diff --git a/.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml b/.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml index b37f868..4f3f6fd 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml @@ -1,137 +1,47 @@ name: Claude Code Review -# Runs on PRs INTO this repo. We use pull_request_target (not pull_request) so -# that PRs from a fork can access CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN — GitHub withholds -# secrets from `pull_request` runs triggered by forks, which is why the plain -# `pull_request` version never worked for fork PRs. +# Thin caller. All logic lives in Postgres-Extensions/ai; read that file for +# the SECURITY rationale behind pull_request_target + the trusted-author gate. +# Everything below is the minimum GitHub requires to live in THIS repo: +# - the trigger (a called workflow cannot declare its own) +# - run-level concurrency (only a workflow-level `concurrency:` can cancel +# the whole caller run outright; `jobs..concurrency` on the caller job +# itself can't, and the per-label cancellation logic below needs exactly +# that) +# - the GITHUB_TOKEN ceiling (a called workflow can only narrow it, never widen) +# Do not add logic here. If this repo needs different behavior, change ai/ so +# every repo gets it. # -# SECURITY: pull_request_target runs in the BASE repo with secrets and a -# write-capable token. The job is gated to PRs from the trusted `jnasbyupgrade` -# fork only — an arbitrary external fork can never trigger this secret-bearing -# job. The workflow file always comes from the base branch (master), so a PR -# cannot modify the reviewer that runs on it. We never check out the fork's PR -# head: GitHub Actions refuses that combination by default (the "pwn request" -# guard — see actions/checkout's allow-unsafe-pr-checkout), and -# anthropics/claude-code-action's own docs (docs/security.md) recommend -# checking out the base ref and letting the action read PR content via the -# GitHub API instead. The code-review prompt passes the PR number; the action -# has a GitHub token and pull-requests read/write, so it fetches the diff -# itself (e.g. `gh pr diff`) without ever writing fork code to disk. +# Pinned to @main, not @v1: this repo is the permanent canary for +# claude-code-review.yml. A change to that file runs here for real before the +# v1 tag protecting every other consuming repo is ever moved to include it. on: pull_request_target: - types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review] + # `labeled` lets adding the claude-debug label start a run on its own, with + # no push needed. Scoped in ai/'s job `if:` so only that label proceeds. + types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review, labeled] concurrency: - group: claude-review-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} + # A non-debug `labeled` event gets its own per-label group so it can never + # cancel an in-progress real review: cancellation resolves when a run is + # admitted, before any `if:` is evaluated, so an `if:` can only no-op itself, + # not un-cancel what it displaced. labeled+claude-debug deliberately keeps the + # plain group -- it is meant to supersede a running review. + # 'claude-debug' is spelled out because `inputs` is not readable here; it must + # match ai/'s debug_label default. + group: claude-review-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}${{ (github.event.action == 'labeled' && github.event.label.name != 'claude-debug') && format('-{0}', github.event.label.name) || '' }} cancel-in-progress: true jobs: claude-review: - # Trusted author only, and skip drafts (don't spend API/CI on unfinished PRs). - # To add more trusted authors, extend the author check. - if: >- - github.event.pull_request.draft == false && - github.event.pull_request.user.login == 'jnasbyupgrade' - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 60 + uses: Postgres-Extensions/ai/.github/workflows/claude-code-review.yml@main permissions: contents: read pull-requests: write # post the review comments checks: read # read sibling check-runs for the cost gate - # write (not just read) needed so claude-code-action's internal - # bun-setup step can save its cache; read-only causes a harmless but - # noisy "Cache reservation failed: cache write denied: token has no - # writable scopes" warning. + # actions: write is the only scope that permits an Actions cache write + # (no narrower one exists). Don't "tighten" this to read. actions: write - steps: - # COST GATE: the paid Claude review is the last thing to run. Wait for the - # PR head's OTHER check-runs to finish and only proceed if they are clean. - # If any sibling check failed we skip the review to avoid spending money - # reviewing a PR that is already known-broken. Uniform across all repos: - # it discovers sibling checks dynamically (no per-repo workflow names). - # - decision=run : all sibling checks completed with a good conclusion, - # OR no sibling checks exist after a short grace window - # (nothing to gate on), OR the poll timed out is treated - # as skip (see below). - # - decision=skip : at least one sibling check failed/cancelled/etc, or - # we timed out waiting for still-pending checks. - # We exclude this workflow's own check-run (job name `claude-review`) so the - # gate never waits on or fails because of itself. - - name: Wait for CI; skip the paid review if any check failed - id: gate - env: - GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - REPO: ${{ github.repository }} - SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} - run: | - decision=skip - for i in $(seq 1 72); do # ~24 min max - json=$(gh api "repos/$REPO/commits/$SHA/check-runs" --paginate \ - --jq '[.check_runs[] | select(.name != "claude-review")]' 2>/dev/null) || json='' - [ -z "$json" ] && { sleep 20; continue; } - total=$(jq 'length' <<<"$json") - if [ "$total" -eq 0 ]; then - [ "$i" -ge 9 ] && { decision=run; break; } # ~3 min grace: nothing to gate on - sleep 20; continue - fi - pending=$(jq '[.[]|select(.status!="completed")]|length' <<<"$json") - if [ "$pending" -eq 0 ]; then - bad=$(jq '[.[]|select((.conclusion//"")|test("^(failure|cancelled|timed_out|action_required|stale)$"))]|length' <<<"$json") - [ "$bad" -eq 0 ] && decision=run || decision=skip - break - fi - sleep 20 - done - echo "decision=$decision" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" - echo "gate decision: $decision" - - - name: Check out base branch - if: steps.gate.outputs.decision == 'run' - # Intentionally tracks the major-version tag (not a pinned SHA) so - # upstream fixes are picked up automatically. - # - # No `repository:`/`ref:` here on purpose — this checks out the base - # branch (master), never the fork's PR head. See the SECURITY note - # above. - uses: actions/checkout@v7 - with: - fetch-depth: 1 - persist-credentials: false - - - name: Run Claude Code Review - if: steps.gate.outputs.decision == 'run' - # Pinned to an immutable SHA: this job runs as pull_request_target with - # pull-requests: write, so a moved upstream tag must not change what - # runs -- same rationale as github-script's pin in pgxntool's - # ci.yml/protect-label.yml. - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@a874e9ecd7bb36efdad65429c6b35815f5a08f10 # v1 - with: - claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }} - # Provide github_token so the action uses it directly for GitHub API - # calls instead of the OIDC->GitHub-App-token exchange, which 401s under - # pull_request_target. GITHUB_TOKEN is repo/workflow-scoped (independent - # of the actor's role) and has pull-requests: write here. - github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} - # NOTE: plugin_marketplaces can't be pinned — it tracks the - # marketplace repo's default branch (upstream anthropics/claude-code). - plugin_marketplaces: 'https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code.git' - plugins: 'code-review@claude-code-plugins' - # --comment is required: without it, the code-review plugin only - # prints its findings to the job log and never posts anything to - # the PR (confirmed by capturing the hidden SDK transcript on a - # canary PR: the review correctly found an injected bug but ended - # with "No `--comment` argument was provided, so no GitHub - # comments were posted"). Every review run before this fix has - # been silently invisible on GitHub. - prompt: '/code-review:code-review ${{ github.repository }}/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} --comment' - # A direct `prompt:` (no @claude mention) runs the action in "agent - # mode". In that mode, claude-code-action only installs the - # github_inline_comment MCP server if it sees - # mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment listed in an - # --allowedTools flag inside claude_args (src/modes/agent/parse-tools.ts) -- - # it does NOT look at the code-review plugin's own `allowed-tools` - # frontmatter to decide that. Without this, the MCP server never - # starts, the tool genuinely doesn't exist in the session, and the - # plugin silently falls back to one consolidated PR comment instead - # of real inline line comments. - claude_args: '--allowedTools mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment' + secrets: inherit + with: + trusted_authors: jnasbyupgrade