Pi 0.80.6 lifecycle captures from T01 replayed through the +extension's real registered handlers, not an actual Pi process/session) live +alongside `pi_mutation_scope/mod.rs` and `sce-pi-extension.test.ts`. + +A separate, genuine real-Pi-runtime tracked-tool smoke also exists at +`config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/` (`run.sh`), reproducible with no +model credentials or network access: it builds `sce` from this branch, runs +the real `sce setup --pi` in a scratch Git repo, installs a throwaway +`.pi/extensions/test-provider/` extension that uses `@earendil-works/pi-ai`'s +own official scripted-response test harness (`createFauxCore`) via +`pi.registerProvider(..., { streamSimple })` to script one deterministic +`bash` tool call, and drives it through the SDK's `createAgentSession()` + +`DefaultResourceLoader` — the same `.pi/extensions/` auto-discovery ordinary +`pi` uses. The real SCE extension (installed by the real `sce setup --pi`, +not stubbed) intercepts the tool call and reaches the real +`sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` Rust adapter. `run.sh` asserts, rather than +merely prints, the scratch repo's own repository-scoped Agent Trace DB result +— via exact-cardinality `SELECT COUNT(*)` queries against the pinned +`nix run .#turso` in machine-readable `list` mode — that exactly one `pi`-actor +scope reaches `status = closed`, exactly one `close` boundary event has +`attribution_kind = ai_exclusive` (`tainted = 0`, `failure_kind = healthy`), +and exactly one `mutation_trace_scope_provenance` row has `session_id LIKE +'pi_%'` and `model_id = sce-test-provider/sce-test-model`; any failed +assertion exits non-zero with a diagnostic. This is distinct from, and not a +replacement for, the capture-replay smoke above — see T06 in +`context/plans/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md` for the full evidence and +scope discipline (bash only, per the task's own minimum-smoke guidance). + +No live model-authenticated Pi session or native Windows host is available in +this sandbox, so the Windows disposition and the competing-`user_bash`-extension +limitation are proven via a `process.platform` override and simulated dispatch +order, not a live run. + +## Scope model and coverage + +The attribution unit is one independently mutation-capable **tracked** Pi tool +execution, never a session, turn, or agent loop. Each tracked execution +receives one fresh `ScopeId`. + +| Pi tool class | Tool names | Mutation-scope behavior | +| --- | --- | --- | +| `TrackedMutation` | `bash`, `edit`, `write` | one attempt, one scope, write-ahead `Start`, terminal `Close` | +| `Untracked` | `read`, `grep`, `find`, `ls`, and every custom/unknown tool name | neutral pass-through; no scope, `Start`, terminal bookkeeping, or recovery state | + +Unlike OpenCode, Pi has no per-tool exclusivity gate and no separate +delegation classification: `tool_call` is the single universal pre-execution +gate for every built-in tool, including `bash` (there is no OpenCode-style +`shell.env` split), and Pi has no dedicated "spawn a subagent" tool the +adapter needs to treat specially — a custom tool that itself launches another +Pi process stays untracked unless explicitly classified, and that child +process's own tracked tools are attributed independently if it also loads the +SCE extension. + +Custom and unknown tool names are untracked even when they mutate: a +`pi.registerTool`-defined tool sharing a name with a tracked built-in is still +admitted as tracked by the name-based allowlist (matching classification's +by-name tolerance), but a plugin tool under any other name is never assumed +mutation-capable from its schema or description alone. False negatives are +preferred to false-positive AI attribution. + +## Attempt-phase lifecycle: no `Active` phase + +Pi's event stream is `tool_execution_start` → `tool_call` → [`tool_result`] → +`tool_execution_end`. `tool_execution_start` fires unconditionally, for every +registered extension, **before** `tool_call` — including for a call `tool_call` +later blocks or throws on — so it carries zero evidentiary value for "the tool +actually began executing" and drives no state transition; the adapter parses +it only to keep the wire protocol total, and may surface it as telemetry. + +`tool_call` is the real fail-closed gate: an admitted attempt is durably +recorded as `PendingStart` before the generic `start` boundary commits, and +`PendingStart` is already the adapter's correct resting state for an admitted, +not-yet-confirmed attempt — there is no further "mark active" write once +`start` succeeds, unlike the OpenCode/Codex adapters' `PendingStart` → +`Active` transition. Concretely, `AttemptPhase` has three variants, not four: + +```text +PendingStart --(tool_result observed)--> Executed --(tool_execution_end, Close succeeds)--> [removed] +PendingStart --(tool_execution_end, no tool_result seen)--> abandoned (D7) --> [removed] +``` + +`tool_result` is present if and only if the tool's `execute()` body actually +ran (success and failed-but-executed alike), and is the sole signal that +transitions `PendingStart` → `Executed`. `tool_execution_end` fires +unconditionally too, even for a blocked/thrown call — it only means Close when +a `tool_result` for the same `toolCallId` was already observed; otherwise it +means the admitted attempt never executed, and the adapter abandons it (never +closes it) through the same flush/abandon/flush recovery pattern the other +adapters use, falling back to abandon on a Close-call failure as well. + +### Why `PendingStart` never blocks a sibling admission + +The OpenCode/Codex adapters treat any lingering `PendingStart` attempt, +anywhere in adapter state, as checkout-wide crash-recovery ambiguity that +blocks every new admission — sound for them because their own `PendingStart` +is a narrow window between admission and marking `Active`, both inside one +boundary-lock-held invocation, so observing it at the *start* of a fresh +invocation can only mean the previous invocation crashed mid-flight. + +That invariant does not transfer to Pi: `PendingStart` is Pi's normal, +possibly long-lived resting state for the tool's *entire* execution window. +Reusing the OpenCode/Codex check would serialize every concurrent Pi tool +call behind whichever one started first, contradicting the requirement that +parallel tool executions stay distinct live scopes. Pi's admission therefore +fails closed only on a lingering `PendingAbandon` (the D7/D8 abandon +pipeline) or a non-`Clear` recovery state — never on a sibling's +`PendingStart`. A genuinely orphaned `PendingStart` (the owning Pi process +crashed, not a tool call still legitimately running) is instead resolved by +the stale-process reconciliation below. + +## Stale-process recovery (D10) + +Every `PendingStart` attempt records a `ProcessOwner { pid, instance_token }` +captured via `getppid()` at admission time: because `sce hooks +pi-mutation-scope` is invoked synchronously as a direct child of the Pi/Node +process for that exact call (`tool_call` is a blocking pre-execution gate), +the OS-reported parent pid at that moment *is* the owning Pi process, with no +wire-protocol or TypeScript-extension change needed. `is_definitely_dead` +(`pi_mutation_scope/process_owner.rs`) proves death via `kill(pid, 0)` == +`ESRCH` on Unix, and additionally guards against PID reuse on Linux by +comparing the parent's `/proc//stat` start-time field against the +recorded value; a live pid whose instance identity can't be established this +way (non-Linux Unix, or a missing `/proc` entry) is always conservatively +treated as alive. No TTL, elapsed time, or session sweep is used anywhere in +this path. + +Every tracked Start admission is itself a reconciliation opportunity, not +merely a lookup keyed on the incoming `(session-id, tool-call-id)`. While +holding the adapter boundary lock, admission first inspects every persisted +`PendingStart`/`Executed` attempt — any session, any prior process, not only +one matching the attempt currently being admitted — and independently proves +each candidate's own recorded owner positively dead via `is_definitely_dead`. +`PendingAbandon` attempts are never included: they already carry durable +terminal recovery intent owned by the pre-existing D8 +pending-recovery-resume path. Because a Pi `session_id` is a fresh UUIDv7 per +process (T01), the process that owned a stale attempt is essentially never +the same process driving the *next* `tool_call`, so a same-key replay is not +how this trigger fires in practice — a later, unrelated Pi session's Start is +what discovers and retires it. + +Every scope with positive owner-death evidence collected in one pass is +retired together through the existing D8 flush/abandon/flush pipeline in a +single recovery generation (`begin_terminal_cleanup` on the whole batch → +one ambiguity flush → one `abandon` per doomed scope → one rebaseline flush), +before the triggering `tool_call` is admitted — no new recovery mechanism, +D10 reuses D8's pattern end to end. A dead `PendingStart` and a dead +`Executed` attempt are both abandoned/rebaselined identically; a dead +`Executed` attempt is never given a synthetic delayed Close, because the +current Git tree no longer represents the original `tool_execution_end` +observation time (D9). Live and uncertain-owner attempts (a live pid whose +exact process-instance identity can't be established) are left completely +untouched by this scan — this is broad *inspection*, never broad +*inference*: no TTL, no elapsed time, no session sweep, no `ActorKind::Pi` +sweep, and no same-session-predecessor rule ever substitutes for an +attempt's own positive process-death proof. If the flush/abandon/flush +sequence fails partway, recovery stays durably `Pending` and the triggering +Start is denied fail-closed; the next boundary-lock acquisition resumes and +completes it before any new Start can commit. + +## Reconciling with the external-mutation guard + +A live Pi scope's local attempt state reconciles with a worktree the +[external-mutation guard](mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md) abandons +through the same existing Close-failure→abandon fallback the adapter already +uses for any other externally tainted worktree: the adapter has no visibility +into *why* the generic runtime abandoned a scope out from under it (a guard +finishing, another harness's recovery, or otherwise), only that it did, and +the next `tool_result`/`tool_execution_end` for that attempt safely reconciles +through the pre-existing recovery path rather than erroring or resurrecting +the scope. A fresh Pi `tool_call` that races an active guard blocks on the +runtime's own worktree-lock timeout and fails closed, touching no protocol +state, then succeeds normally once retried after the guard releases. + +## Scope identity + +```text +pi-tool-v1|n=|s=:|c=: +``` + +The live-attempt key is `(session-id, tool-call-id)`: a replay while that +attempt is live resolves to the existing attempt and `ScopeId`. A checkout-local +monotonic `next_attempt_seq` counter, persisted alongside the attempt list, +is what makes a *new* attempt after the old one's terminal cleanup receive a +fresh `attempt_seq` and therefore a distinct `ScopeId` — so a reused +`toolCallId` can never reactivate a terminal scope, the one property +OpenCode/Codex get for free because their identifiers are never reused across +a session. + +## Provenance and session identity + +`session_id` is prefixed `pi_` via the same `prefixed_diff_trace_session_id` +helper the diff-trace intake already uses for Pi; `model_id` is +`/` as observed directly on `ctx.model` at the exact `tool_call` +handler invocation, normalized through a new `normalize_pi_model_id` beside +the existing Codex/OpenCode normalizers, or `NULL` when unavailable. Model +absence never blocks a tracked tool. + +## Durable state + +`/sce/pi-mutation-scope-state.json`, written with the same +lock/write-temp/sync/atomic-rename discipline as the other adapters' state +files, holding `next_attempt_seq`, a recovery generation/phase, and the live +attempt list. It is bookkeeping only, never attribution evidence, and is never +held while invoking the generic mutation-scope runtime. + +See also [`mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md`](mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md), +[`mutation-scope-runtime.md`](mutation-scope-runtime.md), and +[`mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md`](mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md) +for the harness-neutral `user_bash` guard mechanism this same task added +alongside the adapter. diff --git a/context/context-map.md b/context/context-map.md index 08c2d0793..1f5c159ab 100644 --- a/context/context-map.md +++ b/context/context-map.md @@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ Feature/domain context: - `context/cli/mutation-trace-runtime-coordinator.md` (imperative-shell runtime layer in `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/`, built by the `mutation-cursor-runtime-coordinator` plan: the per-worktree OS advisory lock, `runtime::worktree_lock::WorktreeLock::acquire(git_dir, timeout)` at `/sce/mutation-cursor.lock`, bounded `try_lock()` polling with a distinct matchable timeout error and RAII release, and its distinction from the separate checkout-identity-creation lock; the isolated Git snapshot service `runtime::git_snapshot::GitSnapshotService` (documented in `mutation-trace-snapshot-service.md`); and `runtime::coordinator`'s protocol-integration pipeline (`RuntimeBoundary`/`CoordinateOutcome`/`CoordinateError`, the load → recover-if-needed → prepare/commit CAS-retry loop, and its own bounded snapshot-failure taint-retry loop) plus the public `coordinate(repository_root, boundary, open_db)` entrypoint that runs the shared `runtime::protected_worktree` prefix (`WorktreeLock` -> external-taint write-ahead fence -> `WorktreeId`, extracted so a second entrypoint cannot drift from it and documented in `mutation-trace-protected-worktree.md`), invokes the caller-supplied `open_db` provider so DB acquisition falls inside that fence, drives the pipeline under one held lock, and clears the marker through `ProtectedWorktree::complete()` only on success; `runtime/tests.rs` covers the public `coordinate()` API end to end against real linked worktrees and a real Agent Trace DB; an inherited external-taint marker is overlaid onto `protocol::database_failure` recovery on the next invocation, against the single captured snapshot and re-injected across a losing recovery CAS; the private `runtime::ref_reconciliation` per-worktree snapshot-ref maintenance pass (documented in `mutation-trace-ref-reconciliation.md`) shares the same `WorktreeLock`; `coordinate()` and `abandon_scope()` are now `pub(crate)` re-exported from `runtime/mod.rs` (documented in `mutation-scope-runtime.md`) while the runtime submodules themselves stay private; a generic `sce hooks mutation-scope` CLI ingress now drives both entrypoints, joined by current Claude Code and Codex adapter drivers (registered by `sce setup`/`sce setup --codex` and reachable) and an OpenCode adapter driver (lifecycle + recovery wired, and now generated as the final `sce-mutation-scope.ts` plugin and installed by `sce setup`), documented in `mutation-scope-runtime.md`) - `context/cli/mutation-trace-protected-worktree.md` (the shared safety prefix every mutation-cursor runtime entrypoint runs behind, in `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/protected_worktree.rs`, extracted from `coordinate()` by the `mutation-scope-runtime-integration` plan so a second entrypoint cannot drift from it: `ProtectedWorktree::acquire(repository_root)` running the safety-critical fixed order resolve `git_dir` → `WorktreeLock` (module-owned 10s `WORKTREE_LOCK_TIMEOUT`) → `ExternalTaintMarker::exists()` → `persist()` (fence armed write-ahead of every fallible step that follows, including DB acquisition) → `get_or_create_checkout_id` as `WorktreeId`; the `worktree_id()` / `inherited_external_taint()` / consuming `complete()` surface, where `complete()` clears the marker under the still-held lock and is the only thing that ever clears it while `Drop` releases only the lock; and the one-variant-per-prefix-step `ProtectedWorktreeError` (`GitDirResolution` | `LockAcquisition` | `ExternalTaintMarker { operation, source }` | `CheckoutIdentity`) each entrypoint maps onto its own error surface — `coordinate()` onto exactly the `CoordinateError` variants that step produced before the extraction) - `context/cli/mutation-trace-scope-abandonment.md` (the mutation-cursor runtime's second protected entrypoint in `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/scope_runtime.rs`, built by the `mutation-scope-runtime-integration` plan and the first production call site for `protocol::abandon`: `abandon_scope(repository_root, scope, open_db) -> Result` retires a scope whose final worktree boundary was never observed, sharing `coordinate()`'s `ProtectedWorktree` prefix but deliberately capturing **no** Git snapshot, pin, diff, reconciliation, scope registration, or worktree initialization — so abandonment is not a `RuntimeBoundary` and needs no Quint change; the classify-before-transition order that recovers what `protocol::abandon`'s uniform guarded no-op cannot report (`load_scope` first for the missing-row and cross-worktree cases the projection seam treats as errors, then `load_worktree` for the `NeverSeen` / terminal / `Active` split); the `Abandoned` / `AlreadyTerminal` / `RecoveryRequired` outcomes and the `InheritedExternalTaint` | `MissingScope` | `NeverSeenScope` | `MissingWorktreeState` recovery reasons; the inherited-marker short-circuit that returns before the DB provider is ever invoked; the fence-completion rule that clears the marker only for a settled abandonment or proven-terminal no-op and leaves it armed for every recovery-required outcome and every error, with `MarkerClearAfterCompletion` carrying the already-settled outcome; the CAS retry bounded by the coordinator's shared `MAX_CAS_RETRY_ATTEMPTS`, settling on a competitor's terminal status rather than overwriting it; and the deliberate false-negative tradeoff whereby a missing or `NeverSeen` target forces conservative strong recovery that may abandon unrelated live scopes, because attribution safety outranks preserving potentially valid evidence) -- `context/cli/mutation-scope-runtime.md` (the crate-visible mutation-trace runtime seam and the lifecycle contract every current or future harness adapter must uphold, recorded by the `mutation-scope-runtime-integration` plan: the ten `pub(crate)` re-exports in `runtime/mod.rs` (`coordinate`, `RuntimeBoundary`, `StartProvenance`, `CoordinateOutcome`, `CoordinateError`, `ExternalTaintOperation`, `abandon_scope`, `AbandonScopeOutcome`, `AbandonRecoveryReason`, `AbandonScopeError`), with `ExternalTaintOperation` riding through `coordinator.rs`'s own `pub use` because `CoordinateError::ExternalTaintMarker` carries it — so the type becomes crate-visible without `protected_worktree` becoming a public module — while every `mod` declaration stays private and `ProtectedWorktree`/`ProtectedWorktreeError`/`WORKTREE_LOCK_TIMEOUT`/`reconcile_worktree` stay internal, kept clippy-clean by `#[allow(unused_imports)]` on the re-exports per the `services/style.rs` precedent rather than a placeholder consumer; and the adapter obligations themselves — a scope is one independently mutation-capable execution so a concurrent main agent and subagent need distinct `ScopeId`s, `Start`/`Advance`/`Close` semantics including that only `Start` may carry the optional `StartProvenance`, registered after scope registration and before the protocol commits and never inside `ProtocolState` or the CAS transition, with that registration conditional on the `ScopeState` `register_scope` returns so a provenance row may only be created while the scope is `NeverSeen` (an admission-time snapshot that a post-admission replay cannot backfill) while an existing row is still validated on every provenance-carrying `Start`, that a failed tool still requires `Advance` (the boundary is an observation, not a successful edit) and that a `ScopeId` is never reused after a terminal status (the `NeverSeen` guard silently refuses to reactivate it), `abandon_scope()` requiring positive staleness evidence and never inferring it from `ActorKind`, the `abandon` → `coordinate(Start(successor))` sequence with what each outcome implies for it including that a failed abandonment must never be treated as a safely started successor, that abandonment is not a `RuntimeBoundary` and needs no Quint change, the D1 tradeoff whereby a missing or `NeverSeen` target deliberately forces conservative strong recovery that may invalidate unrelated live scopes because attribution safety outranks preserving potentially valid evidence, and the attribution boundary that `AiExclusive(scope)` means scope exclusivity only and is not standalone proof that no human edited the worktree; a generic `sce hooks mutation-scope` ingress now drives the seam, joined by current Claude Code and Codex adapter drivers (both registered by `sce setup` and reachable) and an OpenCode adapter driver (full lifecycle + recovery, now generated as the final `sce-mutation-scope.ts` plugin and registered by `sce setup`, so reachable by a real session) — Pi remains unwired) -- `context/cli/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md` (the one harness-neutral CLI ingress that drives the mutation-scope runtime, in `cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs`, built by the `mutation-scope-hook-ingress` plan: the hidden `sce hooks mutation-scope` command routing through the normal `cli_schema::HooksSubcommand::MutationScope` → `convert_hooks_subcommand_request` → `services::hooks::HookSubcommand::MutationScope` → `run_hooks_subcommand_in_repo` stack, reading one normalized JSON lifecycle object from STDIN; the strict `parse_mutation_scope_payload` contract supporting exactly `start`/`advance`/`close`/`flush`/`abandon` with a local `MutationScopePayload` transport enum, `claude_code`/`codex`/`opencode`/`pi` actor mapping, non-blank `scope_id`/`event_id`, exact per-operation key sets, an optional `provenance` object accepted on `start` only (a required non-blank `session_id`, an optional `model_id` where an absent key and an explicit `null` both mean no model, and no other key), and a dedicated hard rejection for any `worktree_id` key; the operation mapping to `RuntimeBoundary::Start`/`Advance`/`Close`/`Flush` through `coordinate()` or a direct `abandon_scope()` call, forwarding `ScopeId`/`EventId`/`ActorKind` and `start`'s optional `StartProvenance` verbatim because `EventId` equality is the runtime replay/idempotency key and provenance values arrive already canonical; identity ownership — the adapter owns `scope_id`/`event_id`/`actor_kind`, SCE owns `worktree_id`/Git tree identities/revisions/attempt IDs, and worktree identity is derived only by the runtime from the invoking checkout; the lazy `FnOnce` DB provider reusing `open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime` so DB acquisition stays inside the runtime's protected-worktree ordering; the non-fail-open error classification by durable completion — malformed payload or any pre-completion `CoordinateError`/`AbandonScopeError` → `CliError`/non-zero, while `CoordinateError::MarkerClearAfterCommit` and `AbandonScopeError::MarkerClearAfterCompletion` are treated as durable success with empty stdout, the marker-cleanup failure logged via `sce.hooks.mutation_scope.marker_clear_after_durable_completion`, and the transition not retried; the empty-stdout success contract; abandonment ownership keeping no-snapshot semantics; and the generic-ingress vs harness-adapter boundary — a Claude Code adapter driver (`cli/src/services/hooks/claude_mutation_scope/`) and a Codex adapter driver (`cli/src/services/hooks/codex_mutation_scope/`, hidden `sce hooks codex-mutation-scope`) now exist and are registered by `sce setup`, both consuming this seam's own `pub(crate)` in-process entrypoint; an OpenCode adapter driver (`cli/src/services/hooks/opencode_mutation_scope/`, hidden `sce hooks opencode-mutation-scope`) also consumes it with a full `Start`/`Close`/`Abandon` lifecycle and checkout-local recovery state, and is now driven in production by the generated `sce-mutation-scope.ts` plugin installed last by `sce setup`; Pi still has no lifecycle adapter, no session→`ScopeId` / tool-call→`EventId` derivation, no PID/staleness detection) +- `context/cli/mutation-scope-runtime.md` (the crate-visible mutation-trace runtime seam and the lifecycle contract every current or future harness adapter must uphold, recorded by the `mutation-scope-runtime-integration` plan: the ten `pub(crate)` re-exports in `runtime/mod.rs` (`coordinate`, `RuntimeBoundary`, `StartProvenance`, `CoordinateOutcome`, `CoordinateError`, `ExternalTaintOperation`, `abandon_scope`, `AbandonScopeOutcome`, `AbandonRecoveryReason`, `AbandonScopeError`), with `ExternalTaintOperation` riding through `coordinator.rs`'s own `pub use` because `CoordinateError::ExternalTaintMarker` carries it — so the type becomes crate-visible without `protected_worktree` becoming a public module — while every `mod` declaration stays private and `ProtectedWorktree`/`ProtectedWorktreeError`/`WORKTREE_LOCK_TIMEOUT`/`reconcile_worktree` stay internal, kept clippy-clean by `#[allow(unused_imports)]` on the re-exports per the `services/style.rs` precedent rather than a placeholder consumer; and the adapter obligations themselves — a scope is one independently mutation-capable execution so a concurrent main agent and subagent need distinct `ScopeId`s, `Start`/`Advance`/`Close` semantics including that only `Start` may carry the optional `StartProvenance`, registered after scope registration and before the protocol commits and never inside `ProtocolState` or the CAS transition, with that registration conditional on the `ScopeState` `register_scope` returns so a provenance row may only be created while the scope is `NeverSeen` (an admission-time snapshot that a post-admission replay cannot backfill) while an existing row is still validated on every provenance-carrying `Start`, that a failed tool still requires `Advance` (the boundary is an observation, not a successful edit) and that a `ScopeId` is never reused after a terminal status (the `NeverSeen` guard silently refuses to reactivate it), `abandon_scope()` requiring positive staleness evidence and never inferring it from `ActorKind`, the `abandon` → `coordinate(Start(successor))` sequence with what each outcome implies for it including that a failed abandonment must never be treated as a safely started successor, that abandonment is not a `RuntimeBoundary` and needs no Quint change, the D1 tradeoff whereby a missing or `NeverSeen` target deliberately forces conservative strong recovery that may invalidate unrelated live scopes because attribution safety outranks preserving potentially valid evidence, and the attribution boundary that `AiExclusive(scope)` means scope exclusivity only and is not standalone proof that no human edited the worktree; a generic `sce hooks mutation-scope` ingress now drives the seam, joined by current Claude Code and Codex adapter drivers (both registered by `sce setup` and reachable) and an OpenCode adapter driver (full lifecycle + recovery, now generated as the final `sce-mutation-scope.ts` plugin and registered by `sce setup`, so reachable by a real session) — a Pi adapter driver now also exists (`cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/`, hidden `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope`) and is driven by the canonical generated Pi extension in ordinary Pi sessions; its human `user_bash` path uses the separate guarded external-mutation supervisor) +- `context/cli/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md` (the one harness-neutral CLI ingress that drives the mutation-scope runtime, in `cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs`, built by the `mutation-scope-hook-ingress` plan: the hidden `sce hooks mutation-scope` command routing through the normal `cli_schema::HooksSubcommand::MutationScope` → `convert_hooks_subcommand_request` → `services::hooks::HookSubcommand::MutationScope` → `run_hooks_subcommand_in_repo` stack, reading one normalized JSON lifecycle object from STDIN; the strict `parse_mutation_scope_payload` contract supporting exactly `start`/`advance`/`close`/`flush`/`abandon` with a local `MutationScopePayload` transport enum, `claude_code`/`codex`/`opencode`/`pi` actor mapping, non-blank `scope_id`/`event_id`, exact per-operation key sets, an optional `provenance` object accepted on `start` only (a required non-blank `session_id`, an optional `model_id` where an absent key and an explicit `null` both mean no model, and no other key), and a dedicated hard rejection for any `worktree_id` key; the operation mapping to `RuntimeBoundary::Start`/`Advance`/`Close`/`Flush` through `coordinate()` or a direct `abandon_scope()` call, forwarding `ScopeId`/`EventId`/`ActorKind` and `start`'s optional `StartProvenance` verbatim because `EventId` equality is the runtime replay/idempotency key and provenance values arrive already canonical; identity ownership — the adapter owns `scope_id`/`event_id`/`actor_kind`, SCE owns `worktree_id`/Git tree identities/revisions/attempt IDs, and worktree identity is derived only by the runtime from the invoking checkout; the lazy `FnOnce` DB provider reusing `open_agent_trace_db_for_hook_runtime` so DB acquisition stays inside the runtime's protected-worktree ordering; the non-fail-open error classification by durable completion — malformed payload or any pre-completion `CoordinateError`/`AbandonScopeError` → `CliError`/non-zero, while `CoordinateError::MarkerClearAfterCommit` and `AbandonScopeError::MarkerClearAfterCompletion` are treated as durable success with empty stdout, the marker-cleanup failure logged via `sce.hooks.mutation_scope.marker_clear_after_durable_completion`, and the transition not retried; the empty-stdout success contract; abandonment ownership keeping no-snapshot semantics; and the generic-ingress vs harness-adapter boundary — a Claude Code adapter driver (`cli/src/services/hooks/claude_mutation_scope/`) and a Codex adapter driver (`cli/src/services/hooks/codex_mutation_scope/`, hidden `sce hooks codex-mutation-scope`) now exist and are registered by `sce setup`, both consuming this seam's own `pub(crate)` in-process entrypoint; an OpenCode adapter driver (`cli/src/services/hooks/opencode_mutation_scope/`, hidden `sce hooks opencode-mutation-scope`) also consumes it with a full `Start`/`Close`/`Abandon` lifecycle and checkout-local recovery state, and is now driven in production by the generated `sce-mutation-scope.ts` plugin installed last by `sce setup`; a Pi adapter driver (`cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/`, hidden `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope`) also consumes it now, with `(session-id, tool-call-id)`→`ScopeId` derivation and getppid()/`/proc`-start-time-based stale-process recovery; the canonical generated Pi extension drives it in ordinary sessions — see `context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`) - `context/cli/claude-mutation-scope-integration.md` (the first concrete harness lifecycle adapter, `cli/src/services/hooks/claude_mutation_scope/`, hidden command `sce hooks claude-mutation-scope`, built by the `claude-mutation-scope-integration` plan: one independently mutation-capable Claude tool execution = one SCE mutation `ScopeId` (a session/prompt/main agent/subagent is never a scope); the `classify_tool` table (mutation-capable including unknown names, read-only `Read`/`Glob`/`Grep`/`WebFetch`/`WebSearch`/`AskUserQuestion`, `Agent` = delegation) plus the model-only `is_explicit_background_shell` predicate; the length-prefixed hash-free `cc-tool-v1|n=|s=..|a=..|t=..` `ScopeId` keyed on a monotonic checkout-local `attempt_seq` (never reused after terminal) with deterministic `|start` / `|close` `EventId`s; the `/sce/claude-mutation-scope-state.json` bookkeeping store (never attribution evidence, never synced) with its own separate lock never held across a seam call; `PreToolUse` write-ahead `pending_start` → seam `start` → `active` and its fail-closed Claude `permissionDecision: "deny"` on any failure (never `allow`, detail logged via `sce.hooks.claude_mutation_scope.pre_tool_use_fail_closed`); `PostToolUse`/`PostToolUseFailure` → `close`, with `pending_start`+terminal → abandon-not-late-start (D11) and failed-`close` → abandon-not-replay (D12); the abandonment cleanup signals (`PermissionDenied`, `Stop`/`StopFailure`, `UserPromptSubmit`, `SubagentStop`, `SessionEnd`, best-effort `WorktreeRemove` — the last two not observed to fire on Claude Code `2.1.258`); the `recovery_pending` barrier that denies new mutation-capable `PreToolUse` until quiescent then runs one seam `flush`; raw hook `cwd` (or `worktree_path` for `WorktreeRemove`) as authoritative repository root with no adapter-constructed `WorktreeId`; the `run_in_background = true` denial and the separate self-detaching-descendant unsupported boundary (D20, with T04's Git-observable evidence); the ten unmatched `sce setup` registrations; the strict `claude_mutation_scope → hooks::mutation_scope → mutation_trace::runtime` dependency direction through the single `run_mutation_scope_from_payload` seam import (T05); admission-time exact model-state snapshot into `ScopeProvenance`; and real Git/Agent Trace persistence coverage shared with the Codex path) - `context/cli/mutation-trace-ref-reconciliation.md` (the conservative per-worktree snapshot-ref reconciliation pass in `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/ref_reconciliation.rs`, built by the `mutation-cursor-ref-reconciliation` plan: `reconcile_worktree(repository_root, open_db)` → `pub(super) reconcile_worktree_inner(.., on_lock_contention)`, both returning `ReconciliationOutcome` (`Reconciled(ReconciliationReport { local_required, retained, deleted })` for a pass that ran | `SkippedNoCheckoutIdentity` — an `Ok`, not an `Err` — when no current checkout identity could be derived), a variant-per-fallible-step `ReconcileError` with no `Other`, and the module-owned `RECONCILIATION_LOCK_TIMEOUT`; the two-invariant model — a strictly per-worktree fail-closed local-consistency check via `load_tree_roots(W)` vs. a repository-wide deletion-safety set via `load_all_tree_roots()` so an `A`-owned ref is retained whenever any worktree still durably needs its tree — run entirely under the same `/sce/mutation-cursor.lock` `WorktreeLock` `coordinate()` holds, with the repository-wide read kept coherent by being one SQL statement / one DB snapshot rather than a repository-global lock; deletes only SCE-owned refs via one atomic `git update-ref --no-deref --stdin`, writes no `mutation_trace_*` row, never arms `ExternalTaintMarker`, runs no `git gc`; imperative durability maintenance below the verified Quint protocol; reclaims orphan/unreferenced refs only for the namespace of a checkout id a current worktree still derives — a namespace no current worktree owns (identity-based: a deleted linked worktree, or checkout-id metadata loss followed by `get_or_create_checkout_id` minting a fresh id on a still-present worktree) is beyond every per-worktree pass and left to a recorded future repository-scoped unowned-namespace operation, so the current pass does not bound all orphan-ref growth; `reconcile_worktree` has no `pub(crate)` re-export and no harness/command wiring yet) - `context/cli/mutation-trace-snapshot-service.md` (the isolated Git snapshot and ref-pinning service `runtime::git_snapshot::GitSnapshotService` in `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/git_snapshot.rs`: `new` resolving an absolute `git_dir`, `capture_tree` snapshotting staged/unstaged/untracked/deleted worktree state into the repository's normal object database via a throwaway temp index, `pin_tree` protecting a durable tree with a create-only idempotent **direct** `refs/sce/mutation-cursor//` ref, `diff_trees` emitting `patch.rs`-parseable raw diff text; plus the callerless reconciliation substrate — worktree-scoped `list_pins` inventory returning `Result, PinInventoryError>` that rejects a symbolic ref inside the namespace (mutation-cursor pins are direct refs) as `MalformedRef`, matchable separately from a `git for-each-ref` execution failure, and conditional-atomic `delete_pins` running one `git update-ref --no-deref --stdin` transaction of SHA-conditioned deletes — no-dereference so an inventory→delete direct-ref→symref race cannot escape the inventoried namespace, plus a fail-closed pre-check — that aborts whole if any ref changed since inventory; `REF_NAMESPACE` + `pin_ref_prefix` as the single source of truth for the pin path) @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ Additional mutation-scope integration context: - `context/cli/opencode-mutation-scope-adapter-lifecycle.md` (the T04 OpenCode adapter runtime detail split out of the integration doc: attempt phases `PendingStart` → `Active` → `PendingAbandon`, per-`git-dir` boundary lock, durable `/sce/` state, write-ahead fail-closed `Start`, `Close` on successful `ToolExecuteAfter`, exact-`ToolError`-only `Abandon` with durable terminal intent + ambiguity-consuming `flush` + generation-tracked recovery barrier that retries transient cleanup failures, non-authoritative broad async events, no same-session sweep, no TTL, no protocol/Quint change) - `context/cli/opencode-mutation-scope-integration.md` (the third concrete harness producer, reachable by a real OpenCode session as of the `opencode-mutation-scope-integration` plan's T05 and now proven end-to-end through real Git/DB production-path regressions as of T06: OpenCode tool lifecycle frozen (T01) against `opencode-ai@1.15.4` / `@opencode-ai/plugin@1.15.4` (upstream `v1.15.4`), with the probe fixtures/report under `cli/src/services/hooks/opencode_mutation_scope/fixtures/`; `(sessionID, callID)` scope identity, `bash`/`write`/`edit`/`apply_patch` tracked with the `gpt-`-model patch gate making `edit`/`write` vs `apply_patch` mutually exclusive per session, `task` delegation, MCP/plugin/unknown tools untracked by explicit allowlist; `bash` Start on `shell.env` (post-permission, pre-spawn), file-tool Start write-ahead on `tool.execute.before`, Close on successful `tool.execute.after` (fires for non-zero exit / 127 / timeout, not for rejection / interrupt / validation failure); OpenCode scopes confirmation-required like Codex (shipped in T02 as the generic `requires_boundary_confirmation` predicate); `chat.params` model provenance keyed by `sessionID` else `NULL`; sequential plugin dispatch in explicit-`plugin`-array order with fail-closed `tool.execute.before` / `shell.env` barriers (Probes A/B/C PROVEN); SIGINT/SIGKILL leave no terminal hook and orphan child processes so no TTL is safe; OpenCode persistence is global-user-scoped not checkout-local; T03 added `cli/src/services/hooks/opencode_mutation_scope/mod.rs` (strict wire-event parsing, `classify_tool`, `AttemptKey`, frozen `oc-tool-v1|s=:|c=:` `ScopeId` with no attempt-seq, `oc_` provenance) and the hidden `sce hooks opencode-mutation-scope` command; T04 added the full lifecycle (`state.rs` durable checkout-local attempt state under `/sce/` with attempt phases `PendingStart` → `Active` → `PendingAbandon`, `os_lock.rs`/`boundary_lock.rs`, generation-tracked recovery barrier, write-ahead fail-closed `Start`, `Close`, `Abandon` on exact `ToolError` `(session_id, call_id)` evidence only — broad async `SessionIdle`/`SessionError`/`SessionDeleted`/`ServerDisposed` events retire nothing (D10/D11); `ToolError` first persists the doomed attempt as `PendingAbandon` **and** the recovery generation in one write before any seam call (`begin_terminal_cleanup`), then `resolve_recovery` drives an ineligible `flush` (while doomed + sibling scopes still resolve it `IneligibleUnscoped`), then the generic `abandon`, then removes the attempt only on `abandon` success, then a second `flush` for the rebaseline; a transient failure of any step relinquishes recovery to `Pending` and leaves the attempt `PendingAbandon` so the next recovery-capable boundary (a new tracked `Start` claims the flush; a duplicate `ToolError` retries) replays the whole idempotent sequence rather than forgetting the scope; a replayed `Start` for a `PendingAbandon` identity fails closed and never returns it to `Active`; so a concurrent `Abandon(A)`→`Close(B)` can never yield `AiExclusive(B)` over A's interval while B keeps its later intervals; the ambiguity flush runs alongside live siblings, not deferred to `attempts.is_empty()`; `ToolError` carries `tool_name` so untracked/delegation errors are zero-footprint; no same-session sweep, no TTL; no protocol/Quint change — the generic `flush`/`abandon`/confirmation-required semantics already suffice; the full T04 recovery detail now lives in `context/cli/opencode-mutation-scope-adapter-lifecycle.md`) driving the generic in-process ingress seam; T05 added the generated `sce-mutation-scope.ts` transport plugin (`config/lib/mutation-scope-plugin/`, emitted by `config/pkl/generate.pkl`, registered last in `config/pkl/renderers/common.pkl`), installed as the final OpenCode plugin by the `config_merge` append after arbitrary user plugins, with `sce doctor`'s `inspect_opencode_plugin_ordering_health` flagging a non-last position; the plugin maps `write`/`edit`/`apply_patch` `tool.execute.before` → fail-closed `ToolExecuteBefore`, `shell.env` → fail-closed `ShellEnv` bash Start, `tool.execute.after` → best-effort Close, tool-part `error` → best-effort `ToolError`, observes the model per turn from `chat.params` (`providerID/api.id`, ignoring the `title` agent, replacing rather than merging the cached per-session model so a later turn with no valid model clears it instead of reusing stale evidence), throws on any failure to establish a tracked Start (non-zero adapter exit, spawn failure, timeout, or missing `sce` CLI) so every transport failure fails closed; the broad async `SessionIdle`/`SessionError`/`ServerDisposed` events are not forwarded at all (T04's dispatch is a no-op for them) and `session.deleted` only clears the plugin's local model cache — full plugin-transport/model-provenance detail split into [`opencode-mutation-scope-plugin-transport.md`](cli/opencode-mutation-scope-plugin-transport.md); T06 added real Git/DB production-path regressions in `cli/src/services/hooks/mod.rs` (`services::hooks::tests::mutation_provenance_e2e`) proving tracked-tool success, model-present/model-missing provenance, task/unknown-tool zero-footprint, concurrent reject-and-confirm, and OpenCode+Codex/Claude overlap down to `mutation_ai_patch` and Agent Trace output; a live `apply_patch` fixture against a real credentialed OpenCode CLI session remains outstanding for `/validate` (a credential gap, not a soundness gap)) - `context/cli/opencode-mutation-scope-plugin-transport.md` (the T05 generated `sce-mutation-scope.ts` plugin's model-provenance observation from per-session `chat.params` and its sequential, last-registered position in OpenCode's plugin ordering — detail split out of `opencode-mutation-scope-integration.md` for the repository's per-file line budget) +- `context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md` (the fourth concrete harness adapter, `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/`, hidden command `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope`, driven by the canonical generated extension in ordinary Pi sessions: Pi's `bash`/`edit`/`write` tracked-tool allowlist with `tool_call` as the single universal pre-execution gate for every tool including `bash`; the `pi-tool-v1|n=|s=:|c=:` `ScopeId` whose checkout-local monotonic attempt sequence stops a reused `toolCallId` from ever reactivating a terminal scope; the `PendingStart`→`Executed`→`Closed`/`PendingAbandon` attempt-phase machine with no `Active` phase, because `PendingStart` is Pi's normal resting state for an entire in-flight execution (`tool_execution_start` fires unconditionally before the fail-closed `tool_call` gate and proves nothing; `tool_result` is the sole `Executed` evidence, and `tool_execution_end` with no preceding `tool_result` abandons rather than closes); why admission's fail-closed "uncertain attempt" check covers only a lingering `PendingAbandon` or non-`Clear` recovery state and never a sibling's `PendingStart`, unlike the other three adapters, so concurrent Pi tool calls stay distinct live scopes; a positive-process-death-only stale-`PendingStart`/`Executed` recovery (`getppid()`-captured owner plus Linux `/proc`-start-time PID-reuse proofing, no TTL/sweep), run on every tracked Start admission by independently inspecting persisted attempts rather than only ones matching the incoming key, and adapter reconciliation with the external-mutation guard's forced recovery, both added by a later task in this same plan; and the harness-neutral `external-mutation-guard` mechanism this task also built for Pi's `user_bash`, detailed separately in `context/cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md`) +- `context/cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md` (the harness-neutral, not-Pi-specific D13 external-mutation supervisor process, `run_external_mutation_guard` in `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs`, hidden `sce hooks external-mutation-guard`, Unix-only: acquires a `ProtectedWorktree`, reports it armed, spawns the human shell command as its own child in its own process group with a `dup()`-before-`spawn()` fd handed to the child so the `WorktreeLock` flock survives the supervisor's own death via the child's independent descriptor, finishes exclusively on the shell's own `wait()` (never on a cancel/control-channel signal), and only then forces `database_failure`+`recover` on the already-held worktree and calls `ProtectedWorktree::complete()` — reusing existing runtime primitives with zero `protocol.rs`/Quint change; called by the canonical Pi extension for human `user_bash`) Working areas: diff --git a/context/decisions/2026-09-17-external-mutation-guard-process-supervisor.md b/context/decisions/2026-09-17-external-mutation-guard-process-supervisor.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e97cc9583 --- /dev/null +++ b/context/decisions/2026-09-17-external-mutation-guard-process-supervisor.md @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +# Decision: External-mutation guard as a kernel-enforced process supervisor + +Date: 2026-09-17 +Status: Accepted +Plan: `context/plans/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md` +Task: `T03` + +## Context + +Pi's `!`/`!!` `user_bash` executes a human-initiated shell command that is +never AI attribution, but it can genuinely overlap a live, unconfirmed AI +scope: a confirmation-required harness's attribution is not settled until +`Close`, so a human edit landing mid-interval must never be silently folded +into that scope once it confirms. Pi's own local Bash child is detached on +Unix, so the mutation-producing process is not, by construction, a normal +child of whichever process happens to be waiting on it — it can outlive +either. The plan's own D13 design section went through five recorded +corrections before implementation began, each closing a real soundness hole: +a marker armed but not durably held for the whole command; a marker held by +a separate coordinator process rather than the actual mutating process; +conflating "holds the lock" with "can still mutate"; and a supervisor-crash +race where the flock would release while the guarded shell kept running. +This decision is not Pi-specific: it is the sanctioned shape for any future +harness with the same `user_bash`-style overlap. + +## Decision + +The external-mutation guard (`run_external_mutation_guard`, +`cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs`, hidden +`sce hooks external-mutation-guard`, Unix-only) is the one sanctioned +mechanism for letting a human shell command mutate a worktree outside the +mutation-scope protocol, without ever creating a mutation scope. Its +soundness rests on two specific, deliberately-chosen kernel-level mechanisms: + +1. **The guard's `WorktreeLock` fd is duplicated in the *parent* process, + immediately before spawning the guarded shell**, relying on `fork()`'s + atomic, synchronous fd-table copy so the child is guaranteed to hold its + own independent reference to the lock's open file description by the + moment `spawn()` returns — never inside a `pre_exec` closure running in + the already-forked child, which runs asynchronously relative to the + parent's `spawn()` call returning and therefore cannot give that + guarantee. +2. **The guard's crash safety depends on the difference between an implicit + fd-table teardown and an explicit `flock` unlock.** `WorktreeLock::drop` + calls `File::unlock()` — an explicit `flock(fd, LOCK_UN)` — which releases + the lock for every fd sharing that open file description immediately, not + only on last-close. A real `kill -9` on the supervisor process never runs + that destructor, so the flock survives via the shell's own inherited + duplicate; only the kernel's implicit "this process's fds are gone" + teardown runs. Reasoning about, or testing, "supervisor killed while shell + alive" must reproduce that exact difference, not a plain Rust `drop()`. + +The control protocol is deliberately two-phase: + +```text +{"operation":"arm"} + -> acquire + marker, create LifetimeToken, write+flush {"status":"armed"} + -> ArmedWaitingForExec; no human shell exists +{"operation":"exec","command":...,"cwd":...,"env":...} + -> validate and spawn exactly once +{"operation":"cancel"} + -> pre-spawn: terminate without spawning; post-spawn: signal the shell group +``` + +`Armed` is an admission acknowledgement, not authorization to execute. The +later `exec` frame is positive evidence that the caller received and accepted +establishment and still wants the command run. If writing or flushing `Armed` +fails, the supervisor exits the pre-spawn path and never waits for an exec. +Control EOF before exec is also ordinary pre-spawn cleanup, never implicit +execution. Malformed, unknown, blank, invalid-cwd, and duplicate-exec frames +cannot spawn a shell. + +Finish is triggered only after BOTH the guarded shell's own process +termination (`wait()`) and EOF on a dedicated kernel-owned lifetime pipe +inherited by the shell and ordinary descendants. It is never triggered by +elapsed time, the caller's control channel closing, or stdout/stderr EOF. +Cancellation is accepted only as an explicit request over that channel and +is enacted by signaling the shell's own process group; a closed or +disconnected channel after spawn signals nothing and triggers nothing. + +## Rationale + +A supervisor that is merely "the process holding the lock" is not sound, +because "holds the lock" and "is capable of mutating the checkout" are not +the same fact once the actual mutating process (Pi's detached local shell) +can outlive whoever is waiting on it. Making the guard itself spawn the +shell as its own direct child closes the ordinary parent-death ambiguity, +but that alone is still not sufficient if the guard process itself can be +killed — an OS-level guarantee, not merely a longer-lived process tree, is +needed for that case. `flock(2)` locks tied to an open file description that +survives across `dup()`+`fork()` into the child are exactly the "smallest +sound Unix mechanism" already available in this codebase's own +`worktree_lock.rs`, chosen over inventing a new fencing primitive. + +## Alternatives considered + +- **A separate long-lived guard process that only coordinates with, but does + not itself spawn, the human shell** — rejected: the guard's own liveness + then proves nothing about whether the actual (potentially detached) shell + is still running or capable of mutating. +- **Treating control-channel EOF (the caller's process dying) as equivalent + to "the human command finished"** — rejected: that treats the control + process's silence as proof the mutation-capable process has stopped, which + is exactly the class of false inference this decision exists to close. +- **Duplicating the lock fd inside a `pre_exec` closure in the forked + child** — tried first during T03's implementation and found to race: the + parent could observe/act on the state before the child had actually + duplicated its own fd, opening a real window with zero descriptors + referencing the lock. + +## Compatibility and risks + +- The mechanism is currently unused: no harness extension calls this route + yet. Wiring Pi's real `user_bash` call site to it is separate, later work, + so the risk surface is contained to this Rust-side process/fd/signal + logic until that wiring lands. +- Getting fd/lock/signal semantics wrong here fails either too permissively + (an unguarded human mutation gets folded into AI attribution) or too + conservatively (a legitimate mutation blocks unrelated concurrent work); + both directions were exercised by the task's own test suite, including a + faithful kill-9 simulation distinct from a plain Rust `drop()`. +- Unix-only by design; Windows takes the guard-establishment-failure branch + at the extension level instead (a separate task's responsibility), so this + decision does not need, and must not grow, a Windows-specific code path. + +## Guardrails + +- The normal finish trigger is exclusively the guarded shell's own process + termination plus lifetime-token EOF — never elapsed time, never any + control-channel signal. +- The parent-side `dup()`-before-`spawn()` ordering is load-bearing; moving + fd duplication into any child-side (`pre_exec`) hook reintroduces the fixed + race and must not be reintroduced without re-deriving this same guarantee. +- No `protocol.rs`/Quint change may ride on this mechanism: it is pure + composition of already-existing `ProtectedWorktree`/`WorktreeLock`/ + `ExternalTaintMarker`/`database_failure`/`recover` primitives. + +## Consequences + +- Any future harness with a `user_bash`-shaped human-mutation overlap has a + ready-made, already-reasoned-through mechanism to reuse rather than + re-deriving the same lock/fd/process semantics from scratch. +- Reasoning about or testing "the supervisor process died" must always + simulate the kernel's implicit fd teardown (forget the value, close only + the original fd) rather than Rust's own `Drop`, which is not equivalent + here. + +## Follow-up + +- Wire a real harness's `user_bash` call site (starting with Pi's TypeScript + extension) to this route; until then it remains reachable only via its + hidden CLI command. +- ~~Confirm the guarded shell's exact local-shell contract (`/bin/sh -c + `) against Pi's own `createLocalBashOperations()` behavior when + that wiring lands.~~ **Resolved by a 2026-09-17 T03 repair pass**: the + assumed `/bin/sh -c ` contract was wrong — pinned Pi `0.80.6` + prefers real `/bin/bash`, falling back to `bash` on `PATH`, only then + plain `sh` (`dist/utils/shell.js#getShellConfig`); the guard now + reproduces that exact resolution order instead of hardcoding `/bin/sh`. + The same pass also gave the guard a validated `cwd` field (Pi's real + `user_bash` execution cwd, carried and checked against the guarded + worktree rather than always defaulting to the repository root) and fixed + a final-output-draining race that could drop a stdout/stderr chunk + arriving right at shell exit. Full contract citations and the remaining + deliberate differences (env-merge vs. env-replace; `SIGTERM` vs. + `SIGKILL` cancellation) are recorded in + [`mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md`](../cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md#exact-pinned-pi-0806-local-shell-contract), + not restated here. +- **2026-09-17 lifetime-token repair:** graceful completion now waits for + EOF on a dedicated CLOEXEC-explicit pipe inherited by the shell and + ordinary descendants, not merely for foreground-shell exit. The + supervisor keeps the real WorktreeLock and marker active through that wait + and through forced durable recovery. It polls stdout/stderr continuously + during the wait, uses bounded idle/hard-limit output finalization, and + retains the D14 deliberate-close escape limitation. +- **2026-09-17 post-spawn failure repair:** successful `Command::spawn()` is + the cleanup boundary. Before spawn, ordinary RAII unlock is safe. After + spawn and before lifetime-token EOF, every supervision error or + panic-adjacent unwind consumes `ProtectedWorktree` through the + supervisor-specific abandonment path: it leaves the marker armed and + closes only the supervisor's lock reference without explicit `LOCK_UN`. + The shell/descendant inherited descriptor therefore remains the + kernel-authoritative flock reference. Once it becomes free, the next + boundary observes the still-armed marker and performs inherited-taint + recovery before proceeding. After lifetime EOF, ordinary unlock remains + safe even if final recovery fails, but the marker stays armed. `Armed` is + emitted only after lifetime-token creation/configuration succeeds; failure + before that point emits no acknowledgement and spawns no shell. +- **2026-09-17 two-phase admission repair:** the old `guard` frame no longer + carries a command. The hidden route now arms first, writes and flushes + `Armed`, waits in `ArmedWaitingForExec`, and accepts exactly one later + `exec` frame containing command/cwd/env. Lost or timed-out acknowledgement, + pre-exec EOF, cancellation, malformed exec, and invalid cwd all remain + pre-spawn and cannot create a shell. The lifetime-token writer stays with + the supervisor until successful spawn, then the supervisor closes its copy; + the existing descendant-lifetime and no-`LOCK_UN` post-spawn rules are + unchanged. + +## References + +- Plan: [`pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`](../plans/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md) +- Task: `T03` +- Current-state context: [`mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md`](../cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md) +- Current-state context: [`architecture.md`](../architecture.md) +- Current-state context: [`pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`](../cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md) +- Evidence: [`external_mutation_guard.rs`](../../cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs) diff --git a/context/glossary.md b/context/glossary.md index c80e14cea..8f805072c 100644 --- a/context/glossary.md +++ b/context/glossary.md @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ - `Agent Trace SCE metadata`: Implementation-owned top-level metadata emitted by `build_agent_trace(...)` under `metadata.sce`, carrying `version` (sourced from the compiled `sce` CLI package version via `env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")`) and `line_changes` (exact `{ai,mixed,unknown}` × `{added,removed}` `u64` touched-line attribution counts derived from canonical `post_commit_patch` hunks, reusing each hunk's existing `Conversation.contributor.type` classification with no independent second classification pass, `#[serde(default)]` for backward-compatible deserialization of pre-existing payloads); the whole object is schema-validated with the rest of the payload and persisted in AgentTraceDb `agent_traces.trace_json` without changing the top-level Agent Trace payload/schema `version`. - `ScopeProvenance`: Optional insert-once metadata keyed by a mutation `ScopeId`, storing canonical SCE `session_id` and nullable first-observed `model_id`. It is registered only at `Start` admission while the owning scope is `NeverSeen`, remains outside `ProtocolState` and the CAS transition, and is resolved during mutation projection. `ScopeId` proves mutation ownership; `ScopeProvenance` describes the owning scope. Model/session provenance is observational and never changes `AiExclusive`/`AiContended`/`IneligibleUnscoped` protocol decisions. - `Agent Trace range content_hash`: Per-range `content_hash` emitted by `build_agent_trace(...)` inside every `ranges[]` entry as `murmur3:`, computed from the touched-line kind/content of the `post_commit_patch` or embedded-patch hunk used to emit that range while excluding positions, paths, metadata, and database IDs. +- `external-mutation guard` / `external-mutation supervisor`: `run_external_mutation_guard` (`cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs`, hidden `sce hooks external-mutation-guard`, Unix-only), the harness-neutral, not-Pi-specific mechanism that lets a human-initiated shell command (Pi's `!`/`!!` `user_bash`) mutate a worktree without ever creating a mutation scope: it acquires the same `ProtectedWorktree` guard `coordinate()` uses, reports it armed, itself spawns the human shell as its own child (never signaled or stopped by control-channel closure — only by an explicit cancel request, which it enacts by signaling the shell's own process group), finishes exclusively on the shell's real process termination, and only then forces the existing `database_failure`+`recover` composition on the already-held worktree via `coordinate_on_held_worktree` before clearing the marker with `ProtectedWorktree::complete()`. See [`mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md`](cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md). - `Claude diff-trace attribution`: Diff-trace enrichment rule where one Claude `PostToolUse` event resolves its model with `direct > exact transcript > exact session/agent state > bridge-derived chain state > NULL`: direct top-level/nested metadata first, then that event's `transcript_path` matched by `tool_use_id` to an assistant envelope's `tool_use.id`, then one exact `(cc_, agent_id)` lookup in local `claude_model_state`. Only for a raw structured Claude payload in the exact main-session scope (`agent_id` empty), a state miss then falls back to `bridge session correlation` across the transcript's bridge-linked chain; when that resolves, persistence writes a `claude_model_state` row for the current session (`source="bridge_inherited"`) — the one diff-trace resolution path that writes state — and uses that model, so later traces of the same session resolve from their own exact-scope row. Model sources receive one `claude/` normalization step, ephemeral agent context is never exported, and subagents do not inherit main-session state. - `bridge session correlation`: Claude-specific local correlation using the `bridgeSessionId` in leading transcript records to relate a Claude session's transcript to its sibling transcripts sharing that ID. Selection resolves the newest `claude_model_state` observation across all bridge-linked chain members by `observed_at_ms` (deterministic session-ID tie-break), not the chain origin and not the most recently modified sibling transcript. Discovery is bounded (leading records only) and fail-open, uses existing exact-scope `claude_model_state` rows without persisting the bridge ID, and does not claim authoritative session ordering. One selection rule serves both call sites — the `diff-trace` state-miss path and the `sce hooks claude-model-state` `SessionStart` path — with no most-recently-modified-sibling pick left in the code. See [the read-path bridge-seeding decision](decisions/2026-09-10-claude-bridge-seeding-on-diff-trace.md) and [the bridge-session inheritance decision](decisions/2026-09-08-claude-bridge-session-model-inheritance.md). - `DiffTraceInsert`: Insert payload in `cli/src/services/agent_trace_db/mod.rs` carrying `time_ms`, tool-prefixed `session_id`, `patch`, `model_id`, `tool_name`, nullable `tool_version`, and `payload_type` for parameterized writes to the `diff_traces` table; `payload_type` uses `PAYLOAD_TYPE_PATCH` (`"patch"`) for `OpenCode` unified-diff payloads and `PAYLOAD_TYPE_STRUCTURED` (`"structured"`) for `Claude` `PostToolUse` structured payloads. diff --git a/context/overview.md b/context/overview.md index edabd79e5..45ddba282 100644 --- a/context/overview.md +++ b/context/overview.md @@ -2,13 +2,17 @@ ## Mutation-scope harness coverage -Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode are the wired mutation-scope producers. The -Codex adapter tracks `Bash` and `apply_patch` executions through the hidden +Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi are wired to real sessions as +mutation-scope producers. Pi's Rust adapter is driven by the canonical +extension installed by `sce setup --pi`; the same extension routes human +`!`/`!!` Bash through the guarded external-mutation supervisor without creating +an AI scope (see +[`context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`](cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md)). +The Codex adapter tracks `Bash` and `apply_patch` executions through the hidden `sce hooks codex-mutation-scope` command; its `PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` groups match `^(Bash|apply_patch)$`, while cleanup events are unmatched. Delegation tools do not create scopes, and MCP/unknown tools remain usable but outside individual -mutation attribution. -Pi is not yet wired to real sessions. See +mutation attribution. See [`context/cli/codex-mutation-scope-integration.md`](cli/codex-mutation-scope-integration.md) for the tested Codex 0.153.4 lifecycle, recovery, and attribution boundary. OpenCode's tool lifecycle is frozen against `opencode-ai@1.15.4` / @@ -41,7 +45,7 @@ for `/validate`. See This repository maintains shared assistant configuration for OpenCode, Claude, Pi, and Codex from a single canonical Pkl authoring source. One typed workflow catalog owns the six workflows' shared identity and target routing metadata, while canonical workflow/phase modules own behavior and migrated package-local documents, and target renderers own formatting. Generated target layouts are ephemeral: repository builds consume a pre-Cargo generated payload through `SCE_CLI_GENERATED_INPUT_DIR`, crates.io and Flatpak stage packaging-only fallbacks, and `config/.opencode`, `config/.claude`, `config/.pi`, `config/.agents`, and the generated working-tree SCE config schema are not committed; versioned SCE config schema snapshots live under `schema/v/`. The catalog also marks a workflow `optional` — currently only `brownfield` — which changes nothing about generation and is projected into a generated `config/optional-workflows.json` manifest for install-time consumers. `nix run .#pkl-check-generated` preserves its exact 142-path artifact, metadata/package, phase-reference, internal-reference, optional-workflow-manifest, workflow-orchestration, OpenCode-permission, required-path, and forbidden-path checks while delegating deterministic payload production and inventories to the shared generated-input producer; `nix flake check` runs the same contract. The target matrix contains one manual OpenCode profile plus Claude, Pi, and Codex; the former automated OpenCode profile has been removed. A fourth Pkl renderer, `config/pkl/renderers/codex-content.pkl`, also consumes the same canonical workflow composition to emit skills-only Codex output under `config/.agents/skills/**` (no per-target frontmatter, matching Pi, and no command/prompt layer). Each of the six catalog workflow skills (not `sce-decision`, which has no user-facing entrypoint on any target) additionally carries a Codex-only `agents/openai.yaml`, rendered by `config/pkl/renderers/codex-metadata.pkl` from the shared catalog's `title`/`description` plus an authored `default_prompt`, with `policy.allow_implicit_invocation: false` so these stateful lifecycle workflows activate only from explicit `$sce-` invocation or Codex's `/skills` discovery, never from conversational relevance alone. The Codex renderer also emits a Codex hook registration file (`config/.codex/hooks.json`) and its install-guidance helper (`config/.codex/hooks/run-sce-or-show-install-guidance.sh`). The existing conversation/diff registrations (`UserPromptSubmit`, `Stop`, `PreToolUse` for `Bash`, `PostToolUse` for `apply_patch`) route through `sce hooks codex` and retain their fail-open behavior where designed. The separate mutation-scope registrations route through `sce hooks codex-mutation-scope`: `PreToolUse` and `PostToolUse` use matcher `^(Bash|apply_patch)$`, while `Stop`, `Interrupt`, `SubagentStop`, and `SessionEnd` omit matcher and are unmatched. The tracked mutation `PreToolUse` bootstrap fails closed if Git-root resolution, helper or `sce` discovery, adapter startup, runtime `Start`, or Bash-policy evaluation cannot establish attribution; mutation-scope `PostToolUse` and cleanup hooks do not use this bootstrap behavior. Delegation, MCP, and unknown tools do not match these generated mutation Pre/Post registrations. `sce setup --codex` (and `--all`) now installs it as a fourth `SetupTarget`; setup merges the user-owned `.codex/hooks.json` through the shared structural Codex hook-config service, preserving unrelated valid handlers and rejecting malformed or Codex-invalid documents before the atomic swap. `sce doctor` diagnoses that file per required registration (`PresentAndCurrent`/`Missing`/`Stale`, or `Malformed` for the whole document) rather than by whole-document equality, reporting the mutation-scope registrations under distinct `#(mutation-scope)` rows separate from the `sce hooks codex` rows, and separately reports whether Codex has actually marked each structurally current registration trusted and whether its effective hook-discovery policy allows project hooks, by reading (never writing) Codex's own `$CODEX_HOME/config.toml` and policy state; `sce doctor --fix` repairs structurally unhealthy registrations through the same merge service but never touches trust or policy state (see `context/sce/doctor-human-text-contract.md`). `sce hooks codex` now exists as a typed dispatcher (`cli/src/services/hooks/codex/`): it parses the raw hook JSON into a `CodexHookEvent` and classifies `(hook_event_name, tool_name)` into `UserPromptSubmit`, `Stop`, `PreToolUse(Bash)`, `PostToolUse(apply_patch)`, or a fail-open `NoOp` fallthrough covering every other combination — including `apply_patch` under `PreToolUse`. `UserPromptSubmit` and `Stop` each capture one `messages`/`parts` row (`role="user"`/`role="assistant"`) into the repository Agent Trace DB under the idempotent `cx_` session prefix, `PreToolUse(Bash)` delegates to the existing Bash policy engine, and `PostToolUse(apply_patch)` parses Codex's own `apply_patch` text, resolves paths from the event `cwd` against the real Git root into safe repository-relative paths, normalizes Add/Update evidence into an SCE unified diff under deterministic event-scoped synthetic line identities derived from `tool_use_id`, and persists it as one `diff_traces` row when non-empty (see `context/sce/codex-integration-runtime.md`) — while invalid cwd/path resolution and malformed STDIN payloads fail open with empty stdout, reported model IDs are preserved without fabricated provider prefixes, and missing/blank apply_patch sessions produce no evidence. Delete-File operations and Bash filesystem effects do not become `diff_traces` in this existing conversation/diff pipeline, and its apply_patch evidence has separate operation limitations. Separately, the Codex mutation-scope adapter tracks `Bash` and `apply_patch` executions as `TrackedMutation` scopes; `AiExclusive` means tracked-scope exclusivity, not that Bash authored every mutation in the interval. -It also includes a Rust CLI (`sce`) for Shared Context Engineering workflows: auth, config inspection, setup, doctor, Agent Trace hooks and synchronization, bash-policy evaluation, and repository-scoped Agent Trace storage infrastructure. See `context/architecture.md` for module-level boundaries and `context/context-map.md` for the full domain file index. A new pure, dependency-free `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/` module now exists as a Rust refinement of the verified `spec/mutation_cursor.qnt` mutation-cursor protocol; it currently carries domain types and the full pure action set — `prepare`/`commit` transition logic, attribution/mutation-event materialization, snapshot-failure/database-failure taint actions, scope abandonment, and recovery with an explicit observed-tree input — is registered with `#[allow(dead_code)]`. A separate `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/store.rs` persistence layer (built out by the `mutation-cursor-store-persistence` plan) now provides a real, CAS-guarded database call site against the repository-scoped Agent Trace DB, and a `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/` coordinator layer (built out by the `mutation-cursor-runtime-coordinator` plan) adds the per-worktree advisory lock, the isolated Git snapshot/ref-pinning service, and a public `coordinate()` entrypoint that drives the protocol against a real worktree under that lock, plus a per-worktree `ref_reconciliation` maintenance pass (built out by the `mutation-cursor-ref-reconciliation` plan) that, only for the namespace of a checkout id a current worktree still derives, reclaims orphaned SCE-owned snapshot refs under that same lock while retaining every tree any durable mutation-cursor state still references (a namespace no current worktree owns — via a deleted linked worktree or checkout-id metadata loss/recreation — is out of reach and left to future repository-scoped work). That runtime now has a second protected entrypoint alongside `coordinate()`: `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/scope_runtime.rs`'s `abandon_scope()` (built out by the `mutation-scope-runtime-integration` plan) retires a scope whose final worktree boundary was never observed — a dead agent process leaves no `Close` behind — sharing `coordinate()`'s extracted `runtime/protected_worktree.rs` safety prefix but deliberately capturing no Git snapshot, so abandonment is not a `RuntimeBoundary` and needs no Quint change. Both entrypoints are now reachable crate-wide through nine `pub(crate)` re-exports in `runtime/mod.rs` while every module behind them stays private, and the lifecycle contract every current or future harness adapter must uphold is recorded in `context/cli/mutation-scope-runtime.md`. The protocol runtime entrypoints (`coordinate()` / `abandon_scope()`) are now driven by one harness-neutral CLI ingress, the hidden `sce hooks mutation-scope` command (`context/cli/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md`), which reads a single normalized JSON lifecycle object from STDIN, strictly parses it into exactly `start`/`advance`/`close`/`flush`/`abandon`, maps it to a `RuntimeBoundary` (`start`/`advance`/`close`/`flush`) or an `abandon_scope()` call forwarding `scope_id`/`event_id`/`actor_kind` verbatim (any `worktree_id` key is refused — worktree identity is derived by the runtime from the invoking checkout), and invokes the runtime with a lazy DB provider closure so DB acquisition stays inside the protected-worktree ordering. Unlike the fail-open `diff-trace`/`conversation-trace` intakes, this ingress never discards a valid boundary: it classifies results by durable completion, returning a non-zero `CliError` for a malformed payload or a pre-completion runtime error while treating the two carried-outcome variants (`MarkerClearAfterCommit` / `MarkerClearAfterCompletion` — the durable transition succeeded and only the trailing external-taint marker cleanup failed) as empty-stdout success without retrying the transition. Every successful execution emits empty stdout and writes `mutation_trace_*` rows only. It is the generic transport seam. Concrete harness lifecycle adapters for Claude Code and Codex are wired to it in-process via a `pub(crate)` seam rather than by re-invoking the ingress command; they map each harness's lifecycle events onto one mutation `ScopeId` per mutation-capable tool execution with write-ahead fail-closed `Start`, terminal `Close`, cleanup, recovery barriers, and harness-specific unsupported-boundary handling. OpenCode and Pi remain unwired; the generic runtime supports future adapters for them. Codex execution identity and `ScopeId`/`EventId` derivation are owned by `context/cli/codex-mutation-scope-integration.md`. A separate **read-only** consumer of the same module's persisted mutation-event history is wired, though: the post-commit Agent Trace flow calls `mutation_trace::runtime::resolve_post_commit_mutation_ai_patch(...)` to attribute committed touched lines that direct `diff_traces` evidence does not cover, by replaying the newest 128 events for the invoking worktree (bounded also by a commit attribution cut captured under the worktree lock) oldest-to-newest as one causal per-line provenance lineage rather than matching historical patches independently, resolving the worktree's *existing* checkout identity only, creating no identity and writing no mutation-cursor state, and never inserting into `diff_traces` or `post_commit_patch_intersections` (see `context/cli/mutation-trace-agent-attribution.md` and `context/sce/agent-trace-hooks-command-routing.md`). See also `context/cli/mutation-trace-protocol.md`, `context/cli/mutation-trace-runtime-coordinator.md`, `context/cli/mutation-trace-ref-reconciliation.md`, `context/cli/mutation-trace-protected-worktree.md`, `context/cli/mutation-trace-scope-abandonment.md`, `context/cli/mutation-scope-runtime.md`, `context/cli/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md`, and `context/cli/claude-mutation-scope-integration.md`. +It also includes a Rust CLI (`sce`) for Shared Context Engineering workflows: auth, config inspection, setup, doctor, Agent Trace hooks and synchronization, bash-policy evaluation, and repository-scoped Agent Trace storage infrastructure. See `context/architecture.md` for module-level boundaries and `context/context-map.md` for the full domain file index. A new pure, dependency-free `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/` module now exists as a Rust refinement of the verified `spec/mutation_cursor.qnt` mutation-cursor protocol; it currently carries domain types and the full pure action set — `prepare`/`commit` transition logic, attribution/mutation-event materialization, snapshot-failure/database-failure taint actions, scope abandonment, and recovery with an explicit observed-tree input — is registered with `#[allow(dead_code)]`. A separate `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/store.rs` persistence layer (built out by the `mutation-cursor-store-persistence` plan) now provides a real, CAS-guarded database call site against the repository-scoped Agent Trace DB, and a `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/` coordinator layer (built out by the `mutation-cursor-runtime-coordinator` plan) adds the per-worktree advisory lock, the isolated Git snapshot/ref-pinning service, and a public `coordinate()` entrypoint that drives the protocol against a real worktree under that lock, plus a per-worktree `ref_reconciliation` maintenance pass (built out by the `mutation-cursor-ref-reconciliation` plan) that, only for the namespace of a checkout id a current worktree still derives, reclaims orphaned SCE-owned snapshot refs under that same lock while retaining every tree any durable mutation-cursor state still references (a namespace no current worktree owns — via a deleted linked worktree or checkout-id metadata loss/recreation — is out of reach and left to future repository-scoped work). That runtime now has a second protected entrypoint alongside `coordinate()`: `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/scope_runtime.rs`'s `abandon_scope()` (built out by the `mutation-scope-runtime-integration` plan) retires a scope whose final worktree boundary was never observed — a dead agent process leaves no `Close` behind — sharing `coordinate()`'s extracted `runtime/protected_worktree.rs` safety prefix but deliberately capturing no Git snapshot, so abandonment is not a `RuntimeBoundary` and needs no Quint change. Both entrypoints are now reachable crate-wide through nine `pub(crate)` re-exports in `runtime/mod.rs` while every module behind them stays private, and the lifecycle contract every current or future harness adapter must uphold is recorded in `context/cli/mutation-scope-runtime.md`. The protocol runtime entrypoints (`coordinate()` / `abandon_scope()`) are now driven by one harness-neutral CLI ingress, the hidden `sce hooks mutation-scope` command (`context/cli/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md`), which reads a single normalized JSON lifecycle object from STDIN, strictly parses it into exactly `start`/`advance`/`close`/`flush`/`abandon`, maps it to a `RuntimeBoundary` (`start`/`advance`/`close`/`flush`) or an `abandon_scope()` call forwarding `scope_id`/`event_id`/`actor_kind` verbatim (any `worktree_id` key is refused — worktree identity is derived by the runtime from the invoking checkout), and invokes the runtime with a lazy DB provider closure so DB acquisition stays inside the protected-worktree ordering. Unlike the fail-open `diff-trace`/`conversation-trace` intakes, this ingress never discards a valid boundary: it classifies results by durable completion, returning a non-zero `CliError` for a malformed payload or a pre-completion runtime error while treating the two carried-outcome variants (`MarkerClearAfterCommit` / `MarkerClearAfterCompletion` — the durable transition succeeded and only the trailing external-taint marker cleanup failed) as empty-stdout success without retrying the transition. Every successful execution emits empty stdout and writes `mutation_trace_*` rows only. It is the generic transport seam. Concrete harness lifecycle adapters for Claude Code and Codex are wired to it in-process via a `pub(crate)` seam rather than by re-invoking the ingress command; they map each harness's lifecycle events onto one mutation `ScopeId` per mutation-capable tool execution with write-ahead fail-closed `Start`, terminal `Close`, cleanup, recovery barriers, and harness-specific unsupported-boundary handling. A Pi adapter driver (`cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/`) also now consumes this same `pub(crate)` in-process seam through its hidden `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` command and canonical generated Pi extension, with a `PendingStart`→`Executed`→`Closed`/`PendingAbandon` attempt-phase lifecycle keyed on Pi's `tool_result` event rather than `tool_execution_start` (see `context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`); ordinary Pi sessions now reach it, and its human `user_bash` path uses the separate guarded external-mutation supervisor. Codex execution identity and `ScopeId`/`EventId` derivation are owned by `context/cli/codex-mutation-scope-integration.md`. A separate **read-only** consumer of the same module's persisted mutation-event history is wired, though: the post-commit Agent Trace flow calls `mutation_trace::runtime::resolve_post_commit_mutation_ai_patch(...)` to attribute committed touched lines that direct `diff_traces` evidence does not cover, by replaying the newest 128 events for the invoking worktree (bounded also by a commit attribution cut captured under the worktree lock) oldest-to-newest as one causal per-line provenance lineage rather than matching historical patches independently, resolving the worktree's *existing* checkout identity only, creating no identity and writing no mutation-cursor state, and never inserting into `diff_traces` or `post_commit_patch_intersections` (see `context/cli/mutation-trace-agent-attribution.md` and `context/sce/agent-trace-hooks-command-routing.md`). See also `context/cli/mutation-trace-protocol.md`, `context/cli/mutation-trace-runtime-coordinator.md`, `context/cli/mutation-trace-ref-reconciliation.md`, `context/cli/mutation-trace-protected-worktree.md`, `context/cli/mutation-trace-scope-abandonment.md`, `context/cli/mutation-scope-runtime.md`, `context/cli/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md`, `context/cli/claude-mutation-scope-integration.md`, and `context/cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md` (the harness-neutral process supervisor that lets Pi's `user_bash` mutate a worktree, guarded by the same `WorktreeLock`, without ever creating a scope). The generated `/next-task` workflow persists task-level context-synchronization lifecycle state in each plan (`pending`, `synced`, or `blocked`) so unresolved task synchronization debt survives a session boundary and gates new implementation. Successful `/next-task` execution hands task synchronization an explicit, pre-edit-Git-baseline-relative changed-file list plus implementation, verification, done-check, plan-update, and context-impact evidence, recorded directly on the completed task (`Completed`, `Files changed`, `Result`, `Verify`, `Context impact`, `Context synchronization`); the five-file root context pass remains mandatory. A later-session sync-debt retry reads that same completed task record directly from the plan by plan path and task ID, with no separate persisted synchronization handoff. `/validate` is validation-only: it runs final checks, writes the Validation Report, and reports `validated`, `failed`, or `blocked` without plan-level context synchronization. diff --git a/context/plans/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md b/context/plans/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c710a19dd --- /dev/null +++ b/context/plans/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md @@ -0,0 +1,3149 @@ +# Plan: pi-mutation-scope-integration + +## Change summary + +Add Pi as the fourth concrete mutation-scope producer, building on the validated Claude Code and Codex mutation-attribution adapters plus the mutation-scope-provenance work already on `main`. This plan is stacked on the still-open OpenCode integration (PR #276) rather than assuming it — see **Stack and base**. + +The integration reuses the existing project-local Pi extension rather than introducing a second competing extension. The TypeScript extension remains a thin harness transport layer; a new Rust `pi_mutation_scope` adapter owns event parsing, tool classification, scope identity, durable attempt state, recovery, provenance normalization, and translation into the existing harness-neutral mutation-scope ingress. + +One independently executing mutation-capable Pi tool call is one mutation scope. A Pi session, turn, agent loop, or process is not itself a scope. + +The initial tracked built-in tool set is `bash`, `edit`, `write`. Known read-only built-ins (`read`, `grep`, `find`, `ls`) are untracked. Custom and unknown tools remain untracked in v1 unless exact Pi evidence establishes a sound capability contract — missed attribution is preferred over claiming AI attribution for an unknown tool. + +Pi `!` / `!!` user Bash is human-initiated and never creates a Pi AI mutation scope. + +The integration uses the existing generic mutation-scope runtime and existing `mutation_trace_*` storage. It introduces no new Agent Trace schema or mutation-trace SQL migration. + +The plan is based on Pi `0.80.6`. T01 freezes the lifecycle evidence for that exact version. Changing the Pi version after T01 begins requires stopping the plan, updating the version policy, and rerunning the complete load-bearing probe matrix. + +## Stack and base + +- **Predecessor:** PR #276 `opencode-mutation-scope-integration` (head branch + `opencode-mutation-scope-integration`, head commit `3e01f97f0154135b5b3ffe8aaa3b486bc26fff15` + as of T02's completion; based on `mutation-scope-provenance`). **PR #276 is + currently open and unmerged.** +- **This branch:** `pi-mutation-scope-integration` (PR #278) is stacked + directly on `opencode-mutation-scope-integration`: PR #276's current head is + the merge base of this branch, and #278 contains only the Pi-layer plan + commits above it. The OpenCode mutation-scope adapter and the generalized + per-`ActorKind` confirmation-required predicate (covering `ActorKind::Codex` + and `ActorKind::OpenCode`) are already present in this branch's history via + that stacked base. The exact commit count above the predecessor head grows + as plan tasks land, so it is not recorded here; re-derive it with + `git log --oneline origin/opencode-mutation-scope-integration..pi-mutation-scope-integration` + when it matters. +- **Stack invariant, not a plan task:** PR #276's current head must remain an + ancestor of this branch for as long as #278 is stacked on it. Before + beginning a task, if PR #276's head has moved (amended or rebased), update + this branch onto the new predecessor before continuing. If PR #276 merges, + rebase/retarget #278 onto the branch that now contains the landed OpenCode + work — normally `main`. This is a Git operation performed outside the task + stack, not a numbered task; every task below assumes the invariant currently + holds. +- **Base for the PR while the stack is unmerged:** `opencode-mutation-scope-integration` + (#276 head), **not** `main`. +- **Final branch comparison** is against `opencode-mutation-scope-integration`, + not `main`, for as long as #276 remains open. If #276 changes before + execution time (rebased, amended, or merged to `main`), re-check + `gh pr view 276` and the actual branch ancestry, rebase onto the current + predecessor, and update this section plus every task below that assumes a + specific pre-existing OpenCode/Codex confirmation-required shape. + +## Dependency and version policy + +Independently of the branch stacking above, this plan also pins: + +* `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent` `0.80.6` as pinned by `config/lib/package.json` + (confirmed at planning time); +* upstream Pi tag `v0.80.6`, commit `2b3fda9921b5590f285165287bd442a25817f17b`. + +No Pi package upgrade belongs in this PR. + +If the pinned Pi runtime behaves differently from the lifecycle assumptions below, T01 is a re-planning gate. Do not weaken attribution semantics to make the implementation fit an unexpected lifecycle. + +## Design + +### D1 — One tool execution is one scope + +A mutation scope represents one independently executing mutation-capable tool call. + +```text +Pi session + | + +-- toolCall A: bash -> scope A + +-- toolCall B: write -> scope B + +-- toolCall C: read -> no scope +``` + +Parallel tool executions must remain distinct live scopes. + +A session, turn, agent loop, or Pi process must never be collapsed into a single mutation scope. + +The adapter maintains a monotonic checkout-local attempt sequence so a reused Pi `toolCallId` can never reactivate a terminal SCE scope. + +Canonical identity: + +```text +pi-tool-v1|n=|s=:|c=: +``` + +The exact live-attempt key is: + +```text +(session-id, tool-call-id) +``` + +A replay while that attempt is live resolves to the existing attempt. A new execution after terminal cleanup receives a new attempt sequence and therefore a new `ScopeId`. + +Boundary event IDs derive deterministically from the scope: + +```text +|start +|close +``` + +No timestamp, random UUID, model identifier, PID, or tool argument participates in attribution identity. + +### D2 — Conservative tool classification + +Pi `0.80.6` has three SCE-supported built-in mutation-capable tools: `bash`, `edit`, `write`. These establish scopes. + +Known read-only tools (`read`, `grep`, `find`, `ls`) create no mutation-scope state. + +Custom and unknown tool names are untracked in v1. Their schemas or descriptions are not sufficient evidence of mutation capability. + +This is deliberately asymmetric: + +```text +unknown mutating tool -> possible false negative +unknown read-only tool -> never fabricates an AI scope +``` + +False negatives are preferred to false-positive AI attribution. + +If Pi allows a built-in mutation-capable name to be replaced with behavior that invalidates this classification, T01 must record that and the plan must be revised before T02. + +### D3 — Start is write-ahead and fail-closed + +The candidate Pi Start boundary is `tool_call`. + +The pinned API defines it as occurring before execution and permits the handler to block the tool. + +Within the existing SCE Pi extension, handler ordering must be: + +```text +bash policy + ↓ +mutation-scope Start + ↓ +existing edit/write diff pre-image capture + ↓ +tool execution +``` + +For Bash, an SCE bash-policy denial therefore occurs before mutation-scope admission and creates no scope. + +For a tracked tool, the mutation-scope handler synchronously invokes: + +```text +sce hooks pi-mutation-scope +``` + +and does not allow the tool to proceed unless the Rust adapter has durably established `Start`. + +Transport failure, missing `sce`, timeout, malformed identity, durable-state failure, recovery failure, provenance identity conflict, or generic Start failure all return Pi's normal `{ block: true, reason: ... }` shape. + +A tracked mutation must never proceed merely because mutation attribution could not be established. + +### D4 — Pi becomes confirmation-required + +Pi changes from `requires_boundary_confirmation(Pi) = false` to `requires_boundary_confirmation(Pi) = true`. + +The reason is extension ordering. + +A successful SCE `tool_call` handler does not itself prove the tool will execute. A later Pi extension can still return `block: true`. + +Therefore `Start(Pi A)` followed by a later extension rejecting A must never make A eligible for positive attribution. + +Until Pi A reaches its own confirmed post-execution Close, any boundary while A remains unconfirmed resolves to `IneligibleUnscoped`. + +A successful Pi Close confirms its own scope exactly like the generalized Codex/OpenCode confirmation rule, already in place via the stacked base (see **Stack and base**). + +This change must remain bounded to the existing confirmation-required predicate and corresponding Quint/MBT cases. It must not add Pi-specific fields to `ProtocolState`, `ScopeState`, `MutationEvent`, `Attribution`, or the Quint scope model. + +### D5 — `tool_execution_start` is pre-gate telemetry; `tool_result` proves execution began + +**Frozen by T01 (`cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/NOTES.md`, D5).** The plan originally assumed `tool_execution_start` fires after a successful Start and proves execution began. This is backwards on pinned Pi `0.80.6`: `tool_execution_start` fires unconditionally, for every registered extension, **before** `tool_call` — including for a call `tool_call` later blocks or throws on. Confirmed both live (`captures/bash-success.jsonl`: `tool_execution_start` precedes `tool_call` by ~1.3ms for the same `toolCallId`; `captures/probeC-order-throw.jsonl`: all three extensions' `tool_execution_start` handlers fire before any `tool_call` handler runs) and in the pinned package's own documentation (`docs/extensions.md`, `tool_call` section: "Fired after `tool_execution_start`, before the tool executes"). + +```text +tool_execution_start (unconditional, fires for every extension, before tool_call) +tool_call (the actual gate — can block; see D3) +[tool execute body, if admitted] +tool_result (only if execute() actually ran — see D6) +tool_execution_end +``` + +`tool_execution_start` therefore carries zero evidentiary value for "the tool actually began executing." It performs no mutation-scope state transition and must never be used as proof of execution. It may still be surfaced as informational telemetry (e.g. progress UI) but never drives attribution. + +The reliable evidence that execution occurred is `tool_result`: present if and only if the tool's `execute()` body actually ran — for success and for a genuine runtime failure alike (a non-zero Bash exit still produces `tool_result`) — and absent whenever `tool_call` prevented execution (D6). + +The adapter's checkout-local attempt-phase bookkeeping is: + +```text +PendingStart + ↓ generic Start (tool_call admission) succeeds — attempt stays PendingStart + ↓ tool_result observed for this exact toolCallId +Executed + ↓ tool_execution_end paired with an already-observed tool_result +Closed +``` + +`PendingStart`/`PendingAbandon` naming follows the existing `AttemptPhase` convention already used by `codex_mutation_scope`/`opencode_mutation_scope`; Pi's adapter adds `Executed` as the one phase distinguishing "admitted, execution proven" from "admitted, terminal without execution" (D7). There is no `AwaitingExecution`/`Active` phase keyed on `tool_execution_start`. + +### D6 — `tool_result` is execution evidence; `tool_execution_end` is Close only once execution is proven + +**Frozen by T01 (NOTES.md, D6).** `tool_execution_end` alone cannot serve as the confirming Close: it fires unconditionally for every `tool_call`, including one blocked or thrown on before execution, with `isError: true` and the block/throw reason as its content (`captures/probeA-block.jsonl`, `captures/probeA-throw.jsonl`, `captures/probeB-later-block.jsonl`). + +The corrected rule: + +* `tool_result` is the positive evidence that execution occurred for a given `toolCallId` — success and failed-but-executed (`isError: true`, e.g. Bash exit 7 with a partial write already persisted) alike, exactly matching the original D6 intent for the success/failure split. +* `tool_execution_end` is a confirming Close **only when a `tool_result` for the same exact `toolCallId` was already observed**. A `tool_execution_end` with no preceding `tool_result` proves the opposite of a Close — see D7. +* The adapter Closes on this exact pairing (`tool_result` for `toolCallId`, then `tool_execution_end` for the same `toolCallId`) rather than on `tool_execution_end` alone or on `tool_result` alone: `tool_execution_end` remains Pi's own 1:1 terminal-lifecycle event for the `tool_call` it ends, so gating on it (once execution is proven) keeps the adapter's Close aligned with Pi's own "this tool call is finished" signal rather than closing while Pi may still be running trailing per-call bookkeeping. Exactly one Close boundary is produced per executed tool call, unchanged from the original requirement. + +Both success and failed-but-executed tools map to the same Close boundary, unchanged from the original D6 intent — only the raw event this decision is keyed on changed. + +### D7 — A Start followed by no execution must be abandoned, never closed + +**Frozen by T01 (NOTES.md, D7) — the previously open terminal signal is now exact, not a candidate.** If SCE established Start but the tool never executed — for example because a later extension blocked it — there is no legitimate successful Close: + +```text +tool_execution_end +AND no tool_result was observed for this exact toolCallId + => admitted Start (PendingStart), but the tool never executed + => abandon the scope, never Close it +``` + +This is an exact, per-`toolCallId`, synchronous signal (`captures/probeA-block.jsonl`, `captures/probeA-throw.jsonl`, `captures/probeB-later-block.jsonl` — all reach `tool_execution_end` with no `tool_result`). No broad lifecycle event or elapsed time is used or needed for this determination: + +```text +Do not rely on: + agent_settled + session shutdown + any timeout or TTL +``` + +Recovery (D8) still owns turning this into a durable abandon/rebaseline. + +### D8 — Recovery follows the soundness-first flush/abandon/flush pattern + +Pi is confirmation-required and may overlap another live scope, so terminal recovery must preserve the same safety invariant already established for OpenCode. + +When an exact terminal condition requires abandoning A: + +```text +1. durably record A as PendingAbandon +2. Flush while A and siblings are still live +3. abandon A +4. remove A only after durable abandon succeeds +5. Flush again to consume needs_rebaseline +6. clear recovery only after every step succeeds +``` + +The first Flush makes the ambiguous interval ineligible while A is still an unconfirmed live scope. + +Surviving scopes are not swept: + +```text +Start(A) +Start(B) +mutations +A becomes unrecoverably terminal + ↓ +ambiguous interval -> non-AI +abandon(A) +rebaseline +B remains live +B makes later mutation +Close(B) + ↓ +later B interval can still become AI +``` + +Failed recovery remains fail-closed for subsequent tracked Pi Starts. + +Never replay an old Close later merely because its original delivery failed. The current Git tree would no longer represent the original observation time. + +### D9 — Transport failure after tool execution cannot be repaired by pretending the observation is current + +Start transport is fail-closed because the tool has not executed yet. + +Terminal transport is different: once Pi reports `tool_execution_end`, the mutation may already exist. + +If the terminal event reaches the Rust adapter but the generic Close fails before durable completion, Rust owns the recovery sequence from D8. + +If the TypeScript extension cannot reach the Rust adapter at all after execution: + +* retain an in-process unresolved-terminal marker for that exact attempt; +* deny subsequent tracked Starts while the terminal state remains unresolved; +* once the adapter becomes reachable, recover the old scope through abandonment/rebaseline, not a delayed Close; +* if the Pi process dies before that can happen, process-staleness recovery owns it. + +Existing conversation-trace and diff-trace delivery remains fail-open. Mutation-scope delivery does not inherit their advisory semantics. + +**Relationship to D13 (asymmetric, not a duplicate).** D9 and D13 both guard against ambiguous attribution, but they sit on opposite sides of execution and therefore require different postures: + +```text +D9 — terminal transport failure: + the tool has already executed; the mutation may already + exist; it cannot be undone + => unresolved-terminal / recovery semantics required + +D13 — fence transport failure: + the human command has not been allowed to begin yet; + no mutation has occurred from this attempt + => block user_bash; no ambiguous human mutation is + ever introduced +``` + +Because D13 blocks the human command outright whenever its own fence cannot be proven durably armed, a failed fence-arming attempt never produces a mutation that needs protecting. D13 therefore does not reuse — and must not reuse — this section's in-process unresolved-terminal fallback; there is nothing for that fallback to protect. The two remain independently necessary for their own distinct events: this section protects against losing track of a mutation that has already happened; D13 prevents an ambiguous mutation from happening in the first place. + +### D10 — Process death is positive staleness evidence; elapsed time is not + +Each durable Pi attempt records enough process ownership information to determine whether the Pi process that owned it is definitely gone. + +On a later adapter invocation, an attempt owned by a positively dead process may be recovered through abandonment/rebaseline. + +A live PID alone is not enough to prove ownership after PID reuse; the implementation should use the strongest process-instance evidence available without weakening portability. If exact cross-platform process-instance identity cannot be established, a possibly-reused live PID is treated as alive and the stale scope remains conservative. + +No timeout or TTL proves death. Do not abandon scopes because they are old. Do not abandon every Pi scope at startup. Do not use `ActorKind::Pi` as evidence of staleness. + +### D11 — Pi session/model provenance is admission-time metadata + +Every tracked Start carries: + +```text +session_id = pi_ +model_id = / | NULL +``` + +Canonical session prefixing is idempotent. + +Model provenance comes from the exact `ctx.model` observed for that Start. + +Missing or unusable model evidence yields `NULL`. + +Never: infer the model from another session; reuse stale model state; backfill a `NULL` provenance row later; update provenance after model switching; make model absence itself block a tracked tool. + +Provenance remains insert-once metadata outside protocol state. + +### D12 — Multi-process Pi is normal concurrency + +Pi has no need for a special "subagent scope." + +If another Pi process/session works on the same checkout, its tracked tools naturally receive their own scopes: + +```text +Pi process/session A -> pi-tool scope A +Pi process/session B -> pi-tool scope B +``` + +Their overlap becomes normal mutation-scope contention. + +If an extension/custom tool launches another Pi process, the launching custom tool remains untracked unless explicitly classified; the child Pi's own tracked tools are attributed independently if that child loads the SCE extension. + +No parent scope absorbs child mutations. + +### D13 — `!` / `!!` user Bash may mutate only for the lifetime of a durable, worktree-wide external-mutation guard + +**Corrected twice — the T03-drafted guard-holds-the-lock-itself design closed the marker-only race but has two further, load-bearing soundness holes, both found before T02 began.** An earlier statement of this section (frozen by T01, NOTES.md D13) established that `!`/`!!` user Bash can execute concurrently with an active agent tool call and required a durable worktree-wide `ExternalTaintMarker` armed **before** the command begins. A first correction (superseded by this section) recognized that a one-shot marker is not enough and proposed holding `WorktreeLock`/`ExternalTaintMarker` open for the whole command by making a **separate long-lived guard process**, spawned by the extension, the lock's sole owner — with the actual shell still executed independently, inside Pi/Node, via `createLocalBashOperations().exec()`, and with the guard's "finish" triggered by an explicit signal or by stdin EOF on the pipe to that extension process. + +That design conflated "the process holding `WorktreeLock`" with "the process capable of mutating the checkout," and conflated "the control channel to Pi/Node going quiet" with "the human command has stopped." Both are false in general. Pinned Pi `0.80.6` starts its local Bash child on Unix with `detached: process.platform !== "win32"` (`config/lib/node_modules/@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent`, local-bash execution path used by `createLocalBashOperations()`), so the actual mutation-producing process is, by construction, not a normal child of whichever process happens to be waiting on it — it can outlive either: + +```text +Sequence 1 — guard-owner death does not prove the human shell is dead: + +human shell running (human write #1 already committed) + ↓ +SCE guard process is SIGKILLed (OOM, crash, operator kill -9) + ↓ +guard process's file descriptors close + ↓ +WorktreeLock released <- WRONG: nothing about the + guard dying proves the + detached shell is dead + ↓ +a foreign coordinate() call (Claude/Codex/OpenCode/another Pi) +acquires the now-free lock, observes the still-armed +ExternalTaintMarker, self-heals via database_failure + recover, +then evaluates its own boundary against the "clean" recovered tree + ↓ +the human shell is STILL RUNNING and mutates again (human write #2) + ↓ +write #2 can now be folded into a later confirmed AI attribution, +because nothing durable still marks the worktree as guarded + +Sequence 2 — control-channel EOF is not execution completion: + +human shell running, still mutating + ↓ +the Pi/Node extension process dies (unrelated crash, OOM, user +closes the terminal) + ↓ +the guard's stdin pipe (its connection to Pi/Node) sees EOF + ↓ +the T03-drafted design treats EOF as equivalent to an explicit +finish signal and runs its finish sequence: forced recover, +complete(), release the lock <- WRONG: no evidence + the shell stopped, + only that Pi/Node + stopped talking + ↓ +the detached shell survives Pi/Node's death and writes again + ↓ +the guard has already released the lock, so this write is unguarded +``` + +Both sequences violate the invariant this section exists to establish. The fundamental correction: + +> Protection may end only when SCE has positive evidence that the actual mutation-producing command — the real shell process, not any control or coordinator process — has stopped being capable of mutating the checkout. Death of a control process, or silence on a control channel, is never sufficient evidence of that on its own. + +Pi's `user_bash` lifecycle remains user-initiated and must never establish an `ActorKind::Pi` scope. Ordinary user Bash mutations occurring while no guard and no agent scope are active remain naturally observed as unscoped by the next mutation boundary, unchanged. + +**Required architectural correction: the guard's owner process must itself spawn the human shell, not merely coordinate with whatever process happens to run it.** The generic external-mutation supervisor — a new, harness-neutral runtime/ingress component (still T03's responsibility, still not Pi-specific) — owns the whole guarded interval end to end: + +```text +Pi wrapped BashOperations.exec() + ↓ (control channel: command, cwd, env, timeout, cancellation; + streamed stdout/stderr back) +SCE external-mutation supervisor (new long-lived process, T03) + ↓ +supervisor acquires WorktreeLock, arms ExternalTaintMarker + (ProtectedWorktree::acquire, unchanged) + ↓ +supervisor acknowledges ARMED to Pi/Node + ↓ +supervisor itself spawns the human shell as its OWN child + (the same command Pi would otherwise have handed to + createLocalBashOperations() — now executed by the + supervisor, not by the Pi/Node process) + ↓ +supervisor streams the shell's stdout/stderr back to Pi/Node +over the control channel, so onData still fires as before + ↓ +supervisor continuously observes shell status, stdout/stderr, and a +kernel-owned lifetime-token pipe inherited by the shell and ordinary +descendants + ↓ +foreground shell terminates, but the supervisor does not finish yet + ↓ +lifetime-token EOF proves no ordinary descendant still owns the +inherited token + ↓ +capture final Git tree; database_failure + recover against the +already-held ProtectedWorktree; commit durably; on success, +ProtectedWorktree::complete() (clears the marker); release the +supervisor's own lock reference by exiting + ↓ +return the real exit result (exit code, output) to Pi/Node +``` + +Pi/Node no longer calls `createLocalBashOperations().exec()` to run the command itself; the wrapped `exec()` becomes a thin control-channel client of the supervisor. The supervisor performs the actual spawn (replicating the relevant parts of Pi's own local-shell contract — the exact command string via a shell, `cwd`, `env`, and streamed output — since the supervisor is a plumbing process in this codebase's own language, not a caller of Pi's internal TypeScript helper; T03 must document exactly which local-shell semantics it reproduces and cite pinned Pi's own local-execution behavior as the reference it is matching). + +**Supervisor-crash safety — a kernel-enforced relationship between shell lifetime and lock lifetime, not merely moving the spawn.** Making the supervisor the shell's parent removes Sequence-1-style ambiguity for the *ordinary* teardown path (the supervisor's own `wait()` is real termination evidence), but it is not yet sufficient on its own: if the supervisor itself is `SIGKILL`ed while its child shell keeps running, the supervisor's file descriptors — including its `WorktreeLock` file descriptor — close, and by default that releases the advisory lock even though the actual mutation-producing shell is still alive. The fix must be kernel-enforced, not merely a longer-lived process tree. + +Inspecting the actual implementation (`cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/worktree_lock.rs`) confirms the smallest sound mechanism is available without inventing anything new: `WorktreeLock` wraps a `std::fs::File` and calls `.try_lock()` / `.unlock()` — Rust's standard-library file-locking API, backed on Unix by `flock(2)`. `flock(2)` locks attach to the *open file description*, not to a specific file descriptor number or a specific process: any file descriptor that is a `dup()` of, or is inherited across `fork()`/`exec()` from, the descriptor that took the lock refers to the *same* open file description and therefore holds the *same* lock — the OS releases the lock only once every such descriptor, in every process that holds one, is closed. This is exactly the "smallest sound Unix mechanism" the codebase already has ready to use, chosen instead of inventing a new fencing primitive: + +```text +supervisor acquires WorktreeLock + -> opens/holds an fd referencing the lock file's open file + description (worktree_lock.rs's `File`) + ↓ +supervisor spawns the human shell, duplicating that same fd into +the child (dup() before exec, with FD_CLOEXEC cleared on the +duplicate so `execve` does not close it) — an ordinary, +undocumented-to-the-shell inherited file descriptor; the shell +does not need to know it exists or do anything with it + ↓ +supervisor and shell now both hold a descriptor referencing the +SAME open file description, and therefore the SAME flock + +supervisor is SIGKILLed + ↓ +supervisor's own fd closes — but the shell's inherited duplicate +is still open + ↓ +the flock is STILL HELD (this is exactly the kernel-level +guarantee flock provides across dup'd/inherited descriptors) + ↓ +any foreign coordinate() call still blocks on +ProtectedWorktree::acquire_inner exactly as it did while the +supervisor was alive; it cannot reach the marker or protocol +state regardless of whether the supervisor is alive + +the shell eventually exits (normally, or once its own real work +is done) and, absent a descendant that separately inherited and +kept the fd open (see D14), its copy of the descriptor closes + ↓ +the flock is finally released — this is the first and only +moment at which "the actual mutation producer is dead" becomes +kernel-provable + ↓ +the ExternalTaintMarker is STILL ARMED, because no process ever +ran the supervisor's finish sequence to clear it + ↓ +the very next coordinate() call on this worktree, from ANY +harness, whenever it next happens to run, observes a free lock +and a still-armed marker and runs the existing, completely +unmodified "inherited external taint" database_failure + recover +path before processing its own boundary — identical in shape to +every other kind of unresolved marker this codebase already +self-heals today; no new recovery mechanism, no listener, and no +"who finishes when the supervisor is dead" logic is required, +because the pre-existing inherited-taint self-heal already +handles exactly this shape of leftover marker +``` + +This makes the required property hold structurally rather than by any process's continued aliveness: + +```text +actual mutation producer (the shell, and any descendant that still +holds a duplicate of the lock's file descriptor) alive + => +the kernel-enforced WorktreeLock remains held, by construction, +regardless of whether the supervisor, Pi/Node, or any other +control process is alive +``` + +When the supervisor *is* still alive at the moment the shell exits (the ordinary, non-crash path), it observes that termination directly via its own `wait()`/`waitpid` on its child but does not finish until a separate kernel-owned lifetime token also reaches EOF. That token is a pipe whose read end belongs only to the supervisor and whose CLOEXEC-clear writer is inherited by the shell and ordinary descendants; the supervisor closes its own writer after spawn. It continuously consumes stdout/stderr while waiting. Only after shell termination and token EOF does it run forced recovery, `complete()`, and release, so the fd-duplicated WorktreeLock remains active throughout the descendant interval. + +**Post-spawn failure rule — no explicit unlock before lifetime completion.** Before +`Command::spawn()` succeeds, ordinary RAII cleanup is safe because no external +mutation producer exists. After successful spawn and before lifetime-token EOF, +any wait, poll, lifetime-read, stream-read, callback panic, or other +supervision failure consumes a dedicated abandonment state: the marker remains +armed and the supervisor closes/relinquishes only its own `WorktreeLock` fd +without `flock(LOCK_UN)`. The shell and descendants retain the inherited fd +for the same open file description, so the kernel keeps the flock authoritative +until the last inheritor closes it. Once that inherited lock becomes free, the +next `coordinate()` observes the armed marker and performs the existing +inherited-taint `database_failure + recover` path before proceeding. If +lifetime EOF has already been observed, ordinary unlock is safe even when +final recovery fails, but the marker remains armed. `GuardEvent::Armed` is +reported only after lifetime-token creation/configuration succeeds; a failure +there emits no event and spawns no shell. + +The fd-duplication mechanism above is Unix-specific by construction: it depends on `flock(2)` semantics attaching to the open file description and surviving `dup()`/inheritance across `fork()`/`exec()`, which is a POSIX guarantee with no Windows equivalent for `std::fs::File`'s locking primitive. The separate lifetime token uses the same ordinary Unix fd-inheritance rule: its read end is supervisor-owned and CLOEXEC, its writer is explicitly CLOEXEC-clear, and the supervisor closes its writer after spawn. EOF is positive evidence that the kernel closed the final ordinary writer reference. T03 must keep these ownership and CLOEXEC rules explicit and must not replace token EOF with shell exit, stream EOF, process enumeration, or a timeout. + +**Corrected a third time — Windows was previously and incorrectly claimed to need no lifetime protection.** An earlier version of this section stated that Pi's own `detached: process.platform !== "win32"` conditional meant "the underlying detached-survival hazard this whole section addresses does not arise on Windows in the first place," and that T03 could therefore implement "the simpler 'supervisor process tree death is sufficient' story on Windows." **This claim is false and is retracted.** `detached: false` (Node's default, and what pinned Pi passes on Windows) only controls whether Node places the child in a new process group/session on POSIX; on Windows it controls an unrelated flag (`CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP`/console allocation), and on **neither** platform does a non-detached child's lifetime become tied to its parent's lifetime by default. An orphaned child on Windows, exactly as on Unix, is simply reparented and keeps running when its parent dies — Windows has no default "kill children when parent exits" behavior any more than Unix does. "Pi does not pass `detached: true` on Windows" therefore proves nothing about what happens to the shell if the supervisor is killed on Windows; the detached-survival hazard this whole section addresses is present on **every** platform Pi's local Bash child can outlive its spawner. This is a straightforward category error (a Node.js spawn-option default was treated as an OS-enforced process-lifetime guarantee) and no revision of this plan may repeat it or an equivalent claim for any platform. + +**Chosen Windows disposition — Option B: `user_bash` is unconditionally refused on Windows; tracked-tool (`bash`/`edit`/`write`) attribution remains fully enabled there.** Implementing a real Windows process-lifetime primitive for the guard (a Windows Job Object tying the spawned shell's lifetime to a kernel object the supervisor holds, analogous in spirit to the Unix fd-duplication mechanism, or an equivalent Win32 facility) is a substantial new piece of Rust/Win32 engineering — a new dependency surface, new unsafe FFI, and new platform-specific test infrastructure — that this plan's own investigation-only scope must not invent or commit to sight-unseen (per the plan's existing discipline of deriving exact mechanisms from source inspection, not invention, at T03 time). Scoping the feature honestly instead: + +* On Windows, SCE's `user_bash` handler always takes the existing guard-establishment-failure branch already specified above (`{ result: { output: "", exitCode: 1, cancelled: false, truncated: false } }`) — unconditionally, not merely on a transient failure. `session.executeBash()` is therefore **never** called for `!`/`!!` on Windows; no shell — supervised or otherwise — is ever spawned by that path, so there is no detached-shell lifetime to track and D13's hazard cannot arise there at all. This is a hard refusal (the command never executes), not a silent un-hooking that would let the command run unguarded — the distinction the "do not merely disable handling of `user_bash`" requirement exists to enforce. +* This is chosen over disabling Pi's positive mutation attribution entirely on Windows because the hazard this section addresses is specific to `user_bash`'s detached-shell lifetime; D3–D12 (the `tool_call` fail-closed gate, the `tool_result`/`tool_execution_end` Close pairing, conservative recovery, provenance) involve no OS-level process-lifetime assumption and no evidence anywhere in T01 suggests they behave differently on Windows — they are plain JS/TS control flow inside Pi's own Node/Bun runtime, not calls into OS-specific process-lifetime primitives. Refusing only the one hazardous path (`user_bash`) and leaving the unaffected paths (`bash`/`edit`/`write` tool tracking) enabled is the smaller, more precisely targeted safe behavior; disabling all Pi attribution on Windows would be strictly more conservative than necessary and is not required once `user_bash` cannot execute unguarded. +* **Residual verification gap, not a T02 blocker:** T01's fixtures (`fixtures/NOTES.md`, "OS" row) were captured only on Linux (NixOS `x86_64`). The claim just above — that D5–D12 are platform-independent — is a reasonable inference from the mechanism (plain JS event ordering, no OS syscalls) but is not itself T01-verified on Windows. T06 must add a Windows smoke test exercising the tracked `bash`/`edit`/`write` lifecycle (at minimum `tool_call` → `tool_result` → `tool_execution_end` for a success case) before AC1/AC2 can be considered validated cross-platform; until then, Windows tracked-tool support rests on inference from source, not direct evidence, and T06's task record must say so explicitly rather than silently assuming parity with the Linux captures. +* A future PR may add real Windows lifetime protection (Job Object or equivalent) and enable guarded `user_bash` there; that work is out of scope for #278 and must not be implemented speculatively here. + +**Begin semantics — fail-closed before execution, using Pi's actual API (no `block`/`reason`), now via the supervisor.** T01 was correct that `user_bash` fires unconditionally and can intercept, but the plan's earlier text incorrectly assumed `tool_call`'s `{ block: true, reason: ... }` shape applies to it. Inspecting the pinned `0.80.6` package directly: + +* `UserBashEventResult` (`config/lib/node_modules/@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent/dist/core/extensions/types.d.ts`, ~line 771) is exactly: + ```ts + export interface UserBashEventResult { + operations?: BashOperations; + result?: BashResult; + } + ``` + There is no `block`/`reason` member; that shape belongs only to `ToolCallEventResult` (`tool_call`), a few lines above it in the same file. +* The actual consumption logic, `handleBashCommand()` in `dist/modes/interactive/interactive-mode.js` (~line 4930-4990): if the handler's returned `eventResult.result` is truthy, Pi uses it as a **full replacement** — it builds the UI/history entries from that fabricated `BashResult` and **never calls `session.executeBash()` at all**. Only when `result` is absent does Pi call `session.executeBash(command, onChunk, { excludeFromContext, operations: eventResult?.operations })`, which (`dist/core/agent-session.js`, `executeBash()`) forwards `options.operations ?? createLocalBashOperations({ shellPath })` into `executeBashWithOperations(...)` together with Pi's own `AbortSignal` (`this._bashAbortController.signal`) and streaming callback. +* `BashOperations` (`dist/core/tools/bash.d.ts`) is `exec(command, cwd, { onData, signal?, timeout?, env? }) => Promise<{ exitCode: number | null }>`. + +This gives the real mechanism for both halves of D13's fail-closed requirement, revised for the supervisor-owns-the-shell architecture: + +* **Guard cannot be established (failure or ambiguous acknowledgement):** the handler returns `{ result: { output: "", exitCode: 1, cancelled: false, truncated: false } }`. Because a truthy `result` is a full replacement, `session.executeBash()` — and therefore any real shell, supervisor-spawned or otherwise — is **never invoked**. +* **Guard established:** the handler returns `{ operations: wrappedOperations }`. `wrappedOperations.exec(command, cwd, options)` no longer calls `createLocalBashOperations()` itself; it sends `command`/`cwd`/`env` to the already-armed supervisor over the control channel, relays each streamed output chunk to the caller's `onData` as it arrives, forwards `signal`-driven cancellation and `timeout` expiry to the supervisor as explicit cancellation requests (the supervisor is what actually signals the real shell's process group, since only the supervisor holds its pid), and resolves only once the supervisor delivers the shell's real, supervisor-observed exit result — never merely once the control channel goes quiet. + +**Crash and death semantics — positive death evidence only, and an explicit, chosen policy for every process that can die mid-command; never a timeout used to infer abandonment.** + +* *Supervisor dies mid-command while the shell keeps running* (`SIGKILL`, OOM, crash): per the fd-duplication mechanism above, the `WorktreeLock` is **not** released — the shell's inherited duplicate descriptor keeps the flock held. No foreign `coordinate()` call can proceed past `ProtectedWorktree::acquire_inner` during this window, regardless of the supervisor's death. Only once the shell (and every descendant still holding a duplicate of the fd) exits does the lock free; the very next `coordinate()` call anywhere then self-heals the still-armed `ExternalTaintMarker` via the existing, unmodified inherited-taint path. No PID, timestamp, or TTL is involved at any point; the lock's eventual release, gated on the shell's own fd closing, is the positive death evidence. +* *Pi/Node dies mid-command while the shell is still running* (control-channel process, not the supervisor): **chosen policy — Option A, the supervisor continues execution.** The control channel to Pi/Node closes; the supervisor does not treat that closure as a finish signal, does not kill the shell, and does not run its finish sequence. It keeps holding the lock and marker and keeps waiting on the shell's own termination exactly as if Pi/Node were still alive. When the shell terminates, the supervisor runs its normal finish sequence (forced recover, `complete()`, release) regardless of whether anything is still listening on the (now-dead) control channel — worktree correctness never depends on a listener being present. This is chosen over Option B (the supervisor kills the shell's process group when Pi/Node dies) because killing a running human-typed command merely because the AI harness's own control process happened to crash is a surprising, destructive side effect on work the human explicitly initiated, and D13's invariant does not require it: soundness comes from the guard's lifetime tracking the shell, not from tracking Pi/Node. A future revision could still add Option B as an opt-in policy, but it is out of scope here and must not be silently assumed. +* *Ambiguous begin acknowledgement* (the extension spawns the supervisor and sends its begin request, but the process exits, the pipe breaks, or no acknowledgement arrives before the extension's own bounded wait elapses): the extension must treat this exactly as guard-establishment failure — return the `result` full-replacement, never call `session.executeBash()` — and must additionally terminate the spawned supervisor process before returning, so a supervisor that *did* acquire the lock before the acknowledgement was lost does not linger holding it (and, since no shell was spawned yet in this window, killing the supervisor here releases the lock immediately — the fd-duplication mechanism only matters once a shell exists to inherit the descriptor). This bounded wait is an availability bound on a single establishment attempt, never a staleness determination. +* *Guard finalization fails* (the forced recovery/rebaseline commit does not durably succeed): `complete()` is never called and the marker stays armed; the supervisor exits non-zero. The extension must not claim clean attribution state for the just-finished command — it surfaces the failure, but the human command's already-completed result is still returned to the user (SCE cannot un-execute a finished command); the durable, still-armed marker is what future `coordinate()` calls use to stay conservative until self-healed. +* *Abort/timeout/non-zero exit* (ordinary Pi semantics to preserve): the supervisor accepts a cancellation request from Pi/Node (from `AbortSignal` or Pi's own timeout) and signals the real shell's process group accordingly, exactly as `createLocalBashOperations()` would have — but cancelling the shell does not by itself end the guarded interval; the guard still waits for the shell's own positive termination (which a `SIGKILL` typically produces quickly, but is not assumed instantaneous) before running its finish sequence. A non-zero exit is relayed to Pi/Node like any other exit code and does not change guard behavior. + +**Exclusivity — multiple `user_bash` invocations reuse the same lock, no new admission logic.** Pi's TUI already serializes `!`/`!!` execution to one in flight at a time (T01). If a mode ever allows a second concurrent `user_bash` on the same worktree, its supervisor's own `ProtectedWorktree::acquire` simply contends on the same `WorktreeLock` as the first supervisor and, on timeout, is treated as an ordinary guard-establishment failure by the mechanism above — command refused, no execution. This requires no reference counting, no tokens, and no admission code beyond what `WorktreeLock` already does. + +**No new protocol or Quint semantics.** `database_failure`, `recover`, `Flush`, `CoordinateError::LockAcquisition`, and `CoordinateError::MarkerClearAfterCommit` are all pre-existing, actor-agnostic, and already exercised by Rust tests and MBT. This section changes *which process* spawns the human shell, *how* the OS-level lock's lifetime is made to durably imply the shell's lifetime (fd duplication, a runtime/OS-level mechanism, not a protocol one), and *what triggers* the existing recovery the runtime already performs — not what the protocol model represents. No `protocol.rs` or `spec/mutation_cursor.qnt` edit is required (see AC18). This task does not need to solve the separately deferred Bash-policy behavior for `!`/`!!` beyond this guard. + +**Extension-dispatch interception is an accepted, permanent limitation — not a hole this plan closes.** T01's own evidence (`handleBashCommand()`) establishes that Pi consumes exactly one `user_bash` handler's result — the first one that returns a truthy `operations` or `result` — not a chain where every registered extension's handler runs in sequence the way `tool_execution_start`/`tool_call` do for tool calls (D5). If any other registered Pi extension's `user_bash` handler runs ahead of SCE's and itself returns a result, Pi never invokes SCE's handler at all: no supervisor is spawned, no `WorktreeLock` is acquired, no `ExternalTaintMarker` is armed, and the human command executes with no guard from SCE. + +**Corrected — SCE does not attempt to close this by contesting Pi's dispatch order.** Earlier drafts of this section proposed closing this gap with an SCE-hosted Pi launcher that would own `ResourceLoader` construction (`extensionFactories`/`extensionsOverride`), normalize the resolved extension array to guarantee SCE is first and present exactly once (`sceEnforceExtensionOrder`), and ship a `sce pi` entry point or PATH-shadowing wrapper to get sessions into that launcher. That direction is retracted as a deliberate product decision, not merely deprioritized: + +* SCE does not redistribute Pi, bundle a JS/Bun runtime, or embed Pi's SDK. Pi remains an independently installed, independently launched dependency. +* There is no SCE-hosted Pi process, no `sce pi` command, and no launcher-owned `ResourceLoader`. +* SCE does not claim, prove, or test that its extension is first or unique in Pi's runtime extension array. `sceEnforceExtensionOrder`, the canonical-inline-factory-identity mechanism, and the disk-duplicate-removal normalization described in earlier drafts of this section do not exist and are not built. +* The supported product path remains exactly: `sce setup --pi` installs the generated extension; the user runs ordinary `pi`; Pi auto-discovers SCE like any other extension. + +**The guarantee this task actually provides:** + +```text +SCE user_bash handler receives event + ↓ +arm external-mutation supervisor + ↓ +receive durable Armed acknowledgement + ↓ +only then authorize exec + ↓ +supervisor owns actual shell execution and lifetime guard + ↓ +finish forces database_failure + recover before guard completion +``` + +When SCE's `user_bash` handler is the one Pi invokes, every guarantee elsewhere in this section holds: the guard is durably established before any shell runs, `Armed` alone never authorizes execution, and the supervisor's own lifetime-tracking and forced recovery govern the guarded interval end to end, regardless of which process (Pi/Node, the supervisor, or the shell) dies and when. + +**The explicit limitation this task accepts, not solves:** + +```text +A competing Pi extension may consume user_bash before SCE. +SCE cannot guard an event Pi never dispatches to it. +This configuration is outside the user_bash safety guarantee. +``` + +This limitation is specific to `user_bash` extension-dispatch interception. It does not weaken mutation-attribution semantics for ordinary tracked Pi tools (`bash`/`edit`/`write`, D3–D12), which are gated on SCE actually receiving Pi's `tool_call` event for that call, not on SCE's position in the extension array — Pi calls every registered extension's `tool_call` handler in registration order (D5), so a later extension cannot prevent SCE's own `tool_call` handler from running the way `user_bash`'s first-handler-wins dispatch can. This limitation also must never become a runtime self-disable mechanism for tracked-tool attribution: whether another extension might also see `user_bash` first has no bearing on whether `bash`/`edit`/`write` Start/Close is established when SCE's own `tool_call` handler runs. + +`sce doctor`/`sce setup --pi` may optionally report, as human-readable diagnostic information only, that another extension is configured in a way that could intercept `user_bash` ahead of SCE under naive on-disk resolution. This is informational only: it is never a prerequisite for installing or using the Pi integration, and a clean report is never treated as proof that `user_bash` will actually reach SCE for a given session. + +**Preserving the disk integration.** `sce setup --pi` generates and installs `.pi/extensions/sce/index.ts` exactly as it always has. A normal `pi` invocation discovers it like any other project extension, with no wrapper, launcher, or additional installation step. + +### D14 — Detached descendants remain an explicit limitation + +A foreground Pi Bash tool can potentially launch a child process that survives the Bash tool's own completion. If the pinned Pi runtime provides no structured lifecycle proving all descendants are dead, `tool_execution_end` cannot prove that a self-detached descendant has stopped mutating. + +For the D13 `user_bash` guard specifically, foreground-shell lifetime is not external-mutation lifetime. The supervisor creates a dedicated Unix pipe before spawning: its read end remains with the supervisor, its writer is explicitly CLOEXEC-clear, the shell inherits that writer, and ordinary descendants inherit it under normal Unix fd inheritance. The supervisor closes its own writer after spawn. It does not recover, clear the marker, or release the real WorktreeLock at foreground-shell exit. It waits for shell termination **and** kernel-observable lifetime-token EOF; EOF proves that no ordinary inheritor still owns the token. The final tree is then observed and the existing forced `database_failure + recover` composition runs while the supervisor still owns the ProtectedWorktree. Only durable recovery is followed by marker clear and normal WorktreeLock drop. + +This improves the ordinary `cmd &`, `nohup`, or `disown` case without parsing Bash or enumerating processes. The explicit residual limitation remains: a descendant that deliberately closes the inherited lifetime token (or execs into a program that closes non-standard inherited descriptors) can continue mutating after EOF and escape tracking. The supervisor cannot distinguish that deliberate close from genuine completion; output streams are not used as the safety oracle, and their post-token finalization is bounded. This is accepted and documented, not hidden or solved by a TTL. + +**Windows scoping.** On Windows, `user_bash` is unconditionally refused (D13's corrected Windows disposition) — no shell is ever spawned via that path, so no descendant question arises for `user_bash` there at all. The general, platform-independent D14 rule above (a foreground Pi tool's own tracked Bash call can launch a surviving descendant) is unchanged and unaffected by this correction, since it concerns `tool_call`-mediated `bash`, not `user_bash`, and `tool_call`'s lifecycle is not part of D13's Windows carve-out. + +### T01 evidence corrections (adopted into this design) + +T01 (`cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/NOTES.md`) froze the pinned Pi `0.80.6` lifecycle and found two load-bearing corrections to this design's original text, both incorporated above: + +```text +1. tool_execution_start is pre-gate telemetry, not execution evidence. + tool_result proves execution occurred. + tool_execution_end without a preceding tool_result means the tool + never executed and requires abandon, never Close. (D5, D6, D7) + +2. user_bash can execute concurrently with an active Pi agent tool. + The overlapping interval requires a durable, worktree-wide + external-mutation guard whose lifetime spans the entire human + command — not merely a fence armed before it begins — implemented + by holding the existing per-worktree WorktreeLock/ExternalTaintMarker + for that whole interval, so no part of it can ever become part of + a later confirmed scope's positive attribution, for Pi's own scopes + or any other harness's. (D13) +``` + +Neither finding is a failure of the overall Pi integration approach; both are exactly the kind of refinement T01 exists to surface. Neither weakens the soundness contract: `tool_call`'s fail-closed gate (D3), the confirmation-required design (D4), and conservative recovery (D8–D10) are unchanged. Neither requires a `protocol.rs` or `spec/mutation_cursor.qnt` edit — D5–D7 are adapter-internal (T03) event re-keying, and D13 reuses the already-existing, already-proven `ProtectedWorktree`/`WorktreeLock`/`ExternalTaintMarker`/`database_failure`/`recover` primitives unchanged, held for a longer, explicitly-terminated interval instead of a single boundary (see AC18). T01 itself remains complete and unchanged; see its completed task record below. + +## Acceptance criteria + +- [x] AC1: Exact lifecycle evidence exists for Pi `0.80.6`, covering `tool_call`, `tool_execution_start`, `tool_execution_end`, `tool_result`, blocking, handler failure, tool failure, interruption, session lifecycle, process death, model observation, extension ordering, and concurrency — including the frozen `tool_execution_start`-before-`tool_call` ordering and the `tool_result`-gates-execution rule (D5/D6/D7). + - Validate: satisfied by T01's committed fixtures/report (`cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/`) with exact Pi version, upstream commit, environment, and event sequences; `/validate` re-confirms this AC against the final implementation, not merely against T01's evidence. +- [x] AC2: `bash`, `edit`, and `write` each establish one independently identified Pi mutation scope before their mutation-capable execution begins. + - Validate: adapter tests plus live/runtime fixtures. +- [x] AC3: `read`, `grep`, `find`, `ls`, `user_bash`, and representative unknown/custom tools create no Pi mutation scope. + - Validate: zero-footprint classification and runtime tests. +- [x] AC4: failure to establish a tracked Pi Start blocks the tool before execution. + - Validate: live probe where the adapter fails and an observable filesystem mutation never occurs. +- [x] AC5: a Pi scope cannot create positive mutation attribution until its own confirming post-execution Close, where Close is keyed on the `tool_result`-then-`tool_execution_end` pairing (D6), never on raw `tool_execution_end`. + - Validate: Rust protocol tests plus Quint Pi confirmation-required cases. +- [x] AC6: an unconfirmed Pi scope suppresses positive attribution at Claude, Codex, OpenCode, Pi, and Flush boundaries. + - Validate: protocol/MBT/Quint cross-harness tests. +- [x] AC7: a confirming Pi Close (the D6 `tool_result`-then-`tool_execution_end` pairing) can produce `AiExclusive(Pi)` when it is the only safe live scope and `AiContended` when overlapping confirmation-safe scopes remain. + - Validate: Rust/Quint reachability tests. +- [x] AC8: an earlier extension or SCE bash policy rejecting a tool before SCE Start creates no scope; a later extension rejecting after SCE Start cannot create positive attribution and is eventually conservatively recovered. A later-extension rejection after a successful SCE Start produces `tool_execution_end` with no preceding `tool_result` for that `toolCallId` (D7); the adapter must abandon, never Close, on that exact signal. + - Validate: pinned-runtime ordering fixtures plus adapter/runtime regression; fixtures assert the exact `tool_execution_end`-without-`tool_result` pairing, not a broader heuristic. +- [x] AC9: a tracked tool that executes and then reports `isError` still produces `tool_result` (proving execution occurred, per D6) and observes its final Git tree through the same `tool_result`-gated terminal boundary as success. + - Validate: partial-mutation-then-error regression. +- [x] AC10: simultaneous or overlapping Pi calls remain separate scopes and terminal cleanup of one never implicitly retires another. + - Validate: concurrency adapter/runtime test. +- [x] AC11: a lost or failed terminal boundary cannot later be replayed as if its observation happened at recovery time. + - Validate: injected terminal seam failure followed by another filesystem mutation; recovery must discard/rebaseline the ambiguous interval instead of attributing it. +- [x] AC12: stale-process cleanup requires positive process-death evidence and never uses TTL, age, session identity, or ActorKind alone. + - Validate: live-owner vs dead-owner durable-state tests. +- [x] AC13: Pi Start provenance stores canonical `pi_` plus the exact observed normalized model, or `NULL` when unavailable. + - Validate: real repository Agent Trace DB and final Agent Trace regressions. +- [x] AC14: existing Pi Bash policy, conversation tracing, edit/write diff tracing, generated extension installation, and doctor behavior remain intact. + - Validate: existing Pi/config-lib tests, setup smoke, doctor smoke, and generated-output validation. +- [x] AC15: only confirmed exclusive Pi evidence reaches `mutation_ai_patch`; blocked, ambiguous, unconfirmed, abandoned, custom/unknown, and recovery intervals do not. + - Validate: real Git/DB production-path tests. +- [x] AC16: cross-harness Pi overlap obeys the generalized mutation protocol, at minimum Pi+Claude, Pi+Codex, Pi+OpenCode. + - Validate: production-path tests against the OpenCode adapter already present in the stacked base (see **Stack and base**), plus Rust/Quint cross-harness tests. +- [x] AC17: no new Agent Trace schema or mutation-trace SQL migration is introduced. + - Validate: baseline diff over schema/migration paths is empty. +- [x] AC18: the protocol/Quint semantic change is limited to adding the Pi case to the already-generalized confirmation-required predicate. This also covers D13's external-mutation guard: it reuses the existing `ProtectedWorktree`/`WorktreeLock`/`ExternalTaintMarker`/`database_failure`/`recover` primitives unchanged, held for a longer, explicitly-terminated interval whose lifetime is anchored to the actual shell process (via the supervisor spawning it directly and, on Unix, fd-duplicating the lock into it), and adds no new protocol.rs or Quint code; the new long-lived supervisor invocation the mechanism requires (T03) lives in the runtime/ingress layer (`cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/`, `cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs`), outside this baseline-diff scope entirely. + - Validate: targeted baseline diff over `protocol.rs`, `spec/mutation_cursor.qnt`, its documentation, and MBT/refinement surface, showing only Pi-shaped additions. +- [x] AC19: on every platform where guarded Pi `user_bash` attribution is supported, every mutation performed by a `user_bash` execution occurs inside one worktree-wide external-mutation guard whose lifetime spans the entire lifetime of the actual shell process (not the supervisor's, and not the control channel's), and no AI boundary can make any part of that guarded interval positively attributable, for any live harness scope on that worktree (D13's corrected lifetime invariant). On Windows, where guarded `user_bash` attribution is explicitly unsupported for this PR, `user_bash` is unconditionally refused rather than guarded — see the Windows-refusal bullet below — and this AC's guard-lifetime claims apply only to the Unix mechanism. + - Validate, successful guard, single write: arm the guard while a Pi scope and at least one other-harness scope (Claude, Codex, or OpenCode) are both live and mutating on the same worktree; let the human command execute and mutate; end the guard; then trigger a boundary from the *other* harness's scope (not Pi's own) and assert the forced recovery abandons every live worktree scope before that boundary is evaluated, that neither scope reaches `AiExclusive`/`AiContended` over the guarded interval, and that the interval is excluded from `mutation_ai_patch` (matching AC15). + - Validate, the mid-command race: with the guard active and a human write already made (write #1), have a foreign harness's boundary attempt to run *while the guard is still active* and assert it does not proceed — it observes `CoordinateError::LockAcquisition` (or the adapter's own conservative retry-later handling of it) and neither reads, mutates, nor clears any protocol or taint state; let a second human write occur (write #2) before the guard ends; end the guard; assert both writes remain excluded from positive AI attribution and no live scope reached `AiExclusive`/`AiContended` for any part of the interval spanning either write. + - Validate, supervisor dies while the shell is still running (Unix): after the guard is armed and the shell has produced at least one write, `SIGKILL` the supervisor process directly while the shell keeps running; assert `WorktreeLock` remains held (a concurrent foreign `coordinate()` call still blocks/fails closed with `CoordinateError::LockAcquisition`, exactly as if the supervisor were alive) for as long as the shell (or a descendant holding the duplicated fd) is alive; let the shell make a second write and then exit; assert the lock frees only once the shell exits, that `ExternalTaintMarker` is still armed at that point, and that the very next `coordinate()` call on that worktree — from any harness — self-heals via the existing unmodified inherited-taint path before processing its own boundary; assert both writes remain excluded from positive AI attribution. + - Validate, Pi/Node dies while the shell is still running: kill the Pi/Node control-channel process while the guard is active and the shell is still running; assert the supervisor does not treat this as a finish signal, does not kill the shell, and keeps holding the lock/marker; let the shell make a further write and then exit normally; assert the supervisor still runs its normal finish sequence (forced recover, `complete()`, release) with nothing listening on the dead control channel, and that every write remains excluded from positive AI attribution. + - Validate, Windows refusal: on Windows, invoke `user_bash`; assert the handler unconditionally returns the `result` full-replacement (never `operations`), that `session.executeBash()` is never called, that no shell — supervised or otherwise — is ever spawned, and that the command's own exit/output is never delivered because it never ran; assert a concurrently live Pi `bash`/`edit`/`write` tracked-tool scope on the same Windows worktree is unaffected and can still separately reach `AiExclusive`/`AiContended` normally, proving the refusal is scoped to `user_bash` alone and does not disable tracked-tool attribution. +- [x] AC20: after a `user_bash`-guarded interval ends and its forced recovery/rebaseline durably succeeds, a fresh, uninterfered-with Pi scope — and a fresh scope from any other harness whose boundary was deferred by the guard — can still reach `AiExclusive` (D13). + - Validate: guard, recover (abandoning the live scope(s) and rebaselining), then run a clean tracked Pi tool to completion with no further interference; assert it reaches `AiExclusive` and lands in `mutation_ai_patch`. Also validate that a foreign-harness boundary that was deferred (AC19's mid-command-race case) succeeds normally once retried after the guard ends, and that a boundary deferred by the supervisor-death self-heal case above also succeeds normally once retried. +- [x] AC21: if the worktree external-mutation guard cannot be durably established, the underlying Bash execution is never invoked, and the supervisor — not Pi/Node — is confirmed to be the process that actually spawns the real shell once the guard is established. + - Validate: inject a guard-establishment failure (lock-acquisition timeout, marker-persistence failure, or spawn failure) while a Pi scope (and, in at least one variant, an other-harness scope) is live on the worktree; assert the `user_bash` handler returns Pi's `result` full-replacement (never `operations`), that no real shell is ever spawned by either Pi/Node or a supervisor, that an observable shell mutation never occurs, and that the live scope(s) are unaffected because no human mutation was ever introduced. + - Validate, ambiguous begin acknowledgement: have the supervisor durably acquire the lock and arm the marker while the caller's acknowledgement is lost or delayed past its bound, before any shell has been spawned; assert the command is still blocked (never executed on an uncertain result) and that the caller terminates the orphaned supervisor process so the lock is promptly released (no shell exists yet to hold a duplicated fd in this window); assert a later boundary on that worktree conservatively recovers/rebaselines it anyway — an accepted false negative (unnecessary abandonment), never a safety violation. + - Validate, guard finalization failure: force the forced-recovery commit at guard-finish time to fail; assert `complete()` is never called, the marker remains armed, and the supervisor reports failure without claiming clean attribution; assert the next boundary on that worktree self-heals via the existing inherited-taint recovery path. + - Validate, the real shell's parent is the supervisor: assert the spawned shell process's parent pid is the supervisor's pid (not Pi/Node's), confirming Pi/Node's wrapped `exec()` never itself calls `createLocalBashOperations()`/spawns a shell once a guard exists. +- [x] AC22: `sce setup --pi` installs SCE's canonical generated Pi extension, and a normal `pi` invocation loads it via ordinary auto-discovery and uses it for tracked-tool (`bash`/`edit`/`write`) mutation attribution and for guarded `user_bash` handling whenever Pi actually delivers those events to SCE's handlers. SCE does not claim, prove, or test authority over third-party Pi extension ordering. A third-party extension that consumes `user_bash` before SCE is a documented, accepted boundary of the external-mutation-guard guarantee (D13), not a defect this AC requires closing. + - Validate: in a scratch repository, run `sce setup --pi`, launch ordinary `pi` (no wrapper, no launcher, no alternate entry point), execute a tracked `bash`/`edit`/`write` tool call, and confirm the corresponding Start/Close reaches `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` and produces `AiExclusive` attribution when it is the only live scope; separately, invoke `!`/`!!` `user_bash` and confirm SCE's guard establishes and the command executes only through the supervisor. Then register a second extension ahead of SCE in `.pi/settings.json` whose own `user_bash` handler returns a result; assert Pi never dispatches that `user_bash` event to SCE (no guard-establishment attempt occurs), and record this as the documented, accepted limitation rather than a failure — confirm tracked `bash`/`edit`/`write` attribution for the same session is unaffected, since it does not depend on SCE's position in the extension array. +- [x] AC23: control-process death (Pi/Node) never terminates or truncates a running human `user_bash` command, and never causes the guard to end before the actual shell terminates (D13's chosen Option A policy). + - Validate: kill the Pi/Node process at several points during a running `user_bash` command (before any output, mid-stream, after the shell has already exited but before the supervisor's finish sequence completes) and assert in every case that the shell is never signaled by the supervisor as a result of the control-channel closing, that the guard's finish sequence runs only once the shell itself terminates, and that the shell's own exit code/output — while now undeliverable to the dead Pi/Node process — does not affect worktree correctness. + +### Full validation + +Run from the repository's prescribed Nix environment. + +```text +nix run .#quint -- typecheck spec/mutation_cursor.qnt +nix run .#quint -- test spec/mutation_cursor.qnt +nix build .#checks.x86_64-linux.mutation-trace-quint-connect + +nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml pi_mutation_scope +nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml mutation_trace +nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml hooks:: + +nix run nixpkgs#bun -- test config/lib + +nix run .#pkl-check-generated +nix flake check +git diff --check +``` + +Also verify that the baseline diff introduces no mutation-trace schema migration: + +```text +git diff -- \ + config/schema/agent-trace.schema.json \ + cli/migrations/agent-trace-repository/ +``` + +Expected: empty. `` is `opencode-mutation-scope-integration` (#276 head) for as long as that PR remains open — see **Stack and base**. + +### Context sync + +Expected durable-context impact: + +```text +context/cli/mutation-scope-hook-ingress.md +context/cli/mutation-scope-runtime.md +context/cli/mutation-scope-provenance.md +context/cli/mutation-trace-protocol.md +context/cli/mutation-trace-external-taint.md +context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md +context/sce/agent-trace-hooks-command-routing.md +context/architecture.md +context/context-map.md +context/glossary.md +context/overview.md +spec/mutation_cursor.md +``` + +Pi generation/setup ownership documentation should be updated only where mutation-scope behavior materially changes the existing extension contract. + +Each completed task must finish context synchronization as `synced` before the next task begins. + +## Task context synchronization lifecycle + +Persist this field in every plan; this is durable plan state, not chat state: + +- **Task context synchronization:** every task carries `pending | synced | blocked`. + A completed task must be `synced` before another task can start or the plan can + finish. +- For `blocked`, record **Blocker**, **Required action**, and **Retry condition** + beside the status. Never infer `synced` from conversation history; write every + lifecycle transition to the plan file. + +## Constraints and non-goals + +- **In scope:** pinned Pi lifecycle evidence (`cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/`); + the Pi mutation-scope adapter (`cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/`) and + its hidden `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` route; adding the Pi case to the + existing confirmation-required protocol predicate and its Quint/MBT + scenarios; Pi scope identity and durable adapter state; conservative + recovery/stale-process handling; Pi provenance; existing Pi extension wiring + (`config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.ts`); generated extension parity; + setup/doctor preservation; production Git/DB/Agent Trace regressions; + cross-harness attribution tests against the Claude, Codex, and OpenCode + adapters already present in the stacked base. +- **Out of scope:** redesigning the generic mutation runtime; a new mutation + protocol; Agent Trace schema changes; mutation-trace SQL migrations; + arbitrary custom-tool capability inference; comprehensive attribution for + third-party custom Pi tools; implementing a native Pi subagent framework; + changing conversation-trace or diff-trace semantics; redesigning Pi Bash + policy; policy support for `!` / `!!` unless required for attribution + soundness; parsing Bash to detect detached descendants; upgrading Pi; + refactoring Claude/Codex/OpenCode adapters merely to deduplicate Pi code; + **redoing the OpenCode confirmation-required generalization** — that is + PR #276's work, which this plan's stacked base already supplies rather than + reimplements; **an SCE-hosted Pi launcher, a `sce pi` command, Pi SDK + embedding, or any mechanism claiming SCE is first or unique in Pi's own + runtime extension array** (retracted — see D13; SCE does not redistribute + Pi, and the supported product path is `sce setup --pi` followed by an + ordinary `pi` invocation); npm/Nix/Flatpak release-packaging changes to + bundle Pi, a JS/Bun runtime, or Pi's `node_modules`. +- **Constraints:** PR #276's commits must remain an ancestor of this branch + for as long as #278 is stacked on it (see the stack invariant in **Stack + and base**); no Pi package upgrade; attribution safety outranks preserving attribution coverage; do not + resolve an uncertain lifecycle by broadening positive AI attribution; reuse + `ActorKind::Pi` / `"actor_kind":"pi"`, already accepted by the generic + ingress; production adapter code reaches mutation semantics only through the + existing `hooks::mutation_scope` ingress seam, never a second `coordinate()` + path; the adapter-state lock is never held across a `hooks::mutation_scope` + invocation. +- **Non-goal:** treating `AiExclusive(Pi)` as proof no human edited the + worktree; inferring staleness from `ActorKind::Pi`, TTL, or age; replaying an + old Close at recovery time; a long-lived Pi "session" or "agent" scope; a + Bash-text detached-process detector; proving or testing that SCE's + extension is unavoidable in Pi's dispatch order — a competing Pi extension + that consumes `user_bash` before SCE is an accepted, documented limitation + of the external-mutation-guard guarantee (D13), not a defect future work is + expected to close. + +## Assumptions + +- Task numbering follows T01..T06 as given in the original change request, one + task per design-and-acceptance slice already scoped above. +- File and command naming (`cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/`, + `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope`) follows the existing `claude_mutation_scope` / + `codex_mutation_scope` and `claude-mutation-scope` / `codex-mutation-scope` + precedent exactly, per repository convention. + +## Task stack + +- [x] T01: `Freeze Pi mutation lifecycle evidence` (status:done) + - Task ID: T01 + - Scope: In — probing the exact SCE-pinned Pi `0.80.6` runtime and committing + reproducible evidence under `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/`, + recording Pi package version, upstream tag/commit, OS/platform, runtime + mode, test configuration, and extension ordering. Out — writing any + adapter, protocol, or extension code. + - Dependencies: none + - Done when: every load-bearing assumption in D1–D14 has a recorded + disposition — `PROVEN`, `PROVEN-BY-PINNED-SOURCE`, `DOCUMENTED — NON-LOAD-BEARING`, + or `UNSUPPORTED` — covering at minimum: bash success/non-zero + failure/timeout/abort/partial-mutation-then-failure; write success/failure; + edit success/failure; `tool_call` ordering including handler block/throw + and SCE Start failure; earlier-extension-blocks-before-SCE and + later-extension-blocks-after-SCE-Start; `tool_execution_start` ordering; + `tool_execution_end` success/`isError`; `tool_result` success/`isError`; + whether blocked calls receive execution/result events; multiple/overlapping + tool calls and two Pi processes on one checkout; session + startup/resume/fork/reload/switch/shutdown, `agent_end`, `agent_settled`, + hard process termination; model available/switch/missing at `tool_call`; + `user_bash` (`!`/`!!`) and whether it can overlap an active agent tool; + custom read-only/mutating tools and built-in-name replacement; a foreground + Bash tool spawning a detached descendant. Probe A (Start transport failure + proves fail-closed block with no execution and no filesystem side effect), + Probe B (later-extension rejection after a successful SCE Start proves no + positive attribution is possible while the scope is unconfirmed), and + Probe C (exact `tool_call`/`tool_execution_start`/`tool_execution_end`/`tool_result` + ordering for both success and mutate-then-fail) are explicitly load-bearing + and must each have recorded evidence. The plan may not proceed to T02 if + `tool_call` cannot reliably block before mutation execution, no sound + confirming post-execution boundary exists, later-extension rejection + invalidates the confirmation-required design, Pi user Bash can overlap AI + execution in a way the current protocol cannot soundly distinguish, or + process/recovery semantics cannot conservatively preserve false-positive + safety — any such finding requires revising this plan rather than + weakening attribution. + - Verify: replay/inspect committed captures and compare every load-bearing + claim with upstream Pi `v0.80.6` source. + - Completed: 2026-09-11 + - Files changed: `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/NOTES.md`; + `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/captures/{bash-success,bash-nonzero,bash-detached,write-success,edit-success,readonly-footprint,customtool,parallel,probeA-block,probeA-throw,probeB-later-block,probeC-order-throw,sigint,sessioninfo}.jsonl`; + `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/probe-plugins/{capture,customtool,order-first,order-last,order-last-fault,sessioninfo}.ts` + (21 new files; no other paths touched). + - Result: every load-bearing D1–D14 assumption plus Probes A/B/C now has a + recorded disposition against pinned Pi `0.80.6` (installed at + `config/lib/node_modules/@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent`, no upstream Git + clone available in this sandbox, so citations are against the pinned + package's own compiled `dist/` and shipped `docs/`, per NOTES.md's + "Pinned versions" section). Probing used an isolated `HOME`-redirected + scratch environment with only `auth.json`/`models-store.json` copied in; + the operator's real `~/.pi/agent/sessions/` count (226) was confirmed + unchanged before and after. Twelve of fourteen D-items and all three + probes are `PROVEN` or `PROVEN-BY-PINNED-SOURCE`; two are `DOCUMENTED — + NON-LOAD-BEARING` (D4, folded into D3 for Pi's simpler single-gate shape). + **Two load-bearing corrections to the plan's own text were found and must + be adopted before T02 implements anything:** + (1) **D5/D6 correction:** `tool_execution_start` fires unconditionally + *before* `tool_call` for every registered extension (confirmed directly + against `docs/extensions.md`'s documented lifecycle order and live in + `bash-success.jsonl`/`probeC-order-throw.jsonl`), so it carries no + evidentiary value for "execution began" and cannot back the plan's + `AwaitingExecution` state as literally written. The sound substitute, + proven in every capture, is `tool_result`: present if and only if the + tool's `execute()` body actually ran, absent whenever `tool_call` blocked + or threw. `tool_execution_end` fires unconditionally (even on a blocked + call) and is only a valid Close when a `tool_result` for the same + `toolCallId` was already observed; a `tool_execution_end` with no + preceding `tool_result` is D7's abandon signal instead. This is a + mechanical re-keying, not a soundness weakening — D3's fail-closed gate + and D6's success/isError Close treatment are otherwise intact once keyed + on `tool_result`. + (2) **D13 triggers the plan's own stated stop condition:** `!`/`!!` + `user_bash` is TUI-only and unreachable from one-shot probing, but + `interactive-mode.js`'s `handleBashCommand()` shows `session.executeBash(...)` + is called unconditionally regardless of `session.isStreaming` — the + streaming flag only affects where output is displayed, not whether the + command runs. **User Bash can execute concurrently with an active Pi + agent tool call.** Per the plan's own D13 text ("If it can, the plan must + stop and add a sound explicit unscoped/taint boundary before T02"), this + is a required new T02+ design item: ensuring a `user_bash` mutation + overlapping a live, unconfirmed Pi scope can never be folded into that + scope's attribution once it confirms. This is additive, not a + contradiction of D1–D12, but it is not yet written into any T02–T06 task + body's "Done when" bullets. + Full per-assumption evidence, citations, and the disposition/capture + tables are in `fixtures/NOTES.md`; nothing in either finding invalidates + `tool_call`'s reliability as a fail-closed gate, the existence of a sound + confirming Close, the confirmation-required design itself, or conservative + recovery — so this is not a whole-plan re-planning gate, but neither + finding may be silently absorbed into T02 without updating T02's (and + likely T04's) task body to name the `tool_result`-keyed state machine and + the D13 taint/fence obligation explicitly. **Before approving T02, the + plan's D5/D6 text and T02/T04's task bodies should be revised to reflect + these two corrections; T02 as currently worded still describes the + unrevised `tool_execution_start`-keyed design and omits the D13 fence + requirement.** + - Verify outcome: fixtures replayed and cross-checked against the pinned + package's `docs/extensions.md` lifecycle diagram and `tool_call`/ + `tool_execution_start` section text directly (not merely against the + subagent's summary) — confirmed the documented order is + `tool_execution_start` before `tool_call`, matching every capture. + Spot-checked `probeA-block.jsonl`/`probeB-later-block.jsonl` event + sequences and confirmed no credentials or operator session data leaked + into committed captures. Probe-plugin sources confirmed comment-free per + repository convention. Working-tree diff confirmed limited to the 21 + fixture files listed above; plan file and all other paths untouched by + the research work itself. + - Context impact: durable-context classification `pending-review` — this + finding materially affects the plan's own Design section (D5, D6, D13) + and T02/T04's task bodies, which is plan content, not the five root + context files; no root context file (`architecture.md`, `context-map.md`, + `glossary.md`, `overview.md`, `spec/mutation_cursor.md`) is affected by an + evidence-only task with zero adapter/protocol code. The Task context + synchronization phase should confirm this classification and record any + residual impact. + - Context synchronization: synced + +- [x] T02: `Make Pi a confirmation-required protocol actor` (status:done) + - Task ID: T02 + - Scope: In — adding the Pi case to the existing generalized confirmation + predicate (`ClaudeCode -> false`, `Codex -> true`, `OpenCode -> true`, + `Pi -> true`; the Codex and OpenCode entries already exist in the stacked + base — see **Stack and base** — so this task's actual diff is adding Pi) in + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/protocol.rs`, + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/tests.rs`, + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/`, `spec/mutation_cursor.qnt`, and + `spec/mutation_cursor.md`; adding explicit Pi scenarios (`Start(Pi A)` + + mutation + another actor's boundary => `IneligibleUnscoped`; `Start(Pi A)` + + mutation + `Close(Pi A)` => `AiExclusive(A)`; `Start(Pi A)` + `Start(Claude B)` + + mutation + `Close(Pi A)` => `AiContended`; `Start(Pi A)` + `Start(Codex B)` + + mutation + `Close(Pi A)` => `IneligibleUnscoped` until Codex B confirms). + Also proves, via new Rust regression tests only in + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/tests.rs` (no `protocol.rs`/Quint semantic + change — see D13/AC18), that the existing generic + `database_failure`/`external_taint`/`recover` mechanism composes correctly + with `Pi -> true`: a live Pi scope on a worktree that becomes externally + tainted is abandoned by `recover`, never confirmed, and a fresh Pi scope + started after `recover` clears the taint can still reach `AiExclusive`. + This is the generic-protocol half of the T01 D13 finding and is unchanged + by D13's corrected lifetime-guard mechanism (below): the guard changes + *which process* spawns the human shell, *how* the OS-level lock's + lifetime is made to durably track the shell's own lifetime (a supervisor + process, plus, on Unix, fd-duplicating the lock into the spawned shell — + D13), and *when* the existing `database_failure`/`recover` composition is + forced — not what that composition means at the protocol level, so this + task's Pi-actor regression already covers the load-bearing + generic-protocol claim the guard depends on. Confirmed after inspecting + the corrected D13 supervisor design: it remains pure runtime/ingress + composition of already-existing `ProtectedWorktree`/`coordinate()`/ + `database_failure`/`recover`/`Flush` primitives, the pre-existing + `CoordinateError::{LockAcquisition, MarkerClearAfterCommit}` variants, and + ordinary OS process/fd mechanics (spawning a child, duplicating a file + descriptor into it) — no new field on `ProtocolState`/`ScopeState`/ + `Attribution`, no new Quint action or state component, and no + protocol-level behavior the current model does not already represent. No + mutation-cursor protocol change is needed for D13 beyond what this task + already does for `Pi -> true`. The new long-lived supervisor invocation + itself, and Pi's own call site, are T03's and T05's responsibility, not + T02's. + + **Hard precondition before any work in this task's own scope begins (added by this amendment):** both of D13's remaining blockers must already be resolved in the plan text — + ```text + D13 dispatch-admission strategy = resolved + D13 platform lifetime strategy = resolved + ``` + Both are now resolved in D13 as amended: platform lifetime is Option B + (fd-duplication on Unix, unchanged; `user_bash` unconditionally refused on + Windows with tracked-tool attribution otherwise intact); dispatch/array + admission is Option A per D13 "Corrected a fifth time" — SCE's launcher + owns `ResourceLoader` construction for the session (`createRuntime` + + `resourceLoaderOptions.extensionFactories`/`extensionsOverride`, both + confirmed first-class, publicly-exported Pi `0.80.6` constructor options, + not an invented API), so the array `ExtensionRunner` is built from is + SCE-governed, SCE-first, on every rebuild — initial load, every later + `/reload`/`AgentSession.reload()`, and every `/new`/`/resume`/`/fork` that + reuses the same `createRuntime` factory — by construction, not by a + runtime check that can itself be absent when SCE is. This supersedes and + retracts Option C ("Corrected a fourth time": launcher-refuses-to-exec + + SCE's own in-process self-check + terminate-on-newly-unsafe-reload) as + the primary proof; that design is preserved only as optional + diagnostics/defence-in-depth (see D13). Do not perform any Pi + confirmation-required protocol edit while either strategy is unresolved; + since both are resolved by this amendment, T02's own Rust/Quint work + below may proceed, but this task's own record must restate the + resolution (not silently inherit it from D13) before being marked done — + including D13's required invariant ("the authority... must exist outside, + or below, the replaceable Pi extension set... SCE's own extension cannot + be the sole watchdog for whether SCE is still present, first, or active + after an ExtensionRunner replacement") verbatim or by exact + cross-reference, not merely by section number. + + **Before this task's own Rust/Quint work is considered done, this task + must also formally freeze — mirroring how T01 froze pinned Pi lifecycle + evidence into committed fixtures, not merely into plan prose — pinned-source + evidence answering the following, citing exact files/line numbers from the + vendored `config/lib/node_modules/@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent` copy of + `0.80.6` (this amendment already located the answers below during + plan-correction research; T02 must independently re-confirm each against + the installed package and commit the citations, not merely copy this + paragraph):** + ```text + 1. Who constructs ResourceLoader? — Never AgentSession itself; it is + handed in via constructor config (agent-session.js line 132: + `this._resourceLoader = config.resourceLoader`). The caller — + `createAgentSession`/`createAgentSessionServices`/SCE's own launcher + — constructs it. + 2. Who constructs ExtensionRunner? — AgentSession._buildRuntime(), + exclusively from `this._resourceLoader.getExtensions()` + (agent-session.js lines 2002/2008). + 3. What exact array is passed to ExtensionRunner? — Exactly + `extensionsResult.extensions`, the return value of + `resourceLoader.getExtensions()`, unmodified. + 4. Can an external launcher/host provide or override that exact array? + — Yes: `DefaultResourceLoaderOptions.extensionFactories` (resource-loader.d.ts, + ~line 70; consumed unconditionally on every `reload()` via + `loadFinalExtensionSet()`, resource-loader.js lines 366-372) inserts + launcher-supplied factories independent of on-disk discovery, and + `DefaultResourceLoaderOptions.extensionsOverride` (resource-loader.d.ts + line 78; invoked unconditionally at the end of every `reload()`, + resource-loader.js line 279) lets the launcher reorder/reject the + complete final array. Both are constructor-bound to one `ResourceLoader` + instance reused unreplaced for the life of the process. + 5. Can extension discovery be disabled/frozen? — Discovery itself + (`noExtensions`) can be disabled, but freezing is unnecessary: + `extensionsOverride` governs the final array regardless of what + discovery produces, every time. + 6. What exactly does /reload rebuild? — `AgentSession.reload()` + (agent-session.js lines 2023-2034) calls `this._resourceLoader.reload()` + (the same instance, same bound options) then `_buildRuntime()`, which + rebuilds `ExtensionRunner` from that instance's `getExtensions()`. + Nothing about `/reload` replaces the `ResourceLoader` instance itself. + 7. Can /reload be disabled or intercepted outside extension handlers? — + Not disabled, and does not need to be: the launcher's bound + `extensionsOverride` intercepts every `/reload`'s result by + construction, without any extension-level hook. + 8. Can the launcher host the Pi session programmatically? — Yes: + `createAgentSession`/`createAgentSessionServices`/`createAgentSessionRuntime`/ + `createAgentSessionFromServices` are exported from the package root + (dist/index.d.ts, re-exported from sdk.ts), and Pi's own production + entry point (`dist/main.js` lines 489-598) already uses exactly this + composition, handing the result to `InteractiveMode`/`runPrintMode`/ + `runRpcMode` (also package-root-exported, dist/modes/index.d.ts) for + the actual UI. + 9. Does Pi expose an authoritative runner-construction seam? — Yes: the + `ResourceLoader` the caller supplies is that seam; `ExtensionRunner` + is always and only built from its `getExtensions()` result. + 10. What happens if SCE's own extension is absent after reload? — For a + launcher-hosted session, this cannot happen: SCE's presence and + position come from the launcher's own `extensionFactories`/ + `extensionsOverride`, never from on-disk discovery, so nothing that + mutates on-disk configuration can make SCE "absent." For a session + NOT hosted by SCE's launcher (raw `pi`, or SDK embedding bypassing + SCE's `ResourceLoader` construction), SCE's extension code, if + present at all, still cannot police its own absence — this remains + the named, permanent, unclosable "Raw Pi / SDK embedding" boundary. + 11. Which selected mechanism remains active in that case? — None; there + is no runtime mechanism inside `sce-pi-extension.ts` that this + design still depends on for soundness. The mechanism is the + launcher's `ResourceLoader` construction, which is not a member of + the extension set and therefore cannot be removed by mutating it. + ``` + **Added by this amendment — the plan's D13 "Canonical SCE runtime-instance + invariant" identified a further gap (launcher-hosted SCE loading twice, not + merely not-first) that the eleven answers above do not by themselves close. + T02 must also independently re-confirm and commit, with exact file/line + citations against the installed `0.80.6` package, evidence answering:** + ```text + 12. Does loadFinalExtensionSet() append inline factories to + already-discovered extensions, or does it replace/merge them? — + Confirm exactly (resource-loader.js, loadFinalExtensionSet(), + loadExtensionFactories() call site): this amendment's research + found an unconditional append (extensionsResult.extensions.push( + ...inlineExtensions.extensions), resource-loader.js ~lines + 366-372) — T02 re-confirms this independently rather than + inheriting it from this amendment's prose. + 13. Does Pi perform any deduplication between an extension loaded from + disk and the same factory supplied inline (by path, by name, by + factory reference, or otherwise)? — This amendment's research found + none. T02 must independently verify no such check exists anywhere + in loadFinalExtensionSet()'s call chain before relying on its + absence. + 14. What exact identity/path does a named inline factory + { name: "sce", factory } receive from loadExtensionFromFactory() + (or equivalent) — the literal Extension.path/source-identity + value, not merely "something like "? Cite the exact + source line that assigns it. + 15. What exact identity/path does the generated disk SCE extension + (/.pi/extensions/sce/index.ts) receive from on-disk + discovery, after whatever canonicalization/realpath behavior the + loader applies? Cite the exact source line. + 16. Given 14 and 15, which field is safe to use to identify only SCE's + generated compatibility copy — sufficient to exclude + .pi/extensions/sce-custom/, a foreign package merely named `sce`, + and any extension whose path/name only contains "sce"? Record the + exact predicate, not a name/basename heuristic. + 17. Confirm that extensionsOverride's `base` parameter, for a + launcher-hosted session with the generated disk copy present, does + in fact contain both the disk-discovered and the inline SCE + instances before any normalization runs — i.e. that the duplication + this amendment describes is not merely theoretical for the pinned + version. + 18. Confirm that the array extensionsOverride returns is exactly, and + only, what AgentSession._buildRuntime() passes to ExtensionRunner's + constructor — no further Pi-internal filtering, deduplication, or + reordering occurs between extensionsOverride's return and + ExtensionRunner construction. + ``` + Answers 12-18 must be recorded before T02 is marked complete, alongside + the original eleven. This amendment performs no T02 implementation work + itself — recording these seven questions is a plan-text change only; T02 + remains `todo` and answering them is T02's own task, not this amendment's. + This record replaces, not supplements, the "Also required before this + task is done" paragraph an earlier version of this task carried — that + paragraph characterized Pi's dispatch order (`resourcePrecedenceRank()`, + CLI-provided extensions unconditionally first, `extensionsOverride`'s + unconstrained power) as reasons no SCE-controllable ordering guarantee + could exist; that characterization is **retracted only as a conclusion**, + not as evidence — the underlying dispatch-order facts remain accurate and + are exactly why the launcher must own `extensionsOverride` itself rather + than merely detect what an *adversary's* `extensionsOverride` might do. + T02 must record: (i) the eleven answers above, with exact citations; (ii) + that `extensionFactories`/`extensionsOverride` are confirmed, typed, + root-exported constructor options — not invented — on the pinned + package; (iii) that a raw `pi` invocation or an SDK-embedded + `AgentSession` that does not use SCE's launcher's `ResourceLoader` + construction remains a named, permanent, worktree-unsafe external-mutator + boundary this plan does not close and must never describe as safe. This + is evidence-recording, not a protocol or Quint change, and does not + require touching Rust/TS/Quint code in this task. Out — touching + Claude/Codex/OpenCode's existing confirmation behavior; adding + session/model/process fields to protocol state; implementing the Pi Rust + hook adapter itself (T03) or the external-mutation guard/supervisor + mechanism (T03); implementing the launcher's `createRuntime`/ + `resourceLoaderOptions` wiring or the doctor detection check itself + (T05). + - Dependencies: T01 + - Done when: Rust and Quint agree that Pi needs its own confirming Close and + all existing Claude/Codex/OpenCode behavior remains unchanged; a + Pi-actor regression proves the existing external-taint/recover mechanism + abandons a tainted live Pi scope and allows a later clean Pi scope to + confirm normally, using only the already-existing + `database_failure`/`recover`/`abandon` actions; the task record states + explicitly, after inspecting T03's chosen supervisor design, that no + `protocol.rs`/Quint change is required for D13's lifetime-guard mechanism; + the task record also restates both D13 dispositions (platform lifetime = + Option B; dispatch/array admission = Option A per "Corrected a fifth + time" — SCE's launcher owns `ResourceLoader` construction via + `extensionFactories`/`extensionsOverride`, so the array `ExtensionRunner` + is built from is SCE-governed on every rebuild by construction, with no + runtime self-check or process-termination step required as the primary + proof) and confirms neither is an open/upstream-blocked question before + this task is considered done; the task record additionally restates, + verbatim or by exact cross-reference, D13's required invariant (the + safety authority must exist outside/below the replaceable Pi extension + set; SCE's own extension cannot be the sole watchdog for its own + continued presence) and the worktree-wide unsafe-mode rule (disabling + Pi's own attribution does not protect a live Claude/Codex/OpenCode + scope), and names the raw-`pi`/SDK-embedding path — now defined as any + session whose `ResourceLoader` was not constructed by SCE's launcher — + as the one permanent, worktree-unsafe boundary this plan does not close; + the task record also commits the eleven pinned-evidence answers above, + plus this amendment's seven added answers (12-18, covering inline/disk + identity, dedup absence, and the extensionsOverride/ExtensionRunner + array-consumption guarantee), with exact file/line citations + re-confirmed against the installed package, as this task's own frozen + evidence record. + - Verify: `nix run .#quint -- typecheck spec/mutation_cursor.qnt`; + `nix run .#quint -- test spec/mutation_cursor.qnt`; + `nix build .#checks.x86_64-linux.mutation-trace-quint-connect`; + `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml mutation_trace`. + - Completed: 2026-09-17 + - Files changed: `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/protocol.rs`; + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/tests.rs`; + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/model.rs`; + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/mbt/driver.rs`; + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/coordinator.rs`; + `spec/mutation_cursor.qnt`; `spec/mutation_cursor.md` (7 files; no other + paths touched). + - Result: `requires_boundary_confirmation`/`requiresBoundaryConfirmation` now + return `true` for `Pi` in both `protocol.rs` and `mutation_cursor.qnt` + (previously grouped with `ClaudeCode` under `false`); `mutation_cursor.md`'s + three confirmation-required-actor prose spots updated to name Pi + alongside Codex/OpenCode. A new mock `Scope6 -> Pi -> WT0` was added to the + Quint model (`ScopeId`, `SCOPES`, `scopeWorktree`, `scopeActor`) and the + four scenarios the task named were added as `run`s: `testUnconfirmedPiScopeBlocksCrossHarnessAttribution` + (`Start(Pi A)` + `Start(Claude B)` + mutation + `Advance(Claude B)` => + `IneligibleUnscoped`), `testPiCloseConfirmsExclusiveAttribution` + (`Start(Pi A)` + mutation + `Close(Pi A)` => `AiExclusive(A)`), + `testPiCloseConfirmsContendedAttribution` (`Start(Pi A)` + `Start(Claude B)` + + mutation + `Close(Pi A)` => `AiContended`), and + `testPiAndCodexScopesStayMutuallyUnconfirmedAtEitherClose` (`Start(Pi A)` + + `Start(Codex B)` + mutation + `Close(Pi A)` => `IneligibleUnscoped`, Codex B + still unconfirmed) — all four auto-covered by the existing `test.*` + coverage-backstop `quint_test` in `mbt/tests.rs` with no new hand-written + Rust wrapper needed, matching that backstop's documented purpose. Adding + `Scope6` exposed a real pre-existing bug in `singleScope` (line ~259): a + fixed if/else chain over `Scope0..Scope4` with a bare `else { Scope5 }` + fallback that silently mis-attributed any live set containing only + `Scope6` as `Scope5` (`AiExclusive(Scope5)` instead of `AiExclusive(Scope6)`); + the fallback is now `else if (scopes.contains(Scope5)) { Scope5 } else { + Scope6 }`. `HasPiConfirmedExclusiveEvidence`/`HasPiConfirmedContendedEvidence` + `val`s were added alongside the existing Codex/OpenCode ones. In + `tests.rs`, a `pi_scope` helper was added and a new regression, + `a_tainted_live_pi_scope_is_abandoned_by_recover_and_a_fresh_pi_scope_can_still_confirm`, + proves the existing `database_failure`/`external_taint`/`recover` + mechanism composes correctly with `Pi -> true`: a live Pi scope on an + externally-tainted worktree is abandoned by `recover` and excluded from + confirmation, and a fresh Pi scope started afterward on the + recovered worktree still reaches `AiExclusive` at its own `Close`. The MBT + driver/model (`mbt/driver.rs`, `mbt/model.rs`) were extended with the + matching `scope6`/`Scope6`/`Pi` wiring so the Quint-Connect replay harness + stays in lockstep with the mock scope partition. Making Pi + confirmation-required broke the *premise*, not the correctness, of two + pre-existing tests that had used Pi as a stand-in for "a second + non-confirmation-required actor" (the only such actor now is `ClaudeCode`): + `tests.rs`'s `two_live_non_codex_scopes_still_attribute_contention` and + `coordinator.rs`'s `contended_scopes_yield_ai_contended_same_and_different_actor` + (via its `assert_contended_attribution` helper) both drove attribution + through a boundary (`Advance` on the *other* scope) that never confirms the + Pi scope, which is now correctly `IneligibleUnscoped` rather than a bug. + Both were updated to close the confirmation-required scope directly + (`Close(pi-b)` / `RuntimeBoundary::Close` on `scope-b`) — the same shape + already proven for Codex/OpenCode elsewhere in this suite — restoring + `AiContended` coverage for a live non-required scope overlapping a + confirmed Pi scope. + + **No `protocol.rs`/Quint change is required for D13's lifetime-guard + mechanism**, after inspecting the corrected D13 supervisor design: it is + pure runtime/ingress composition of already-existing + `ProtectedWorktree`/`coordinate()`/`database_failure`/`recover`/`Flush` + primitives, the pre-existing `CoordinateError` variants, and ordinary OS + process/fd mechanics (spawning a child, duplicating a file descriptor + into it). It adds no new field to `ProtocolState`/`ScopeState`/ + `Attribution`, no new Quint action or state component, and no + protocol-level behavior the current model does not already represent — + this task's Pi-actor `database_failure`/`recover` regression already + covers the load-bearing generic-protocol claim the guard depends on + (`Pi -> true` composes soundly with the existing recovery mechanism). The + new long-lived supervisor invocation itself, and Pi's own call site, + remain T03's and T05's responsibility. + + **D13 dispositions restated (not merely inherited from D13):** platform + lifetime strategy = Option B (fd-duplication on Unix so the `WorktreeLock` + flock survives the supervisor's own death via the shell's inherited + duplicate descriptor; `user_bash` unconditionally refused on Windows, + tracked-tool attribution otherwise intact there). Dispatch/array admission + strategy = Option A per D13 "Corrected a fifth time": SCE's own launcher + owns `ResourceLoader` construction for the session via + `createRuntime`/`resourceLoaderOptions.extensionFactories`/`extensionsOverride` + (confirmed first-class, publicly-exported, typed constructor options on the + pinned package, not invented), so the exact array `ExtensionRunner` is + built from is SCE-governed, SCE-first, on every rebuild (initial load, + every `/reload`, every `/new`/`/resume`/`/fork` reusing the same + `createRuntime` factory) by construction, not by a runtime check that can + itself be absent when SCE is. Neither disposition is open or + upstream-blocked. + + **D13's required invariant, restated verbatim:** "the authority... must + exist outside, or below, the replaceable Pi extension set... SCE's own + extension cannot be the sole watchdog for whether SCE is still present, + first, or active after an ExtensionRunner replacement." The + worktree-wide unsafe-mode rule: disabling Pi's own attribution does not + protect another harness's live scope on the same worktree — for any live + Claude/Codex/OpenCode/Pi scope, not only Pi's own. The one permanent, + worktree-unsafe boundary this plan does not close is any session whose + `ResourceLoader` was not constructed by SCE's launcher — a raw `pi` + invocation, or an SDK embedding that bypasses SCE's `ResourceLoader` + construction. + + **18 pinned-evidence answers, independently re-confirmed against the + installed `config/lib/node_modules/@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent@0.80.6` + package (exact file/line citations; some line numbers differ slightly + from the amendment's approximate ones because this task re-derived them + directly rather than copying them):** + 1. `dist/core/agent-session.js:132`: `this._resourceLoader = + config.resourceLoader;` — no `??` fallback, no self-construction; + the constructor requires the caller to supply it. + 2. `dist/core/agent-session.js:2002`: `const extensionsResult = + this._resourceLoader.getExtensions();` inside `_buildRuntime()`. + 3. `dist/core/agent-session.js:2008`: `new + ExtensionRunner(extensionsResult.extensions, extensionsResult.runtime, + this._cwd, this.sessionManager, this._modelRegistry)` — exactly + `extensionsResult.extensions`, unmodified. + 4. `dist/core/resource-loader.d.ts:70` (`extensionFactories?: + InlineExtension[]`) and `:78` (`extensionsOverride?: (base: + LoadExtensionsResult) => LoadExtensionsResult`); consumed at + `dist/core/resource-loader.js:369` (inline factories pushed into the + final array inside `loadFinalExtensionSet`) and `:279` + (`this.extensionsResult = this.extensionsOverride ? + this.extensionsOverride(extensionsResult) : extensionsResult;`, + unconditional at the end of `reload()`). + 5. `noExtensions?: boolean` (`resource-loader.d.ts:71`) only gates + discovery paths (`resource-loader.js:267`, `:351`); `extensionsOverride` + still runs unconditionally at `:279` regardless, so freezing discovery + is unnecessary — `extensionsOverride` governs the final array every + time. + 6. `dist/core/agent-session.js:2023-2034` (`reload()`): calls + `this._resourceLoader.reload()` (line 2028) then `this._buildRuntime()` + (line 2029) — the same `ResourceLoader` instance, same bound options; + nothing replaces the instance itself. + 7. Not disabled, does not need to be: `extensionsOverride` (bound to the + one instance at construction) intercepts every `reload()`'s result + unconditionally at `resource-loader.js:279`, with no extension-level + hook required. + 8. `dist/index.d.ts:17` root-exports `createAgentSession`, + `createAgentSessionServices`, `createAgentSessionFromServices`, + `createAgentSessionRuntime` from `./core/sdk.ts`; `dist/main.js:501` + (`createAgentSessionServices`), `:570` + (`createAgentSessionFromServices`), `:593` + (`createAgentSessionRuntime`) show Pi's own production entry point + using exactly this composition, handing the result to + `runRpcMode`/`InteractiveMode`/`runPrintMode` (`main.js:652,655,686`), + which `dist/modes/index.d.ts:4,5,7` confirm are themselves + package-root-exported. + 9. The `ResourceLoader` the caller supplies is the only seam: + `ExtensionRunner` is always and only built from its `getExtensions()` + result (answers 1-3). + 10. For a launcher-hosted session this cannot happen (answer 1: no + fallback construction exists). For a session not hosted by SCE's + launcher, no in-extension mechanism can inspect how its own host + constructed the `ResourceLoader` it was handed. + 11. None — no runtime mechanism inside `sce-pi-extension.ts` remains + depended on; the mechanism is the launcher's `ResourceLoader` + construction itself, external to the extension set. + 12. `resource-loader.js:369`: + `extensionsResult.extensions.push(...inlineExtensions.extensions);` + inside `loadFinalExtensionSet` — an unconditional append, confirmed + not a replace/merge. + 13. `resource-loader.js:401-403`, `addExtensionConflictDiagnostics`'s own + comment: "Keep all extensions loaded. Conflicts are reported as + diagnostics, and precedence is handled by load order." No + deduplication exists anywhere in the call chain. + 14. `resource-loader.js:689`: `extensionPath = + \`\`` inside + `loadExtensionFactories`; `dist/core/extensions/loader.js:369` + (`loadExtensionFromFactory`): `createExtension(extensionPath, + extensionPath)`; `loader.js:334`: `path: extensionPath` — for `{ + name: "sce", factory }` this is exactly `` for both + `Extension.path` and `.resolvedPath`. + 15. `loader.js:345` (`loadExtension`): `resolvedPath = + resolvePath(extensionPath, cwd, { normalizeUnicodeSpaces: true })`; + `loader.js:352`: `createExtension(extensionPath, resolvedPath)` — + `.path` is the literal on-disk path string passed to discovery + (e.g. `.pi/extensions/sce/index.ts`), `.resolvedPath` is the + canonicalized absolute path. + 16. The safe predicate is exact equality of `.resolvedPath` against the + canonical absolute path of the generated file (e.g. + `path.resolve(repoRoot, ".pi/extensions/sce/index.ts")`), never a + name/basename/substring heuristic: per answers 14-15, an inline + factory's `.resolvedPath` is never a filesystem path (``) + and a foreign `sce`-named or `sce-custom` on-disk extension resolves + to a different absolute path, so exact-path equality alone + distinguishes all cases the plan named. + 17. `resource-loader.js:270` (`loadFinalExtensionSet` populates + `extensionsResult` with both disk-discovered extensions and, per + answer 12, the pushed-in inline ones) flows directly into `:279`'s + `this.extensionsOverride(extensionsResult)` — the identical object, + not a filtered subset, is `base`. + 18. `resource-loader.js:162-164`: `getExtensions() { return + this.extensionsResult; }` returns the exact value set at `:279` + verbatim; `agent-session.js:2002/2008` pass + `extensionsResult.extensions` straight into `new ExtensionRunner(...)`. + No further Pi-internal filtering, deduplication, or reordering occurs + between `extensionsOverride`'s return and `ExtensionRunner` + construction. + - Verify outcome: `nix run .#quint -- typecheck spec/mutation_cursor.qnt` + passed. `nix run .#quint -- test spec/mutation_cursor.qnt` passed all 40 + named scenarios (including the 4 new Pi ones) after the `singleScope` fix + above — first attempt surfaced the real `singleScope` bug via + `testPiCloseConfirmsExclusiveAttribution` failing with `AiExclusive(Scope5)` + instead of `AiExclusive(Scope6)`, confirmed via an `--out-itf` trace dump, + then fixed and reverified green. `nix build + .#checks.x86_64-linux.mutation-trace-quint-connect` passed. `nix develop + -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml + mutation_trace` passed 370/370 after fixing the two pre-existing tests + described above (368 passed, 2 failed on the first run for the reason + given; 370 passed, 0 failed after the fix). + - Context impact: durable-context classification `pending-review` — this is + a protocol/Quint semantic change (`Pi -> true`) plus a real spec bug fix + (`singleScope`'s fallback), but none of the five root context files + (`architecture.md`, `context-map.md`, `glossary.md`, `overview.md`, + `spec/mutation_cursor.md`) name Pi's confirmation-required status as a + fact needing correction beyond `spec/mutation_cursor.md` itself, which + this task already updated directly (it is the plan's living design + document, not a completed-task record). No other root context file + asserts Pi is non-confirmation-required. The Task context synchronization + phase should confirm this classification and record any residual impact. + - Context synchronization: synced + - Repair (post-completion review, 2026-09-17): `spec/mutation_cursor.md` + incorrectly generalized Codex/OpenCode's "post-tool signal absent on + denial" reasoning to Pi, implying Pi's terminal event is likewise absent + when execution is denied. It is not (T01 D5: the terminal event fires + unconditionally, even when Pi's own `tool_call` gate blocks or throws). + Corrected the prose to state that Pi's terminal event alone is not + execution evidence, and that only the `tool_result`-then-terminal-event + pairing (D6/D7) confirms a Pi scope — matching the implementation + unchanged. Separately, + `a_tainted_live_pi_scope_is_abandoned_by_recover_and_a_fresh_pi_scope_can_still_confirm` + was rewritten: it previously continued past `recover` by constructing a + fresh `ProtocolState::default()` and inserting the follow-up Pi scope + directly as `Active`, bypassing the real `Start` transition. It now + continues directly from `recover`'s own returned state, pre-registers the + follow-up scope as `NeverSeen` (as production seeds a scope row before + its first hook boundary), and drives it through a real `prepare`/`commit` + `Start`, an intermediate `attribution_for_boundary` check proving + `IneligibleUnscoped` before its own confirmation, and a real `Close` + reaching `AiExclusive(Pi)`. Neither repair touched + `requires_boundary_confirmation`/`requiresBoundaryConfirmation` or any + other `protocol.rs`/Quint semantics. Re-verified: `nix develop -c + ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml + mutation_trace` (370 passed, 0 failed). + +- [x] T03: `Add the Pi mutation-scope adapter` (status:done) + - Task ID: T03 + - Scope: In — `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/` and the hidden + `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` route, owning strict Pi wire parsing, + tracked/read-only/untracked classification, `ScopeId`/`EventId` + derivation, canonical `pi_` session identity, admission-time model + provenance, checkout-local attempt state (`PendingStart` -> `Executed` -> + `Closed`, with `PendingAbandon` for the existing D8 recovery bookkeeping), + `tool_call` Start, the `tool_result`-keyed `Executed` transition, and + `tool_execution_end` Close gated on that transition having already + happened (D5/D6/D7, corrected by T01). `tool_execution_start` is received + and may be surfaced as telemetry only; it drives no phase transition. + Also adds the D13 external-mutation supervisor mechanism as new, + harness-neutral runtime/ingress plumbing — not a Pi-specific route, so any + future harness with the same `user_bash`-shaped overlap can reuse it: + + * A small `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/protected_worktree.rs`/ + `coordinator.rs` refactor exposing a way to (a) acquire a + `ProtectedWorktree` and report its "armed" state to a caller without + immediately processing a boundary and completing it, and (b) later, on + that *same already-held* `ProtectedWorktree` (no second acquisition, no + window where the lock could be lost to a queued foreign waiter), force + the existing `database_failure` + `recover` composition against a + freshly observed tree and, only on a durable commit, call + `ProtectedWorktree::complete()`. Both operations reuse + `WorktreeLock`/`ExternalTaintMarker`/`database_failure`/`recover` + unchanged; no `protocol.rs`/Quint edit (D13/AC18). + * One new long-lived sibling of the existing one-shot + `start`/`advance`/`close`/`flush`/`abandon` operations in + `cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs` (exact operation/command + naming per repository convention, not frozen here) that plays the role + of the D13 supervisor: on invocation it performs the acquire above, + emits one durable "armed" acknowledgement over its control channel once + the lock is held and the marker is durably persisted, then **itself + spawns the actual human shell as its own child process** — replicating + the relevant parts of pinned Pi's own local-shell contract (the command + string via a shell, `cwd`, `env`) since this is a Rust process and + cannot call Pi's TypeScript `createLocalBashOperations()` directly; T03 + must document exactly which parts of that contract it reproduces and + cite the pinned package's own local-execution behavior as the reference + being matched. The supervisor streams the shell's stdout/stderr back + over the control channel (so Pi's `onData` still fires) and accepts + cancellation/timeout requests from the caller, which it enacts by + signaling the real shell's process group. On Unix, before spawning the + shell, the supervisor duplicates the `WorktreeLock`'s underlying file + descriptor (a `std::fs::File`-backed `flock(2)`, confirmed against + `worktree_lock.rs`) with `FD_CLOEXEC` cleared on the duplicate, so the + spawned shell inherits an open descriptor referencing the *same* open + file description and therefore holds the *same* advisory lock, + independent of the supervisor's own liveness (D13's supervisor-crash + safety); this supervisor mechanism, and the shell-spawning it performs, + is invoked only on Unix — on Windows, D13's `user_bash` handler takes + the guard-establishment-failure branch unconditionally (see D13's + corrected Windows disposition), so the supervisor is never invoked and + this fd-duplication step is simply not reached, not "skipped as + unnecessary." T03 must gate the supervisor's invocation on platform + (Unix-only) rather than implementing a no-op/simplified guard path for + Windows. Lifetime-token creation/configuration precedes the durable + `Armed` acknowledgement; a token-establishment failure emits no + acknowledgement and spawns no shell. The normal finish trigger is + **exclusively the shell's own process termination plus lifetime-token EOF** + (`wait()`/`waitpid` and the kernel-owned pipe on the spawned child and + ordinary descendants) — never stdin EOF or any other signal on the + control channel to Pi/Node, which may close independently of the shell's + lifetime (D13's chosen Option A: control-channel death from Pi/Node dying + does not finish the guard). Once both conditions hold, the supervisor + runs the forced recovery/`complete()` sequence above, after which it + emits a final result over the control channel (if anything is still + listening) and exits — success only if the recovery commit and the + marker clear both durably succeeded. Before spawn, ordinary RAII cleanup + is safe. After successful spawn and before lifetime EOF, every + supervision error or panic-adjacent unwind uses a consuming abandonment + path that leaves the marker armed and closes only the supervisor's own + lock reference without explicit `flock(LOCK_UN)`; the inherited shell or + descendant descriptor keeps the flock kernel-held. After lifetime EOF, + ordinary unlock is safe even if final recovery fails, but the marker + remains armed. This needs no `scope_id`/`event_id` — + worktree identity is still derived by the runtime from the invoking + checkout, and guard identity (for stale-owner detection) is exactly "is + the `WorktreeLock` still held (by the supervisor, by the shell via its + duplicated descriptor, or both)," never a Pi-specific field, session + id, or `ActorKind::Pi`. + + Durable Pi adapter state remains under + `/sce/pi-mutation-scope-state.json` with a versioned schema, + persisted with the same lock/write-temp/sync/atomic-rename/ + best-effort-parent-sync discipline as other adapters, never holding the + adapter-state lock while invoking the generic mutation runtime; this file + and its discipline are unrelated to, and untouched by, the external-mutation + supervisor, which is generic runtime state, not Pi adapter state. Out — + any recovery/stale-process handling beyond the supervisor's own crash + semantics already specified in D13 (T04 owns the adapter-reconciliation + tests); wiring into the actual TypeScript extension, including the + `user_bash` call site that spawns/manages the supervisor process (T05). + **Superseded text, retained for history only:** an earlier draft of this + line additionally scoped out "the `user_bash` extension-dispatch-order + launcher/env-var gate and doctor check (T02 records the disposition, T05 + implements both — AC22)." No such launcher, env-var gate, or + dispatch-order doctor check exists or is implemented by T05 — D13's later + retraction of any SCE-hosted Pi launcher or extension-order authority + mechanism (see D13's "No dispatch-safety self-check, no launcher, no + extension-order authority" and AC22) makes that sentence stale; T05's + actual scope is the unconditional `user_bash` handler wiring (arm -> + `Armed` -> `exec`, Windows refusal) with no dispatch-position self-check + of any kind. Also out of T03's scope — any Windows-specific + supervisor/guard code (D13's Windows disposition is unconditional refusal + at the extension level, T05, not a Rust-side platform branch T03 needs to + implement). + - Dependencies: T02 + - Done when: the Rust adapter correctly drives the frozen happy-path Pi + lifecycle through the generic mutation-scope runtime, with durable + provenance and no recovery shortcuts, reaching mutation semantics only + through the existing `hooks::mutation_scope` ingress seam (no second + direct `coordinate()` path); focused tests cover parser rejection, + classification, identity stability/replay, terminal `ScopeId` non-reuse, + session separation, model present/absent, the `tool_result`-keyed + `Executed` transition (never `tool_execution_start`), successful Close, + failed-execution-still-Close, `tool_execution_end`-without-`tool_result` + abandon (D7), untracked zero footprint, and the new external-mutation + supervisor invocation: armed acknowledgement only after the lock is held + and the marker is durably persisted; the supervisor — not the caller — + spawns the real shell as its own child, with the spawned shell's parent + pid equal to the supervisor's pid; on Unix, the shell inherits a + duplicated, `FD_CLOEXEC`-cleared copy of the lock's file descriptor + before any command executes; a concurrent foreign `coordinate()` call + blocks and then fails closed with `CoordinateError::LockAcquisition` + while the guard is active, touching no protocol state; killing the + supervisor process directly (not the shell) while the shell keeps running + leaves `WorktreeLock` held (a concurrent foreign `coordinate()` call still + blocks/fails closed) until the shell itself exits, at which point the + lock frees with `ExternalTaintMarker` still armed and the next + `coordinate()` call self-heals via the existing inherited-taint path; + closing the control channel to the caller (simulating Pi/Node death) + while the shell is still running does not trigger the finish sequence and + does not signal the shell; finish requires the shell's own process + termination and lifetime-token EOF, then forces `database_failure`+`recover` + against the already-held `ProtectedWorktree`, only then clearing the marker; + a failed finish commit leaves the marker armed and reports failure without + calling `complete()`; all with no `protocol.rs` involvement. + - Verify: `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml pi_mutation_scope`; + `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml hooks::`. + - Completed: 2026-09-17 + - Repaired: 2026-09-17 (same-day repair pass — cwd contract, exact pinned + Pi shell contract citations, final stdout/stderr draining race, and + context synchronization; see the sections below marked "2026-09-17 + repair pass"). T04 was not started by this repair. + - Files changed: `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/{mod.rs,state.rs,os_lock.rs,boundary_lock.rs}` + (new); `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs` (new); + `cli/src/cli_schema.rs`; `cli/src/services/hooks/mod.rs`; + `cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs`; + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/coordinator.rs`; + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/mod.rs`; + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/protected_worktree.rs`; + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/worktree_lock.rs`; + `cli/src/services/parse/command_runtime.rs` (13 files; no other paths touched; + `fixtures/` and `protocol.rs`/`spec/mutation_cursor.qnt` untouched). + - **2026-09-17 repair pass files changed** (see "Repair" below): + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs`; + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/git_snapshot.rs` (new + `resolve_worktree_root`); `cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs` + (new `cwd` wire field); `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/{mod.rs,state.rs}` + (whitespace-only `cargo fmt` reformatting of pre-existing drift found + while getting `nix flake check`'s `cli-fmt` gate green, no behavior + change). `protocol.rs`/`spec/mutation_cursor.qnt` and `fixtures/` + remain untouched. + - **2026-09-17 lifetime-token repair files changed:** + `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs`; + `context/cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md`; + `context/plans/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`; + `context/decisions/2026-09-17-external-mutation-guard-process-supervisor.md`. + No change to normal `WorktreeLock` drop semantics, protocol/Quint change, + T04 work, or generated-config change was made. + - Result: **Adapter** (`pi_mutation_scope/{mod.rs,state.rs,os_lock.rs,boundary_lock.rs}`, + mirroring `opencode_mutation_scope`'s file shape): a strict wire parser + accepts `hook_event_name` one of `ToolExecutionStart`/`ToolCall`/`ToolResult`/ + `ToolExecutionEnd` (with `session_id`/`tool_call_id`/`cwd`/`tool_name`, plus + `model` only on `ToolCall`) over the new hidden `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` + route; classification is the closed `bash|edit|write -> TrackedMutation` + allowlist per D2 (`read`/`grep`/`find`/`ls` and everything else untracked) — + no OpenCode-style bash/`ToolExecuteBefore` split, since D4/T01's NOTES.md + establish `tool_call` as Pi's single universal pre-execution gate for every + tool including `bash`. `ScopeId` is `pi-tool-v1|n=|s=:|c=:` + exactly per D1's freeze, with a checkout-local monotonic `next_attempt_seq` + counter in the adapter state file so a toolCallId reused after terminal + cleanup gets a fresh `attempt_seq`/`ScopeId` rather than ever reactivating a + closed/abandoned scope (proved by + `a_new_attempt_after_terminal_cleanup_gets_a_fresh_attempt_seq_and_scope_id` + and the mod.rs-level + `a_reused_tool_call_id_after_terminal_cleanup_gets_a_distinct_scope_id`). + The attempt-phase machine is `AttemptPhase::{PendingStart, Executed, + PendingAbandon}` — no `Active` phase — because D5's freeze makes + `PendingStart` Pi's normal resting state for the tool's *entire* in-flight + execution window (there is no `tool_execution_start`-keyed commit step); + `mark_executed` transitions `PendingStart -> Executed` on `tool_result` only + (D5/D6), and `tool_execution_end` closes an `Executed` attempt (falling back + to abandon/recover on a Close failure, matching the OpenCode precedent) or + abandons a still-`PendingStart` attempt outright — D7's exact signal, with + no reliance on `agent_settled`/timeouts. **Deliberate departure from the + OpenCode/Codex `admit_tracked_attempt` precedent**, recorded because it is + not spelled out character-for-character in the plan text but follows + necessarily from D5+D12: since `PendingStart` is Pi's long-lived steady + state (not a narrow crash-recovery artifact the way it is for + OpenCode/Codex, whose admission also serializes under one boundary lock + per invocation but transitions to `Active` before releasing it), the + "uncertain attempt" fail-closed admission check for Pi only fires on a + lingering `PendingAbandon` or non-`Clear` `RecoveryState` — **never** on a + sibling's `PendingStart` — otherwise every concurrent Pi tool call would + serialize checkout-wide, contradicting D12 + (`a_pending_start_attempt_never_blocks_a_concurrent_new_admission`, + `concurrent_bash_calls_in_one_session_stay_separate_live_scopes`). D11 + provenance reuses the existing `prefixed_diff_trace_session_id(PI_TOOL_NAME, + ...)` (already Pi-aware) plus a new `normalize_pi_model_id` alongside the + existing Codex/OpenCode normalizers in `hooks/mod.rs`. The adapter reaches + mutation semantics only through the existing `hooks::mutation_scope` + ingress seam (no second direct `coordinate()` path) — proved against a + `RecordingSeam` fake for every lifecycle branch and, separately, against a + real Git repository and a real Agent Trace DB in a new `runtime_seam_tests` + module (`a_write_start_result_close_lands_a_real_ai_exclusive_event_with_pi_provenance`, + `a_start_followed_by_no_execution_abandons_through_the_real_runtime`). + + **D13 external-mutation supervisor**, implemented as new, harness-neutral + runtime/ingress plumbing (not a Pi-specific route), reusing + `WorktreeLock`/`ExternalTaintMarker`/`database_failure`/`recover` unchanged + with zero `protocol.rs`/Quint edit: + * The "acquire a `ProtectedWorktree` and report its armed state without + processing a boundary" half of the refactor needed **no code change**: + `ProtectedWorktree::acquire` already does exactly this (returns the guard + synchronously, with the lock held and the marker durably armed, before + any boundary work). The only actual refactor is a new `pub(super)` + `coordinate_on_held_worktree` in `coordinator.rs` — a thin wrapper around + the existing private `coordinate_protected` — letting a caller that + already holds a `ProtectedWorktree` (so cannot safely re-enter + `coordinate()`/`coordinate_inner`, which acquire their own lock and would + deadlock against the one already held) force the existing + `database_failure`+`recover` composition against a freshly observed tree + by passing `force_recovery: true` (reusing the exact mechanism + `inherited_external_taint` already drives), then the caller itself calls + the pre-existing `ProtectedWorktree::complete()` only on a durable commit. + `WorktreeLock::as_raw_fd`/`ProtectedWorktree::lock_raw_fd` (both + `#[cfg(unix)]`) expose the lock's raw fd for duplication. + * New `cli/src/services/mutation_trace/runtime/external_mutation_guard.rs` + (`run_external_mutation_guard`, Unix-only — `#[cfg(not(unix))]` returns + `GuardError::UnsupportedPlatform` unconditionally, per D13's Windows + disposition that T05 refuses `user_bash` guard-establishment outright + there, with no Windows-specific guard code written here): acquires + `ProtectedWorktree`, creates/configures the lifetime token, and only then + emits `GuardEvent::Armed`; a lifetime-token establishment failure emits + no event and spawns no shell. It then spawns the human shell using the + pinned Pi-compatible shell contract as its own child (`process_group(0)`, + its own process group so process-group signaling never reaches the + supervisor itself), streams stdout/stderr back through a channel-fed + callback, accepts an explicit cancel signal (a caller-supplied + `mpsc::Receiver<()>` — **never** channel-close/disconnect, which the + finish loop explicitly ignores), and enacts it by sending `SIGTERM` to + the shell's process group via a minimal local `dup`/`kill` FFI shim (no + new Cargo dependency — both are simple, already-linked libc symbols). + Normal finish requires the shell's own `wait()` **and** lifetime-token + EOF, never control-channel/cancel-channel state alone. Before spawn, + ordinary RAII cleanup is safe. After successful spawn and before + lifetime EOF, all supervision errors and panic-adjacent unwinds use a + consuming abandonment path that leaves the marker armed and closes only + the supervisor's lock reference without explicit `flock(LOCK_UN)`; the + inherited shell/descendant descriptor keeps the flock kernel-held. Once + both completion conditions hold, it forces recovery through + `coordinate_on_held_worktree(..., force_recovery: true)` and calls + `ProtectedWorktree::complete()` only on that durable commit. A failed + final recovery leaves the marker armed; because lifetime EOF was already + proven, ordinary unlock is safe in that case. **On Unix, the fd + duplication itself happens in the *parent*, immediately before + `Command::spawn()`** (a plain `dup()` on the lock fd, whose result is + CLOEXEC-clear by POSIX default with no further flag-clearing needed), + relying on `fork()`'s atomic, synchronous fd-table copy so the child is + guaranteed to hold its own independent reference to the lock's open file + description by the moment `spawn()` returns — the parent's own duplicate + is then closed via `File::from_raw_fd` + `drop`, leaving the child's copy, + and only the child's copy, alive. + + **Two genuine correctness bugs found and fixed while writing and running + the tests below (not merely by inspection) — both exactly the class of + subtle Unix-semantics defect D13's own plan-text history warns about:** + (1) an earlier draft duplicated the fd inside a `pre_exec` closure + (child-side, strictly after `fork()`); since `pre_exec` runs + *asynchronously* relative to the parent's `spawn()` returning, this opened + a real race where the parent could close its own reference before the + child had actually duplicated its own — during that window the kernel + would see zero referencing descriptors and release the flock early. Fixed + by moving the `dup()` into the parent, before `spawn()`, as described + above — `fork()` is atomic, so there is no such window. (2) + `WorktreeLock::drop` calls `File::unlock()` — an *explicit* + `flock(fd, LOCK_UN)` — which releases the lock for **every** descriptor + sharing that open file description immediately, not only when the last + referencing descriptor closes; this never affects the supervisor's own + graceful finish path (the guarded shell has already exited, and its own fd + already closed, before `protected` is ever consumed by `complete()`), but + it means simulating "the supervisor is killed" in a test via a plain Rust + `drop(protected)` is **unfaithful** — a real `kill -9` never runs Rust + destructors, so `unlock()` would never explicitly execute; only the + kernel's implicit "close this fd" teardown would run. The test was + corrected to reproduce that exact difference (`std::mem::forget` the guard + plus a raw `close()` on only the *original* fd, leaving the child's + inherited duplicate as the sole remaining reference) — see + `a_supervisor_killed_without_unlocking_leaves_the_flock_held_by_the_spawned_shell`. + Focused tests in `external_mutation_guard.rs` (6, all passing) cover: a + foreign `WorktreeLock::acquire` times out while the guard is active; the + spawned shell's own `$PPID` (read from inside the shell itself, avoiding + any post-exit `/proc` race) equals the supervisor process's pid; the + kill-9-simulated case above; closing the cancel channel (sender dropped) + triggers neither finish nor a signal to the shell; a cancel request sent + mid-run reaches the shell's process group (proved via a `trap 'exit 9' + TERM` shell script) and finish still waits for the shell's real exit + rather than firing immediately; and a failed finish commit (injected + DB-open failure) leaves the external-taint marker armed and returns + `GuardError::Finish` without calling `complete()`. + + **CLI wiring — a recorded deviation from the plan text's literal + phrasing, using the "not frozen here" latitude it explicitly grants.** The + plan describes the new operation as "one new long-lived sibling of the + existing one-shot start/advance/close/flush/abandon operations in + `cli/src/services/hooks/mutation_scope.rs`." The five existing operations + share one JSON-`operation`-dispatched, single-shot shape: `read_hook_stdin()` + blocks until STDIN reaches EOF, then the whole payload is parsed and + exactly one `coordinate()`/`abandon_scope()` call runs, returning one + string. The guard operation cannot fit that shape: it must read an initial + JSON run request, then keep STDIN open afterward to receive a *later*, + optional cancel request while the guarded shell is still running, and + stream JSON status lines to STDOUT as it goes — genuinely long-lived, + bidirectional, incompatible with "read all of STDIN to EOF, then respond + once." The new `run_external_mutation_guard_subcommand` function still + lives in `mutation_scope.rs` (satisfying the instruction at the file + level) and uses an explicit two-phase operation-tagged JSON protocol: + exactly `{"operation":"arm"}` first, then (only after the flushed + `{"status":"armed"}` acknowledgement) exactly one + `{"operation":"exec","command":"","cwd":"...","env":{...}}` + frame. `{"operation":"cancel"}` is accepted while waiting for exec and + after spawn; it means pre-spawn termination before spawn and process-group + cancellation after spawn. The hidden CLI verb is `sce hooks + external-mutation-guard` (`cli_schema.rs`/`command_runtime.rs`/`hooks/mod.rs` + additions mirroring the existing per-adapter hidden routes), rather than + the shared `MutationScopePayload` enum/`sce hooks mutation-scope` verb. + STDOUT emits line-delimited JSON: `{"status":"armed"}`, `{"stream": + "stdout"|"stderr","data":""}` (lossy UTF-8 — no `base64` crate is + present in this workspace and the Done-when criteria concern lock/fd/process + semantics, not byte-fidelity of streamed output; recorded as an explicit + simplification for T05 to revisit if binary-safe streaming is later + required), and a final `{"status":"result","exit_code":}`. + The explicit state machine is `Starting -> ArmedWaitingForExec -> Running + -> Finished`; no arm acknowledgement can itself spawn a shell. Focused + tests in `mutation_scope.rs` cover strict arm/exec/cancel parsing and event + serialization. + + **Assumptions carried forward for T04/T05:** (a) the admission + "uncertain-attempt" scoping departure above (`PendingAbandon`/non-`Clear` + recovery only, never a sibling's `PendingStart`) is load-bearing for D12 + and should inform how T04 detects a genuinely orphaned `PendingStart` (a + crashed `establish_tracked_start`, not a live in-flight tool call) — this + task deliberately leaves that cross-invocation detection to T04, per its + own stated scope. (b) **superseded by the 2026-09-17 repair pass below** + — the guarded shell was originally spawned via a hardcoded `/bin/sh -c + ` without checking pinned Pi source; T03's own scope text asked + this task to "document exactly which parts of [Pi's local-shell] + contract it reproduces and cite the pinned package's own local-execution + behavior as the reference being matched," and that citation work was not + done. The repair pass closed it directly against pinned + `@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent@0.80.6`'s `dist/core/tools/bash.js` + (`createLocalBashOperations`) and its `dist/utils/shell.js`/ + `dist/utils/child-process.js` helpers: the assumed `/bin/sh` contract was + wrong (Pi prefers real `/bin/bash`, then `bash` on `PATH`, only then + plain `sh`), and the guard now reproduces that exact resolution order. + Full contract citations, and the deliberate differences kept as-is + (env-merge vs. env-replace; `SIGTERM` vs. `SIGKILL` cancellation), live in + `context/cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md` rather than being + duplicated here. + - Verify outcome: `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path + cli/Cargo.toml pi_mutation_scope` passed (59/59). `nix develop -c + ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml hooks::` + passed (691/691, 1 pre-existing unrelated ignore). Additionally, given the + shared `mutation_trace::runtime` files touched (`coordinator.rs`, + `protected_worktree.rs`, `worktree_lock.rs`, `mod.rs`): `nix develop -c + ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml + mutation_trace` passed (376/376, up from T02's 370 — the 6 new + `external_mutation_guard` tests), the full unscoped `cargo test` + passed (1586/1586, 1 pre-existing unrelated ignore, 0 filtered), and `cargo + clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` (with `clippy::pedantic`/`warnings` + denied workspace-wide, `SCE_CLI_PACKAGE_FALLBACK=1`) passed with zero + warnings — clippy caught and this task fixed two real pedantic violations + along the way (`PiHookEvent`'s four variants originally shared a `Tool` + prefix; a test-local `const` was declared after statements). `spec/mutation_cursor.qnt` + and `protocol.rs` are confirmed untouched by `git status`. + - **2026-09-17 repair pass verify outcome:** `nix develop -c + ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml + external_mutation_guard` passed (19/19 matched by that name filter — 17 + of those live in `external_mutation_guard.rs` itself, up from 6, the + other 2 are pre-existing `command_runtime.rs` hidden-route parser tests + coincidentally matched by the same substring). 11 new tests in + `external_mutation_guard.rs`: 8 covering the `cwd` contract, 1 + unit-testing the drain-after-join ordering fix directly and + deterministically (no subprocess timing dependency), and 2 end-to-end + multi-chunk stdout/stderr regressions. `pi_mutation_scope` re-verified + unchanged (59/59). `hooks::` passed (695/695, up from 691 — 4 new + `cwd`-wire-parsing tests in `mutation_scope.rs`'s `guard_protocol` + module, 1 pre-existing unrelated ignore). `mutation_trace` passed + (387/387, up from 376 — the 11 new `external_mutation_guard` tests). + The full unscoped `cargo test` passed (1601/1601, up from 1586, 1 + pre-existing unrelated ignore, 0 filtered). `cargo clippy --all-targets + -- -D warnings -D clippy::pedantic` (`SCE_CLI_PACKAGE_FALLBACK=1`) + passed with zero warnings. `git diff --check` passed (no whitespace + errors). `nix flake check` — not run by T03's original verification — + was run for this repair pass and reported **all checks passed**, + including `cli-fmt`; that check first failed against whitespace-only + drift already present in `pi_mutation_scope/{mod.rs,state.rs}` before + this repair began (confirmed via `git diff` — none of the flagged lines + were touched by this repair's own changes), closed by running the + already-sanctioned `cargo fmt` autofix (AGENTS.md), not by editing test + assertions or behavior. + - **2026-09-17 lifetime-token repair verify outcome:** `nix develop -c + ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml + pi_mutation_scope` passed (59/59); `hooks::` passed (695/695, 1 ignored); + `mutation_trace` passed (388/388); the focused external-mutation-guard + suite passed (20/20). `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings -D + clippy::pedantic` passed, `nix flake check` passed all checks, and + `git diff --check` passed. The graceful-descendant and output/lifetime + regressions pass alongside the existing supervisor-death regression. + - **2026-09-17 lifetime-token repair:** added a CLOEXEC-explicit Unix + lifetime pipe, positive shell-termination-plus-token-EOF completion, and + continuous bounded output polling. Added deterministic regressions for a + graceful background descendant and output while its lifetime token is + held. The real WorktreeLock and marker remain active until durable + recovery succeeds; D14's deliberate-close escape remains documented. + - **2026-09-17 post-spawn failure repair:** added explicit guard ownership + states for pre-spawn, post-spawn-before-lifetime-EOF, and completed-lifetime + cleanup. `ProtectedWorktree::abandon_after_spawn_without_unlock` consumes + the supervisor's lock reference without explicit `LOCK_UN`; normal + `WorktreeLock` drop behavior is unchanged for all existing callers. The + `Armed` event now follows lifetime-token establishment. Deterministic + regressions cover lifetime-establishment failure, injected post-spawn + observation failure with a live background descendant, and the same + failure after a shell with no descendants. They assert inherited lock + exclusion, armed-marker persistence, and the next-boundary inherited-taint + recovery. Focused external-guard tests passed 23/23; `mutation_trace` + passed 391/391; the requested `pi_mutation_scope` and `hooks::` suites + remained green at 59/59 and 695/695. `nix flake check` passed all checks, + including clippy, format, CLI tests, and Quint-connect; `git diff --check` + passed. T03 remains `done`; T04 remains `todo` and was not started. + - **2026-09-17 two-phase admission repair:** replaced the misleading + single-phase `guard` request carrying command data with + `arm -> flushed Armed -> explicit exec` and made the runtime expose an + `ArmedExternalMutationGuard` handle. Arm acquires the worktree and marker, + establishes the lifetime token, and waits without a shell. Exec performs + request-specific cwd validation and is the only path that calls + `spawn_guarded_shell`; a lost Armed write/flush, pre-exec EOF, cancellation, + malformed/unknown/duplicate exec, blank command, or invalid cwd cannot + spawn. The pre-spawn handle retains the token writer and ordinary RAII lock + release; successful spawn still enters the existing descendant-lifetime and + no-`LOCK_UN` abandonment states. Added deterministic regressions for lost + Armed delivery (including an absent filesystem side effect), arm-without- + exec plus inherited-taint self-heal, and the two-phase happy path proving + no side effect before exec; protocol regressions cover strict arm/exec, + cwd/env, cancellation, malformed, unknown, blank, and extra-field frames. + `T03` status remains `done`; `T04` and `T05` remain `todo` and were not + started. + - Context impact: durable-context classification `pending-review` — this + task adds a new adapter directory (`pi_mutation_scope/`) alongside the + existing Claude/Codex/OpenCode ones and a new generic + `external_mutation_guard` runtime primitive plus a new hidden CLI route, + but makes no protocol/Quint semantic change (D13 required none, confirmed + above) and asserts no new fact about Pi's confirmation-required status + (already recorded by T02) or the mutation-scope protocol's own shape. The + Task context synchronization phase should confirm whether + `architecture.md`/`context-map.md` enumerate the concrete adapter set or + the external-mutation-supervisor mechanism closely enough that this task's + additions are a correction rather than an unremarkable extension, and + record any residual impact. + - **2026-09-17 repair pass context impact:** resolved. The canonical + `context/cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md` now carries an + "Execution cwd contract" section and an "Exact pinned Pi `0.80.6` + local-shell contract" section (shell resolution, command transport, + cwd, stdio, process-group, exit-code, and final-output-draining + parity, plus the two deliberate documented differences: env-merge and + `SIGTERM` cancellation) with exact pinned-source file/line citations, + and its Lifecycle diagram now names continuous output polling during the + descendant-lifetime wait plus bounded finalization. + The `2026-09-17-external-mutation-guard-process-supervisor` ADR's + Follow-up section is updated to mark the shell-contract confirmation + resolved (its Decision/Rationale/Alternatives/Consequences are + historical and were left untouched). `architecture.md`, `context-map.md`, + `glossary.md`, `overview.md`, and `pi-mutation-scope-integration.md` + already described the guard only at the same high level this repair + preserved (spawns the human shell as its own child, harness-neutral, + Unix-only, unwired) with no incorrect specifics to correct, so per "keep + one canonical explanation and link to it," they are left as their + existing links to the guard doc rather than duplicating the new detail. + - Context synchronization: synced + +- [x] T04: `Add sound terminal and stale-process recovery` (status:done) + - Task ID: T04 + - Scope: In — the conservative recovery obligations frozen by T01: Start + committed then execution later blocked (`tool_execution_end` with no + preceding `tool_result`, D7) => abandon/rebaseline, never Close; Start + committed then process dies before execution; execution begins then + process dies before terminal event; Close/abandon seam failure; + first-ambiguity-Flush and rebaseline-Flush failure; duplicate/late terminal + events; adapter crash during recovery; multiple live Pi siblings; a Pi + sibling plus another harness. Durable terminal intent (mark -> Flush + ambiguous interval -> abandon -> remove only after abandon succeeds -> + Flush rebaseline -> clear recovery), with a failed step leaving recovery + pending and a new tracked Start remaining fail-closed until pending + recovery resolves. Positive process-staleness handling based only on exact + process-death evidence from the frozen Pi lifecycle — no TTL, no broad + session sweep, no same-session predecessor sweep. + + Note on scope narrowing: D13's guard blocks `user_bash` outright whenever + it cannot be durably established (see D13), so there is no longer a human + mutation from a *failed guard-establishment* attempt for recovery to + protect against, and no in-process "withheld Close" state for this task to + reconcile against. This task does not need — and must not add — recovery + cases whose only purpose was handling "`user_bash` executed after an + initial guard-establishment failure," because that execution is now + forbidden by construction at the `user_bash` handler itself (T05). + + What this task owns, explicitly, is the guard's own lifecycle recovery — + the property the earlier one-shot fence could not provide — plus the + *successful*-guard cross-process case: + + * **Supervisor dies mid-command while the shell keeps running + (Unix).** The long-lived supervisor process (T03) is `SIGKILL`ed/crashes + while the shell it spawned is still running. Assert `WorktreeLock` is + **not** released while the shell (or a descendant holding a duplicate of + the lock's inherited file descriptor) remains alive — a fresh + `coordinate()` call from any harness still blocks up to the existing + timeout and then fails closed with `CoordinateError::LockAcquisition`, + exactly as if the supervisor were alive. Only once the shell (and every + fd-holding descendant) exits does the OS release the flock; assert that + release, not the supervisor's death, is what a fresh `coordinate()` call + actually waits on. Once released, assert the next `coordinate()` call on + that worktree — from any harness — observes `ExternalTaintMarker` still + armed (nobody ran the supervisor's finish sequence) and runs the + existing unmodified inherited-taint `database_failure`+`recover` path + before processing its own boundary, exactly as for any other unresolved + marker. Prove no PID/timestamp/TTL check is involved anywhere in this + sequence: staleness is proven solely by the lock eventually becoming + free, and the lock's freedom is itself gated on the shell's own exit, + not the supervisor's. + * **Pi/Node control process dies mid-command (chosen Option A).** The + caller's control-channel process dies (or the connection otherwise + closes) while the supervisor is still waiting on the shell. Assert the + supervisor does not treat this as a finish signal: it does not signal + the shell, does not run the forced recovery sequence, and continues + holding `WorktreeLock`/`ExternalTaintMarker` exactly as before. Assert + that when the shell later terminates on its own, the supervisor still + runs its normal finish sequence (forced recover, `complete()`, release) + even though nothing is listening on the dead control channel, and that + the worktree ends up in the same correct state as if Pi/Node had stayed + alive the whole time. + * **Guard finalization fails.** The finish-time forced + `database_failure`+`recover` commit does not durably succeed. Assert + `ProtectedWorktree::complete()` is never called, the marker remains + armed, the supervisor reports failure (never success), and the next + `coordinate()` call on that worktree self-heals via the existing + inherited-taint path. + * **Foreign boundary arrives while the guard is active.** A + Start/Advance/Close/Flush from another live scope (same harness or a + different one) is attempted while the guard still holds `WorktreeLock` + (whether the supervisor, the shell via its inherited descriptor, or both + currently hold it). Assert it blocks up to the existing lock-acquisition + timeout and then fails closed with `CoordinateError::LockAcquisition`, + touching no protocol state (no read, no taint, no clear); assert the + adapter that issued it applies its own existing conservative handling + for that failure (fail-closed block-the-tool for a Start, D9's existing + unresolved-terminal retry-later pattern for a Close/Advance). + * **Foreign process crashes while waiting** on + `CoordinateError::LockAcquisition` (or otherwise mid-retry). Assert this + leaves no durable state behind for the guard to reconcile against — the + foreign process never reached a point where it could mutate protocol + state, so there is nothing to recover for its sake specifically; the + guard's own finish sequence still runs normally when the shell ends. + * **Stale guard recovered from positive shell-death evidence** — the + same "supervisor dies mid-command" case, explicitly reframed as the + generic-adapter reconciliation obligation: prove the Pi adapter's own + local attempt-state (for any Pi scope live during the guarded interval) + correctly reconciles with a scope the generic runtime abandoned out + from under it on the adapter's next interaction, the same obligation + existing adapters already have for any externally tainted worktree — + not a new mechanism D13 introduces. + * **Multiple AI scopes overlap the guarded interval.** Pi A and at + least one other-harness scope B are both live when the guard begins; + assert the finish-time forced recovery abandons both, regardless of + which one (if either) is the harness that happened to observe + `user_bash`. + + The critical end-to-end proof, spanning the whole guarded interval, not + just its endpoints: + + ```text + guard begins (durably established); supervisor spawns the shell + human write #1 + a foreign harness's boundary attempts to run + => blocks, then fails closed (LockAcquisition); no state touched + human write #2 + the shell itself terminates + => (if the supervisor is still alive) supervisor observes the + termination directly via wait() and runs finish immediately; + (if the supervisor already died) the lock frees only once the + shell's own fd closes, and the next coordinate() call anywhere + self-heals the still-armed marker via the existing + inherited-taint path + => either way: forced recover/rebaseline; every live worktree + scope abandoned + the deferred foreign boundary is retried + => now succeeds normally against the recovered worktree + assert: write #1 and write #2 both remain outside positive AI + attribution for every scope whose lifetime overlapped the guard, + on every harness involved, regardless of whether the supervisor or + Pi/Node died at any point during the interval + ``` + + Also the successful-guard cross-process case at the granularity of a + single write, unchanged in substance from the original text: + + ```text + Pi A live + Claude/Codex/OpenCode B live + + guard begins; human mutation occurs; guard ends + => forced recover before any later boundary is evaluated + => no human mutation becomes positive AI attribution + ``` + + This is the existing worktree-wide `recover()` behavior (D13/AC18) + exercised specifically for the case where the triggering boundary belongs + to a harness other than the one whose scope observed `user_bash`, proving + the adapter's own local attempt-state reconciles with a scope the generic + runtime abandoned out from under it — the same reconciliation obligation + the existing adapters already have for any externally tainted worktree, + not a new mechanism D13 introduces. Out — any change to the TypeScript + extension, including the `user_bash` call site itself and supervisor + process management (T05). + - Dependencies: T03 + - Done when: no tested crash, rejection, missing terminal event, guard + lifecycle event, or transient seam failure can turn an uncertain Pi + interval — or an interval guarded on behalf of any harness — into positive + AI attribution, while unrelated surviving scopes retain future attribution + capability; a guard-triggered abandonment is correctly reflected in the + adapter's own durable attempt state on its next interaction, including + when the triggering boundary belongs to a different harness than the + abandoned scope; a foreign boundary that raced an active guard never + observes or mutates protocol state until the guard ends, and succeeds + normally once retried afterward; no recovery path exists for a + `user_bash` execution that a failed guard-establishment attempt should + have prevented, because D13 forbids that execution at the source; killing + the supervisor while the shell keeps running never allows the lock to + free (and therefore never allows a foreign boundary to proceed) before + the shell itself exits; and killing the Pi/Node control process never + causes the guard to finish early or signal the shell. + - Verify: `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml pi_mutation_scope`; + `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml mutation_trace`. + - Completed: 2026-09-17 + - Repaired: 2026-09-17 (same-day repair pass — the original trigger-point + decision below keyed stale-owner reconciliation solely to an exact + `(session_id, tool_call_id)` replay match, which a fresh Pi process (a + new UUIDv7 session per T01) essentially never produces against an older + dead process's attempt; a dead `Executed` attempt was also not eligible + at all. Both gaps are closed by this repair; see "2026-09-17 repair + pass" below. T05 was not started by this repair.) + - Files changed: `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/mod.rs`; + `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/state.rs`; + `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/process_owner.rs` (new) + (3 files; no other paths touched — `context/plans/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md` + itself, `protocol.rs`, `spec/mutation_cursor.qnt`, `fixtures/`, and the + TypeScript extension confirmed untouched). + - **2026-09-17 repair pass files changed:** `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/mod.rs`; + `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/state.rs`; + `context/plans/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`; + `context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`. `process_owner.rs` + (the process-death primitive itself), `boundary_lock.rs`, `protocol.rs`, + `spec/mutation_cursor.qnt`, `fixtures/`, and the TypeScript extension + remain untouched. No T05 work was started. + - Result: **D10 (process-staleness)** is implemented as a new sibling + module `process_owner.rs`, mirroring `os_lock.rs`'s single-purpose style + and reusing the local `unsafe extern "C"` FFI pattern already established + in `external_mutation_guard.rs` (no new Cargo dependency). `ProcessOwner + { pid, instance_token }` is captured via `getppid()` at Start-admission + time — the invoking `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` process's parent *is* + the Pi/Node process for that exact synchronous invocation (D3), so this + needed no wire-protocol or TypeScript-extension change. `is_definitely_dead` + proves death via `kill(pid, 0)` returning `ESRCH` (Unix), and additionally + detects PID reuse on Linux by comparing `/proc//stat` field 22 + (starttime) against the recorded value; where that instance evidence + can't be established, a live pid is always conservatively treated as + alive, per D10's own explicit fallback. No `Instant`/`SystemTime`/TTL is + used anywhere, enforced structurally by a test that greps the module's + own production source. `AdapterAttempt` gained an `owner: ProcessOwner` + field (`ADAPTER_STATE_VERSION` bumped 1→2, rejected fail-closed by the + pre-existing version gate for any old-schema state file — no real + production state exists yet since T05 hasn't shipped). + + **Load-bearing trigger-point decision (the part the plan explicitly left + open) — superseded by the 2026-09-17 repair pass below.** The original + implementation keyed stale-owner reconciliation to the single-attempt + lookup-by-incoming-key that `admit_tracked_attempt` already performs for + D1's replay handling: when an incoming `ToolCall`'s exact `(session_id, + tool_call_id)` key matched an existing `PendingStart` attempt *and* that + attempt's recorded owner was positively dead, `admit_tracked_attempt` + returned an `AdmitDecision::StaleOwnerAbandon { scope_id }` instead of an + ordinary replay. This was recorded as load-bearing at the time precisely + *because* its own reachability was narrow — a Pi `session_id` is a fresh + UUIDv7 per process (T01's NOTES.md), so the same session_id recurring + after its owning process died is not how Pi's ordinary lifecycle + behaves — and that self-reported narrowness is exactly what the repair + below corrects: the realistic crash lifecycle T04's own Done-when names + ("Start committed → owning Pi process dies before execution", and + "execution began → tool_result observed → owning Pi process dies before + tool_execution_end") produces a *different* process's *different* + session driving the next `tool_call`, which the exact-key trigger could + never observe. A dead `Executed` attempt (the second crash shape) was + also never eligible for this trigger at all, since D1's replay lookup + only special-cased `PendingStart`. Both gaps left a stale scope live + indefinitely until an exact-key replay that, by T01's own UUIDv7 design, + essentially never occurs. + + **2026-09-17 repair pass.** Stale-owner reconciliation is now a new + `reconcile_stale_owners` step in `mod.rs`'s `admit_or_recover`, run on + *every* tracked Start admission before the incoming key is looked up — + not folded into `attempt.matches_key(incoming_key)` at all. It repeatedly + calls a new read-only `state::find_definitely_dead_attempts`, which scans + every persisted attempt (any session, any prior process) and returns the + `scope_id`s of exactly those in a `PendingStart` or `Executed` phase whose + own recorded `ProcessOwner` satisfies `is_definitely_dead` — `PendingAbandon` + is never included, since it already carries durable terminal recovery + intent owned by the pre-existing D8 pending-recovery-resume path + (`admit_tracked_attempt`'s existing `RecoveryState::Pending` → + `FlushClaimed` branch continues to own resuming an interrupted recovery + generation unchanged). Every scope discovered in one scan is retired + together — `begin_terminal_cleanup` on the whole batch, then the + existing, unmodified `resolve_recovery` (one ambiguity flush, one + `abandon` per doomed scope, one rebaseline flush) — before the loop + rescans and, finding nothing left, falls through to ordinary + incoming-key admission; a mid-sequence failure leaves `RecoveryState` + durably `Pending` and denies the triggering Start, exactly as the + pre-existing D8 machinery already guarantees for any other recovery + generation. `AdmitDecision::StaleOwnerAbandon` and + `admit_tracked_attempt`'s narrow exact-key dead-owner special case are + removed outright: by the time `admit_tracked_attempt` runs, any dead + attempt matching the incoming key has already been retired by the broad + scan, so an exact-key match remaining there is, by construction, either + live or uncertain — an ordinary replay, never a stale-owner case. This is + still not TTL/age/session/`ActorKind` sweeping: each candidate is + filtered independently by its own `is_definitely_dead(&attempt.owner)` + result, computed by the same, unmodified `process_owner.rs` primitive + T04 originally shipped (D10, untouched — no live-but-uncertain owner is + ever treated as dead). `is_definitely_dead` and the primitive itself are + unchanged and were not touched by this repair. Six new + `lifecycle_tests` regressions cover the corrected rule end to end: + `a_dead_pending_start_attempt_is_recovered_by_an_unrelated_fresh_session_start`, + `a_dead_executed_attempt_is_recovered_by_a_fresh_session_start_without_a_synthetic_close` + (asserts no `close` op is ever emitted for a dead `Executed` attempt, per + D9), `a_dead_owner_scope_is_recovered_while_a_live_owner_sibling_survives_untouched`, + `multiple_dead_owner_scopes_are_retired_in_one_recovery_generation_while_a_live_sibling_survives` + (two independently dead-owned scopes retired in one `flush`/`abandon`/ + `abandon`/`flush` generation, a live third scope untouched), + `an_owner_that_cannot_be_positively_proven_dead_is_never_abandoned_by_an_unrelated_start` + (a live pid with no recorded instance token), and + `an_interrupted_stale_owner_recovery_remains_pending_and_denies_the_triggering_start_until_resumed` + (a one-shot seam failure on the reconciliation's own `abandon` step + leaves recovery `Pending` and denies the triggering Start; the next + invocation resumes and completes it, then admits). The pre-existing + `a_pending_start_attempt_owned_by_a_dead_process_is_abandoned_not_replayed` + exact-key regression is unchanged and still passes: the broad scan + subsumes the exact-key case, producing the identical seam-operation + sequence (`start, flush, abandon, flush, start`). + + **Adapter/guard reconciliation** (new tests only; zero production changes + needed — confirmed by inspection that `handle_tool_execution_end`'s + existing Close-failure→abandon fallback, first proven in T03's + `a_failed_close_falls_back_to_abandon_recovery`, already handles a scope + the generic runtime abandoned out from under the adapter, whatever caused + that abandonment). Three new tests in a new `guard_reconciliation_tests` + module (`#[cfg(all(unix, test))]`) combine a live Pi scope (via the real + `hooks::mutation_scope` ingress seam against a real Git repo + Agent Trace + DB) with `run_external_mutation_guard`: + `a_guard_triggered_worktree_abandonment_reconciles_with_the_pi_adapters_own_state` + (two live Pi scopes overlap a guarded interval; the guard's finish-time + forced recovery abandons both; the adapter's own local JSON state + converges to empty once it observes each scope's terminal event); + `a_guard_abandons_a_live_pi_scope_alongside_a_live_scope_from_another_harness` + (a live Pi scope plus a live `ActorKind::ClaudeCode` scope both overlap + the guard and are both abandoned; the Pi adapter still reconciles + cleanly); `a_foreign_pi_start_racing_an_active_guard_fails_closed_touching_no_state_then_succeeds_on_retry` + (a fresh Pi `ToolCall` racing an active guard blocks on the real + `WORKTREE_LOCK_TIMEOUT`, fails closed with `FAIL_CLOSED_MESSAGE` surfaced + from `CoordinateError::LockAcquisition`, leaves no scope row in the DB, + then succeeds normally once the guard releases). + + **Remaining D7/D8 gaps** (new tests only, satisfied by already-existing + T03 production code): `duplicate_tool_result_after_close_is_a_safe_no_op`, + `duplicate_tool_execution_end_after_abandon_is_a_safe_no_op`, + `abandoning_one_sibling_never_touches_a_concurrent_sibling_in_the_same_session`, + `a_crash_mid_abandon_loop_is_resumed_and_completed_on_the_next_boundary_lock_acquisition` + (a transient one-shot seam failure on the "abandon" step simulates a crash + between durable steps, proving `RecoveryState::Pending` correctly resumes + the sequence on the next invocation — the same pattern T03 already proved + for the "flush" step). + + **Deliberate, honestly-reported scope narrowing.** T04's Done-when also + names "killing the supervisor while the shell keeps running never frees + the lock before the shell exits" and "killing the Pi/Node control process + never finishes the guard early," from the Pi-adapter's own angle. No + literal SIGKILL-the-supervisor-with-a-live-Pi-scope test was added, + because: (a) that requires the `GuardTestHooks`/`run_external_mutation_guard_with_hooks` + seam T03 deliberately kept module-private to `external_mutation_guard.rs`, + and widening that visibility is beyond this task's scope; (b) the Pi + adapter's JSON state and the guard's `WorktreeLock`/DB state are + structurally independent, and the adapter can only ever observe the + *outcome* (a scope transitioning to `abandoned` via forced recovery) — + byte-for-byte identical in the DB whether the guard finished cleanly or + self-healed after a supervisor kill, since both paths run the exact same + `database_failure`+`recover` composition. The + `a_guard_triggered_worktree_abandonment_reconciles_with_the_pi_adapters_own_state` + test already exercises the adapter's reaction to that outcome; the + supervisor-kill/control-death mechanics themselves remain covered, + unchanged, by T03's own `external_mutation_guard.rs` tests. This + Done-when item is satisfied substantively, not via a literal duplicate + test — flagged explicitly rather than silently assumed. + - Verify outcome: `pi_mutation_scope` filter: 76/76 passed (up from T03's + 59 — 8 new `process_owner` unit tests, 6 new `lifecycle_tests`, 3 new + `guard_reconciliation_tests`; independently reproduced). `mutation_trace` + filter: 396/396 passed (unchanged by this task's tests; independently + reproduced). Full unscoped `cargo test`: 1624/1624 passed, 1 pre-existing + unrelated ignore. `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings -D + clippy::pedantic` (`SCE_CLI_PACKAGE_FALLBACK=1`): zero warnings + (independently reproduced); fixed 4 `clippy::cast_possible_wrap` + pedantic violations on `std::process::id() as i32` via `.cast_signed()`. + `cargo fmt -- --check`: clean (independently reproduced). `git diff + --check`: clean (independently reproduced). `nix flake check` was not + run — this task touches only Rust adapter internals with no CLI + schema/hidden-route/Quint/TS surface change (unlike T03), so the full + clippy+fmt+full-test matrix above was judged sufficient. + - **2026-09-17 repair pass verify outcome:** `pi_mutation_scope` filter: + 82/82 passed (up from 76 — 6 new `lifecycle_tests` regressions above; + `hooks::`/tests unaffected). `mutation_trace` filter: 396/396 passed + (unchanged). `hooks::` filter: 715/715 passed, 1 pre-existing unrelated + ignore (unchanged from before this repair). Full unscoped `cargo test`: + 1630/1630 passed (up from 1624 by exactly the 6 new tests), 1 + pre-existing unrelated ignore. `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D + warnings -D clippy::pedantic` (`SCE_CLI_PACKAGE_FALLBACK=1`): zero + warnings (one `clippy::needless_continue` pedantic violation surfaced + and was fixed during this repair by replacing a loop `continue` arm with + an `if`/`matches!` early-return). `cargo fmt -- --check`: clean. + `git diff --check`: clean. `nix flake check` was not run for this + repair, for the same reason T04's original pass gave: this repair + touches only the same two Rust adapter files with no CLI + schema/hidden-route/Quint/TS surface change, so the clippy+fmt+full-test + matrix above was judged sufficient. + - Context impact: durable-context classification `no-change` — no new + adapter directory, generic runtime primitive, or hidden CLI route was + added, and no protocol/Quint change was made. This task only extended + the already-documented `pi_mutation_scope` adapter's internal recovery + logic (a new private sibling module, a new attempt field, a new + `AdmitDecision` variant) and added regression tests combining + already-documented, already-covered mechanisms (the Pi adapter and the + external-mutation guard, both already named in + `context/cli/mutation-trace-external-mutation-guard.md` and the root + docs at the level T03's own synced pass already settled). None of the + five root context files or the guard doc contain incorrect specifics + this task's changes would contradict. The Task context synchronization + phase should confirm this classification. + - **2026-09-17 repair pass context impact:** still `no-change` at the + five-root-context-file level (still no new adapter directory, runtime + primitive, hidden CLI route, or protocol/Quint change). The corrected + trigger-point behavior was, however, wrong to leave undocumented in + `context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`'s own "Stale-process + recovery (D10)" section, which previously described the exact-key + trigger as the mechanism without flagging it as insufficient — that + section is rewritten by this repair pass to describe the broad, + per-attempt reconciliation scan instead. `AdmitDecision::StaleOwnerAbandon` + is removed (no longer produced); nothing outside `pi_mutation_scope` + referenced it. + - Context synchronization: synced + +- [x] T05: `Wire mutation scope into the existing Pi extension` (status:done, completed 2026-09-17) + - Task ID: T05 + - Scope: In — modifying the canonical Pi extension source + `config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.ts` (not a second project-local SCE + extension) to register mutation lifecycle handlers in the frozen T01 order + (bash policy -> mutation Start -> edit/write diff pre-image) plus the + frozen execution/terminal lifecycle handlers, forwarding `tool_call` + (Start), `tool_result` (execution evidence), and `tool_execution_end` + (Close, gated on a prior `tool_result`) — `tool_execution_start` may still + be forwarded for telemetry but participates in no attribution state + (D5/D6/D7). Start, Executed, and Close are established purely from SCE + actually receiving these Pi events for a given `tool_call`; nothing here + depends on, checks, or gates on SCE's position in Pi's registered + extension array — Pi calls every registered extension's `tool_call` + handler in registration order (D5), so a later extension cannot prevent + SCE's own handler from running. + + **D9 — terminal transport failure denies subsequent tracked Starts and + never becomes a delayed Close.** Once a tracked tool has executed, losing + communication with the Rust adapter must not let later tracked work + proceed as though the previous terminal state were known: + + ```text + execution happened + ↓ + terminal mutation-scope transport (tool_execution_end) fails + ↓ + that exact attempt becomes unresolved in-process + ↓ + later tracked-tool Starts are denied (fail-closed) while unresolved + ↓ + once adapter communication becomes available again, recover the old + scope through abandon/rebaseline — never a delayed Close as though the + tool finished just now + ``` + + `tool_result` forwarding is never retried: a `tool_execution_end` that + later reaches the adapter with no recorded `tool_result` is already + correctly abandoned by the adapter's own D7 pairing rule, so this case is + sound with no new wire surface. `tool_execution_end` forwarding failure is + what this requirement protects: it is retried with backoff, and every + tracked-tool `tool_call` Start is denied while any `tool_execution_end` + delivery remains outstanding for this process. + + **Known residual case requiring a narrow Rust adapter addition.** When + `tool_result` already reached the adapter (the attempt is `Executed`) + before `tool_execution_end` transport failed, a later retried delivery of + the same `tool_execution_end` is wire-indistinguishable from an on-time + Close — the existing four `hook_event_name` values (`ToolExecutionStart`, + `ToolCall`, `ToolResult`, `ToolExecutionEnd`) give the adapter no way to + know the terminal event arrived late. Closing this exactly requires the + adapter to accept an explicit, attempt-scoped abandon request from the + extension — a fifth `hook_event_name` (e.g. `ToolExecutionAbandon`, + carrying the same `session_id`/`tool_call_id`/`cwd` identity as the other + events) that retires the named attempt through the existing D7/D8 + abandon/rebaseline pipeline regardless of whether its owning process is + still alive, rather than through D10's positive-process-death path. This + is new Rust surface T05 must add + (`cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/mod.rs`: parsing, a + `PiHookEvent::ExecutionAbandon` variant, and dispatch into the existing + abandon pipeline) — it does not exist today, and T05 is not + TypeScript-only merely because the rest of the wiring is. If this + sub-case is not closed, T05 must say so explicitly in its completion + record rather than describe D9 as fully sound. + + **Closed by the T05 repair pass (2026-09-17).** `PiHookEvent::ExecutionAbandon` + exists in `mod.rs` exactly as specified above, dispatches into the + existing D7/D8 abandon/rebaseline pipeline regardless of the attempt's + `PendingStart`/`Executed` phase, and never produces a Close. The + TypeScript extension's terminal-delivery tracker + (`config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.ts`) closes the wire-level + ambiguity this sub-case describes structurally, not merely by adding the + Rust route: it keys every in-flight attempt by `(session_id, + tool_call_id)` and always awaits that exact attempt's own `tool_result` + delivery outcome before choosing what to send for + `tool_execution_end` — so `tool_execution_end` can never reach the + subprocess boundary before its own `tool_result`, and Rust never has to + disambiguate an on-time Close from a late retried one. When `tool_result` + delivery is known to have failed, or when an already-successful attempt's + `tool_execution_end` delivery itself fails, the extension marks that + exact attempt unresolved, denies further tracked Starts while unresolved, + and sends `ToolExecutionAbandon` (retried with backoff) instead of a + (possibly stale) `ToolExecutionEnd`. This sub-case is fully closed, not an + open residual case. + + Also registers a `pi.on("user_bash", ...)` handler using Pi's **actual** + pinned `0.80.6` API — established directly from + `config/lib/node_modules/@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent/dist/core/extensions/types.d.ts` + and the real consumption logic in + `dist/modes/interactive/interactive-mode.js`'s `handleBashCommand()` + (D13), not the `tool_call`-only `{ block, reason }` shape: + + ```ts + interface UserBashEventResult { + operations?: BashOperations; + result?: BashResult; + } + ``` + + There is no `block`/`reason` member on this result. Pi's own dispatch + (`handleBashCommand()`) treats a truthy `result` as a full replacement — + it never calls `session.executeBash()` at all in that case — and + otherwise passes `operations` through to + `session.executeBash(command, onChunk, { excludeFromContext, operations })`. + Under D13's supervisor architecture, `operations` is **never** + `createLocalBashOperations()` or a wrapper around it — the real shell must + be spawned by the supervisor (T03), not by Pi/Node, so `wrappedOperations` + is a thin control-channel client: + + ```text + pi.on("user_bash", async (event) => { + if process.platform === "win32": + // D13's Windows disposition — unconditional refusal, not a + // transient failure. No supervisor is ever spawned on this + // platform; this is the same shape as the establishment-failure + // branch below, taken unconditionally, every time. + return { result: { output: "SCE does not support guarded + user_bash execution on Windows in this release; run this + command outside Pi.", exitCode: 1, cancelled: false, + truncated: false } } + + // Unconditional: SCE guards whatever user_bash event Pi actually + // dispatches to it. There is no dispatch-position self-check here — + // D13's accepted, documented limitation is that a competing + // extension may consume user_bash before Pi ever calls this + // handler, in which case there is nothing for SCE to gate. + spawn the external-mutation supervisor process (T03) with a + control channel (piped stdio or an equivalent IPC transport) + await its "armed" acknowledgement, bounded by an establishment + timeout (an availability bound on this one attempt, never a + staleness determination — D13); no shell exists yet in this + window, so the supervisor can be killed cleanly on failure + + on failure, missing-`sce`, spawn error, or an ambiguous/timed-out + acknowledgement: + terminate the spawned supervisor process so a lock it may + already hold is not left orphaned (D13 crash semantics; + safe here because no shell has been spawned yet) + return { result: { output: "", exitCode: 1, + cancelled: false, truncated: false } } + // Pi never calls session.executeBash(); no shell — supervised + // or otherwise — is ever invoked. + + on durable "armed" acknowledgement: + return { operations: wrappedOperations } + // wrappedOperations.exec(command, cwd, options) does NOT call + // createLocalBashOperations() or spawn any shell itself. It + // sends command/cwd/env to the already-armed supervisor over + // the control channel, relays each streamed output chunk to + // the caller's onData as it arrives, and forwards + // signal-driven cancellation and timeout expiry to the + // supervisor as explicit cancellation requests (the + // supervisor signals the real shell's process group, since + // only the supervisor holds its pid). exec() resolves only + // once the supervisor delivers the shell's real, + // supervisor-observed exit result (exit code + any final + // output) — never merely because the control channel closed. + // If Pi/Node's own process were to die at this point, the + // supervisor keeps running per D13's chosen Option A; there + // is nothing left in this process to resolve the promise, and + // that is an accepted, explicit consequence of Option A, not + // a bug to route around. + }) + ``` + + **No dispatch-safety self-check, no launcher, no extension-order + authority.** Earlier drafts of this task specified a `dispatchSafe` + in-process self-check gating both `user_bash` and tracked-tool Start + registration, and an SCE-hosted Pi launcher (`sce pi`, or a `PATH` + wrapper) that would own `ResourceLoader` construction and normalize the + resolved extension array (`sceEnforceExtensionOrder`) to prove SCE first + and exactly once. Both are retracted as a deliberate product decision + (see D13): SCE does not redistribute Pi, embed its SDK, or claim + authority over Pi's extension ordering. `dispatchSafe`, + `sceEnforceExtensionOrder`, the launcher host program, and any `sce pi` + entry point do not exist and must not be (re)built. Tracked-tool + attribution runs unconditionally whenever SCE's own `tool_call` handler + is invoked; the `user_bash` guard is established unconditionally whenever + SCE's own `user_bash` handler is invoked; neither depends on whether SCE + happens to be first among Pi's registered extensions. + + `sce setup --pi` continues to generate and install + `.pi/extensions/sce/index.ts` exactly as it does today — no new + packaging, wrapper, or entry point. `sce doctor`/`sce setup --pi` may + optionally report, as informational-only diagnostic text, that another + extension is configured ahead of where SCE would rank under naive + on-disk resolution; this is not a prerequisite for using the Pi + integration and must never gate or disable attribution. + + Existing mutation Start ordering remains unchanged. Synchronous + fail-closed Start transport, D9's terminal-transport handling above, and + preservation of existing Bash policy, conversation trace, edit/write + diff trace, message trace, Pi session prefix behavior, and tool-version + resolution. Using the existing generated Pi extension pipeline + (`config/lib` / Pkl sources) — no hand-edited generated copies; the + generated factory function is reused unmodified, exactly as it is today, + with no second integration path. Also in scope — the narrow Rust + `ExecutionAbandon` addition described above, if needed to close D9's + residual case; the unconditional Windows-refusal branch in the + `user_bash` handler; the external-mutation-guard client (arm, await + `Armed`, `exec`, cancellation/timeout forwarding, resolve-only-on-the- + supervisor's-own-result). + Out — any SCE-hosted Pi launcher, `sce pi` command, or Pi SDK embedding; + `sceEnforceExtensionOrder` or any other extension-array normalization; + npm/Nix/Flatpak release packaging changes to bundle Pi, Bun, or Pi's + `node_modules`; any Rust adapter change beyond T03/T04's existing + machinery plus the narrow `ExecutionAbandon` addition above if it proves + necessary; implementing the supervisor's own shell-spawn logic itself + (T03, already done); any Windows-side Rust/supervisor code (none exists — + refusal is entirely a TypeScript-extension-level branch). + - Dependencies: T04 + - Done when: + 1. `sce setup --pi` installs the normal generated Pi extension, unchanged + from today. + 2. A user launches ordinary `pi` — no wrapper, launcher, or alternate + entry point. + 3. `bash`, `edit`, and `write` establish mutation scope fail-closed + whenever SCE's own `tool_call` handler runs, independent of SCE's + position in the extension array. + 4. `read`, `grep`, `find`, `ls`, custom, and unknown tools remain + untracked, as specified. + 5. `tool_result` is the sole execution evidence (D6). + 6. An executed, terminal path Closes exactly once. + 7. An admitted-but-not-executed path abandons/rebaselines (D7), never + Closes. + 8. Terminal transport ambiguity follows D9 above and blocks subsequent + tracked Starts while unresolved; the `Executed`-then-transport-failed + sub-case is closed via the `ExecutionAbandon` Rust addition plus the + extension's per-attempt `(session_id, tool_call_id)`-keyed + terminal-delivery ordering, which also guarantees + `tool_execution_end` is never sent to Rust before its own + `tool_result` regardless of independent subprocess scheduling. + 9. `user_bash`, when Pi actually delivers it to SCE, executes only + through the T03 supervisor (arm -> `Armed` -> `exec`). + 10. Guard-establishment failure prevents shell execution. + 11. An ambiguous/timed-out `Armed` acknowledgement prevents shell + execution and terminates the orphaned supervisor. + 12. Cancellation/timeout is forwarded to the supervisor rather than + killing a local child. + 13. The supervisor's real result drives Pi's Bash result; nothing + resolves merely because the control channel closed. + 14. Normal Pi tracing/diff/bash-policy behavior remains intact. + 15. Windows: `user_bash` is unconditionally refused; tracked-tool + attribution is unaffected. + 16. No SCE-hosted Pi launcher or embedded Pi runtime exists. + 17. No `sce pi` command exists. + 18. No release-packaging changes were made. + + Bun tests (mocked subprocess transport) cover: bash-policy-denial-means- + no-Start, tracked-Start-success, tracked-Start-adapter-failure-blocks, + missing-`sce`-blocks, read-only/unknown-tool-means-no-adapter-call, + `tool_result`-keyed execution-evidence forwarding/state (never + `tool_execution_start`), successful/failed `tool_execution_end` gated on + a prior `tool_result`, `tool_execution_end`-without-`tool_result` + abandon, `tool_execution_end` deferred until its own `tool_result` + delivery settles and then sent strictly after it (never racing two + independently scheduled subprocesses), a failed `tool_result` delivery + immediately denying Starts and converting a later `tool_execution_end` + into `ToolExecutionAbandon` rather than a Close, a `tool_execution_end` + transport failure after a successful `tool_result` retrying as + `ToolExecutionAbandon` (never a delayed replayed End) via an injectable + synchronous retry seam, the same `toolCallId` under two different + `sessionId`s maintaining fully independent unresolved state, terminal + transport failure denying subsequent tracked Starts and recovering via + retry, `user_bash`-returns-`operations`-and-relays-to-the- + supervisor-rather-than-spawning-a-shell-itself, + `user_bash`-returns-`result`-full-replacement-and-never-calls- + `session.executeBash`-on-guard-establishment-failure, + `user_bash`-returns-`result`-full-replacement-and-terminates-the- + orphaned-supervisor-process-on-an-ambiguous-acknowledgement, + wrapped-`exec`-forwards-cancellation/timeout-to-the-supervisor-rather- + than-killing-a-local-child, wrapped-`exec`-resolves-only-on-the- + supervisor's-own-delivered-exit-result-never-merely-on-control-channel- + closure, `user_bash`-unconditionally-refused-on-Windows-with-no- + supervisor-spawn, model present/absent, session canonicalization, and + unchanged edit/write-diff and conversation tracing. + - Verify: `nix run nixpkgs#bun -- test config/lib`; `nix run .#pkl-check-generated`; + `nix flake check`; focused Rust tests + (`nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml pi_mutation_scope`) + if the `ExecutionAbandon` addition is implemented; plus a real scratch + `sce setup --pi` installation followed by running ordinary `pi` against + it (not `sce pi`) to exercise the tracked-tool and `user_bash` paths + end to end. + - Repair pass (2026-09-17, T05 soundness repair, not T06 work): fixed two + remaining soundness issues identified at head `3a6e2e9d1`: + (1) `ToolResult`/`ToolExecutionEnd` transport ordering — the extension's + terminal-delivery tracker is now keyed by `(session_id, tool_call_id)` + (never bare `toolCallId`) and `forwardEnd` always awaits the exact same + attempt's `forwardResult` delivery outcome before choosing what to send, + so `tool_execution_end` can never reach Rust before its own + `tool_result` regardless of independent subprocess scheduling; a failed + `tool_result` delivery now marks that exact attempt unresolved + immediately and converts any later `tool_execution_end` into + `ToolExecutionAbandon` rather than silently dropping it (the previous, + now-removed test explicitly accepted the drop — D9 requires it not be + best-effort); a `tool_execution_end` transport failure after a + successful `tool_result` likewise recovers via retried + `ToolExecutionAbandon`, never a delayed replayed `ToolExecutionEnd`. + (2) `user_bash` control-channel-close fabrication — `exec()` now rejects + when the guard's control channel closes before any `status: "result"` + frame, instead of resolving `{ exitCode: null }`; an explicit supervisor + `result(exit_code: null)` still resolves normally, confirmed by pinned + Pi `0.80.6` source (`executeBashWithOperations` in `bash-executor.js` + awaits `operations.exec()` in a try/catch and rethrows on non-abort + failure, confirming Promise rejection is the correct, native contract). + Added a matching Rust regression proving the same `toolCallId` under two + different `session_id`s never cross-contaminates `ExecutionAbandon` + resolution, plus a duplicate-`ExecutionAbandon`-is-a-safe-no-op + regression. Verified: `nix run nixpkgs#bun -- test config/lib` (49 + passed), `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path + cli/Cargo.toml pi_mutation_scope` (88 passed), `... test hooks::` (721 + passed, 1 ignored), `nix run .#pkl-check-generated` (142 files, parity + ok), `nix flake check` (all checks passed), `git diff --check` (clean). + Real scratch smoke: `sce setup --pi` + ordinary `pi` (not `sce pi`) + against a live model (`opencode-go/gpt-5.6-luna`) drove one real tracked + `bash` tool call end to end — the adapter's own durable state showed a + clean `PendingStart(seq=1) -> Executed -> Close -> removed` cycle with + `recovery: {"phase":"clear"}`, proving ordinary Pi's own subprocess + scheduling did not trigger the Problem-1 race under this fix. The + `user_bash` (`!command`) supervisor path could **not** be exercised + through a real interactive Pi session in this sandboxed environment: it + requires Pi's interactive TUI mode, which needs a real TTY — a + `printf '!...' | pi --approve --no-session` attempt hung waiting for a + terminal and was killed by timeout, and `--print` non-interactive mode + treats its argument as an LLM prompt, not a literal `!`-prefixed REPL + command, so it cannot reach `user_bash` at all. This is an environmental + limitation of this sandbox, not a code defect; the `user_bash` fix is + still fully covered by the Bun unit tests above (control-channel-close + rejection, explicit `exit_code: null` result) and by the pre-existing + Rust `guard_reconciliation_tests`/D13 integration tests, which continue + to pass unchanged. + - **2026-09-17 real interactive-TUI smoke evidence:** after reinstalling + the current branch's Pi integration, ordinary interactive `pi` loaded SCE. + Running `!sh -c 'printf "guarded\\n" >> human.txt; sleep 60'` visibly held + the command while an external terminal confirmed that + `/sce/mutation-cursor-tainted` existed. Cancelling the command + through Pi was followed by confirmation that the marker was absent. This + proves the normal `pi -> SCE user_bash -> arm -> Armed -> exec/supervisor` + path and cancellation/finalization cleanup in the real TUI. The previous + sandbox limitation is superseded; it no longer blocks T05 completion. + - Completed: 2026-09-17 + - Files changed: `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/mod.rs`; + `config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.ts`; + `config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.test.ts`; + `context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md` (4 files; no generated + `.pi` copy). + - Result: The canonical generated Pi extension now fail-closed gates + tracked `bash`/`edit`/`write` Starts, orders per-attempt terminal delivery + by `(session_id, tool_call_id)`, abandons unresolved terminal observations, + and routes human `user_bash` through the two-phase supervisor guard. It + refuses guarded `user_bash` on Windows without affecting tracked-tool + attribution, while preserving existing policy, diff, and conversation + tracing behavior. + - Verify outcome: All previously recorded T05 verification remains + satisfied — Bun tests (49 passed), focused Pi adapter tests (88 passed), + hook tests (721 passed, 1 ignored), generated-output parity (142 files), + and `nix flake check` all passed with clean `git diff --check`. The real + interactive-TUI smoke above supplies the previously missing `user_bash` + supervisor evidence. + - Context impact: root — the completed extension wiring changes the + externally observable Pi integration boundary; the five-file root pass + confirmed the current overview, architecture, glossary, patterns, and + context map, with stale Pi/guard availability statements corrected in + root and domain context. + - Context synchronization: synced + +- [x] T06: `Add production-path and live Pi attribution regressions` (status:done, completed 2026-09-18) + - Task ID: T06 + - Scope: In — extending the existing mutation-provenance production test + harness with Pi, driving real temporary Git repositories and real + repository-scoped Agent Trace databases through the Pi adapter, generic + mutation ingress, snapshot coordinator, scope provenance, + `mutation_trace_events`, `mutation_ai_patch`, post-commit intersection, and + Agent Trace JSON, covering: Pi bash/write/edit confirmed mutation with + `pi_` + model in Agent Trace; missing model preserving session + with `model` `NULL`; read/grep/find/ls and custom/unknown tools with zero + scope footprint; later-extension rejection after Start producing no + `mutation_ai_patch`; mutate-then-error still observing the final Git tree + through the confirmed Close; two overlapping Pi calls as independent + scopes with correct contended/confirmation behavior; one overlapping call + failing while the surviving scope's later confirmed interval remains + attributable; Pi+Claude, Pi+Codex, and Pi+OpenCode overlap under + confirmation-safe semantics; stale/dead Pi process recovery discarding the + old ambiguous interval while later fresh Pi work remains usable; + `user_bash` creating no Pi AI scope; and the D13 guard end to end: `Start + -> tool_result -> tool_execution_end` reaches confirmed `AiExclusive` + attribution; `Start -> no tool_result -> tool_execution_end` abandons and + never reaches AI attribution. + + Also, explicitly, both sides of the D13 guard, each as an end-to-end + regression: + + **Guard succeeds — cross-harness recovery, including the mid-command + race.** This is the regression that proves the lifetime property, not + merely a precondition: + + ```text + Pi scope A live + other-harness scope B live + + user_bash begins; guard durably established; supervisor spawns + the real shell as its own child + human write #1 + + B's boundary attempts to run while the guard is still active + => + blocks, then fails closed (CoordinateError::LockAcquisition); + no protocol or taint state is read, mutated, or cleared + + human write #2 + the shell itself terminates (never a control-channel signal) + => + forced database_failure + recover runs against the already-held + ProtectedWorktree; A and B abandoned; cursor rebaselined to the + final observed tree; only then is the marker cleared + + B's deferred boundary is retried + => + now succeeds normally against the recovered worktree + + assert: + both write #1 and write #2 remain excluded from positive AI + attribution for A and for B, on the harness that owned B, not + only on Pi's own + ``` + + Test at least one actual cross-harness path (Pi+Claude, Pi+Codex, or + Pi+OpenCode), and retain the broader Pi+Claude / Pi+Codex / Pi+OpenCode + overlap coverage already required above. Also test, as a variant of the + same regression, the two death modes D13 requires an exact policy for: + + ```text + variant — supervisor dies mid-command (Unix): + human write #1; SIGKILL the supervisor directly; assert a + foreign coordinate() attempted at this point still fails closed + with LockAcquisition (the shell's inherited fd keeps the lock + held); human write #2; the shell exits on its own; assert the + lock frees only now, and the next coordinate() on this worktree + (from either harness) self-heals via the existing + inherited-taint path; both writes remain excluded from positive + AI attribution for A and B alike + + variant — Pi/Node dies mid-command (chosen Option A): + human write #1; kill the Pi/Node control process; assert the + supervisor does not signal the shell and does not finish early; + human write #2; the shell exits on its own; assert the + supervisor still runs its normal finish sequence with nothing + listening on the dead control channel; both writes remain + excluded from positive AI attribution for A and B alike + ``` + + Then, in the same regression, verify recovery does not permanently + poison the checkout: + + ```text + recover + abandon/rebaseline + fresh Start(C) on the same worktree + clean AI mutation + tool_result(C) + tool_execution_end(C) + => C may reach AiExclusive + ``` + + **Guard fails to establish — command never executes.** + + ```text + Pi scope A live + other-harness scope B may be live + + user_bash + guard-establishment fails (lock-acquisition timeout, + marker-persistence failure, or spawn/transport failure) + + assert: + the handler returns { result: ... } full replacement + no shell — supervised or otherwise — is ever spawned by + Pi/Node or by the supervisor + human command did NOT execute + filesystem mutation did NOT occur + A/B remain unaffected by a nonexistent human mutation + no false AI attribution was introduced + ``` + + Also test ambiguous begin acknowledgement: + + ```text + supervisor process durably acquires the lock and persists the + marker (no shell spawned yet in this window) + caller's acknowledgement is lost or times out + user command blocked; caller terminates the orphaned supervisor + process + + later boundary + => + conservative recovery occurs, since the killed process's death + releases the lock immediately in this window — no shell exists + yet to hold a duplicated fd (positive death evidence, not a + timeout-based staleness guess) + ``` + + That case is allowed to lose attribution (an accepted false negative); + it must never lose safety. Also test guard-finalization failure end to + end: force the finish-time recovery commit to fail; assert the + supervisor reports failure, the marker remains armed, and the next + boundary on that worktree self-heals via the existing inherited-taint + path rather than silently proceeding as if attribution were clean. + + Also test the accepted competing-`user_bash`-extension limitation D13 + documents, so the boundary is proven rather than merely asserted in + prose: + + ```text + variant — a competing extension consumes user_bash before SCE: + register a second extension, ranked ahead of SCE under Pi's normal + on-disk resolution, whose own user_bash handler returns a truthy + result or operations; trigger !command; + + assert: + Pi never invokes SCE's own user_bash handler for this command + (no supervisor process is spawned, no arm request occurs) + this is the expected, documented outcome, not a test failure — + SCE makes no guard claim for an event Pi never dispatched + to it + a tracked bash/edit/write tool call in the SAME session still + establishes mutation scope normally, proving this + limitation is scoped to user_bash dispatch interception and + does not weaken tracked-tool attribution + ``` + + Also a pinned real-Pi smoke covering + bash, write, edit, SCE Start failure, later extension rejection, execution + error, and model provenance. This smoke, like T01's fixtures, runs on + Linux; also add a Windows-specific pinned real-Pi smoke (D13's Windows + disposition) covering: (a) `user_bash` unconditionally refused — the + handler returns the `result` full-replacement, no supervisor process + exists on Windows at all, and the human command never executes; (b) a + tracked `bash`/`edit`/`write` tool call on the same Windows session still + reaches confirmed `AiExclusive` normally, proving refusal is scoped to + `user_bash` alone. Do not claim AC1's Windows coverage is equivalent to + Linux's beyond what this smoke actually exercises — record the + difference in this task's record rather than asserting parity. Out — + weakening any regression because the conservative runtime produces less + positive attribution than expected — fix the expectation or the + lifecycle design per the formal semantics instead. + - Dependencies: T05 + - Done when: Pi has the same production-path mutation-attribution confidence + as Claude, Codex, and OpenCode — confirmed exclusive evidence can reach + final Agent Trace provenance; uncertain, blocked, failed-to-observe, or + ambiguous execution cannot. + - Verify (task-level; the plan-wide **Full validation** section — including + `nix flake check` and the Quint suite — is deferred to `/validate` and is + not part of this task's own Verify): + `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml hooks::`; + `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml pi_mutation_scope`; + `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml mutation_trace`; + `nix run nixpkgs#bun -- test config/lib`; `cargo fmt --check`; `biome check`; + `cargo clippy --all-targets -D warnings`; `git diff --check`; baseline diff + over `config/schema/agent-trace.schema.json` and + `cli/migrations/agent-trace-repository/` against + `opencode-mutation-scope-integration` (expected empty). + - Completed: 2026-09-18 (reopened same day for a completion-evidence + correction, then re-completed once the real Pi-runtime smoke below was + obtained — see **Real Pi-runtime smoke (2026-09-18 correction)**). + - Files changed: `cli/src/services/hooks/mod.rs`; + `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/mod.rs`; + `config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.test.ts`; + `config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/provider-extension.ts`; + `config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/driver.mjs`; + `config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/run.sh` (6 files; test-only, no + production code, schema, or migration changed). + - Result: Added 12 Pi production-path cases to the existing + `mutation_provenance_e2e` harness (bash/write/edit confirmed attribution + with session+model; missing-model NULL; zero-footprint read-only/custom + tools including a `user_bash`-named-tool proxy; later-extension-rejection + abandonment; mutate-then-error through confirmed Close; concurrent + reject/confirm; Pi+Claude, Pi+Codex, Pi+OpenCode overlap; stale-process + recovery with fresh-work reachability) plus a new `#[cfg(test)]` seam + (`force_attempt_owner_dead_for_tests`) needed to drive dead-owner recovery + from that module. Added 2 new D13 guard end-to-end regressions to + `guard_reconciliation_tests` (mid-command race with a foreign harness scope + failing closed then succeeding on retry; guard-triggered abandonment not + poisoning a later fresh Pi scope) — the remaining AC19–AC23 sub-scenarios + (supervisor-SIGKILL, control-channel death, finalization failure, + parent-pid, establishment-timeout, ambiguous acknowledgement) were already + exact-match covered, harness-neutrally, by the five pre-existing + `external_mutation_guard.rs` runtime tests, since D13's supervisor + mechanism is generic and Pi is only its current caller — duplicating them + with a Pi-specific wrapper would not add coverage. Added a pinned **Pi + capture-replay smoke** (Linux) — also describable as a pinned Pi + lifecycle-fixture replay; covering bash/write/edit, SCE Start failure, + later-extension rejection, execution error, model provenance — that + replays T01's exact captured JSONL fixtures (real Pi 0.80.6 lifecycle + events) through the extension's real registered handlers against a real + temporary Git repository. This proves real Pi capture shape -> real SCE + extension handlers -> expected forwarding behavior. **It does not execute + the actual Pi 0.80.6 runtime/process**, does not exercise Pi's own + extension auto-discovery/dispatch, and is not a substitute for a real + Pi-runtime smoke — this record previously mislabeled it "pinned real-Pi + smoke"; that label is retracted, the test itself is retained and renamed + in `sce-pi-extension.test.ts`. A live model-authenticated Pi session could + not be driven in this sandbox (no `~/.pi/agent/auth.json` credentials), + matching the environmental limitation T05 already documented for its own + real-TUI evidence — that explains why a live-model session wasn't used + for this capture-replay smoke; it does not make capture-replay equivalent + to a real-Pi-runtime smoke. Added a Windows-specific variant of the same + capture-replay method (same caveat: not a native Windows run and not a + real-Pi-runtime smoke) that overrides `process.platform` to `"win32"` + inside the same Linux test process, proving `user_bash` is unconditionally + refused there while tracked-tool attribution is unaffected. Added one + further TypeScript test proving the + accepted competing-`user_bash`-extension limitation (D13/AC22): a + synthetic extension ranked ahead of SCE in the dispatch loop consumes + `user_bash` before SCE's own handler ever runs (no supervisor spawn), while + a tracked `bash` call in the same session is unaffected — this, too, could + not be exercised through a live interactive Pi TUI session in this sandbox + (`user_bash` is TUI-keystroke-only per T01's own NOTES.md evidence), so it + is proven via Pi's documented first-truthy-wins dispatch order instead. + - Verify outcome: `cargo test … hooks::` 735 passed, 1 ignored, 0 failed + (includes the 12 new `pi_*` production-path cases and the 2 new + cross-harness guard cases); `cargo test … pi_mutation_scope` 90 passed, 0 + failed; `cargo test … mutation_trace` 396 passed, 0 failed; `bun test + config/lib` 58 passed, 0 failed (57 pre-existing/smoke + 1 new + competing-extension case); `cargo fmt --check` and `biome check` both + clean after auto-formatting the new code; `cargo clippy --all-targets -D + warnings` clean (one new test needed the same + `#[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)]` precedent already used elsewhere in + this file); `git diff --check` clean; baseline diff over + `config/schema/agent-trace.schema.json` and + `cli/migrations/agent-trace-repository/` against + `opencode-mutation-scope-integration` is empty (AC17 holds). Full + `nix flake check` / Quint suite from **Full validation** was not + separately re-run for this test-only change beyond the targeted + cargo/bun/fmt/clippy/diff-check commands above; run it as part of + `/validate`. + - **Post-completion cleanup:** per repo convention and explicit user + instruction, all explanatory comments added or touched in + `cli/src/services/hooks/mod.rs`, `cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/mod.rs`, + and `config/lib/pi-plugin/sce-pi-extension.test.ts` during this task were + removed (doc comments, section banners, and inline "why" notes alike). + `cargo fmt --check`, `biome check`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -D + warnings`, the `pi_mutation_scope`/`hooks::` cargo suites, and `bun test + config/lib` were all re-run clean afterward. + - **Real Pi-runtime smoke (2026-09-18 correction):** this record originally + mislabeled the capture-replay smoke above "pinned real-Pi smoke." That was + retracted (see the corrected Result text above); T06 was reopened + (`status:todo`) until a genuine real-Pi-runtime smoke existed, per the + task's own original scope. Investigation into pinned Pi `0.80.6` + (`config/lib/node_modules/@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent`, + `docs/custom-provider.md` and `docs/sdk.md`) found a supported, + credential-free path: extensions may call `pi.registerProvider()` with a + `streamSimple` implementation that fully replaces the network call (no + HTTP request is made), and `@earendil-works/pi-ai` ships its own official + scripted-response test harness for exactly this (`createFauxCore` / + `fauxAssistantMessage` / `fauxToolCall`, from `providers/faux.js`) — a + supported Pi test mechanism, not an invented one. Separately, + `createAgentSession()`'s `DefaultResourceLoader` discovers + `.pi/extensions/` from `cwd`, the same auto-discovery ordinary `pi` uses, + so a scratch repo's real `sce setup --pi`-installed extension loads + through Pi's own normal mechanism, not a hand-built API shim. No live + model call, network access, or `~/.pi/agent/auth.json` credential is + involved anywhere in this path. + + Built and ran this end to end: `config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/` + (`provider-extension.ts` — a throwaway `.pi/extensions/test-provider/` + scripting one `bash` tool call via `createFauxCore`, then a `done` text + turn; `driver.mjs` — an SDK driver using `createAgentSession` + + `DefaultResourceLoader` + `session.setModel()` + `session.prompt()`; + `run.sh` — builds `sce` from this branch's own source via + `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh build --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml`, + creates a fresh scratch Git repo, runs the real `sce setup --pi` with that + binary on `PATH`, copies in the test-provider extension, runs the driver, + then queries the scratch repo's own repository-scoped Agent Trace DB via + the pinned `nix run .#turso`). Reproduce with: + `bash config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/run.sh`. + + First attempt showed zero mutation-trace rows despite the bash mutation + happening — diagnosed as a test-environment bug, not a production one: + the generated extension's `spawnSync("sce", ["hooks", "pi-mutation-scope"])` + resolved to a stale, globally-installed `sce` on the host `PATH` + (predating this branch, with no `pi-mutation-scope` hook subcommand at + all) rather than this branch's freshly built binary. Prepending this + branch's `cli/target/debug` to `PATH` before running `sce setup --pi` and + the driver fixed it. Observed durable evidence, queried directly from the + scratch repository-scoped `agent-trace.db`: + `mutation_trace_scopes`: `actor_kind = pi`, `status = closed`, scope ID + exactly matching D1's canonical format + (`pi-tool-v1|n=1|s=36:|c=16:sce-smoke-bash-1`). + `mutation_trace_events`: `boundary_kind = close`, + `attribution_kind = ai_exclusive`, `tainted = 0`, `failure_kind = healthy`. + `mutation_trace_scope_provenance`: `session_id = pi_`, + `model_id = sce-test-provider/sce-test-model`. This satisfies all of: the + tracked `bash` tool executed through Pi's real tool-dispatch engine; the + SCE extension loaded via normal Pi discovery, not manual registration; + real `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` reached the Rust adapter before + execution (fail-closed Start honored); `ToolResult`/`ToolExecutionEnd` + reached it in real Pi order; the attempt closed cleanly; the resulting + Git mutation reached confirmed `AiExclusive`, not contended or ambiguous; + and session/model provenance reached the final durable row. Reproduced + twice independently (once directly, once by a parallel investigation) + with matching results each time. + + Scope discipline: `bash` only, per this task's own "prefer bash as the + minimum tracked tool" guidance; `edit`/`write` were not additionally + exercised through the real runtime, matching the instruction not to + duplicate the capture-replay matrix just to satisfy the word "smoke." + T06's original Done-when was not weakened; this closes it as originally + written. `[x] T06 ... (status:done)` is restored. The capture-replay + smoke and this real-runtime smoke remain two distinct, separately labeled + evidence types, per the task record above and + `context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md`. + - Context impact: `context/cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md` updated to + record the real Pi-runtime smoke alongside the existing real-TUI + (`user_bash`) evidence, distinct from the capture-replay smoke. No other + root context file, schema, migration, or public interface changed. + - **Real Pi-runtime smoke self-verification hardening (2026-09-18 repair, + PR #278):** `run.sh` previously printed the durable evidence rows without + asserting them, so the smoke could exit 0 having proven nothing — exactly + the failure mode the first attempt above already hit once (stale global + `sce` on `PATH` silently produced zero mutation-trace rows). Repaired + `config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/run.sh` only (`driver.mjs` and + `provider-extension.ts` unchanged) to close that gap: + it now asserts, via the pinned `nix run .#turso -- --experimental-multiprocess-wal + --readonly -m list -q` (machine-readable pipe-delimited `list` output, + not the pretty table), exact-cardinality `SELECT COUNT(*)` checks — + total Pi scopes = 1, closed Pi scopes = 1, one `close`/`ai_exclusive`/ + `tainted=0`/`healthy` event, one `mutation_trace_scope_provenance` row + with `session_id LIKE 'pi_%'` and the expected `model_id`, and zero + `mutation_trace_worktrees` rows left `tainted`/`needs_rebaseline`/ + unhealthy — plus that `smoke-output.txt` exists and contains + `sce-real-pi-smoke`, and that `sce doctor`'s reported + `agent_trace_db.path` is non-empty, non-null, and exists on disk before + querying it. Any failed assertion prints a diagnostic and exits non-zero; + a successful exit now entails a passing assertion, not merely a + completed process. The stale-`sce` regression is now structurally + prevented, not just fixed once: `run.sh` builds and calls + `"$sce_bin" setup --pi --non-interactive` / + `"$sce_bin" doctor --format json` by absolute path (no `PATH` reliance), + and, immediately before the real Pi driver runs (inside the same + `nix develop` invocation used to run it, after re-prepending the + branch-built `cli/target/debug` onto `PATH` so `nix develop`'s own PATH + setup cannot let a stale global `sce` win back), asserts + `command -v sce` resolves, after `realpath`, to + `$repo_root/cli/target/debug/sce`, failing before Pi starts otherwise. + `node driver.mjs` now runs through `nix develop -c bash -c '... node + driver.mjs ...'` instead of bare `node`, per this repo's Nix-only + tooling rule. Setup is explicit `--pi --non-interactive`, with a scratch + `.sce/config.json` (`agent_trace.auto_sync: false`) written before setup + so the automated run can never opt into uploading Agent Traces; no + control-plane upload or login occurs. Every flake-relative invocation + (`nix develop`, `nix run .#turso`) now runs inside a `(cd "$repo_root" && + ...)` subshell, so `run.sh` behaves identically regardless of the + caller's working directory (verified by running it from `/tmp`). + Additionally, `XDG_STATE_HOME` is now scoped to each run's own scratch + directory: the scratch repo's Agent Trace repository identity is derived + from a fixed synthetic remote URL, so without this the repository-scoped + Agent Trace DB would previously have been the same persistent file + reused (and accumulated into) across every run, which would have made + the new exact-cardinality assertions fail on any run after the first — + this was found and fixed during this repair, not merely asserted safe. + Proved the assertions are load-bearing by temporarily changing the + "closed Pi mutation scopes" expectation from 1 to 2 and re-running the + full smoke end to end: it failed with `FAIL: closed Pi mutation scopes: + expected '2', got '1'` and a non-zero exit, then the expectation was + reverted and the smoke re-run clean (`PASS: real Pi runtime + mutation-attribution smoke`, exit 0) — this reproduces the exact same + durable evidence already recorded above (same scope/event/provenance + shape, fresh Pi session UUIDs each run), so this repair reproves rather + than reopens T06's runtime claim. Reproduce with: + `cd /tmp && /config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/run.sh`. + - Context synchronization: synced + +## Open questions + +None. T01 owns every lifecycle fact that could invalidate this design, and a contradictory finding there is a re-planning gate, not a deferred guess. The one dependency question this plan started with — whether to wait for PR #276 to merge, redo its protocol generalization here, or stack directly on its branch — was resolved during planning: this plan stacks on PR #276's head per **Stack and base**. + +## Validation Report + +**Status:** validated +**Date:** 2026-09-18 + +### Commands run + +- `nix run .#quint -- typecheck spec/mutation_cursor.qnt` -> exit 0 (typecheck clean) +- `nix run .#quint -- test spec/mutation_cursor.qnt` -> exit 0 (`mutation_cursor` suite passed) +- `nix build .#checks.x86_64-linux.mutation-trace-quint-connect` -> exit 0 (build succeeded) +- `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml pi_mutation_scope` -> exit 0 (90 passed, 0 failed) +- `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml mutation_trace` -> exit 0 (396 passed, 0 failed) +- `nix develop -c ./scripts/run-cli-cargo.sh test --manifest-path cli/Cargo.toml hooks::` -> exit 0 (735 passed, 1 ignored, 0 failed) +- `nix run nixpkgs#bun -- test config/lib` -> exit 0 (58 passed, 0 failed) +- `nix run .#pkl-check-generated` -> exit 0 (142 files, ephemeral generation matches committed output) +- `nix flake check` -> exit 0 (all checks passed: cli-tests, cli-clippy, cli-fmt, mutation-trace-quint-connect, cli-generated-input, pkl-generated, codex-hook-command, npm/config-lib bun+biome checks, workflow-actionlint, native-portability-audit, flatpak-static-validation, cargo-sources-parity, flatpak-manifest-parity) +- `git diff --check` -> exit 0 (clean, no whitespace/conflict markers) +- `git diff origin/opencode-mutation-scope-integration...HEAD -- config/schema/agent-trace.schema.json cli/migrations/agent-trace-repository/` -> exit 0 (empty diff) +- `git diff origin/opencode-mutation-scope-integration...HEAD -- cli/src/services/mutation_trace/protocol.rs spec/mutation_cursor.qnt spec/mutation_cursor.md` -> exit 0 (104 insertions/11 deletions across exactly these 3 files; every added line is Pi-shaped: `ActorKind::Pi` added to `requires_boundary_confirmation`, one new `Scope6`/Pi Quint scope constant, Pi-specific Quint test scenarios and doc wording; no new protocol fields or structural changes) +- `bash config/lib/pi-plugin/real-pi-runtime-smoke/run.sh` (run from `/tmp`, independent of T06's own run) -> exit 0 (`PASS: real Pi runtime mutation-attribution smoke`; real Pi 0.80.6 SDK session via `createFauxCore`/`DefaultResourceLoader`, real `sce setup --pi`-installed extension via ordinary auto-discovery, real `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` dispatch; durable evidence: 1 Pi mutation scope, closed; 1 `close`/`ai_exclusive`/`tainted=0`/`healthy` event; 1 provenance row `session_id=pi_`, `model_id=sce-test-provider/sce-test-model`; 0 tainted/unresolved worktrees) + +### Success-criteria verification + +- [x] AC1: exact Pi 0.80.6 lifecycle evidence exists -> T01's committed fixtures/report (`cli/src/services/hooks/pi_mutation_scope/fixtures/`) remain in the tree; re-confirmed against the final implementation by the independent real-Pi-runtime smoke reproduction above, which reproduces the exact `tool_call`/`tool_result`/`tool_execution_end` ordering and produces the expected confirmed-Close outcome. +- [x] AC2: `bash`/`edit`/`write` each establish one scope before execution -> `mutation_provenance_e2e::pi_bash_mutation_persists_model_and_session_in_agent_trace`, `pi_edit_mutation_persists_model_and_session_in_agent_trace`, `pi_write_mutation_persists_model_and_session_in_agent_trace` (all passing in the `hooks::` run), plus the real-runtime smoke's `bash` scope. +- [x] AC3: read-only/`user_bash`/unknown tools create no scope -> `pi_mutation_scope::tests::classification_table` and `mutation_provenance_e2e::pi_read_only_and_unknown_tools_create_no_scope_or_mutation_state` passing. +- [x] AC4: failed Start blocks the tool before execution -> `pi_mutation_scope::tests::run_from_payload_fails_closed_when_a_tracked_start_cannot_resolve_its_checkout` passing. +- [x] AC5: positive attribution requires confirming Close, keyed on `tool_result`-then-`tool_execution_end` -> `runtime_seam_tests::a_write_start_result_close_lands_a_real_ai_exclusive_event_with_pi_provenance` and the Quint `requires_boundary_confirmation`/close-pairing model (typecheck + test suite green) passing. +- [x] AC6: unconfirmed Pi scope suppresses attribution across harnesses -> `mutation_provenance_e2e::pi_and_claude_overlap_produces_ai_contended`, `pi_and_codex_overlap_stays_ineligible_until_codex_confirms`, `pi_and_opencode_overlap_stays_ineligible_until_opencode_confirms` passing; Quint `testUnconfirmedPiScopeBlocksCrossHarnessAttribution` in the passing Quint suite. +- [x] AC7: confirming Close yields `AiExclusive`/`AiContended` correctly -> same `pi_and_*_overlap` tests plus `runtime_seam_tests::a_write_start_result_close_lands_a_real_ai_exclusive_event_with_pi_provenance`, and the real-runtime smoke's single-scope `AiExclusive` result. +- [x] AC8: earlier-extension/bash-policy rejection creates no scope; later-extension rejection abandons, never Closes -> `runtime_seam_tests::a_start_followed_by_no_execution_abandons_through_the_real_runtime`, `lifecycle_tests::tool_execution_end_without_a_preceding_tool_result_abandons_never_closes`, `mutation_provenance_e2e::pi_later_extension_rejection_after_start_produces_no_mutation_ai_patch` all passing. +- [x] AC9: `isError` execution still produces `tool_result` and observes the final tree through the same Close -> `mutation_provenance_e2e::pi_mutate_then_error_still_persists_confirmed_mutation_through_close` passing. +- [x] AC10: overlapping Pi calls stay independent scopes -> `mutation_provenance_e2e::pi_concurrent_reject_and_confirm_keeps_only_the_confirmed_mutation_ai`, `lifecycle_tests::abandoning_one_sibling_never_touches_a_concurrent_sibling_in_the_same_session` passing. +- [x] AC11: lost/failed terminal boundary is never replayed as current -> `lifecycle_tests::a_terminal_recovery_flush_failure_leaves_a_pending_recovery_and_denies_new_admission`, `a_crash_mid_abandon_loop_is_resumed_and_completed_on_the_next_boundary_lock_acquisition` passing. +- [x] AC12: stale-process cleanup requires positive death evidence only -> `lifecycle_tests::a_dead_owner_scope_is_recovered_while_a_live_owner_sibling_survives_untouched`, `multiple_dead_owner_scopes_are_retired_in_one_recovery_generation_while_a_live_sibling_survives`, `a_pending_start_attempt_never_blocks_a_concurrent_new_admission` passing. +- [x] AC13: Start provenance stores canonical `pi_` + model or `NULL` -> `mutation_provenance_e2e::pi_missing_model_preserves_session_with_null_model_in_agent_trace` and the three `pi_*_mutation_persists_model_and_session_in_agent_trace` tests passing; independently reconfirmed by the real-runtime smoke's `mutation_trace_scope_provenance` row (`session_id=pi_`, `model_id=sce-test-provider/sce-test-model`). +- [x] AC14: existing Pi Bash policy/conversation-trace/diff-trace/setup/doctor remain intact -> `nix run nixpkgs#bun -- test config/lib` 58/58 passing (bash-policy-plugin, pi-plugin, mutation-scope-plugin suites), and the real-runtime smoke's `sce setup --pi` / `sce doctor --format json` path succeeding end to end. +- [x] AC15: only confirmed exclusive Pi evidence reaches `mutation_ai_patch` -> `pi_later_extension_rejection_after_start_produces_no_mutation_ai_patch` (negative) plus the `pi_bash/edit/write_mutation_persists_model_and_session_in_agent_trace` tests (positive), all passing against a real Git/DB harness. +- [x] AC16: cross-harness Pi overlap (Pi+Claude, Pi+Codex, Pi+OpenCode) -> `pi_and_claude_overlap_produces_ai_contended`, `pi_and_codex_overlap_stays_ineligible_until_codex_confirms`, `pi_and_opencode_overlap_stays_ineligible_until_opencode_confirms` all passing. +- [x] AC17: no new Agent Trace schema or migration -> targeted baseline diff over `config/schema/agent-trace.schema.json` and `cli/migrations/agent-trace-repository/` against `opencode-mutation-scope-integration` is empty. +- [x] AC18: protocol/Quint change limited to the Pi confirmation-required case -> targeted baseline diff over `protocol.rs`/`spec/mutation_cursor.qnt`/`spec/mutation_cursor.md` shows exactly 3 files, 104 insertions/11 deletions, every added line Pi-shaped (see Commands run); no new `protocol.rs` structures. +- [x] AC19: guarded `user_bash` lifetime spans the real shell process, not the supervisor or control channel; Windows refuses -> `external_mutation_guard::tests::a_supervisor_killed_without_unlocking_leaves_the_flock_held_by_the_spawned_shell`, `closing_the_control_channel_does_not_trigger_finish_or_signal_the_shell`, `graceful_completion_waits_for_an_inherited_background_descendant`, `output_is_consumed_while_a_background_descendant_holds_the_lifetime_token` (all in the passing `mutation_trace` run) plus the TS `describe("Windows-specific pinned Pi capture-replay smoke (D13 disposition)")` / `test("refuses unconditionally on win32")` cases in the passing `bun test config/lib` run. +- [x] AC20: post-recovery fresh scopes still reach `AiExclusive` -> `mutation_provenance_e2e::pi_stale_process_recovery_discards_ambiguous_interval_while_fresh_pi_work_remains_usable` and `external_mutation_guard::tests::a_concurrent_foreign_lock_attempt_times_out_while_the_guard_is_active` passing. +- [x] AC21: guard-establishment failure never spawns a shell; supervisor is the real spawner -> `external_mutation_guard::tests::lost_armed_acknowledgement_cannot_spawn_or_mutate`, `a_failed_finish_commit_leaves_the_marker_armed_and_reports_failure`, `lifetime_token_establishment_failure_cannot_emit_armed`, `the_spawned_shells_parent_is_the_calling_process`, `armed_guard_waits_for_exec_and_drops_without_spawning_on_eof` all passing. +- [x] AC22: `sce setup --pi` + ordinary `pi` auto-discovery drives tracked-tool attribution; competing extension is a documented boundary -> independently reproduced by the real-Pi-runtime smoke (ordinary `sce setup --pi`, real Pi auto-discovery, real `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` dispatch, `AiExclusive` result) for the tracked-tool path; TS `test("a competing extension consuming user_bash ahead of SCE prevents SCE's handler from ever running, while tracked-tool attribution in the same session is unaffected")` passing for the documented-boundary path. The interactive `!`/`!!` guard-establishment portion of this AC's Validate text remains evidenced only by the unit/integration guard tests and T05's documented environmental limitation (no `~/.pi/agent/auth.json`, no live TUI in this sandbox) — an unchanged, previously accepted limitation, not a new gap. +- [x] AC23: control-process death never truncates a running `user_bash` command or ends the guard early -> `external_mutation_guard::tests::closing_the_control_channel_does_not_trigger_finish_or_signal_the_shell` passing, matching this AC's exact scenario. + +### Failed checks and follow-ups + +- None. + +### Residual risks + +- AC19/AC22's interactive `!`/`!!` guard-establishment path against a live, credential-authenticated Pi TUI session was not exercised in this sandbox (no `~/.pi/agent/auth.json`); coverage rests on the `external_mutation_guard` unit/integration suite plus T05's real-TUI evidence for the non-guard path, a limitation already documented at task completion, not introduced by this validation. +- T06's own record notes Windows tracked-tool (`bash`/`edit`/`write`) parity with the Linux captures is inferred from source (plain JS/TS control flow, no OS syscalls) rather than directly captured on Windows; the Windows-specific evidence obtained is a same-process `process.platform` override, not a native Windows run. + + diff --git a/context/sce/pi-extension-runtime.md b/context/sce/pi-extension-runtime.md index 81db7db25..3ce419e22 100644 --- a/context/sce/pi-extension-runtime.md +++ b/context/sce/pi-extension-runtime.md @@ -97,6 +97,34 @@ Rust `conversation-trace` intake applies the same idempotent `pi_` prefix to both message and part session IDs, while skipped and batch-failure diagnostics retain the original producer-native session ID. +## Implemented slice: mutation-scope lifecycle + +- `tool_call` gates the tracked built-ins `bash`, `edit`, and `write` through + the hidden `sce hooks pi-mutation-scope` command and blocks fail-closed when + attribution cannot be established. Read-only, custom, and unknown tools do + not invoke the adapter. +- `tool_result` is forwarded as execution evidence; `tool_execution_end` is + delivered only after that exact attempt's result delivery settles. A missing + result or terminal transport failure uses the adapter's abandon/rebaseline + path rather than fabricating a Close. `tool_execution_start` is telemetry + only. +- Terminal delivery state is keyed by `(session_id, tool_call_id)` and blocks + later tracked Starts while unresolved. Pi session and model provenance are + captured at Start admission. + +## Implemented slice: guarded user Bash + +- `user_bash` uses Pi 0.80.6's `{ operations, result }` API. On Unix it arms + `sce hooks external-mutation-guard`, waits for durable `Armed`, and returns + operations that relay the command, output, cancellation, and final result to + the supervisor; Pi/Node never spawns the shell locally. On Windows it + returns a full replacement failure result and never executes the command. +- The human command never creates a Pi AI scope. When SCE receives the event, + the supervisor's guard remains active through shell termination and cleanup. +- A real interactive-TUI smoke confirmed marker presence during a running + `!` command and marker cleanup after Pi cancellation; see + [`Pi mutation-scope integration`](../cli/pi-mutation-scope-integration.md). + ## Asset pipeline, install, and doctor coverage - For repository builds, a pre-Cargo step evaluates the canonical Pkl model and @@ -115,7 +143,7 @@ retain the original producer-native session ID. ## Deferred non-goals -User-shell `!`/`!!` policy enforcement and bash-mutation diff tracing are +User-shell `!`/`!!` policy enforcement and bash-mutation diff tracing remain deferred (see `context/plans/pi-extension-sce-integration.md`). See also: [generated-opencode-plugin-registration.md](generated-opencode-plugin-registration.md), diff --git a/spec/mutation_cursor.md b/spec/mutation_cursor.md index 404b3dadb..a93dd1543 100644 --- a/spec/mutation_cursor.md +++ b/spec/mutation_cursor.md @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ new scope → Active Attribution is computed for the transition observed *at a boundary*, and is: -- any unconfirmed live confirmation-required scope (Codex or OpenCode) on the worktree → `IneligibleUnscoped`; +- any unconfirmed live confirmation-required scope (Codex, OpenCode, or Pi) on the worktree → `IneligibleUnscoped`; - otherwise zero active AI scopes → `IneligibleUnscoped`; - otherwise one active AI scope → `AiExclusive(scope)`; - otherwise two or more active AI scopes → `AiContended`. @@ -136,11 +136,11 @@ Failure and external-taint states can only weaken attribution to `IneligibleUnsc ## Unconfirmed confirmation-required scopes -Some actors are **confirmation-required**: `requiresBoundaryConfirmation` is `true` for `Codex` and `OpenCode`, `false` for `ClaudeCode` and `Pi`. +Some actors are **confirmation-required**: `requiresBoundaryConfirmation` is `true` for `Codex`, `OpenCode`, and `Pi`, `false` for `ClaudeCode`. -A confirmation-required actor's `Start` is a write-ahead admission boundary. It records that SCE established the scope before the harness's aggregate pre-tool decision was known — not that the tool ultimately executed. An arbitrary third-party sibling pre-tool hook can deny the execution after SCE's own `Start` succeeded, an OpenCode tool can fail its own in-tool permission or validation check after `tool.execute.before`, and neither harness exposes an aggregate-denial signal, so the resulting scope state is indistinguishable from a genuinely running one. +A confirmation-required actor's `Start` is a write-ahead admission boundary. It records that SCE established the scope before the harness's aggregate pre-tool decision was known — not that the tool ultimately executed. An arbitrary third-party sibling pre-tool hook can deny the execution after SCE's own `Start` succeeded, an OpenCode tool can fail its own in-tool permission or validation check after `tool.execute.before`, a later Pi extension can still return `block: true` after SCE's own `tool_call` handler succeeded, and none of these harnesses exposes an aggregate-denial signal, so the resulting scope state is indistinguishable from a genuinely running one. -A live confirmation-required scope is therefore **unconfirmed** at every boundary except its own `Close`. Its `Close` is driven by the post-tool signal, which a denied tool never reaches, so that boundary is positive evidence the tool actually executed. One boundary closes at most one scope, so any *other* live confirmation-required scope stays unconfirmed even there. +A live confirmation-required scope is therefore **unconfirmed** at every boundary except its own `Close`. For Codex and OpenCode, `Close` is driven directly by the post-tool signal, and a denied tool never reaches it, so that signal's occurrence is itself positive evidence the tool executed. Pi's terminal event is not equivalent: it fires unconditionally for every tool call, including one Pi's own pre-execution gate blocked or threw on, so its mere occurrence is not execution evidence. Pi's `Close` instead requires a separate, earlier positive execution signal for the same call; only the pairing of that signal with the terminal event confirms the scope. A Pi terminal event reached without that prior signal is not a confirming `Close` — it is evidence the tool never executed, and the scope instead follows the non-executed abandonment path rather than any successful Close. A genuine runtime failure after real execution can still supply the required signal, since failure alone does not mean the tool never ran. One boundary closes at most one scope, so any *other* live confirmation-required scope stays unconfirmed even there. While a worktree has any unconfirmed live confirmation-required scope, the whole transition is `IneligibleUnscoped` — the uncertain scope is not merely dropped from the live set and the remaining scopes attributed, because that would still be a positive attribution claim made under incomplete knowledge. `MutationEvent.activeScopes` still records the complete actual live set; only attribution eligibility changes. @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ The model includes safety properties covering: - two or more live confirmation-required scopes suppressing attribution even at a confirming `Close`; - CAS/replay safety and cursor/evidence consistency. -Deterministic runs cover database-unavailable state preservation, external-taint recovery, abandoned-scope non-reactivation, same-actor and different-actor contention, an unconfirmed Codex or OpenCode scope blocking cross-harness contention, a `Flush` never confirming a Codex or OpenCode scope, a Codex or OpenCode `Close` confirming both exclusive and contended attribution, a second live confirmation-required scope suppressing a confirming `Close` (including a mixed OpenCode + Codex pair), and a terminal Codex scope not suppressing later attribution. +Deterministic runs cover database-unavailable state preservation, external-taint recovery, abandoned-scope non-reactivation, same-actor and different-actor contention, an unconfirmed Codex, OpenCode, or Pi scope blocking cross-harness contention, a `Flush` never confirming a Codex, OpenCode, or Pi scope, a Codex, OpenCode, or Pi `Close` confirming both exclusive and contended attribution, a second live confirmation-required scope suppressing a confirming `Close` (including a mixed OpenCode + Codex pair, and a mixed Pi + Codex pair), and a terminal Codex scope not suppressing later attribution. ## Implementation refinement diff --git a/spec/mutation_cursor.qnt b/spec/mutation_cursor.qnt index a03bd613a..1c19d61f9 100644 --- a/spec/mutation_cursor.qnt +++ b/spec/mutation_cursor.qnt @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ module mutation_cursor { type WorktreeId = WT0 | WT1 type ActorKind = ClaudeCode | Codex | OpenCode | Pi - type ScopeId = Scope0 | Scope1 | Scope2 | Scope3 | Scope4 | Scope5 + type ScopeId = Scope0 | Scope1 | Scope2 | Scope3 | Scope4 | Scope5 | Scope6 type TreeId = Tree0 | Tree1 | Tree2 | Tree3 type EventId = | Event0 @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ module mutation_cursor { | MbtStutter val WORKTREES: Set[WorktreeId] = Set(WT0, WT1) - val SCOPES: Set[ScopeId] = Set(Scope0, Scope1, Scope2, Scope3, Scope4, Scope5) + val SCOPES: Set[ScopeId] = Set(Scope0, Scope1, Scope2, Scope3, Scope4, Scope5, Scope6) val TREES: Set[TreeId] = Set(Tree0, Tree1, Tree2, Tree3) val EVENTS: Set[EventId] = Set( Event0, @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ module mutation_cursor { | Scope3 => WT1 | Scope4 => WT0 | Scope5 => WT0 + | Scope6 => WT0 } pure def scopeActor(scope: ScopeId): ActorKind = @@ -183,6 +184,7 @@ module mutation_cursor { | Scope3 => OpenCode | Scope4 => Codex | Scope5 => OpenCode + | Scope6 => Pi } pure def isLive(status: ScopeStatus): bool = status == Active @@ -265,8 +267,10 @@ module mutation_cursor { Scope3 } else if (scopes.contains(Scope4)) { Scope4 - } else { + } else if (scopes.contains(Scope5)) { Scope5 + } else { + Scope6 } var worktrees: WorktreeId -> WorktreeState @@ -330,8 +334,8 @@ module mutation_cursor { match actor { | Codex => true | OpenCode => true + | Pi => true | ClaudeCode => false - | Pi => false } def scopeRequiresConfirmation(scope: ScopeId): bool = @@ -1398,6 +1402,18 @@ module mutation_cursor { event.attribution == AiContended ) + val HasPiConfirmedExclusiveEvidence = mutationEvents.exists(event => + isClose(event.boundary) and + scopes.get(boundaryScope(event.boundary)).actorKind == Pi and + event.attribution == AiExclusive(boundaryScope(event.boundary)) + ) + + val HasPiConfirmedContendedEvidence = mutationEvents.exists(event => + isClose(event.boundary) and + scopes.get(boundaryScope(event.boundary)).actorKind == Pi and + event.attribution == AiContended + ) + val HasUnconfirmedRequiredScopeSuppressedEvidence = mutationEvents.exists(event => hasUnconfirmedRequiredScope(event.activeScopes, event.boundary) and event.activeScopes.size() >= 1 and @@ -2041,6 +2057,83 @@ module mutation_cursor { ) .expect(Safety) + run testUnconfirmedPiScopeBlocksCrossHarnessAttribution = + init + .then(prepare(Attempt0, Start({ scope: Scope6, event: Event0 }))) + .then(commitAttempt(Attempt0)) + .then(prepare(Attempt1, Start({ scope: Scope0, event: Event1 }))) + .then(commitAttempt(Attempt1)) + .then(mutate(WT0, Tree1)) + .then(prepare(Attempt2, Advance({ scope: Scope0, event: Event2 }))) + .then(commitAttempt(Attempt2)) + .expect(scopes.get(Scope6).status == Active) + .expect( + mutationEvents.exists(event => + event.afterTree == Tree1 and + event.activeScopes == Set(Scope0, Scope6) and + event.attribution == IneligibleUnscoped + ) + ) + .expect(HasUnconfirmedRequiredScopeSuppressedEvidence) + .expect(Safety) + + run testPiCloseConfirmsExclusiveAttribution = + init + .then(prepare(Attempt0, Start({ scope: Scope6, event: Event0 }))) + .then(commitAttempt(Attempt0)) + .then(mutate(WT0, Tree1)) + .then(prepare(Attempt1, Close({ scope: Scope6, event: Event1 }))) + .then(commitAttempt(Attempt1)) + .expect(scopes.get(Scope6).status == Closed) + .expect( + mutationEvents.exists(event => + event.afterTree == Tree1 and + event.activeScopes == Set(Scope6) and + event.attribution == AiExclusive(Scope6) + ) + ) + .expect(HasPiConfirmedExclusiveEvidence) + .expect(Safety) + + run testPiCloseConfirmsContendedAttribution = + init + .then(prepare(Attempt0, Start({ scope: Scope6, event: Event0 }))) + .then(commitAttempt(Attempt0)) + .then(prepare(Attempt1, Start({ scope: Scope0, event: Event1 }))) + .then(commitAttempt(Attempt1)) + .then(mutate(WT0, Tree1)) + .then(prepare(Attempt2, Close({ scope: Scope6, event: Event2 }))) + .then(commitAttempt(Attempt2)) + .expect(scopes.get(Scope0).status == Active) + .expect( + mutationEvents.exists(event => + event.afterTree == Tree1 and + event.activeScopes == Set(Scope0, Scope6) and + event.attribution == AiContended + ) + ) + .expect(HasPiConfirmedContendedEvidence) + .expect(Safety) + + run testPiAndCodexScopesStayMutuallyUnconfirmedAtEitherClose = + init + .then(prepare(Attempt0, Start({ scope: Scope6, event: Event0 }))) + .then(commitAttempt(Attempt0)) + .then(prepare(Attempt1, Start({ scope: Scope2, event: Event1 }))) + .then(commitAttempt(Attempt1)) + .then(mutate(WT0, Tree1)) + .then(prepare(Attempt2, Close({ scope: Scope6, event: Event2 }))) + .then(commitAttempt(Attempt2)) + .expect(scopes.get(Scope2).status == Active) + .expect( + mutationEvents.exists(event => + event.afterTree == Tree1 and + event.activeScopes == Set(Scope2, Scope6) and + event.attribution == IneligibleUnscoped + ) + ) + .expect(Safety) + run testFlushDoesNotConfirmOpenCodeScope = init .then(prepare(Attempt0, Start({ scope: Scope5, event: Event0 })))